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Semantic Primes and Universal Grammar

Empirical evidence
from the Romance languages

Edited by
Bert Peeters

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Semantic Primes and Universal Grammar

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Volume 81

Semantic Primes and Universal Grammar:
Empirical evidence from the Romance languages
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Semantic Primes and Universal Grammar

Empirical evidence from the Romance languages

Edited by

Bert Peeters

University of Tasmania

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List of abbreviations

1	first person	LOC	locative
2	second person	MASC	masculine
3	third person	NEG	negative marker
ACC	accusative	NOML	nominalizer
ART	article	OBL	oblique pronominal
AUX	auxiliary	PART	partitive
CLIT	clitic	PAST	past
COMP	complementizer	PCOMP	passé composé
COND	conditional	PL	plural
DIM	diminutive	PPART	past participle
ERG	ergative	PPROS	passato prossimo
FEM	feminine	PREP	preposition
FUT	future	PRES	present
GER	gerund	PRET	preterite
GIV	given, presupposed or thematic information	REFL	reflexive
IMPF	imperfect	REL	relative pronoun
INF	infinitive	SPEC	specific
LIG	ligature	SG	singular
		SJV	subjunctive

Typographical conventions and symbols

- *Italics* are used for citing linguistic forms (words, sentences, or phrases) in any language, including English, and also for emphasis and in bibliographic references.
- ‘Single inverted commas’ are used for glosses, translations, definitions, and for citing components of semantic explications.
- “Double inverted commas” are used (a) for quotations, and (b) to draw attention to a term, either because it is new or because there is something suspect or figurative about it.
- SMALL CAPS are used (a) for proposed semantic primes, and (b) for grammatical morphemes in interlinear glosses.

Preface

Anna Wierzbicka

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Twelve years after *Semantic and Lexical Universals* (Goddard & Wierzbicka 1994), ten years after *Semantics: Primes and Universals* (Wierzbicka 1996), and four years after *Meaning and Universal Grammar* (Goddard & Wierzbicka 2002), *Semantic Primes and Universal Grammar* (this volume) brings us another step closer to the realization of the aims of a research program which started more than thirty years ago, with the publication of *Semantic Primitives* (Wierzbicka 1972). Unlike its predecessors, though, it focuses on a group of typologically closely related languages, viz. the most important languages in the Romance group (French, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian). This is a first in the history of what is now known as the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) approach, and more will be said about it later. To begin with, let us briefly recall the approach's main tenets and achievements, without getting lost in technicalities (these will be addressed in Chapter 1).

The NSM semantic theory developed over the last three and a half decades on the basis of a large number of cross-linguistic investigations has made it possible to make a distinction between genuine lexical and grammatical universals, on the one hand, and spurious ones, on the other hand, and also to establish, on an empirical basis, that some universals are indeed genuine. Results to date strongly support the original hypothesis that all languages share a universal core, both in their lexicon and in their grammar; a core which constitutes the bedrock of human understanding, communication, and translation. This shared core is like a mini-language, which can be used as a culturally neutral semantic metalanguage for the description of all languages, for the study of the cultural diversity as well as the psychological unity of humankind, and also for applied purposes, in education and cross-cultural communication. Let us look at each of these claims in turn.

Compilers of bilingual dictionaries know only too well that words from different languages usually do not match in meaning. For example, there are many English words which have no semantic equivalents in French, and vice versa. If this is the case for any *two* languages, the idea that, polysemy apart, some words could

be found which have exact semantic equivalents in *all* languages may seem completely fantastic. Yet, this is precisely what emerges from extensive empirical study, over more than three decades, of a number of diverse languages: viz., that words (or word-like elements) which have exact semantic equivalents in all languages (at least those that have now been studied from this point of view) do exist. A list of such words or word-like elements with exact semantic equivalents in all languages – so-called “semantic (or conceptual) primes” – has been drawn up, largely by trial and error, and continues to be tested against further languages. As pointed out before, the present volume is one more step in that direction.

In its current form, the list of primes includes some sixty-five elements, which can be organized in a table in some sense analogous to Mendeleev’s table of elements in chemistry (cf. D’Andrade 2001; Goddard in press). It is not claimed that this list – divided into broad thematic groups – is absolutely final but it is probably pretty close to final. While it has undergone many revisions in the past, these revisions were not random but rather can be seen as successive approximations to the goal – a goal which does not recede further and further as one seeks to approach it but rather comes more and more clearly into view. The elements in the list constitute the conceptual building blocks out of which all complex human ideas are constructed. Different cultures can produce different meaning systems, with different configurations of the same elementary building blocks; but the building blocks themselves are, in all cases, given to begin with. In the language of seventeenth-century philosophers like Descartes and Leibniz, these building blocks – or “simple ideas” – are “innate”, and in the language of modern science they are “hard-wired” and constitute part of the human genetic endowment. The “innateness” or “hard-wiredness” of the matching human concepts is of course only a hypothesis. But the universality of the elements themselves, emerging from empirical cross-linguistic investigations, gives this hypothesis a great deal of support.

In the NSM framework, meaning and grammar are seen as inseparable. For the sake of brevity and convenience, the sixty-odd semantic primes can be described as lexical, but in fact their true nature is lexico-grammatical. In every language, each element has its own lexical (phonological) embodiment (and, in many cases, several such embodiments, i.e. lexical variants or “allolexes”); and at the same time, each element has its own set of grammatical (combinatorial) properties. The actual configurations lexically, phraseologically or grammatically encoded in different languages are language-specific, but the rules of combination are the same in all languages, and it is possible to enumerate, for each prime, all its combinatorial possibilities. Thus, each conceptual prime has its own conceptual grammar, and this grammar is as universal as the prime itself. For instance, in all languages the prime I can be combined with the prime CAN, the prime CAN with the prime NOT, and the prime MOVE with the prime CAN and with the prime SOMETHING,

to form sentences such as ‘I can’t move’ and ‘this thing is moving’. The combined grammatical properties of all the primes constitute a genuine universal grammar: the primes themselves, together with their combinatorial properties, form a system in which – in Saussure’s famous phrase (unless it was Meillet’s; cf. Peeters 1990) – “tout se tient” (everything hangs together). This system constitutes the indivisible conceptual core of all human languages. The proposed model of universal grammar, i.e. the inherent syntactic properties of all universal semantic primes, is described in detail in Goddard & Wierzbicka (2002). It is a return to the time-honored tradition of universal grammar, in which the fundamentals of grammar were seen as arising from fundamentals of human thought, shared by all people and by all languages, a view largely overshadowed in the Chomskyan era by the Chomskyan structure-based conception of universal grammar, in which meaning played no real part. There is however one important difference between traditional universal grammar and the universal grammar of the NSM approach, viz. detailed and rigorous analysis of natural languages. After more than thirty years of semantic research inaugurated in the early nineteen seventies with the publication of Wierzbicka (1972), revitalised by Cliff Goddard’s ideas in the nineteen eighties (cf. e.g. Goddard 1989), and in the last two decades vigorously pursued in numerous publications by a growing number of scholars, it has become possible to articulate a detailed and concrete account of exactly what the unity of all grammars consists in; that is, to delineate where the line runs between what is constant and what is variable, what is essential and what is “accidental”, what is universal and what is language-specific.

Having a set of universal primes, lexically embodied in every language, as well as a universal grammar governing the combination of these primes, is tantamount to having a universal mini-language, or rather a set of universal mini-languages which are matching and fully intertranslatable. Each of these languages constitutes a “natural semantic metalanguage” or an “NSM”, suitable for explaining all complex meanings within a particular language to speakers of that language, and also effective as a bridge to the meanings expressed by people in other languages and other cultures. These mini-languages can be called the English NSM, the French NSM, the Malay NSM, and so on, provided we bear in mind that they are isomorphic and constitute, in effect, different variants of one language-independent conceptual system – the universal human “lingua mentalis” (cf. Wierzbicka 1980). The English list of primes is a convenient medium for talking about genuine lexical universals and their universal combinatorial properties at international fora, but it is only a matter of convenience. The whole point is that equivalent lists can be drawn for all other languages, and that so-called canonical sentences (cf. Goddard & Peeters this volume) for testing their translational equivalence can be readily constructed in any language whatsoever.

This, then, is what is meant by empirical substantive universals – elements like SOMEONE and SOMETHING, GOOD and BAD, which can be transferred into any language whatsoever, and not just as isolated elements but within the context of particular sentences. If these sentences respect the combinatorial properties of the primes, then they can match exactly in meaning across all languages and be used in semantic explications constructed in any NSM. An explication formulated in English does not depend on the English lexicon or on English grammar, but can be readily transferred into any other language. Here is an example – a (simplified) explication of the German emotion term *Schadenfreude*, couched in universal human concepts and universal syntax, in an English, a French and a German version:

X felt *Schadenfreude* =

- (a) X thought like this about someone else:
- (b) « some good things happened to this person before
- (c) this person felt something good because of this
- (d) this person thought: this is good
- (e) now something bad happened to this person
- (f) this person feels something bad because of this
- (g) I think: this is good »
- (h) when X thought like this X felt something good because of this

X a ressenti de la *schadenfreude* =

- (a) X a pensé comme ça de quelqu'un d'autre :
- (b) « il y a des choses bien qui sont arrivées à cette personne avant
- (c) cette personne a senti quelque chose de bien à cause de cela
- (d) cette personne a pensé : cela est bien
- (e) maintenant, quelque chose de mal est arrivé à cette personne
- (f) cette personne sent quelque chose de mal à cause de cela
- (g) je pense : cela est bien »
- (h) quand X a pensé comme ça, X a senti quelque chose de bien à cause de cela

X fühlte *Schadenfreude* =

- (a) X dachte so über jemand anders:
- (b) « vorher sind dieser Person manche gute Dinge passiert
- (c) diese Person fühlte deswegen etwas Gutes
- (d) diese Person dachte: das ist gut
- (e) jetzt ist dieser Person etwas Schlechtes passiert
- (f) diese Person fühlt deswegen etwas Schlechtes
- (g) ich denke: das ist gut »
- (h) als X so dachte fühlte X deswegen etwas Gutes

Thanks to the English and the French explications, we can actually explain the meaning of the word *Schadenfreude* to speakers of English and French. Moreover, since these explications can be transferred directly into any other NSM, we can similarly explain the meaning of this word to speakers of any other language. The German version can be seen as reflecting what speakers of German mean by the word *Schadenfreude*; and the proposed explication can be tested against native speakers' intuitions. Such matching explications, linking the speaker's meaning with the understanding of an outsider (coming from any language background whatsoever), are possible only because words like I, SOMEONE, SOMETHING, THINK, FEEL, GOOD and BAD (in the relevant meaning) have their counterparts in all other languages and because syntactic combinations like 'think something', 'feel something good / bad' or 'someone else' are universally available.

From this point of view, semantic formulae expressed in NSM radically differ from other systems of semantic representation. Usually, those other systems are "bilateral": they link linguistic expressions with some semantic representations and they do not refer to what these expressions can possibly mean to either the speaker or the hearer. By contrast, explications written in NSM are, as it were, not "bilateral" but "quadrilateral": they are meant not only to link linguistic expressions with their semantic representations, but also to explain what a *speaker* can mean by a given expression, and how a *hearer* can interpret it. In other words, they link four elements, not two: a hypothetical speaker, a linguistic expression, a semantic representation, and a potential hearer. This is what the word *natural* in the name of the metalanguage underscores: although the metalanguage is a formal system, not a natural language in the sense in which English, French or Malay is, it is a metalanguage carved *out of* a natural language (*any* natural language, e.g. English, French or Malay) and therefore intelligible *through* a natural language (*any* natural language, e.g. English, French or Malay).

Being sufficiently close to natural language to be inherently intelligible through real natural languages, like ordinary English or ordinary French, to speakers of those languages, NSM can be used for human communication, language teaching, dictionary-making, and a host of other applied purposes. It can be used for explaining to people what words, expressions, and indeed whole texts mean; and it can be used for explaining ideas, and whole systems of ideas, including aspects of law, religion, politics, and so on. NSM is useful, not only for academic purposes (in particular, for linguists talking to, and writing for, other linguists), but also for human communication outside academia. No other theoretical framework in semantics has similarly aimed at full translatability of research findings across languages: they all thrive on highly language-specific, mostly English terms and appear to see no problem with such a terminological and conceptual Anglo-centrism. This volume is predicated on the assumption that it is time for change.

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Scope and contents of this volume

Bert Peeters

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Recent times have seen determined and largely successful attempts at describing the isomorphic NSMs or natural semantic metalanguages (cf. Wierzbicka this volume; Goddard & Peeters this volume) of a number of typologically different languages spoken all over the world. The five chapters in Part I (i.e. Chapters 2 to 6) report on a similar effort focused on French, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian. Chapter 1, on the other hand, is a more detailed overview of the NSM approach than has been offered in the preface. In the present volume, and for the first time in the history of the NSM approach, four closely related versions of the metalanguage are presented side by side, and it is shown that, in spite of the similarities between them, there are at the same time some interesting differences. Where the four versions differ, French and Italian, more often than not, go one way and Spanish and Portuguese another one – a fact which is not surprising for anyone who is familiar with the historical circumstances in which each of the Romance languages developed out of a common ancestor (Latin). Nor is it surprising that at least some of the findings presented here invite us to have a fresh look at what has already been achieved, and to amend some of our working hypotheses accordingly.

Earlier descriptions for French (cf. Peeters 1994 and 1997) have been updated. Many of the existing proposals were in urgent need of revision, and nothing had been put forward for many of the most recently added primes, apart from a possible exponent. Justification and exemplification were required, a task greatly facilitated thanks to the input of Marie-Odile Junker. Similarly, work on Spanish (Travis 2002) was brought up to date. The Portuguese NSM was constructed by Patrick Farrell and Pedro Perini-Santos. Brigid Maher provided the Italian version, after doing the groundwork in her unpublished Honors thesis. In all cases, utmost attention was paid to the observance of the latest findings in NSM syntax. Various canonical contexts were used to describe the irreducible semantic core of each of the four main Romance languages, complete with its universal combinatorial properties. In the process of identifying and describing the local exponents

of the universal semantic primes, the essential morphosyntactic characteristics of each language were described, and their general typological profile was established. This, together with the conscious decision not to have one chapter for each language (which would have resulted in a lot of potentially tedious repetition), but to “divide” the NSM in five roughly identically sized areas covered in separate chapters, with reference to all the languages under examination, explains why, in this volume, there are no general typological overviews of the sort found at the outset of each of the language chapters in Goddard & Wierzbicka (1994, 2002). The five roughly identically sized areas of NSM are as follows:

- Substantives; determiners; quantifiers (Chapter 2)
- Evaluators and descriptors; mental predicates (Chapter 3)
- Speech; actions, events and movement; existence and possession; life and death (Chapter 4)
- Time and space (Chapter 5)
- Logical concepts; intensifier and augmentor; taxonomy and partonomy; similarity (Chapter 6)

The six chapters in Part II, on the other hand, offer a number of case studies. Short summaries for each appear below, and are followed by some general background information on “key words” (the focus of Chapters 7 to 9; cf. Wierzbicka 1997) and on “ethnopragmatics” (the focus of Chapters 10 to 12; cf. Goddard 2006).

Brigid Maher formulates clear and precise NSM paraphrases for the different meanings of the Italian key word *sfogarsi* which, in its most common use (roughly, ‘to vent one’s negative feelings’), refers to a way of releasing emotions that might otherwise build up inside a person in a dangerous way (Chapter 7). Two so-called “cultural scripts” are proposed to describe some of the Italian folk theories (cultural norms and values) relevant to the expression of emotions.

Patrick Farrell uses NSM to underscore the culture-specificity and explicate the meaning of the Portuguese key word *saudade*, which refers to an emotion associated with absence and longing (Chapter 8). Comparisons are made with related concepts in Portuguese and, to a lesser extent, in English. Farrell’s approach to *saudade* differs from that of most previous studies not only in its use of NSM but also in its heavy reliance on distributional evidence and colloquial corpora.

Deborah DuBartell’s study is as much synchronic as diachronic in nature. Demonstrating how the Spanish key word *crisis* developed over time, it represents a preliminary investigation into one of a number of ways in which NSM methodology could be applied in historical linguistics (Chapter 9). The author uses the process of formulating semantic explications as the foundation of a so-called “configuration method” aimed at offering insight into the semantic aspects of word development.

Monique Burston looks at the meaning and use of the French discourse marker *certes* in sequences involving an assertive-concessive adverb *certes* (equivalent to English *certainly*, *admittedly*, *granted*, *of course* etc.) followed by an apodosis starting with *mais* ('but') or an equivalent adversative expression (Chapter 10). An NSM explication is proposed which shows that *certes* is at the heart of a "diaphonic" situation: a duality of voices can be heard in the text, of which the second reinterprets, reformulates and integrates the first.

Mónica Aznárez Mauleón and Ramón González Ruiz focus on "sincerity" in Spanish discourse (Chapter 11), paying special attention to clausal adverbs such as *sinceramente* 'sincerely', *honestamente* 'honestly', *francamente* 'frankly', and to phrases with the speech verbs *hablar* 'speak' and *decir* 'say' (e.g. *hablar / decir con sinceridad, francamente, con el corazón en la mano* 'speak / say [something] with sincerity, frankly, with your heart in your hand'). Their study involves an analysis, using NSM, of the concepts of *sinceridad* 'sincerity', *franqueza* 'frankness' and *honestidad* 'honesty', and of their pragmatic and discursive functions.

Finally, Angela Bartens and Niclas Sandström describe the variable uses of Spanish and Italian diminutives within an NSM framework (Chapter 12). In both languages, diminutives are able to express a number of diverse emotional nuances ranging from the positive and the "affectionate" to the negative and the pejorative. Different dialects of Spanish are checked to gain a better insight into areal variation.

As mentioned before, rather than to appear in random order, the chapters in Part II are grouped according to focus. Specific "key words" (Italian *sfogarsi*, Portuguese *saudades*, Spanish *crisis*) are investigated in Chapters 7 to 9. They are words that are "more culturally laden" than others, words that assume, as it were, "more than their share of cultural work" (Jay 1998:4), that are "particularly important and revealing in a given culture" (Wierzbicka 1997: 15–16). As the very name suggests, a key word is supposed to provide a key. Some, like the term *tall poppy* in Australian English, are directly linked to a cultural value, such as (Australian) egalitarianism (Peeters 2004); many others, such as the word *weekend*, are more muted, but nonetheless enlightening, signposts (Peeters 2006). There is no such thing as an objective strategy resulting in the identification of all the key words of a language; the number of key words in any given language is not predetermined either. Nonetheless, some useful indicators do exist. First up is frequency of use, against the entire lexicon or within particular semantic areas. It appears to be intuitively correct to say that key words are relatively common words; far from contributing to its salience, a peripheral status is more likely to keep a word out of the limelight. Occurrence in idiomatic expressions is another indication: key words are often at the heart of a significant array of set phrases. Besides, they are likely to occur with some degree of regularity in the proverbs of a language, in its aphorisms, in song lyrics, book titles, and so on. Other potential indications

of key word status include observations by social and other commentators, listing in regional dictionaries, direct borrowing (without translation) into another language, etc.

Key word studies aimed at the discovery of cultural values typical of the culture in which the key words occur are studies in “cultural semantics”. The latter term refers to one of three possible pathways in an NSM-inspired study of cross-cultural communication (Peeters 2002, 2003, 2004), together with the terms “cultural pragmatics” and “cultural axiology” – or, if the approach is contrastive or comparative, cross-cultural (or intercultural) pragmatics and cross-cultural (or intercultural) axiology. A short while ago, Peeters (2004:73) proposed definitions along the following lines:

- Intercultural (or cross-cultural) semantics is the contrastive or comparative study of putative cultural key words; its aim is to reach a better understanding of known cultural values, to detect new (i.e. previously undetected) cultural values, and/or to discover and explicate affiliated communicative norms. In the absence of a contrastive or a comparative focus, this approach may be referred to as cultural semantics.
- Intercultural (or cross-cultural) axiology is the contrastive or comparative study of hypothetical cultural values; its aim is to substantiate them through the identification of relevant communicative norms underpinned by them and of any lexical evidence which, as a result, would deserve the status of key words. In the absence of a contrastive or a comparative focus, this approach may be referred to as cultural axiology.
- Intercultural (or cross-cultural) pragmatics is the contrastive or comparative study of communicative norms; its aim is to reach a better understanding of the cultural values that underpin them, to detect new (i.e. previously undetected) cultural values, and/or to find supporting key words. In the absence of a contrastive or a comparative focus, this approach may be referred to as cultural pragmatics.

Instead of the terms *cultural* and *intercultural* (or *cross-cultural*) *pragmatics*, NSM researchers have also used the term *ethnopragmatics*. Ethnopragmatic issues (the use of the French discourse marker *certes*, Spanish discourse strategies aimed at expressing “sincerity”, and the functions of Spanish and Italian diminutives) are the focus of Chapters 10 to 12. As an umbrella term, *ethnopragmatics* may well be preferable, even though existing definitions (e.g. Goddard 2002, 2004, 2006) refer to just one of the aims of cultural and intercultural or cross-cultural pragmatics. According to the existing definitions, the aim of ethnopragmatics is to identify, describe and explain culturally preferred discourse practices from the viewpoint of the speakers themselves (this is what distinguishes ethnopragmatics from what is commonly known as “contrastive pragmatics”) – rather than with reference to

any presumed pragmatic universals. Hitherto, ethnopragmatics has taken cultural values as a starting point, not an end point in the study of speech patterns and discourse practices (i.e. communicative norms): it has *relied* on local systems of categorization, local understandings and assumptions about “how people tick”, local cultural values, and has not sought to detect *new* (i.e. previously undetected) cultural values. Future definitions may well be broadened accordingly – and if this were the case, cultural semantics could, by analogy, be called “ethnosemantics”.

Each chapter in Part II translates the semantic explications that are provided in English into at least one of the Romance versions of the metalanguage, as described in Chapters 2 to 6. Some authors offer wholly equivalent explications in *more* than one Romance language. The single most important aim shared by all contributors to Part II is to show that research findings couched in NSM are fully translatable between languages, without any risk of undue coloring resulting from the use of terms and concepts which are foreign to the topic of study and forced upon it. It is an aim consistent with that of many others who have engaged in the world-wide search for the isomorphic semantic cores of all languages and for the universal syntactic principles by which the building blocks in these cores can be combined into full-fledged semantic explications.

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The Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) approach

An overview with reference to the most
important Romance languages

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1.1 Basic principles

For some thirty-odd years now, Anna Wierzbicka has been a very prolific, insightful, and inspiring scholar in the field of linguistic semantics. For about twenty of them, she has arguably been among the *most* prolific, insightful and inspiring scholars in her field. Her books and articles encompass areas as diverse and diversified as lexical semantics, grammatical semantics and pragmatics (not to mention bible exegesis; cf. Wierzbicka 2001). At the theoretical level, she is widely known for the twofold claim that the same limited set of universal semantic primes can be identified in all the languages of the world, where they exist as meanings of specific morphemes, words or phrases; and that this universal set of primes makes up the lexicon of a Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) governed by an equally universal set of combinatorial properties. Following in the footsteps of – but at the same time going well beyond – Descartes, Pascal, Arnauld and, above all, Leibniz, Wierzbicka views her primes as semantically simple concepts which, duly combined, give rise to articulate thought. To describe her set of semantic primes, she often uses Leibniz’s image of an “alphabet of human thoughts”.¹

Overall, it can be said that while, in recent years, Wierzbicka’s approach to semantic description – which is to use NSM as a tool to explain or explicate anything in any language that is semantically complex – has undergone considerable modification, its four basic principles have remained constant since the publication of *Semantic Primitives* (Wierzbicka 1972) more than three decades ago.

- The *first basic principle* of what is now known as the NSM approach is that semantic analysis *can* and *must* be conducted through paraphrase in natural, i.e. ordinary, language. Logical formalisms, technical neologisms and especially so-called “expert terms” are of little use to conduct proper semantic analysis because their meanings are not clear until and unless they are explained in simple, ordinary language. This is a point which, in spite of repeated statements issued by Wierzbicka as well as by her affiliates, continues to be misunderstood by many.²
- The *second basic principle* is that complex meanings, which have come to include grammatical patterns and culture-specific communicative behavior, *can* and *must* be decomposed, without circularity and without residue, into combinations of discrete other meanings known as “explications” and, in the case of shared understandings about conventional pragmatic behavior within a given society, as “cultural scripts”. It follows that there has to be a finite set of indefinable meanings which are the terminal elements of semantic analysis, viz. the so-called “semantic primes” (formerly referred to as “semantic primitives”).³
- The *third basic principle* is that the semantic cores of all human languages coincide: the minimal representational systems of indefinable lexical elements which, for semantic description to be entirely successful, *can* and *must* be “carved out” from any and all languages are fundamentally isomorphic. There is not one indefinable element in the semantic core of one human language which is not at the same time an equally indefinable element in the semantic core of all others.⁴
- The *fourth and final basic principle* is that the minimal representational system which can be “carved out” of any language is not merely a mini-*lexicon* but a full-fledged mini-*language*, i.e. a natural language in miniature created for human beings to understand one another. To reflect the fact that the semantic primes which comprise the vocabulary of the system have a universal combinatorial syntax which *can* and *must* be specified, the term *Natural Semantic Metalanguage* has been adopted, and it has become relatively common, in NSM circles, to speak of a single such metalanguage with *numerous versions*, one in each of the world’s languages. In the present volume, the Romance versions of the metalanguage will be referred to as the French NSM, the Spanish NSM, the Portuguese NSM and the Italian NSM.

As mentioned before, the four basic principles have remained constant, even though it was not until the mid-1980s that the latter two came increasingly to the fore, as colleagues and graduate students of Wierzbicka’s, many of whom were engaged in field-work on non-European languages, wrestled with the translatability of some of the proposed semantic primes and explications of that time. For

Wierzbicka, any serious challenge to the translatability of her system was – and is – a matter of utmost gravity. For although it is derived mainly from deep semantic investigations into European languages, hers is a hypothesis about the fundamental nature of human language and cognition, a hypothesis which, for instance, in the late 1990s, led to the inclusion of a counterfactual prime IF ... WOULD, abandoned again shortly after, primarily because it could be explicated after all, and also because it was found lacking in some languages (cf. Chapter 6, Section 6.1.5, as well as Goddard 2002a: 303–306).⁵

Wierzbicka's huge output of empirical semantic studies can be seen as an attempt to establish, test, and refine a viable set of semantic primes, the “indefinable words” of ordinary natural language, the words one would be left with after an exhaustive reductive paraphrase analysis of the entire lexicon, not just of one language, but of any language. Though much remains to be done, the Natural Semantic Metalanguage or NSM is the most comprehensive and empirically-based system of semantic analysis in modern linguistics. The current inventory numbers some sixty-five elements. The claim is that using this tiny lexicon one can frame reductive paraphrase explications for all the lexical items in any language, as well as for all language-specific grammatical constructions (be they grammatical or idiomatic) and all language-specific cultural scripts.⁶

The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 1.2 maps the growth of the NSM lexicon over the years. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 provide an account of the main analytical concepts – allolexy, portmanteaus and (non-compositional) polysemy – which, over the years, have emerged from the NSM enterprise, and notably from the pursuit of universality. Sections 1.5 and 1.6 report on developments in NSM syntax, including the idea that primes may have a number of “valency options”.⁷ Section 1.7 contains a few concluding remarks.

1.2 The growth of the NSM lexicon

The original set of primes (Wierzbicka 1972), itself the result of seven years of intensive research and hundreds of test definitions, numbered a mere 14 elements. It was expanded to 15 in 1980, when in addition several other elements were mentioned as possible candidates for future inclusion. The list of semantic primes remained in this relatively austere state until the late 1980s when, with the publication of the “Expanding Set” paper (Wierzbicka 1989), the initial expansion began. In the “Expanding Set” article, part of a *Quaderni di Semantica* “Roundtable” on semantic primes organized three years earlier at the University of Adelaide, by Cliff Goddard and David Wilkins, Wierzbicka revised earlier analyses of time, place, knowledge, causality, evaluation, and action. To some extent she had been provoked by Goddard's (1989) contribution to the same roundtable, but it is apparent

from the scope of her article that the ideas expressed in it were the fruit of years of thought, semantic seminars, and debates with absent colleagues, especially Andrzej Bogusławski. To replace the earlier, rather counter-intuitive, analysis of time in terms of ‘worlds becoming worlds’, Wierzbicka introduced a stative prime *WHEN* and a relational prime *AFTER*, to provide for temporal sequence. To replace earlier explications of place in terms of ‘parts of the world’, she adopted the spatial prime *WHERE* (OR BE SOMEWHERE). Rejecting earlier analyses of *X knows this* as ‘X can say this’ and of *A because B* as ‘if not B, then not A’, she also admitted *KNOW* and *BECAUSE*. Earlier attempts to explicate *GOOD* and *BAD* (in terms of wanting) and *DO* (in terms of happening and wanting) were abandoned. Other new additions were the quantificational elements *TWO* and *ALL*, the concepts of similarity and identity (*LIKE* and *THE SAME*), and the intensifier *VERY*. All of the above remain part of the metalanguage as it stands today, although it is proposed in the present volume to formulate the identity prime as *SAME* rather than *THE SAME* (cf. Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2).

Over the next few years, more primes were proposed (cf. Wierzbicka 1992a), until, by 1993, the list had stabilized at almost triple the size of the original inventory. 1993 was also the year that saw the first concerted effort to familiarize linguists in the French-speaking world with Wierzbicka’s work: Peeters (1993) includes, among other things, two papers by Wierzbicka compiled by the editor on the basis of earlier publications in English (Wierzbicka 1992a, b; 1993a, b). To the best of our knowledge, no similar efforts have been made for any of the other Romance languages. A year later, it was the 1993 set of 37 primes whose cross-linguistic viability was tested – and on the whole upheld – in the *Semantic and Lexical Universals (SLU)* project (Goddard & Wierzbicka 1994a). The *SLU* list of semantic primes (cf. Goddard 1994:22) is reproduced below:

Substantives:	I, YOU, SOMEONE, SOMETHING, PEOPLE
Mental predicates:	THINK, SAY, KNOW, FEEL, WANT
Determiners/quantifiers:	THIS, THE SAME, OTHER, ONE, TWO, MANY, ALL
Actions/events:	DO, HAPPEN
Meta-predicates:	NO, IF, CAN, LIKE, BECAUSE, VERY
Time/place:	WHEN, WHERE, AFTER, BEFORE, UNDER, ABOVE
Partonomy/taxonomy:	HAVE PARTS, KIND OF
Evaluators, descriptors:	GOOD, BAD, BIG, SMALL

The publication of the *SLU* volume was a watershed in the development of the NSM framework. For the first time, a strictly comparable set of studies established that it was possible to find clear exponents for almost the entire set of semantic primes in a sample of typologically and genetically diverse languages. In alphabetical order, the languages involved were Acehnese, Arrernte, Ewe, French (the only European language), Japanese, Kalam, Kayardild, Longgu, Mandarin Chinese,

Mangaaba-Mbula, Misumalpan (three languages), Samoan, Thai and Yankunytjatjara. The next exploration (Goddard 1997a) was focused specifically on the combinatorial properties of semantic primes in selected areas. Topics included the grammar of mental predicates in Hawaii Creole English and in Japanese, the grammar of spatial relations in Longgu, the grammar of time and space in French and in Cantonese, and the status of conditionals and counterfactuals in Japanese. Finally, a similar but much more ambitious enterprise led to the publication, in 2002, of the two *Meaning and Universal Grammar (MUG)* volumes (Goddard & Wierzbicka 2002a). Two of the languages of the *SLU* project, viz. Chinese and Mangaaba-Mbula, were subjected to further scrutiny. Another four were added, viz., in alphabetical order, Lao, Malay, Polish and Spanish. There were now 59 proposed primes, six more than in *Semantics: Primes and Universals* (Wierzbicka 1996), where the number of proposed semantic primes had reached 53. Of these, several were already under investigation (as is often the case during periods of rapid theoretical development) by the time the *SLU* volume appeared in print. The *MUG* list (cf. Goddard 2002b: 14) is as follows:

Substantives:	I, YOU, SOMEONE, PEOPLE, SOMETHING, BODY
Determiners:	THIS, THE SAME, OTHER
Quantifiers:	ONE, TWO, SOME, ALL, MUCH / MANY
Evaluators:	GOOD, BAD
Descriptors:	BIG, SMALL
Mental predicates:	THINK, KNOW, WANT, FEEL, SEE, HEAR
Speech:	SAY, WORDS, TRUE
Actions, events, movement:	DO, HAPPEN, MOVE
Existence and possession:	THERE IS, HAVE
Life and death:	LIVE, DIE
Time:	WHEN, NOW, BEFORE, AFTER, A LONG TIME, A SHORT TIME, FOR SOME TIME
Space:	WHERE, HERE, ABOVE, BELOW, FAR, NEAR, SIDE, INSIDE
Logical concepts:	NOT, MAYBE, CAN, BECAUSE, IF
Intensifier, augmentor:	VERY, MORE
Taxonomy, partonomy:	KIND OF, PART OF
Similarity:	LIKE

The increased reliance on morphologically (though not semantically) transparent phrasemes, even in the English version of the NSM, is noteworthy. Bound morphemes and phrasemes had already been admitted, besides words, as appropriate exponents of the semantic primes in the languages surveyed in the *SLU* project, provided they expressed the requisite meaning and had the requisite combinatorial properties – which, incidentally, was not taken as a requirement for exponents

of the same prime in different languages to belong to the same part of speech. For example, the exponent of KNOW, a *verb* in English and in many other languages (including those of the Romance group), was shown to be an *adjective* in Yankunytjatjara; the exponent of TWO, an *adjective* in English and in many other languages (including those of the Romance group), was shown to be a *verb* in Samoan.

Let us briefly compare the two lists, to get a better idea of the progress which has been made.

BODY was suggested for inclusion among the substantives by Goddard (2001), who counters an earlier claim of non-universality by Wilkins (1996), interestingly enough his co-host at the Adelaide workshop referred to above. It was added, among other reasons, to facilitate the description of body parts.

Arguments for the inclusion of an “indeterminate number” prime SOME were presented by Wierzbicka (1996). MUCH / MANY, on the other hand, is a notational variant for MANY; the latter was included in the later stages of the SLU project, and immediately linked with MUCH, even though the “official list” only mentioned MANY.

With respect to mental predicates, Wierzbicka had long maintained that SEE and HEAR were definable in terms of KNOW, and *eyes* and *ears*, respectively: in essence, *see* = ‘come to know using the eyes’ and *hear* = ‘come to know using the ears’ (Wierzbicka 1980). At the same time, some difficulties were recognized. *Eyes* and *ears* had to be explicated not as ‘sense organs’, but purely in physical and positional terms (e.g. *eyes* = ‘two small movable parts of the upper face’), which was counter-intuitive, and which also meant that the full semantic structures for *see* and *hear* would be very complex, once all the necessary detail was substituted in. Admitting SEE and HEAR as semantic primes (Wierzbicka 1994a) overcame these difficulties.

Formerly a mental predicate, SAY has now been transferred into a category of its own, together with two new primes, one of which is the (indeterminate rather than plural) form WORDS. The latter was required to adequately explicate swear-words and taboo words (i.e. BAD WORDS), performative verbs, and concepts such as “language” and “paraphrase”. It has also proven useful to capture the effect of metaphorical and figurative usage (cf. Goddard 2004). The singular form WORD (Wierzbicka 1996) was short-lived. The second new prime in this area is TRUE, added in the course of the MUG project; it is mainly used in assessments of what people say when they speak: more than the words themselves, it is what someone says *with* them that is true, or not true.

MOVE was added (Wierzbicka 1996) after it became clear that *change*, in the earlier definition of motion as ‘change of place over time’, was no more straightforward than *motion* itself, and also that not all movement can plausibly be regarded as a change of place. For instance, if I move my hands I am moving, but it seems counter-intuitive to see this in terms of my hands changing place.

Like “speech”, “existence and possession” is a new subset. In many languages the exponents for existence and alienable possession are related or even identical (but distinguishable through their syntactic behavior; cf. Section 1.4 below). The admission of *THERE IS* (Wierzbicka 1996) put an end to numerous and mostly not entirely satisfactory attempts to explicate existence. Alienable possession (*HAVE*) was added a little later; it has greatly facilitated the explication of possessive pronouns and other equivalent grammatical constructions.

The story of *LIVE* and *DIE* is very similar. The two are in a newly created subset of life and death. The former was added in Wierzbicka (1996), the latter more recently. The difficulty of defining the concept of “life” has long been recognized in philosophy, science and medicine. It is now believed to be beyond definition. On the other hand, because the concept of “life after death” is not a contradiction, attempts to explicate *DIE* as ‘cease to be alive’ have been abandoned.

In the latest versions of the NSM lexicon (once again starting with Wierzbicka 1996), the temporal and spatial domains have both been enriched, firstly, by the addition of the deictics *NOW* and *HERE*. For a long time it was assumed that these could be explicated in terms of *THIS* and temporal/spatial reference to the speech act situation (*now* = ‘when I say this’, *here* = ‘where I say this’), but these explications no longer seem satisfactory, if only because the range of application of *NOW* and *HERE* is typically wider than the proposed explications would predict. The temporal domain has also been expanded by the time-period expressions *A LONG TIME* and *A SHORT TIME*, and by the durational prime *FOR SOME TIME* (which cannot be satisfactorily explicated in terms of *SOME* and *TIME*, or *WHEN*). In the spatial domain, *BELOW* now replaces *UNDER*. Newly added primes include the distance expressions *FAR* and *NEAR*, and the relational notions of *SIDE* (laterality) and *INSIDE* (containment), which give the metalanguage greatly improved capacity for dealing with concrete objects and actions.

Last but not least, among the logical concepts, “minor” changes include the replacement of *NO* with *NOT*, as well as that of *HAVE PARTS* with *PART OF*, then *PART*. More importantly perhaps, as it became clear that the prime *CAN* had been used in more than one way, *MAYBE* was added to introduce something like “possibility” into the system, leaving *CAN* to cover “potentiality”. The augmentor *MORE*, briefly contemplated at the end of the 1980s but abandoned again soon after, was given a second lease on life. Most of these changes took effect in Wierzbicka (1996); the replacement of *PART OF* with *PART* is much more recent.

As can be seen from the *SLU* and *MUG* lists of primes above, it had become possible, by the mid-1990s, to arrange the primes into subsets of similar elements identified by means of labels. The use of such labels (in line with earlier proposals by Goddard 1990:258) has greatly contributed to silence those critics who, like Verschueren (1981:322), could see no logic in what they thought was a random list of primitive elements. What was originally a mere “list” or “inventory” now

looked more and more like a mini-language, i.e. a full natural language in miniature – and still does, increasingly so. The expanded lexicon reflects a much more “embodied” and concrete perspective than the ancestral set of 14. One can now recognize clear correspondences between the proposed groups of primes and the major conventional lexical classes and semantic and grammatical categories found in the world’s languages.

For example, though the universality of personal pronouns was reflected in the presence of *I* and *you* in the very earliest prime inventories, the addition of *PEOPLE* and *LIVE* has allowed the categories “human” and “animate”, so commonly invoked by typologists, to be readily constructed within NSM. Along with cognition (*THINK*, *KNOW*) and illocution (*SAY*), the new list includes predicates of perception (*SEE*, *HEAR*), all of which are often grammaticalized into evidential systems (Wierzbicka 1994a). The emotion/sensation prime *FEEL* finds its way into special experiencer constructions. The temporal primes are frequently grammaticalized into tense and aspect systems, and the spatial primes can be found grammaticalized in the elaborate systems of locational deixis found in North and Central America (cf. Goddard 1997b).

Has the “expansion phase” of the NSM prime inventory come to an end? Probably not, although we can be fairly sure that the rate of any future expansion will be slower than has been the case so far. Once again, none of the additions have been willy-nilly; all are the result of careful consideration of recalcitrant semantic problems. This is not to say that all the newcomers are here to stay. Several expressions – e.g. *IN ONE MOMENT*, *TOUCH*, *IT* – are currently under consideration as additional primes (the first two have been included in this volume), but the latest inventory (see the index of primes on pages 361–362) may also have to be trimmed back as a consequence of ongoing cross-linguistic testing. As mentioned above, this is what recently happened in the case of the counterfactual *IF ... WOULD*. Above all, it must be borne in mind that such modifications, though they may puzzle or frustrate some observers, are inevitable in view of the empirical character of the NSM program. It would be a matter of concern if the hypothesis about the shared lexical core of all languages did not change in response to continued semantic analysis and cross-linguistic investigation.

To conclude this review of the NSM lexicon, it should be pointed out that, by the early 1990s, Wierzbicka had revised her stance on primitive meanings in one important respect. Like Leibniz (cf. Ishiguro 1972: 45–46), she used to believe that primes should be semantically independent, because – so the argument went – if two concepts have something in common, they could not both be indivisible. Nevertheless, the inclusion among the primes of pairs of opposites such as *GOOD* and *BAD* (and later *NEAR* and *FAR*) and of converses such as *BEFORE* and *AFTER* (and later *ABOVE* and *BELOW*, and also *FOR SOME TIME* and *IN ONE MOMENT*), with their many intuitive connections, had become a necessity, paradoxical as it seemed. It

was indeed impossible to explicate the members of such pairs in terms of one another: GOOD, for instance, is not the same thing as NOT BAD, nor is BAD the same thing as NOT GOOD, etc. On the other hand, it was also impossible to extract any common feature, any discrete component, from the newly introduced pairs of opposites and/or converses, in spite of the relationships within each of them. Abstract terms such as *evaluation*, *distance*, *vertical orientation* and *temporal sequence* are plainly more obscure and difficult to translate across languages than simple basic terms like GOOD, BAD, NEAR, FAR, and so on, and could not possibly replace the latter in a plausible universal semantic metalanguage.⁸

1.3 Allolexy and portmanteaus

The term *allolexy* (Wierzbicka 1989) was coined to designate situations in which several different words or word-forms (“allolexes”) express a single meaning in complementary contexts. The concept was foreshadowed as early as 1980, when Wierzbicka observed that semantic explications cannot be kept entirely free of contextual variation. She added: “For example, to assure the readability of English-based explications both the forms ‘me’ and ‘I’ have to be used, standing for the same primitive” (1980:36).⁹ Wierzbicka had obviously read Apresjan (1992) in the original Russian (published in 1974), and was familiar with his view that, in an ideal metalanguage, “basic meanings and their names must stand in one-to-one correspondence to one another” (Apresjan 1992:49). She had reached the conclusion that this was an unrealistic expectation, especially if the metalanguage was meant to be “carved out” of natural language, which – as per Wierzbicka’s (1994b:446) sobering statement – “simply does not work that way”. Instead, we must “recognise, and indeed expect, allolexy” (ibid.:475).

In current NSM thinking, there are three different types of allolexy, distinguished from one another through the epithets *positional*, *combinatorial* and *inflectional*.

Positional allolexy is the modern face of one form of allomorphy. It can be illustrated by means of the pronouns I and ME, which can be defined as positional allolexes of the single semantic prime I. It is impossible to state any semantic difference between I and ME, at least in the form of a substitutable paraphrase. That is, I in ‘I did something’ or ‘I don’t know’ has the same meaning as ME in ‘You did something to me’ or ‘Some people want to say something about me’. The distribution of the alternate forms is determined solely by position, i.e. I pre-verbally and ME elsewhere. Something similar applies throughout the Romance languages, although the number of allolexes is invariably higher: whereas French and Italian have three separate forms, Spanish and Portuguese have four. More information will be provided in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1.

The second type, combinatorial allolexy, comes in two subtypes. One of them is the other form of allomorphy, and Romance NSMs (and no doubt many other NSMs as well) would be nowhere without it. This first subtype is much less widespread in the English NSM, even though it exists. All the traditional forms of agreement (e.g. of an adjective with a noun, of a determiner with a noun, of a verb with its subject, etc.) belong here. The French prime *PETIT*, for instance, has four combinatorial allolexes, viz. *PETIT* [MASC.SG], *PETITE* [FEM.SG.], *PETITS* [MASC.PL] and *PETITES* [FEM.PL]. The other subtype can be illustrated by means of the relationship between *SOMETHING* and *THING*, or (to take a Romance example) between French *QUELQUE CHOSE* and *CHOSE*. In combination with determiners and quantifiers, *THING* and *CHOSE* function as combinatorial allolexes of *SOMETHING* and *QUELQUE CHOSE*: *THIS THING* / *CETTE CHOSE* = *THIS* + *SOMETHING* / *CE* + *QUELQUE CHOSE*, *TWO THINGS* / *DEUX CHOSSES* = *TWO* + *SOMETHING* / *DEUX* + *QUELQUE CHOSE*, and so on. The NSM evaluators (*GOOD* and *BAD*), on the other hand, provide an interesting case of combinatorial allolexy which appears to be typical of Romance: whereas in the Spanish and Portuguese NSMs the evaluators are realized as adjectives, in the French and Italian NSMs, nouns and/or adverbs are used instead of adjectives in most contexts, although adjectives also occur (cf. Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4 for more details). A more complex case is that of the subjunctive in the Romance languages surveyed in this volume. Subjunctives which are triggered automatically (e.g. after the prime *WANT*) are in a relationship of combinatorial allolexy with the corresponding indicative and do not add extra layers of meaning. Subjunctives which do should not normally be used in NSM, and are to be explicated.

The third and final type is inflectional allolexy. It is confined to NSM, and very different from the other types, as clearly shown in the following illustration, based on the phenomenon of obligatory tense-marking in English. In NSM explications, a number of verb tenses need to be called into service. The present tense is the most common one: it is considered to be universal and semantically simple – something which cannot be said about the past and the future tenses. It is used when there is an explicit or implicit reference to ‘now’. Future tense forms, on the other hand, will be used in NSM when explicit reference is made to a time ‘after now’; past tense forms, when equally explicit reference is made to a time ‘before now’. In an English sentence such as *I did something*, the word *did* is semantically complex, conveying both *do* and past tense; *do* and *did*, in ordinary English, are semantically distinct – and therefore not in an allolexical relationship. This is no longer the case as soon as the semantic content of past tense (i.e. *AT A TIME BEFORE NOW*, or – more idiomatically – *SOME TIME AGO*) is spelled out for the purposes of an NSM explication. *I did something*, rewritten in NSM, becomes ‘At a time before now, I did something’. Here, *do* is simply ungrammatical, and the choice of *did* as opposed to *do* becomes automatic and allolexical. The same applies in many other

languages, including those of the Romance group. In NSM, time reference is always represented independently, in lexical terms, and consequently the distribution of *did* and *do* (etc.) can be predicted from the surrounding context.

Some observers have expressed disquiet about the concept of allolexy, especially with reference to the second subtype of the combinatorial variety (e.g. the relationship between *SOMETHING* and *THING*). They feel that it may be invoked too hastily, to identify “variants” of semantic primes that should not be treated as such. Once *THING* has been recognized as a combinatorial allolex of *SOMETHING*, and once, by analogy perhaps, *PERSON* has been recognized as a combinatorial allolex of *SOMEONE*, what is to stop us from saying that “*INTEND*” is a combinatorial allolex of *WANT*? How do we know that we have overstepped the mark? The answer is that, for allolexy to obtain, the two or more elements which are thought to be in an allolexical relationship must not differ in meaning in any paraphrasable way. In other words, a claim that *X* and *Y* are allolexes can be disproved by producing a paraphrase of either term, which serves to identify a semantic difference between them. It would not be hard, for example, to counter the entirely mistaken view that English *WANT* and “*INTEND*” are allolexes, because it can be shown that “*INTEND*” contains a semantic component based on *THINK* which is absent from *WANT*. Allowing “allolexes” which add extra layers of meaning would of course make a mockery of one of the most fundamental working hypotheses of NSM semantics, viz. that the semantic cores of the languages of the world are isomorphic. In more general terms, whether the focus is on positional, combinatorial or inflectional allolexy, the same basic principle applies. As long as the allolexical relationship is genuine, there is no danger of infiltration of unwanted meanings. The existence of language-specific inflectional categories, for instance, is by no means irreconcilable with the claim that there is a perfect semantic equivalence between the NSM versions derived from different languages, regardless of what some observers (e.g. Moravcsik 1991) may have said.

Moving on to portmanteaus, they exist whenever a single word (or bound morpheme, or phraseme) expresses a combination of semantic primes. A simple example in the English NSM is *CAN’T*, combining *CAN* + *NOT*. It seems that many languages have portmanteaus involving negation, sometimes combining it with several other elements, as for instance in “negative imperative” words such as Latin *NOLI*, which is an amalgam of *NOT WANT* and *YOU DO*. A number of relatively straightforward portmanteau phenomena occur in the Romance languages, and will be described in more detail in the following chapters. One of them involves the primes *LIKE* and *THIS*, and also occurs in other languages, e.g. the Australian aboriginal language Yankunytjatjara, where the word *ALATJI* is a portmanteau for *LIKE THIS*, equivalent to *NYANGA PURUNYPA*. *ALATJI* translates in Spanish as *ASÍ*, in Portuguese as *ASSIM*, and in Italian as *così*. The case of French *COMME ÇA* is different, as will be shown in Chapter 6, Section 6.4.1.1. Many languages have even

more specialized portmanteaus for combinations such as DO LIKE THIS, HAPPEN LIKE THIS, OR SAY LIKE THIS.¹⁰

1.4 Polysemy

Polysemy is hardly a novel concept. However, it is a frequent complication when trying to identify exponents of semantic primes across languages. It is quite common for their range of use not to match up because, aside from the shared, identical meaning, the exponents in question also have additional meanings which are different from language to language. Careful internal analysis is therefore required. For example, the Yankunytjatjara exponent of WANT, *mukuringanyi*, has secondary meanings approximating English ‘like, be fond of’ and ‘need’, so that its range of use does not correspond to that of English *want*. Similarly, in Spanish, the verb *querer* means not only WANT, but also ‘love’ (cf. Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3.2). Only after the polysemy is sorted out and justified on language-internal grounds (i.e. on the basis of different syntactic properties for each meaning) does the equivalence of the primary meanings of *want* and *mukuringanyi* become clear.

Polysemies involving WANT are in fact found in many languages. In more general terms, frequent polysemies in which semantic primes are involved include: DO with ‘make’ (the Romance languages, Misumalpan, Arrernte, Samoan, Kalam), HAPPEN with ‘appear’ or ‘arrive’ (French, Ewe, Mangaaba-Mbula), WANT with ‘like’, ‘love’ or ‘seek’ (Spanish, Ewe, Ulwa), FEEL with ‘taste’, ‘smell’ or ‘hold an opinion’ (English, Acehnese, Ewe, Mandarin, some of the Romance languages), SAY with ‘speak’ or ‘make sounds’ (Thai, Mandarin, Yankunytjatjara, Kalam), BEFORE with ‘first’, ‘go ahead’ or ‘front’ (Lao, Samoan, Kayardild, Ewe), BECAUSE with ‘from’ (Yankunytjatjara, Arrernte). Details relevant to the Romance examples are provided in Chapters 2 to 6.

Rigorous semantic analysis sometimes paints a picture of polysemy which challenges preconceptions about the literal and the figurative (cf. Goddard 1996). For example, in some languages, the exponent of FEEL or of WANT turns out to be a word which can also have a body-part meaning, whether specific, such as ‘belly’ or ‘guts’ (Yankunytjatjara, Kalam), or general, such as ‘insides’ (Mangap-Mbula). In cases like these, contrary to the tradition which would have it that the concrete meaning is “prior”, we must recognize the prime FEEL or WANT sense as the simpler meaning and the body-part meaning as the complex, extended one.

Curious (and potentially confusing) as these cases may be, from a theoretical point of view there is nothing very surprising about the fact that a word may have two (or more) related meanings, one indefinable and the other definable. Much less expected was the finding, which emerged clearly from the *SLU* volume, that in some languages a single form may express two different indefinable meanings.

In Yankunytjatjara a single form KUTJUPA can express both SOMEONE and OTHER. In Arrernte a single form PEKE can express both MAYBE and IF. In Samoan a single form FAI expresses both DO and SAY. More complex examples are found in Kalam, where a single stem G- expresses DO, HAPPEN and FEEL, and in Bunuba, where a simple use of the root MA-, with a [3SG] subject, is no less than five-ways ambiguous – between SAY, DO, THINK, FEEL and HAPPEN. In other words, the possibility of polysemy, however undesirable, had to be accepted as a fact of life, even within NSM. Together with allolexy and portmanteau phenomena, it was another illustration of the inevitable absence of a strict meaning-form correspondence in metalanguages based on natural language.

One may be inclined to ask how it can be shown that, for instance, G- in Kalam does not in fact have a single “abstract” meaning, more abstract than any one of DO, HAPPEN, or FEEL. For NSM scholars, this is a non-question. One cannot show anything about hypothetical meanings which are so abstract and so language-specific that they cannot be either stated or paraphrased in another language (such as English, or any of the Romance languages). This is not to say that the meanings have nothing to do with one another, that the overlap is semantically arbitrary, and that it is just coincidence that all three are expressed in Kalam by the same bound morpheme. The affiliation is such that the discovery of the overlap is not jarring – or, at least, not as jarring as it would be to find that IF was expressed by the same form as YOU, TWO, or BAD!

What should we call such recurrent, semantically non-arbitrary match-ups? Since the meanings involved are primitive, it almost looks as though we are dealing with distinct words; nonetheless, the term *homonymy* is unsatisfactory because it would suggest an arbitrary coincidence of form. Wierzbicka has therefore chosen to use the term *polysemy* in an extended sense to register the fact that, although there is no compositional relationship, the meanings in question (SOMEONE and OTHER, MAYBE and IF, DO and SAY, etc.) are associated in non-compositional ways. The key to identifying non-compositional polysemy is, once again, the existence of different syntactic properties. Although there are relevant instances in Italian, e.g. the prime SENTIRE (‘FEEL’ and ‘HEAR’; cf. Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4.4), an example from a typologically different language will be used instead.

Consider the Yankunytjatjara sentences below. In (1) we see the form KUTJUPA functioning adnominally, with the meaning ‘OTHER’. In (2) and (3), on the other hand, it is the head of an NP in its own right, with the meaning ‘SOMEONE’. Even though the same lexical form is used, it occurs in distinct syntactic (combinatorial) contexts, hence there can be no confusion about which meaning is intended.

- (1) Palu ngayulu munu kungka kutjupa.
 but I and woman other
 ‘But (there was) me and another woman.’

- (2) Ngayulu nyangu kutjupa nyara waru-ngka nyina-nytja-la.
 I see:PAST someone there fire:LOC sit:NOML.LOC
 'I saw someone sitting over there by a fire.'
- (3) Kutjupa-ngku iti katingu!
 someone:ERG baby take:PAST
 'Someone took the baby!'

It could of course be argued that *kutjupa* is not a true nominal head in (2) and (3), and that there has been ellipsis of an "understood" categorical head such as *anangu* 'person/human being'. That is, it could be claimed that *kutjupa* in (2) is short for *anangu kutjupa* and that *kutjupangu* in (3) is short for *anangu kutjupangu*, both meaning 'another person/human being'. However, this analysis is not semantically viable because the referential range of *anangu* is confined to human beings whereas that of nominal *kutjupa* is not. For instance, traditional folktales often tell of babies being stolen from their families by such creatures as *pangkalangu* 'ogre' and *kungkapanpa* 'bogey woman'. In such tales a distraught mother could say the likes of (3), but since there is no presumption that a human being is responsible, *anangu kutjupa(ngku)* cannot be substituted for *kutjupa*. Similarly, example (4) shows the use of *kutjupa* to make an indefinite reference which turns out to relate to God (many Yankunytjatjara people have adopted Christianity).

- (4) Kutjupa-ngku rawangu nyuntunya nyanganyi munu kulini.
 someone:ERG always you:ACC see:PRES and think:PRES
 Nganalu? Godalu.
 who:ERG God:ERG
 'Someone is always watching and thinking about you. Who? God.'

Once again, *anangu kutjupa* 'another person/human being' could not be substituted for *kutjupa* here.

NSM research on matters to do with polysemy (both of the conventional and of the non-compositional type) is only just beginning; however, one important insight which can be derived from it, and which has clear implications beyond non-compositional affiliation, is that multiple primitive meanings cannot be expressed by a single exponent unless they possess sufficiently distinctive syntactic properties. This is presumably one reason why pairs of opposites and converses cannot be lexicalized by means of the same forms, but also (and more interestingly) it is one reason why I, YOU and SOMEONE are kept lexically distinct in all languages. As Wierzbicka (1994b:450) remarks: "patterns of polysemy of this kind could lead to unresolvable ambiguities on a very large scale". The same presumably applies to the quantifiers ONE, TWO, MUCH/MANY and ALL, and to the classifiers KIND OF and PART. The syntactic properties of THINK, KNOW and SAY may also be too close to allow for expression by means of a single form.¹¹

1.5 NSM syntax

Allolexy... Polysemy... Non-compositional polysemy. A natural semantic metalanguage based on a natural language is clearly a far cry from an ideal “philosophical language”, in which there would be a perfect one-to-one correspondence between form and meaning. For some commentators, this is all too much. Cattelain (1995), for example, finds allolexy and polysemy suspicious and disturbing. In his summary of the findings of the *SLU* project, he accepts only unique exponents as truly satisfactory, describing as “problematic” all cases where the *SLU* authors had recognized allolexy or polysemy.

This nervousness is perhaps understandable, but it is unjustified. It would be unrealistic to expect every natural language to harbor an ideal “one form, one meaning” semantic metalanguage. Natural languages are not designed for the convenience of linguists. Although it appears, on the available evidence, that every natural language contains all the necessary raw material to furnish an adequate semantic metalanguage, it is also true that every natural language has some individual, language-specific characteristics which must be retained in the Natural Semantic Metalanguage – at least, if that metalanguage is to retain a sufficiently natural quality to guarantee intelligibility to native speakers. Such characteristics should not be seen as a mere nuisance to be shunted aside. They constitute the essential individuality or “personality” of each language – the minimal set of properties which makes all languages different. Many (e.g. patterns of allolexy and polysemy) are strictly lexical and related to the phenomena envisaged in Sections 1.3. and 1.4. Many more (e.g. word order, morphological marking, word-class characteristics, inflection, affixation, etc.) are grammatical in nature and must not blind us to the fact that what is being “carved out” of the natural language for which we are defining a metalanguage is an irreducible semantic core consisting not only of lexical but also of syntactic properties which are meant to be *universal*. The existence of universal patterns according to which the exponents of the semantic primes can combine across all languages is just as important to the NSM project as the existence of shared semantic primes.

No version of the NSM has been adequately described until its syntax, i.e. its combinatorial properties, are fully specified. In the 1980s, lack of explicitness on this score led to justifiable criticism of the NSM approach, for instance by McCawley (1983), who called on Wierzbicka to supplement her list of universal primes with a list of their universal patterns of combination (cf. also Goddard 1989). The call did not go unheeded: Wierzbicka realized that, until this had been done, it was impossible to know for sure whether the goal of a universal semantic metalanguage was realizable at all. In the last fifteen years or so, a lot of research has gone into the formulation of specific hypotheses related to a universal semantic

syntax. The earliest such hypotheses, which became known as “canonical contexts”, were contained in Wierzbicka (1992b).

An important research tool in the NSM approach to syntax, a canonical context is a sentence or sentence fragment consisting predominantly (or exclusively) of semantic primes, and created for each of them, in line with predictions and/or expectations about universal syntactic patterns. They can be subjected to rigorous cross-linguistic testing – and may have to be revised in the process. An interesting example involves the prime *FEEL*. The first canonical contexts created for this verb were ‘I feel good’, ‘I feel bad’ and ‘I feel like this’ (Goddard & Wierzbicka 1994b:52). Almost immediately, though, doubts were raised. Wierzbicka (1994b:464) noted that, perhaps, other phrases should have been used, viz. ‘I feel something good’ and ‘I feel something bad’. These eventually came to play a crucial role in the explication of many emotion terms, so much so that the prime *SOMETHING* has become an integral part of the combinatorial syntax of the verb *FEEL* – in spite of the fact that, at least in English, *feel something good* and *feel something bad* do not sound particularly good. Until today, it is a secondary, though by no means unimportant, tenet of the NSM approach that it is acceptable for canonical contexts to be marginally unidiomatic, as long as they are intuitively comprehensible. Idiomaticity should not be pursued at the cost of even the slightest ambiguity or lack of clarity. That would be a price too high to pay. The current view is that the “idiomatic alternative (e.g. ‘X felt bad’)” is in fact “not an alternative at all” (Goddard & Wierzbicka 2002a:65). *X felt bad* typically means something akin to ‘X felt guilty’, which is highly specific and far too narrow. Other readings are possible, depending on context: many Australians, for instance, felt bad – but certainly not guilty – in the lead-up to, and immediately after, the hanging in Singapore of an Australian citizen of Vietnamese descent, on 2 December 2005. What they felt was “something bad”: outrage, helplessness, perhaps a combination of both. It must be acknowledged that recent research (particularly Junker & Blacksmith 2006) appears to suggest that the revised canonical contexts (especially ‘I feel something good’, ‘I feel something bad’) cannot be universally translated; more research is needed to establish whether this is truly the case, or whether suitable paraphrases can after all be found.

Other, less controversial, examples of canonical contexts include, for instance:

Someone said something bad about you.

Something bad happened.

I don’t want you to do this.

She said something to me, but I didn’t hear it.

Something happened in this place.

There are many kinds of bird (fish, nut, etc.).

These people lived for a long time.

This thing has two parts.

If you do this, people will say bad things about you.

Some of these, and many others, were first employed in the *SLU* project, where their primary role was heuristic. This is not to say that the need for an explicitly spelled out universal semantic syntax had not yet been fully appreciated. The main objective of the project, however, was to identify the exponents of all known semantic primes in a number of typologically unrelated languages, more so than to elaborate the details of a truly universal syntax. Canonical contexts were the tools used to assist in identifying the exponents of the primes. In many instances, this was easier said than done. One of the problems that had to be overcome was that many of the *English* exponents of the semantic primes are polysemous, and that only one sense of each is proposed as a prime. Carefully chosen canonical contexts provided a way to pinpoint which of the various senses was intended. The syntactic (combinatorial) properties of a prime were seen to be part of its distinctive “signature”: by knowing exactly what to expect of the combinatorial properties of each prime, NSM scholars were better able to zero in on them in particular languages.

Soon, though, the canonical contexts took on an additional role. In the research that led to the publication of Goddard (1997a) and of Goddard & Wierzbicka (2002a), they were not only used as a heuristic device, but also as a springboard: contributors were provided with a list of about 200 canonical sentences which were meant to be put to the test. The aim was not only to find exponents of primes, but also to further consolidate the foundations of the universal syntax of meaning the lack of which McCawley (1983) had deplored.

So, how much is known at present? What are the current hypotheses in the area of meaning and universal grammar? Lack of space means they cannot be listed here in full; for more information, the reader is referred to Goddard & Wierzbicka (2002a).

The basic unit of NSM syntax is analogous to the clause, namely, a combination of a substantive phrase with any one of a range of predicates and some additional elements determined by the nature of the predicate (a so-called predicate phrase). A substantive phrase can consist either of a bare substantive (I, YOU, SOMEONE, PEOPLE, SOMETHING), or of a combination of a substantive along with other elements forming a unit analogous to a noun phrase. Combinations include first of all those of the substantives SOMEONE, SOMETHING and PEOPLE with attributes (GOOD, BAD, BIG, SMALL). SOMEONE and SOMETHING can also combine with THIS, with other determiners (SAME, OTHER) and quantifiers (ONE, TWO, ALL, MUCH / MANY, SOME). The prime PEOPLE has similar, but more restricted, combinatorial properties.

The primes KIND OF and PART can be regarded as substantive-like: they can combine with determiners and quantifiers. The primes WHEN and WHERE can also

form substantive phrases with determiners. WHERE can, in all probability, combine with BIG and SMALL (e.g. A BIG WHERE > A BIG PLACE). Certain combinations of quantifier and determiner are allowed (e.g. THESE TWO THINGS, MANY OTHER PLACES), while certain other combinations are out (e.g. *THESE SOME PEOPLE).

The elements which may function as predicates are as follows:

Actions, events, movement:	DO, HAPPEN, MOVE
Mental and speech predicates:	KNOW, THINK, SAY, WANT, SEE, HEAR, FEEL
Life and death:	LIVE, DIE
Locational elements:	(BE) SOMEWHERE, HERE, ABOVE, BELOW, INSIDE, ON ONE SIDE (etc.), NEAR, FAR
Other relators:	(BE) LIKE, PART, KIND OF
Evaluators and descriptors:	(BE) GOOD, BAD, BIG, SMALL
Existence, possession:	THERE IS, HAVE

These predicative elements can be grouped in various ways according to their combinatorial properties. All of them can combine with the “meta-predicates” NOT (negation) and MAYBE (possibility). If NOT and MAYBE co-occur, MAYBE has the wider scope. All predicates can also combine with a temporal adjunct such as NOW OR AT THIS TIME. Some (DO, HAPPEN, MOVE, SAY, SEE, HEAR, DIE) are actually time-dependent and *require* such a temporal adjunct, which may be either explicit or understood. These time-dependent predicates may be regarded as analogues of prototypical verbs. A larger group, including all those just listed as well as KNOW, THINK, LIVE and perhaps WANT, can combine with the meta-predicate CAN (potentiality).

All the mental and speech predicates can take a complement (THIS or SOMETHING). In the case of KNOW and THINK, the complement can be propositional, e.g. I KNOW THAT... , I THINK THAT... The locational elements, with the exception of SOMEWHERE and HERE, share with the other “relators” the fact that they necessarily involve two referring substantive expressions. The evaluators and descriptors (GOOD, BAD, BIG and SMALL) may be regarded as analogues of prototypical adjectives: they can function both as predicates and as attributes. Finally, as long noted by linguists and philosophers, THERE IS is a predicate unlike any other. It has exceptional syntactic properties. In particular, it can form a proposition without a substantive subject (e.g. ‘there are many kinds of birds’).

As mentioned before, all predicates can occur with temporal adjuncts, that is, with expressions such as AT THIS TIME, AT THE SAME TIME, BEFORE NOW, AFTER NOW. Most predicates can also combine with the “scalar” temporal primes A SHORT TIME and A LONG TIME. These, in turn, can occur *within* complex temporal adjuncts (e.g. ‘a long time before [this time]’). Locational adjuncts occur with a narrower range of predicates. The predicates which take locational adjuncts are DO, HAPPEN, MOVE and THERE IS. Locational adjuncts may also occur in the com-

plement of SEE (as in ‘I see something there’). Locational phrases are similar to temporal phrases in composition, e.g. IN THIS PLACE, IN THE SAME PLACE, ABOVE HERE, BELOW HERE.

Clauses can be combined in NSM syntax in various ways. We have already noted that some predicates, such as THINK and KNOW, can take propositional complements. As well, the capacity of the element THIS to refer back to the content of a preceding clause enables a powerful clause linking strategy. It enables entire clauses to participate in causal adjuncts (BECAUSE OF THIS). Whether it also enables entire clauses to participate in *temporal* adjuncts (AT THE SAME TIME AS THIS, AFTER THIS, BEFORE THIS), as used to be assumed, appears far less certain; this is one of the many areas requiring further research. Finally, there is one purely interclausal construction in NSM, viz. the conditional (introduced by IF).

The “interpropositional syntax” or textual structure of NSM explications is a crucial part of NSM syntax on which we have not commented at all. More information is available in Goddard & Wierzbicka (2002a:79–81). Suffice it to say, in the context of this introductory survey, that the use of certain typographical conventions such as separate lines and indents helps visualize the semantic and syntactic links between the various propositions embedded in semantic explications, in ways that are far beyond what additional verbal components could achieve. Once again, the hypothesis is that such conventions will be universally understood. What Wierzbicka (1993b:119) said remains true more than ten years later: “Tout reste à faire dans ce domaine – ou presque” ‘Everything remains to be done in this area – or just about’.

1.6 Valency options

There is one important theoretical concept embraced by Wierzbicka in work on NSM syntax published since the mid-nineties that cannot be merely hinted at, but must be considered in some detail. The notion that semantic primes may have optional or alternative “valency options” is a radical departure from earlier work. For example, it is now assumed that the prime DO, in addition to its obligatory subject and complement (as in ‘someone did something’), may also take an additional substantive “patient” (as in ‘someone did something to someone’). In other words, from the point of view of their realization in English, DO and DO TO are both regarded as manifestations of a single prime. This approach supersedes long-standing, but problem-ridden, attempts to explicate the “patient” notion in lexical (compositional) terms, as proposed in Wierzbicka (1980) (cf. Bogusławski 1991).

Apart from a patient option, it is assumed that DO can accommodate two more options, one “instrumental”, the other “comitative”.

- (5) someone did something
 - someone did something to someone [“patient”]
 - someone did something to someone with something [“instrument”]
 - someone did something with someone [“comitative”]

The prime SAY also has an array of valency options. As well as an obligatory subject and (substantive) complement, it may take an optional substantive “topic” (in English, SAY ABOUT). It also has a distinctive addressee valency option (in English, SAY TO) which presumably makes it stand out from all other predicates. In addition, SAY can take a “direct” complement. One would also expect SAY to combine in some fashion with WORDS.

- (6) someone said something
 - someone said something about something [“topic”]
 - someone said something to someone [“addressee”]
 - someone said: “–”
 - someone said some words (these words)

DO and SAY are far from the only primes currently believed to have alternative or optional valency options. For instance, it is now thought that GOOD has a “beneficiary” option (GOOD FOR) and a clausal option describing an action, event or situation (GOOD IF); that HAPPEN has an optional “undergoer” slot (HAPPEN TO) and possibly an alternative optional place slot (HAPPEN IN THIS PLACE); and that KNOW and THINK, like SAY, have an optional topic slot (KNOW ABOUT, THINK ABOUT).

Two other kinds of valency option have been adopted in current work. A “reference point” option is available for SAME; it introduces a second argument giving the point of comparison, as in (7). Quantifiers can participate in a construction designated as the “selective relation”: they have a “selective” option, as in (8).

- (7) I did the same as you
- (8) one / two / many of these people / things

It must be emphasized that when Wierzbicka claims universality for the various valency options of semantic primes referred to above, she is not claiming that the formal realization of these structures in different languages will be identical. However, formal differences do not necessarily compromise semantic equivalence. Complement structures, for instance, differ from language to language. In the Romance languages surveyed in this volume, only equi-clauses following WANT consist of an infinitive verb, whereas non-equi-clauses require a verb in the subjunctive. Nonetheless, as will be argued in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3, there is no paraphrasable difference between, say, Spanish *quiero que tú hagas algo* (lit. ‘I want that you do_{subj} something’) and English *I want you to do something*, where an infinitive is used instead of a subjunctive. In Yankunyjtajtjara, on the other

hand, there are two complementizers found with MUKURINGANYI ‘WANT’: *-kitja* in equi-constructions and *-ku* (the so-called “switch reference” purposive) elsewhere. Regardless, despite the range of variations in formal realization, it appears that in all languages it is possible to form sentences equivalent in meaning to, for example, ‘X wants something’, ‘X wants to do something’, ‘X wants Y to do something’, and so on.

For a different example, consider the formal marking of argument structures. In English, the “topic” arguments of SAY, THINK, and KNOW happen to be marked by the same formal means, namely, the preposition *about*; but it is by no means the case that in other languages the same uniform marking is used, nor even that an adposition is necessarily involved. For instance, in Mangaaba-Mbula there is only a single general oblique preposition *pa*, which, as shown in (9), marks both “locutionary topic” and “addressee” (which are distinguished solely by order). In Yankunytjatjara, the locutionary topic is marked by a suffix *-tjara* (which in other constructions can express the meaning ‘have’), while the “topic” of THINK appears as a direct object; see (10) and (11).

Mangaaba-Mbula:

- (9) Ni i-so piam pa mbulu tiam ta na.
 say:3SG.MASC US:OBL OBL behavior our SPEC GIV
 ‘He spoke to us about our behavior.’

Yankunytjatjara:

- (10) Ngayulu ara kutjupa-tjara wangka-nytji-tkitja mukuri-nganyi.
 I matter other-having say:NOML.COMP want:PRES
 ‘I want to talk about another matter.’
- (11) Ngayulu mani kuli-ni.
 I money think:PRES
 ‘I’m thinking about money.’

Similarly, languages differ in formal means used to constitute the determiner and quantifier constructions. For instance, in Italian, a relatum of the prime STESSO ‘SAME’ is marked by the preposition *di* ‘of’ while, in Malay, a relatum of the local exponent SAMA is marked by the preposition *dengan* ‘with’ or with *macam* ‘like’.

- (12) Vuole la stessa cosa di me.
 want:3SG.PRES the same thing of me
 ‘He / She wants the same as me.’
- (13) Dia mahu sama macam / dengan saya.
 3SG want same like with me
 ‘He wants the same as me.’

Example (14) shows the strategy adopted in Lao to realize the “selective” valency option of its quantifiers. To express the same meaning as the English phrase *two OF THESE PEOPLE*, Lao uses a construction of the form ‘these people, two people’. But this different strategy does not interfere with the semantic equivalence between the Lao and English constructions.

- (14) Khon² nii⁴ sòong³ khon² jaak⁵ vaw⁴ qan-nùng¹ kap² mùng².
 people this two people want say something-one with you
 ‘(Of) these people, two people want to speak to you.’

1.7 Concluding remarks

This volume is the first to focus on a set of four typologically related languages, and to combine a number of relatively “theoretical” chapters which establish four different, Romance, versions of the metalanguage, with data-driven work which illustrates its potential. It comes at the right time. A few years ago, the French linguist Xavier Mignot (2000: 91) wondered why Romance languages had been almost completely ignored in Athanasiadou & Tabakowska (1998), a collection of papers which deals with the conceptualization of emotions in languages throughout the world: “Serait-ce que la méthode d’Anna Wierzbicka, à qui il est fait abondamment référence, a moins de succès chez les spécialistes de ces langues?” (‘Could it be that the methodology adopted by Anna Wierzbicka, who is extensively quoted, is less well known among scholars working on these languages?’). The answer to Mignot’s question may well be in the affirmative. Although interest is growing, Romance linguists in general have a lot to catch up on. It is hoped that the present volume, even though it is written in English, will go some way towards providing them with an additional opportunity to join researchers worldwide in their “defense and illustration” of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage.

Notes

1. In a recent article, which sets out to make short shrift of the Wierzbickian enterprise, Sériot (2004) attempts to prove that Wierzbicka’s efforts to “reconcile Leibniz and Humboldt” are doomed to fail. He cannot resist the temptation to compare Wierzbicka’s principles of universal grammar to some ancient proposals put forward by Ramon Llull (1235–1315) and to recall that the work of this Catalan theologian was “delightfully ridiculed” in Jonathan Swift’s *Third of Gulliver’s Travels*. Some of the more surprising claims made by Sériot have been countered in Wierzbicka (2006). A more detailed rebuff appears in Wierzbicka (in press a).
2. A recent example is offered by Diller (2002: 50), who appears not to appreciate the difficulties created by so-called “expert terms”, which are “homonymous with (and semantically related to) folk terms”.

3. Diller (2002: 50), on the other hand, does not hesitate to proclaim that “the basic emotions – anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and perhaps desire – are primes in the sense proposed by Wierzbicka” and that they are “shared not only by the entire human race but by other social mammals as well”. In reality, the so-called “basic emotions” are anything but basic, anything but primitive, and anything but shared (cf. Wierzbicka 1999; Goddard 2002a).
4. The determiner *CE*, for instance, is as much an indefinable part of the semantic core of French as the determiner *THIS* is of the semantic core of English. Arguments against attempts to explicate *CE* were made twenty years ago by Kleiber (1986), with no reference whatsoever to the Wierzbickian enterprise. For an opposing point of view, see Wilmet (1998: 234–237). It would no doubt be an interesting exercise to compare, on a larger scale, arguments for and against the indefinability of individual primes across languages.
5. Sériot (2004) has nothing but disdain for the fact that, over the years, some primes were either removed from the list, or added to it, or added before being removed again. Amendments to the lexicon of NSM have never been made lightly. Sériot’s paper, which does not even mention (let alone discuss) the several collective volumes referred to in Section 2 of the present overview, is a sad testimony of one man’s misguided attempt at discrediting the widely acclaimed efforts of a research *team*, on the basis of a limited number of superficial readings, and with total disregard for the empirical work which underpins NSM.
6. In recent work, Wierzbicka (e.g. in press b) argues that, although hundreds of concepts encoded in the languages of the world (e.g. emotion words and speech acts) are built directly out of primes, many more (in fact, the bulk of the concrete lexicon, such as artifacts and cultural kinds) also contain so-called “semantic molecules” of various degrees of complexity. Some of these have exact semantic equivalents in other languages, others do not. Farrell (this volume) claims that Portuguese *alma*, which corresponds more or less to the English word *soul*, is a semantic molecule which enters into the definition of the word *coração* ‘heart’. Similarly, the English word *hand* is a molecule contained in the definitions of words such as (a) *handkerchief* and *handle*, (b) *gloves*, *fist*, *finger*, *clap* and *stroke*, (c) *cup*, *mug* and *spoon* – etc. It would be counter-intuitive to define the word *glove* without having recourse to the word *hand*, or to expand the definition of the word *glove* so as to include in it the definition of the word *hand*, without actually using the word itself. Semantic molecules constitute the latest step in NSM theorization: they replace the “pseudo-primitives” of earlier work.
7. None of these concepts (allolexy, portmanteaus, non-compositional polysemy, valency options) are referred to by Sériot (2004), who claims to “present” the principles of NSM, but without providing as little as a current list of semantic primes.
8. Opposites and converses are only the beginning: there are all sorts of other, subtler, less obvious non-compositional relationships as well (for instance, between *SOMEONE* and *OTHER*, *WANT* and *SAY*, *if* and *MAYBE*). For more information, see Section 1.4. In actual fact, the existence of non-compositional relationships between primes was apparent to some extent even in the very earliest lists: *I* and *YOU* are not independent of *SOMEONE*, though it was well-established (Sørensen 1963; Benveniste 1971; Wierzbicka 1976) that none of them could be defined away in terms of the others.
9. An even earlier indication is contained in the title of a paper published in 1976: “In defense of *YOU* and *ME*” is in reality a defense of the primes *YOU* and *I*.
10. For more information on allolexy and portmanteaus, see Goddard (2002b: 20–24).

11. For more information on polysemy in general and non-compositional polysemy in particular, see Goddard (2002b:24–30). For some tentative distinctions between different kinds of non-compositional relationships, see Goddard (1999:20–24).

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PART I

**Romance versions of the Natural
Semantic Metalanguage**

Natural Semantic Metalanguage exponents and universal grammar in Romance

Substantives; determiners; quantifiers

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This chapter defines exponents in French, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian (hereafter collectively referred to as “the main Romance languages”) for the following semantic primes:

Substantives:	I, YOU, SOMEONE, SOMETHING, PEOPLE, BODY
Determiners:	THIS, SAME, OTHER
Quantifiers:	ONE, TWO, SOME, MUCH / MANY, ALL

2.1 Substantives

2.1.1 I and YOU

Whereas, in the absence of any speech level differentiation for the first person, the exponents for I in the main Romance languages are entirely unproblematic, those for YOU are less straightforward. All the languages in our sample distinguish between so-called T forms, which are “more intimate”, and V forms, which are “more formal”. The former are typically the first to be acquired by children and are normally used among immediate family members, between lovers, in prayers, and when addressing pets. The latter are used when addressing one’s seniors and people one does not know well or from whom one wants to keep some kind of formal distance. The exact distribution of T and V forms varies however from country to

country, and also between regions within the one country, not to mention speakers in the one region. Firm rules are few and far between, and coexist with a large number of potentially contradictory parameters that appear to be more or less consistently observed.

Analysis of different second-person forms in a number of Asian languages has found the “intimate” or “low” form to be the most semantically basic (cf. Diller 1994: 167–169 on Thai; Onishi 1994: 362–366 on Japanese; Enfield 2002: 147–149 on Lao). The “higher” forms, on the other hand, are semantically marked and need to be defined in terms of their basic counterparts. Generally speaking, they have a complex meaning including components such as not knowing the addressee well and thinking good things about them (or at least wishing to create that impression). It has been suggested that, in all languages with a distinction between “high” and “low” forms, the former are semantically complex, and the latter semantically equivalent cross-linguistically (Wierzbicka 1992: 320). There are however several Romance dialects, especially in Latin America, where the situation is different. Travis (2002: 177–182) provides details on Bogotá Spanish, arguing that here, as well as in some other regions in Colombia, the V forms are the basic ones. The facts for Portuguese are briefly summarized below. Nonetheless, overall, the T forms do appear to be the most appropriate exponents of the prime you across our sample.

It could be argued that the T forms are “more intimate” and “less respectful” than *you_{sg}* in English, which is felt to be “neutral”. Goddard & Wierzbicka (1994: 38) counter this view with the claim that it is “hardly plausible” to suggest that every time a dog in a French-speaking country is addressed as *tu*, one wants to remind it that it does not need to be shown any respect. But dogs aren’t people, and it may be necessary to soften the stance that the absence of a manifestation of respect “is not part of the intended message” (ibid.). There is clear evidence throughout the French-speaking world that, in some cases at least, the once expected manifestation of respect is consciously suppressed (Peeters 2004). Its absence *may* be part of the intended message, even though in most cases it is not. T forms have become quite common, even in contexts and/or situations where V forms were traditionally the only choice.

There is another issue in relation to the first and second person pronouns that needs to be addressed. Verbs in all the languages, with the exception of French, often occur without an overtly expressed subject: the use of subject pronouns is pragmatically constrained. Not unexpectedly, there are consequences for the various Romance versions of the NSM. Whereas, in French (and to a lesser extent in Brazilian Portuguese), the exponents of I and you will appear in explications in much the same way as their English counterparts, the same cannot be said of the first and second person subject pronouns in Spanish, European Portuguese and Italian. For reasons of idiomaticity, they are best either not expressed at all (except if there are specific pragmatic reasons to do otherwise), or at most only once

(with the same proviso), viz. the first time they appear in an explication. Indeed, as subject pronouns in these languages are pragmatically marked, their repeated use in NSM explications would be highly inappropriate, to the point of being incorrect. Explications *with* unnecessary subject pronouns might end up adding layers of meaning which are neither intended nor universally translatable.

The various exponents for *I* and *you* can be tabularized as follows (allolexes occurring in non-subject positions are placed between brackets):

French:	JE (ME, MOI) / TU (TE, TOI)
Spanish:	YO (ME, MÍ, -MIGO) / TÚ (TE, TI, -TIGO)
Portuguese:	EU (ME, MIM, -MIGO) / TU, VOCÊ (TE, TI, -TIGO)
Italian:	IO (MI, ME) / TU (TI, TE)

2.1.1.1 French

The basic exponents of *I* and *you* in French could be either the so-called disjunctive pronouns *moi* and *toi*, or the unstressed subject pronouns *je* and *tu*. While the former “look better” in a list of semantic primes, where each element has an autonomy of its own, the latter prevail once the primes are put to use in explications, and are therefore to be preferred. There are separate positional allolexes for direct and indirect objects: *me* for the first person, and *te* for the second (*m’* and *t’* in front of a vowel). The disjunctive forms are used after prepositions and in general wherever stress is required. All other allolexes are clitics and precede the verb that governs them, whether finite or non-finite. The use of *je* (*me*, *moi*) and *tu* (*te*, *toi*) is illustrated in (1)–(3) below:

- (1) Je pense à toi.
I think:1SG.PRES PREP you
‘I think of you.’
- (2) Tu sais quelque chose de moi.
you know:2SG.PRES something PREP me
‘You know something about me.’
- (3) Les gens te voient, ils ne me voient pas.
the people you see:3PL.PRES 3PL.CLIT NEG me see:3PL.PRES not.
‘People see you, they don’t see me.’

2.1.1.2 Spanish

The basic exponent of *I* in Spanish is *yo*. There are a number of positional allolexes for this prime: *yo* is used in subject position, as well as following the preposition (and prime) *como* ‘LIKE’; *me* is used as the direct and indirect object pronoun; *mí* occurs following most prepositions; and *-migo* occurs in combination with the preposition *con* (*CONMIGO*). The various forms are illustrated below. Spanish ex-

hibits a process known as “clitic doubling”, whereby direct and indirect objects can be expressed both in clitic form and as independent pronouns. The clitic pronouns precede finite verbs, but demonstrate variable position with non-finite forms and with periphrastic tenses (e.g. *me quiere ver* or *quiere verme* ‘he wants to see me’). The independent forms typically occur post-verbally (with the pre-verbal use implying emphasis), and definite human direct objects (including references to the first and the second person) occur with the preposition *a*, as in (5).

- (4) Yo le dije algo.
I 3SG.CLIT say:1SG.PRET something
‘I said something to him.’
- (5) Él me vio a mí.
3SG me see:3SG.PRET PREP me
‘He saw me.’
- (6) Él dijo algo malo de mí.
3SG say:3SG.PRET something bad PREP me
‘He said something bad about me.’
- (7) Mi hermano fue conmigo.
my brother go:3SG.PRET with.me
‘My brother went with me.’

YOU is expressed as TÚ, which is posited here as the most appropriate exponent for this prime in the vast majority of dialects, with the notable exception of some Colombian dialects where *usted* is the more basic form (cf. preamble). Its various allomorphs are similar to those existing for YO ‘I’: TÚ occurs in subject position and following the preposition (and prime) COMO ‘LIKE’, TE in direct and indirect object position, TI following most prepositions, and -TIGO with *con* (*contigo*).

- (8) Tú quieres saber algo.
you want:2SG.PRES know:INF something
‘You want to know something.’
- (9) Otra cosa te va a pasar a ti.
something.else you happen:3SG.FUT PREP you
‘Something else will happen to you.’

As explained above, overt mention of subject pronouns is pragmatically marked in Spanish, often indicating either that new information is adduced or that the referent is being highlighted in some way. Thus, in (4), *yo* conveys emphasis, for example to mark an (implicit) contrast: ‘I am the one who said something to him, not anyone else’. If the contrast is explicitly encoded (which could very well happen in NSM explications of the type ‘you think like this; I don’t think the same’), both *yo* and TÚ are to be used (‘tú piensas así; yo no pienso lo mismo’). If no emphasis is required, they should normally remain unexpressed.

2.1.1.3 Portuguese

The basic exponent of *I* in Portuguese is *EU*, which has a number of positional allolexes similar to those of *YO* in Spanish. Apart from being a subject pronoun, *EU* is also used after the preposition (and prime) *COMO* ‘LIKE’ (cf. Spanish). *ME* is used for direct and indirect objects, *MIM* follows prepositions other than *com* ‘with’, and *-MIGO* occurs in combination with the latter. The various forms are illustrated in examples (10)–(14).

- (10) *Eu falei algo para ele.*
 I say:1SG.PRET something PREP 3SG
 ‘I said something to him.’
- (11) *Ele me viu.*
 3SG me see:SG.PRET
 ‘He saw me.’
- (12) *Esta coisa me aconteceu.*
 this thing me happen:SG.PRET
 ‘This thing happened to me.’
- (13) *Ela pensa em mim.*
 3SG think:SG.PRES PREP me
 ‘She thinks of me.’
- (14) *Ele falou comigo.*
 3SG speak:SG.PRET with.me
 ‘He spoke with me.’

With respect to the second person pronoun, the situation is not as clear-cut. In European Portuguese, *YOU* (subject) is commonly expressed as *TU*. The allolexes *TE*, *TI*, and *-TIGO* function exactly like *ME*, *MIM*, and *-MIGO*.

- (15) *Tu queres saber algo.*
 you want:2SG.PRES know:INF something
 ‘You want to know something.’
- (16) *Aconteceu -te algo bom.*
 happen:SG.PRET you something good
 ‘Something good happened to you.’
- (17) *Eu penso em ti.*
 I think:1SG.PRES PREP you
 ‘I think of you.’
- (18) *Eu falei contigo.*
 I spoke:1SG.PRET with.you
 ‘I spoke with you.’

In Brazilian Portuguese, which is used for examples in this book unless otherwise noted, the primary exponent for the second person pronoun is not *TU*, but *VOCÊ* (historically a *V* form). *TU* provides a possible alternative in some dialects, while typically still triggering the same default singular verb agreement that *VOCÊ* does, unlike in European Portuguese – which has verbs inflected for second person singular agreement, as shown in (15). In non-subject positions, Brazilian Portuguese allows a choice between non-clitic *VOCÊ*, illustrated in (19), and either forms such as *TE*, *TI*, and *-TIGO*, which imply a degree of intimacy, or various third person counterparts of these, which imply a degree of respect. In NSM explications, the more neutral *VOCÊ* may be preferable.

- (19) *Você sabe que eu vejo você.*
 you know:SG.PRES COMP I see:1SG.PRES you
 ‘You know that I see you.’

Subject pronouns, especially for the second and third person, are much more commonly expressed in Brazilian Portuguese than, say, in Spanish and are not pragmatically marked. Nevertheless, subject pro-drop does occur and under certain conditions may be preferred. The position of dative and accusative pronominal forms varies across dialects and registers, with Spoken Brazilian Portuguese generally preferring proclisis, as in (11)–(12), and European Portuguese generally preferring enclisis, as in (16).

2.1.1.4 *Italian*

The Italian exponent of *I* is *IO*. There are two other (positional) allolexes, viz. *MI* and *ME*. *MI* is the unstressed pre-verbal form used for direct and indirect objects; *ME* occurs after prepositions, including *COME* ‘LIKE’. In addition, it can be called upon to add stress, for example in contexts where *ME* and *YOU* are put into contrast.

- (20) *Io voglio fare del male a questa persona.*
 I want:1SG.PRES do:INF PART bad PREP this person
 ‘I want to do something bad to this person.’
- (21) *Questa persona mi vede.*
 this person me see:3SG.PRES
 ‘This person sees me.’
- (22) *Qualcosa mi succederà.*
 something me happen:3SG.FUT
 ‘Something will happen to me.’
- (23) *Qualcuno pensa bene di me.*
 someone thinks good PREP me
 ‘Someone thinks something good about me.’

TU is the primary exponent of the prime YOU because it is the basic, unmarked form for the second person. There are two other relevant pronouns to be briefly considered, viz. *lei* (sometimes written with a capital L) and *voi*. *Lei* is the standard V form in Italian. *Voi*, as well as being [2PL], is still occasionally used as a singular form, generally when addressing older relatives. This usage is now mostly confined to the south of Italy, and very rare among speakers of higher socio-economic classes. Like *lei* (and V forms in general), *voi* has a complex meaning. TU, on the other hand, enters in an allolexical relationship with T1 (used as an unstressed direct or indirect object) and TE (a stressed pronoun, also occurring after prepositions).

- (24) Tu vuoi sapere qualcosa.
 you want:2SG.PRES know:INF something
 'You want to know something.'
- (25) Qualcosa ti succederà.
 something you happen:3SG.FUT
 'Something will happen to you.'
- (26) Ci vado con te.
 there go:1SG.PRES with you
 'I go there with you.'

There is no subject pronoun IO in (26). (20) and (24) would also sound far more natural and idiomatic without a subject pronoun. Overall, as in the case of Spanish, subject pronouns add emphasis or establish a contrast. They may also be required to prevent ambiguity, e.g. in the singular forms of the present subjunctive. If the subject of a subjunctive is *tu*, a pronoun must be used. To maximize clarity, first and third person pronouns are also often expressed in this environment. Clitic placement is as in Spanish.

2.1.2 SOMEONE and SOMETHING

Like their English counterparts, exponents for SOMEONE and SOMETHING in the main Romance languages require combinatorial allolexes for use with determiners and quantifiers, as well as in negative constructions and in relative clauses. Even so, in English explications, the combinations THIS SOMEONE and THIS SOMETHING appear to have been used quite freely (side by side with THIS PERSON and THIS THING), and the inevitable question which must be raised is whether this is legitimate. No answer will be offered here; the matter remains very much a question for further discussion in NSM circles. Suffice it to say that, in the main Romance languages, both types of combinations are grammatically possible, and could therefore be part of the Romance NSMs. However, only the latter (i.e. THIS PERSON and THIS THING) will be illustrated in the following subsections.

On the other hand, whereas SOMETHING combines freely with all quantifiers, SOMEONE only occurs with the numerals (ONE and TWO). In English, the combination of TWO and SOMEONE requires a separate allolex PEOPLE, not to be confused with the prime (see Section 2.1.3 for additional comments).

In the main Romance languages, all of the following are needed:

French:	QUELQU'UN (PERSONNE, QUI) QUELQUE CHOSE (CHOSE, RIEN, CE QUI / CE QUE)
Spanish:	ALGUIEN (PERSONA, NADIE, QUIÉN) ALGO (COSA, NADA, LO QUÉ)
Portuguese:	ALGUÉM (PESSOA, NINGUÉM, QUEM) ALGO (COISA, NADA, O QUE)
Italian:	QUALCUNO (PERSONA, NESSUNO, CHI) QUALCOSA (COSA, NIENTE, CHE COSA)

When a negative allolex is used in (written) French, either pre-verbally or post-verbally, an additional negative marker must be inserted before the verb. In the other languages, only post-verbal negative allolexes – including subjects (which however do not need to be post-verbal) – require this type of marker; in Italian, for instance, both of the following are correct:

- (27) Nessuno / niente si muove.
nobody nothing move:3SG.PRES
'Nobody / nothing is moving.'
- (28) Non si muove nessuno / niente.
NEG move:3SG.PRES nobody nothing
'Nobody / nothing is moving.'

Further research is needed to determine if, for NSM purposes, one of these two word orders is to be preferred to the other. It must be noted that the use of a post-verbal subject in French triggers a pre-verbal “dummy” subject pronoun *il* (e.g. *rien n'arrive* or *il n'arrive rien* ‘nothing is happening’).

2.1.2.1 French

SOMEONE and SOMETHING are expressed in French by means of QUELQU'UN and QUELQUE CHOSE, whose morphological build-up mirrors that of their English counterparts. When they are followed by an adjective or an adjectival phrase, a ligature must be inserted: SOMETHING SMALL, for instance, is QUELQUE CHOSE DE PETIT. The lack of agreement on a following adjective demonstrates that, semantically, QUELQUE CHOSE is a single unit; used on its own, *chose* is [FEM] (it takes the indefinite article *une*). QUELQU'UN is also a single unit, even though, in Canadian French, there is a separate form for the feminine, viz. *quelqu'une*. The latter is not expected to play any role in NSM. The plurals *quelques choses* ‘a few things’ and

quelques-uns / quelques-unes ‘a few [people or things]’ are semantically distinct: their use with *de* + Adj / AdjP is ungrammatical.

Combinations of QUELQU’UN and QUELQUE CHOSE with THIS and other determiners and quantifiers (subject to the caveats noted above) require the use of the allolexes PERSONNE and CHOSE, as in CETTE PERSONNE and CETTE CHOSE (where CETTE is the feminine form of the demonstrative CE). PERSONNE is also needed in negative statements, where it is neutral rather than feminine and occurs together with the negative marker *ne*, to refer to NOBODY or NOT ... ANYBODY; for things, RIEN (NOTHING, NOT ... ANYTHING) is used, also with the negative marker *ne*. Relative clauses require yet another set of allolexes: QUI for WHO, CE QUI for WHAT (subject) and CE QUE for WHAT (DIRECT OBJECT).

- (29) Quelqu’un a vu quelque chose.
 someone see:3SG.PCOMP something
 ‘Someone saw something.’
- (30) Deux personnes ont entendu toutes ces choses.
 two persons hear:3PL.PCOMP all these things
 ‘Two people heard all these things.’
- (31) Je ne sais rien et je ne pense à
 I NEG know:1SG.PRES nothing and I NEG think:1SG.PRES PREP
 personne.
 nobody
 ‘I know nothing and I think of nobody.’
 ‘I don’t know anything and I don’t think of anybody.’
- (32) Tu sais qui je suis et ce que je fais.
 you know:2SG.PRES who I be:1SG.PRES and what I do:1SG.PRES
 ‘You know who I am and what I do.’
- (33) Ces gens ne savent pas ce qui est bien.
 these people NEG know:3PL.PRES not what be:3SG.PRES good
 ‘These people do not know what is good.’

2.1.2.2 Spanish

SOMEONE and SOMETHING are expressed by means of ALGUIEN and ALGO; whereas the French exponents are both morphologically complex, ALGO as a whole appears to be the first constituent of ALGUIEN, which in turn is morphologically related to *quién* ‘who’.

- (34) Alguien lo llevó.
 someone 3SG.CLIT take:3SG.PRET
 ‘Someone took it.’

- (35) Veo algo ahí.
 see:1SG.PRES something there
 'I see something over there.'

With determiners and quantifiers, *PERSONA* 'PERSON' and *COSA* 'THING' are used (*ESTA PERSONA*, *DOS COSAS*). Further allolexes, viz. the forms *NADIE* 'NOBODY' and *NADA* 'NOTHING', are required in negative sentences, where they are used with an additional negative marker *no* (except when placed in pre-verbal position, as explained in the preamble to this section):

- (36) No vi a nadie.
 NEG see:1SG.PRET PREP nobody
 'I didn't see anyone.'

- (37) Nadie dijo nada.
 nobody say:3SG.PRET nothing
 'Nobody said anything.'

In relative clauses, *QUIÉN* 'WHO' and *LO QUE* 'WHAT' take over from *ALGO* and *ALGUIEN*:

- (38) Quiero saber quién lo hizo.
 want:1SG.PRES know:INF who 3SG.CLIT do:3SG.PRET
 'I want to know who did it.'

- (39) No sabemos lo que pasó.
 not know:1PL.PRES what happen:3SG.PRET
 'We don't know what happened.'

ALGUIEN and *ALGO* do occur as such with evaluators and descriptors (*ALGO GRANDE* / *PEQUEÑO* 'SOMETHING BIG / SMALL', *ALGUIEN BUENO* / *MALO* 'SOMEONE GOOD / BAD'). There is no need for a ligature (as was the case in French).

2.1.2.3 Portuguese

ALGUÉM 'SOMEONE' and *ALGO* 'SOMETHING', illustrated in the following example, have essentially the same properties as their Spanish cognates.

- (40) Alguém disse algo.
 someone say:SG.PRET something
 'Someone said something.'

The allolexes *NADA* and *NINGUÉM* occur in negative constructions; *QUEM* and *o QUE* are used in relative clauses:

- (41) Ninguém viu nada.
 nobody see:SG.PRET nothing
 'Nobody saw anything.'

- (42) Eu não fiz nada.
I NEG do:1SG.PRET nothing
'I didn't do anything.'
- (43) Você quer saber quem fez isso.
you want:SG.PRES know:INF who do:SG.PRET this
'You want to know who did this.'
- (44) Você quer saber o que aconteceu.
you want:SG.PRES know:INF what happen:SG.PRET
'You want to know what happened.'

The allolexes *PESSOA* 'PERSON' and *COISA* 'THING' occur with determiners (*ESTA PESSOA* 'THIS PERSON') and quantifiers (*MUITAS COISAS* 'MANY THINGS'); the base forms *ALGUÉM* and *ALGO* are used with evaluators and descriptors (*ALGUÉM BOM* 'SOMEONE GOOD', *ALGO PEQUENO* 'SOMETHING SMALL'). A very common variant of *ALGO* is *ALGUMA COISA*, which is morphologically as transparent as French *QUELQUE CHOSE*.

2.1.2.4 Italian

QUALCUNO 'SOMEONE' and *QUALCOSA* 'SOMETHING' are morphologically complex, like their French cognates: *QUALCUNO* consists of the elements *qualche* 'some' and *uno* 'one'; similarly, *QUALCOSA* consists of *qualche* and *cosa* 'thing'. Both can occur as subjects and direct or indirect objects:

- (45) Qualcosa mi è successo.
something me happen:3SG.PPROS
'Something happened to me.'
- (46) Qualcuno dice bene di te.
someone say:3SG.PRES good PREP you
'Someone says good things about you.'
- (47) Vedo qualcuno / qualcosa.
see:1SG.PRES someone something
'I see someone / something.'

Instead of *QUALCUNO* and *QUALCOSA*, *PERSONA* and *COSA* are used with NSM determiners and quantifiers (e.g. *QUESTA PERSONA* 'THIS PERSON', *DUE COSE* 'TWO THINGS'). The negative allolexes are *NESSUNO* 'NOBODY' and *NIENTE* 'NOTHING', respectively. Both generally occur with the negative marker *non* (except when used pre-verbally).

- (48) Non vedo nessuno / niente.
NEG see:1SG.PRES nobody nothing
'I can't see anybody / anything.'

- (49) Nessuno mi ha sentito.
 nobody me hear:3SG.PPROS
 'Nobody heard me.'

In relative clauses, *QUALCUNO* and *QUALCOSA* are realized as *CHI* 'WHO' and *CHE COSA* 'WHAT'.

- (50) Voglio sapere che cosa / chi si muove.
 want:1SG.PRES know:INF what who move:3SG.PRES
 'I want to know what / who is moving.'

QUALCOSA can be followed by an adjective. A ligature is required, as in French (*QUALCOSA DI BENE / DI MALE / DI GRANDE / DI PICCOLO* 'SOMETHING GOOD / BAD / BIG / SMALL'). *QUALCUNO* appears to be a little more recalcitrant, but the same combinations, while not very idiomatic, are certainly intelligible. In Standard Italian, one would much rather say *una persona grande* 'a big person' instead of *qualcuno di grande*. Not much is at stake here: in NSM explications, both could in fact be used indiscriminately, since, as indicated, *PERSONA* is needed as an allolex of *QUALCUNO* for other reasons.

2.1.3 PEOPLE

The English exponent for *PEOPLE*, a frequent prime in cultural scripts, where it refers to a socially or culturally defined community, is a collective noun triggering plural verb agreement when used as a subject. It occurs on its own, or with determiners and quantifiers other than *ONE* and *TWO*. The same exponent also denotes humans as a species different from, say, dogs or birds, and it may be used to describe their relationship to the god or gods they worship, or to refer to specimens within the species, e.g. in the statement that *crocodiles eat people* (one by one). Earlier claims (for instance in Wierzbicka 2002:74) that the prime *PEOPLE* is *inherently* social are to be treated cautiously. As all attempts to single out one of the above uses as basic, and to explicate the others, have failed, it looks as though the different phrases that are needed in some languages (e.g. Malay, according to Goddard 2002:95, and perhaps also German, where *LEUTE* may have to be opposed to *MENSCHEN*) are allolexes of a single prime. There is no allolexy in the main Romance languages, except for Portuguese. French uses a plural noun. Spanish and Italian rely, as does English, on a collective one. In Portuguese, instead of a collective noun, a plural allolex is needed in some contexts. Subject-verb agreement with the collective nouns is in the singular. Often, articles must be added, in accordance with rules of grammar which vary slightly from one language to another.

French:	GENS
Spanish:	GENTE
Portuguese:	GENTE (AS PESSOAS)
Italian:	GENTE

2.1.3.1 French

The selection, by Peeters (1994:426), of the singular indefinite or generic subject pronoun *on* (usually glossed as the English generic ‘one’ in, e.g. *One never knows*) as the unique exponent for PEOPLE was welcomed by Wierzbicka (1994:453) as a “very interesting suggestion”; she added nonetheless that she could think of no reason to assume that “the more obvious candidate”, viz. the grammatically plural collective noun phrase LES GENS – with the definite article – was not another exponent of the same meaning. The suggestion to posit allolexy is therefore hers; however, it was ignored in more recent work, in which only *les gens* appears. The underlying assumption is that *on* is not sufficiently basic: it is mostly inherently plural, but it can also be singular, for instance when reference is made to an unnamed spokesperson (e.g. in press reports of the type *Personne n’a été tué, précise-t-on à la gendarmerie* ‘Nobody has been killed, says a source at the police station’). Canonical contexts for GENS are given below. Examples (53)–(54) show that the exponent is needed also in positions other than that of the subject.

- (51) Si tu fais cela, les gens diront du mal de toi.
if you do:2SG.PRES that, the people say:3SG.FUT PART bad PREP you
‘If you do that, people will say something bad about you.’
- (52) Les gens disent que Dieu sait tout.
the people say:3SG.PRES COMP God know:3SG.PRES everything
‘Some people say that God knows everything.’
- (53) J’ ai vu beaucoup d’ autres gens.
I see:1SG.PCOMP many LIG other people
‘I saw many other people.’
- (54) Dieu aime les gens.
God love:3SG.PRES the people
‘God loves people.’
- (55) Les oiseaux volent, mais pas les gens.
the birds fly:3PL.PRES but not the people
‘Birds fly, but people do not.’

2.1.3.2 Spanish

The exponent of the prime PEOPLE in Spanish is GENTE. Its distribution is identical to that of its French counterpart, the only difference being that GENTE, being a

singular noun, is followed by a singular verb form when used as a subject. Travis (2002: 184) posited a separate allolex *PERSONAS* to be used with numerals – but it has been established in the meantime that *DOS PERSONAS* ‘TWO PEOPLE’ is in fact a combination involving the prime *SOMEONE*. In other words, *PEOPLE*, in the English NSM, is non-compositionally polysemous (Goddard & Peeters this volume), with differences in syntactic patterning allowing to distinguish between the prime, on the one hand, and the allolex of *SOMEONE*, on the other. The presence of a definite article in (56) and (58) and its absence in (57) is in line with what was said in the introduction to this section.

- (56) Si pienso así, la gente va a decir algo bueno
 if think:1SG.PRES like.this the people say:3SG.FUT something good
 de mí.
 PREP me
 ‘If I think like this, people will say something good about me.’
- (57) Hay mucha gente en este sitio.
 there.is much people PREP this place
 ‘There are many people in this place.’
- (58) Los peces viven en el mar, la gente no.
 the fish live:3PL.PRES PREP the sea the people not
 ‘Fish live in the sea, people don’t.’

A more idiomatic version of (56) – and of many other similar sentences – would involve the use of a [3PL] verb and no overt mention of the subject, i.e. *van a decir* ‘(they) will say’. However, as *they* is not a prime and as it cannot be combined with a quantifier such as *MUCHO* (which is one of the combinatorial properties expected of and hypothesized for the prime *PEOPLE*), this construction is not available in NSM.

2.1.3.3 Portuguese

To express the prime *PEOPLE* in Portuguese, the singular collective noun *GENTE* is used in the absence of a definite article or in the presence of a quantifier other than a numeral, as illustrated in (59). Elsewhere, to prevent confusion, the plural of *PESSOA* ‘PERSON’ must be used, as in (60)–(61). This is because *a gente* (lit. ‘the people’), at least in the absence of a modifier, only has the value of a [1PL] pronoun, even though it triggers the same default singular verb agreement as [3SG] subjects and [2SG] *VOCÊ*, as shown in (62).

- (59) Eu vi muito mais gente.
 I see:1SG.PRET much more people
 ‘I saw many more people.’

- (60) Se você fizer isso, as pessoas vão falar mal de você.
 if you do:SG.FUT.SJV this the people say:PL.FUT bad PREP you
 ‘If you do this, people will say something bad about you.’
- (61) Os pássaros têm penas, as pessoas não têm.
 the birds have:PL.PRES feathers the people not have:PL.PRES
 ‘Birds have feathers, people don’t.’
- (62) A gente não tem penas.
 we not have:SG.PRES feathers
 ‘We don’t have feathers.’

2.1.3.4 *Italian*

In Italian, the most appropriate exponent for the prime PEOPLE is *GENTE*. As in Spanish and Portuguese, this collective noun triggers singular verb agreement when used as a subject. An Italian cultural script could start off as in (63). Other typical NSM collocations of *GENTE* are given in (64)–(66).

- (63) La gente qui pensa così: ...
 the people here think:3SG.PRES like.this
 ‘People here think like this: ...’
- (64) Se dico così, la gente penserà bene di me.
 if say:1SG.PRES like.this the people think:3SG.FUT well PREP me
 ‘If I say something like this people will think good things about me’
- (65) Questa gente conosce molta altra gente.
 this people know:3SG.PRES much other people
 ‘These people know many other people.’
- (66) Le tigri mangiano la gente.
 the tigers eat:3PL.PRES the people
 ‘Tigers eat people.’

2.1.4 BODY

The need to include BODY, a prime required to refer to body parts (of people as well as of animals) and to facilitate the explication of concepts such as “man” and “woman”, “boy” and “girl”, was first recognized in the later stages of the *MUG* project (Goddard & Wierzbicka 2002a), which may explain why no exponent was identified in the chapter on Spanish (Travis 2002). The exponents in the main Romance languages are straightforward, though, and no allolexy is involved.

French:	CORPS
Spanish:	CUERPO
Portuguese:	CORPO
Italian:	CORPO

All of the above are masculine nouns. No further comment appears to be called for; the subsections below consist of illustrative material only.

2.1.4.1 *French*

- (67) Le corps d' un homme n' est pas comme le corps
the body PREP a man NEG be:3SG.PRES not like the body
d' une femme.
PREP a woman
'The body of a man is not like the body of a woman.'
- (68) La jambe est une partie du corps.
the leg be:3SG.PRES a part PREP.the body
'The leg is a part of the body.'

2.1.4.2 *Spanish*

- (69) El cuerpo de un adulto es más grande que el
the body PREP a adult be:3SG.PRES more big COMP the
cuerpo de un niño.
body PREP a child
'The body of an adult is bigger than the body of a child.'
- (70) Los ojos son partes del cuerpo.
the eyes be:3PL.PRES parts PREP.the body
'The eyes are parts of the body.'

2.1.4.3 *Portuguese*

- (71) O corpo de uma criança é menor que o corpo de
the body PREP a child be:SG.PRES smaller COMP the body PREP
um adulto.
a adult
'The body of a child is smaller than the body of an adult.'
- (72) A mão é (uma) parte do corpo.
the hand be:SG.PRES a part PREP.the body
'The hand is part of the body.'

2.1.4.4 *Italian*

- (73) Il corpo di una donna non è come il corpo di
 The body PREP a woman not be:3SG.PRES like the body PREP
 un uomo.
 a man
 ‘The body of a woman is not like the body of a man.’
- (74) La bocca è una parte del corpo.
 the mouth be:3SG.PRES a part PREP.the body
 ‘The mouth is a part of the body.’

2.2 Determiners

2.2.1 THIS

The hypothesis that, in all the languages of the world, there is an exponent for THIS in contexts such as THIS PERSON, THIS PLACE – i.e. for THIS as a determiner – remains as strong and unchallenged as ever, as does the hypothesis of a compatibility with other determiners and quantifiers in contexts such as ALL THESE PEOPLE, THESE TWO THINGS. On the other hand, in some languages, instead of the quasi-substantive use (once thought to be universal) illustrated in strings such as ‘if you do this’, ‘I don’t want this’, ‘because of this’, a head noun – typically the appropriate combinatorial allolex of the prime SOMETHING – is either expected (cf. Bugenhagen 2002:27–28 on Mangaaba-Mbula) or enforced (Enfield 2002:200–202 on Lao). As a result, Goddard & Wierzbicka (2002b:47) now describe quasi-substantive THIS in languages such as English as an “abbreviatory convention”. The prime SOMETHING is omitted, but is completely predictable: it typically makes an “anaphoric reference to a situation spelt out in a previous clause” (Goddard & Wierzbicka 2002b:46). In other languages (including French, Spanish and Portuguese), quasi-substantive THIS requires an additional allolex. Finally, whenever THIS is combined with LIKE to indicate either similarity or manner, portmanteaus are used in Spanish, Portuguese and Italian. More details on how to express LIKE THIS in the main Romance languages will be provided in Chapter 6, Section 6.4.1.

The proposed exponents of this in the main Romance languages are as follows:

French:	CE (CELA)
Spanish:	ESTE (ESO)
Portuguese:	ESTE (ISSO)
Italian:	QUESTO

2.2.1.1 French

The proposals contained in Peeters (1994:429–430) reflected the mistaken view that there was a universal quasi-substantive use of the prime *THIS*. Quasi-substantive *CECI* was declared to be the “only fitting exponent” (although *CELA* was used later, e.g. in Peeters 2002:93), and allolexy was posited whenever *THIS* was supposed to occur adnominally, i.e. as a genuine determiner. The additional allolex was *CE*, which had itself a number of combinatorial allolexes, since it had to agree in gender and number with the noun it qualified. Apart from being incompatible with the facts brought to light by the in-depth analysis of languages such as Mangaaba-Mbula and Lao, the 1994 approach ignored the fact that, primarily, the prime *THIS* is (and at the time already was) thought of as a determiner, not a pronoun.

In an attempt to improve on the earlier analysis, it is now proposed to posit the *determiner* *CE* as the basic exponent. Additional combinatorial allolexes include *CETTE* [FEM.SG], *CET* [in front of MASC.SG nouns starting with a vowel] and *CES* [PL].

- (75) Certaines gens ne connaissent pas cet endroit.
 some people NEG know:3PL.PRES not this place
 ‘Some people don’t know this place.’
- (76) Ces deux autres choses sont loin d’ ici.
 these two other things be:3PL.PRES far PREP here
 ‘These two other things are far from here.’

The positional allolex *CELA* is used for quasi-substantive *THIS* (except in the similarity and manner phrase *LIKE THIS*, which is best rendered as *COMME ÇA*; cf. Chapter 6, Section 6.4.1.1). In contemporary spoken French, *ça* is widely used instead of *cela*. However, the generalized use of *ça* may be slightly too informal for NSM purposes.

- (77) C’ est bien si quelqu’un fait cela.
 3SG.CLIT be:3SG.PRES good if someone do:3SG.PRES this
 ‘It is good if someone does this.’
- (78) Si tu dis cela, je penserai du bien de toi.
 if you say:2SG.PRES this I think:1SG.FUT PART good PREP you
 ‘If you say this, I will think something good about you.’
- (79) Quelque chose est arrivé après cela.
 something happen:3SG.PCOMP after this
 ‘Something happened after this.’

2.2.1.2 Spanish

As a determiner, **THIS** is realized in Spanish as **ESTE** [MASC.SG] / **ESTA** [FEM.SG] / **ESTOS** [MASC.PL] / **ESTAS** [FEM.PL]. The gender and number of the head noun determine which form is used.

- (80) Hay mucha gente en este sitio.
 there.is much people PREP this place
 'There are many people in this place.'
- (81) Esta persona lo hizo.
 this person 3SG.CLIT do:3SG.PRET
 'This person did it.'
- (82) Estos dos animales son muy grandes.
 these two animals be:3PL.PRES very big
 'These two animals are very big.'

In its quasi-substantive use, **THIS** is realized as **ESO** (equivalent to French **CELA**).

- (83) Es malo si alguien dice eso.
 be:3SG.PRES bad if someone say:3SG.PRES this
 'It is bad if someone says this.'
- (84) Si yo hago eso, la gente va a decir algo malo de mí.
 if I do:1SG.PRES this the people say:3SG.FUT something bad PREP
 me
 'If I do this, people will say something bad about me.'

The additional alloloxes proposed by Travis (2002:205) may not be needed; they mostly refer to specific objects, a kind of reference that does not arise in NSM definitions, where nouns are repeated if required.

2.2.1.3 Portuguese

The base form and additional positional alloloxes of the prime **THIS** in Portuguese are identical to their Spanish cognates, except for the [MASC.PL], which is **ESTES**. Prepositions such as *em* 'in / on' and *de* 'of' contract with them just as they do with articles.

- (85) Algumas pessoas não vêem estas coisas.
 some people not see:PL.PRES these things
 'Some people don't see these things.'
- (86) Eu falei mal desta pessoa.
 I say:1SG.PRET bad PREP.this person
 'I said something bad about this person.'

- (87) Estas duas árvores são grandes.
 these two trees be:PL.PRES big
 ‘These two trees are big.’

ISSO is the quasi-substantive allolex of the Portuguese exponent of THIS, corresponding to Spanish ESO and to French CELA.

- (88) É ruim se alguém pensa isso.
 be:SG.PRES bad if someone think:SG.PRES this
 ‘It is bad if someone thinks this.’
- (89) Por causa disso eu senti algo ruim.
 because PREP.this I feel:1SG.PRET something bad
 ‘Because of this I felt something bad.’

2.2.1.4 Italian

There is no need to posit allolexy for the Italian exponent of the prime THIS: the same form QUESTO can act both as a determiner and a quasi-substantive. Although there is a separate word for the latter, viz. *ciò*, it seems unlikely that it would be needed in an Italian NSM, as QUESTO easily fits all the requirements of the prime.

As a determiner, QUESTO must agree in number and gender with the noun it refers to, hence QUESTA [FEM.SG], QUESTI [MASC.PL] and QUESTE [FEM.PL] also occur. There is no agreement when QUESTO is a quasi-substantive, at least not in NSM explications: like its quasi-substantive counterparts in the other languages, it is a neuter form.

- (90) Qualcosa è successo a questa cosa / questa persona.
 something happen:3SG.PPROS PREP this thing this person
 ‘Something happened to this thing / this person.’
- (91) Molta gente dice che questo è bene.
 much people say:3SG.PRES COMP this be:3SG.PRES good
 ‘Many people say that this is good.’
- (92) Tu hai fatto del male, io non sapevo questo.
 you do:2SG.PPROS PART bad I not know:1SG.IMPF this
 ‘You did something bad, I didn’t know this.’

As in the other languages, QUESTO can occur with other NSM determiners, e.g. QUESTE DUE PERSONE ‘THESE TWO PEOPLE’, QUESTE ALTRE PERSONE ‘THESE OTHER PEOPLE’, TUTTE QUESTE PERSONE ‘ALL THESE PEOPLE’.

2.2.2 SAME

The polysemy of the English determiner *same* – which can be either about (perceived) identity, i.e. (perceived) lack of difference (as in *This is the same car as last year; I haven't bought a new one*), or about mere similarity or likeness (as in *They've got the same eyes*) – is reflected in the main Romance languages, although at least two of them have a fairly common word (Spanish *igual*, Italian *uguale*) for similarity as opposed to identity. The NSM prime refers to the latter only. Evidence from Romance suggests that the inclusion of a definite article in the English exponent, which has always been thought to be THE SAME, may be ill-inspired, even though it was not questioned in earlier work on either French or Spanish. Admitting the article as part of the prime compels us to posit a unique form of combinatorial allomorphy involving the use of different definite articles as well as of different endings in all the languages in our sample. It may be preferable to state that the use of the article before the determiner SAME is a basic rule of grammar in the main Romance languages – comparable to the rule that says that, in a variety of contexts, an article must be used with the Romance exponents of (the prime) PEOPLE, but not with the English exponent (cf. Section 2.1.3 above). Accordingly, the following lexicalizations are proposed:

French:	MÊME
Spanish:	MISMO
Portuguese:	MESMO
Italian:	STESSO

Closer scrutiny of the prime reveals some discrepancies among the main Romance languages, especially in the area of quasi-substantive usage. All exponents have a valency option for a reference point (THE SAME AS); the latter requires the complementizer *que* in French, Spanish and Portuguese, and *di* in Italian.

2.2.2.1 French

Combining MÊME, the French exponent of SAME, with PERSONNE (an allomorph of QUELQU'UN) as well as with a number of other primes with which it is expected to occur universally is very straightforward: LA MÊME PERSONNE 'THE SAME PERSON', LE MÊME ENDROIT 'THE SAME PLACE', AU MÊME MOMENT 'AT THE SAME TIME', etc. All that is required is an appropriate article. Number agreement (MÊME > MÊMES) also applies.

- (93) Ces deux choses sont arrivées au même endroit.
 these two things happen:3PL.PCOMP PREP.the same place
 'These two things happened at the same place.'

- (94) Quelqu'un a vu les mêmes personnes que toi.
 someone see:3SG.PCOMP the same persons as you
 'Someone saw the same people as you.'

The only context in which it appears *MÊME* could occur without a following head noun, i.e. quasi-substantively, is when it is used as a subject complement, as in (95). However, such uses are clearly elliptical, and the head noun to be supplied is never far away (and is probably only left out to avoid repetition). A definite article remains compulsory.

- (95) Ces deux endroits sont les mêmes.
 these two places be:3PL.PRES the same
 'These two places are the same.'

2.2.2.2 Spanish

The Spanish exponent of SAME is *MISMO*. As a determiner, in examples such as (96) and (97), it agrees in gender and number with the head noun, resulting in the combinatorial allomorphs *MISMO* [MASC.SG], *MISMA* [FEM.SG], *MISMOS* [MASC.PL] and *MISMAS* [FEM.PL]. As a quasi-substantive, it occurs with the article *lo*, as in examples (98) and (99).

- (96) Ella vio la misma persona.
 3SG see:3SG.PRET the same person
 'She saw the same person.'
- (97) Fueron al mismo sitio, no a otro sitio.
 go:3PL.PRET PREP.the same place not PREP other place
 'They went to the same place, not to another place.'
- (98) Lo mismo me pasó.
 the same me happen:3SG.PRET
 'The same happened to me.'
- (99) Tú piensas lo mismo que yo.
 you think:2SG.PRES the same as I
 'You think the same as me.'

2.2.2.3 Portuguese

MESMO, the Portuguese exponent of SAME, can function as a determiner, in which case it has the usual gender- and number-based combinatorial allomorphs, as in the other Romance languages, or as a quasi-substantive.

- (100) Ele pensa a mesma coisa que eu.
 3SG think:SG.PRES the same thing as I
 'He thinks the same thing as me.'

- (101) Foram ao mesmo lugar.
 go:PL.PRET PREP.the same place
 ‘They went to the same place.’
- (102) O mesmo aconteceu comigo.
 the same happen:SG.PRET with.me
 ‘The same happened to me.’

2.2.2.4 Italian

Like Spanish *MISMO* and Portuguese *MESMO*, Italian *STESSO* is invariable as a quasi-substantive, and inflects for gender and number when it acts as a determiner (*STESSO* [MASC.SG], *STESSA* [FEM.SG], *STESSI* [MASC.PL], *STESSE* [FEM.PL]).

- (103) Hai detto qualcosa alla stessa persona.
 say:2SG.PPROS something PREP.the same person
 ‘You said something to the same person.’
- (104) Tu hai fatto qualcosa, io ho fatto lo stesso.
 you do:2SG.PPROS something I do:1SG.PPROS the same
 ‘You did something, I did the same.’

In some combinations (e.g. after a verb such as *PENSARE*, or after a preposition), the quasi-substantive use is less satisfactory. This does not raise any problems for the Italian NSM, as it is always possible to use the expression *LA STESSA COSA* ‘THE SAME THING’ INSTEAD.

- (105) Ho pensato la stessa cosa di te.
 think:1SG.PPROS the same thing as you
 ‘I thought the same as you.’

2.2.3 OTHER

Rather than to “augmentative otherness” (as in idiomatic expressions such as *Let’s have another beer* = *Let’s have one more beer*), the prime *OTHER* refers to “qualitative otherness”. It means something like ‘not the same’ – but cannot be thought of as a portmanteau for *NOT* + *SAME* (as pointed out by Wierzbicka 1994: 471). *OTHER* freely occurs with the entire set of NSM determiners and quantifiers, except – for obvious reasons – the prime *SAME*. The exponents in the main Romance languages are straightforward:

French:	AUTRE
Spanish:	OTRO
Portuguese:	OUTRO
Italian:	ALTRO

2.2.3.1 French

AUTRE ‘OTHER’ combines with all the substantives in the NSM lexicon, except I and YOU. In the absence of other determiners and/or quantifiers, it normally takes an indefinite article (UN AUTRE [MASC.SG], UNE AUTRE [FEM.SG], D’AUTRES [PL]). The combinations SOMEONE ELSE, SOMETHING ELSE, NOBODY ELSE and NOTHING ELSE are expressed as QUELQU’UN D’AUTRE, AUTRE CHOSE, PERSONNE D’AUTRE and RIEN D’AUTRE, respectively. In other words, whereas English uses a combinatorial allolex (ELSE), French AUTRE is linked to the preceding substantive by means of a ligature, except in the case of AUTRE CHOSE. The combination *quelque chose d’autre* also exists, but is less widely used. There appears to be no paraphrasable difference between the two.

- (106) J’ étais dans un autre endroit.
 I be:1SG.IMPf PREP an other place
 ‘I was in another place.’
- (107) Ces deux autres personnes ont vu autre chose.
 these two other persons see:3PL.PCOMP other thing
 ‘These two other people saw something else.’

2.2.3.2 Spanish

OTHER is realized as OTRO, a form which agrees in gender and number with the head noun (OTRO [MASC.SG], OTRA [FEM.SG], OTROS [MASC.PL], OTRAS [FEM.PL]). There is no requirement for an indefinite article in the absence of other determiners and/or quantifiers. Some illustrative uses are provided below.

- (108) No es un perico. Es otro tipo de pájaro.
 not be:3SG.PRES a parrot be:3SG.PRES other kind of bird
 ‘This is not a parrot. It’s another kind of bird.’
- (109) Esta otra cosa no es pequeña.
 this other thing not be:3SG.PRES small
 ‘This other thing is not small.’

OTRA COSA ‘SOMETHING ELSE’, NADIE OTRO ‘NOBODY ELSE’ and NADA OTRO ‘NOTHING ELSE’ are comparable to their French counterparts – except for the fact that no ligature is needed. As in French, OTRA COSA is more common than *algo otro*, and so is OTRA PERSONA ‘SOMEONE ELSE’ compared to *alguien otro*. A relevant example is given in (9) above.

2.2.3.3 Portuguese

The Portuguese exponent of OTHER is OUTRO. It has [MASC] (OUTRO), [FEM] (OUTRA) and [PL] (OUTROS / OUTRAS) forms that display agreement with the head noun. SOMEONE ELSE, SOMETHING ELSE, NOBODY ELSE and NOTHING ELSE

are lexicalized in exactly the same way as in Spanish: *OUTRA PESSOA*, *OUTRA COISA*, *NINGUÉM OUTRO* and *NADA OUTRO*, respectively.

- (110) Eu estava em um outro lugar.
I be:SG.IMPf PREP an other place
'I was in another place.'
- (111) Estas outras pessoas viram outra coisa.
these other people see:PL.PRET other thing
'These other people saw something else.'

2.2.3.4 Italian

ALTRO 'OTHER' can be used before NSM substantives such as *COSA* 'THING' and *PERSONA* 'PERSON', with which, as usual, it must agree in gender and number, giving rise to *ALTRA* [FEM.SG], *ALTRI* [MASC.PL] and *ALTRE* [FEM.PL]. In the singular it requires a preceding indefinite article *un*. *ALTRO* can also occur with the NSM substantives *QUALCUNO* 'SOMEONE' and *QUALCOSA* 'SOMETHING', and their negative allolexes *NESSUNO* 'NOBODY' and *NIENTE* 'NOTHING', but in these cases, which in English necessitate the allolex *ELSE*, *ALTRO* must follow the noun (*QUALCUN ALTRO*, *NESSUN ALTRO*, *QUALCOS'ALTRO*, *NIENT'ALTRO*).

- (112) Ho visto molte altre cose.
see:1SG.PPROS many other things
'I saw many other things.'
- (113) Qualcos' altro mi è successo.
something other me happen:3SG.PPROS
'Something else happened to me.'

2.3 Quantifiers

2.3.1 ONE and TWO

ONE and *TWO* hardly need any general comments, apart perhaps from the fact that, in the main Romance languages, *ONE* requires a separate form for the feminine. Portuguese has a [FEM] form for *TWO* as well. The exponents for *ONE* are formally identical to the indefinite article but, unlike the latter, have no corresponding [PL] forms. In two of the languages, there is an additional allolex for quasi-substantive uses of *ONE*. Details (minus gender allolexes, which are not shown) are as follows:

French:	UN / DEUX
Spanish:	UN (UNO) / DOS
Portuguese:	UM / DOIS
Italian:	UN (UNO) / DUE

2.3.1.1 French

The French exponents of ONE and TWO are UN [MASC] / UNE [FEM] and DEUX. Both can be used with the determiner AUTRE ‘OTHER’, which must follow the quantifier.

- (114) Il a deux fils et une fille.
 3SG.CLIT have:3SG.PRES two sons and one daughter
 ‘He has two sons and one daughter.’
- (115) Il y avait deux (autres) personnes dans cet endroit.
 there.is:IMPF two other people PREP this place
 ‘There were two (other) people in this place.’

UN and DEUX have an optional selective valency slot: they may be used to identify a subset, in which case the head noun (i.e. the noun referring to the set from which members are drawn) takes the preposition *de*.

- (116) J’ ai entendu une de ces paroles, pas l’ autre.
 I hear:1SG.PCOMP one PREP these words, not the other
 ‘I heard one of these words, not the other one.’

2.3.1.2 Spanish

ONE and TWO are realized as UN / UNO / UNA and DOS, respectively. UN and UNO are both [MASC]; the former is used in noun phrases and is therefore the basic exponent (in spite of indications to the contrary in Travis 2002: 207–208); the latter appears in other contexts (e.g. when followed by the preposition *de* to mark a subset, as in *uno de ellos* ‘one of them’). UNA, on the other hand, is [FEM]. Of the two numerals, only DOS can co-occur with the determiner OTRO, which, unlike in French, *precedes* the quantifier.

- (117) Ella tiene un hijo.
 3SG have:3SG.PRES one child
 ‘She has one child.’
- (118) Vi a otras dos personas.
 see:1SG.PRET PREP other two people
 ‘I saw two other people.’
- (119) Una / dos de estas personas lo hizo / hicieron.
 one two PREP these persons 3SG.CLIT do:3SG.PRET do:3PL.PRET
 ‘One / two of these people did it.’

2.3.1.3 Portuguese

In Portuguese, the exponents of both ONE, viz. UM / UMA [MASC / FEM], and TWO, viz. DOIS / DUAS [MASC / FEM], agree in gender with the head noun.

- (120) Ela tem um filho e dois cachorros.
 3SG have:SG.PRES one child and two dogs.
 'She has one child and two dogs.'

- (121) Eu vi duas pessoas, não uma.
 I see:1SG.PRET two persons not one
 'I saw two people, not one.'

Once again, as illustrated in (122), UM and DOIS may be used to identify a selection. Example (123), on the other hand, shows that the exponents of ONE and TWO can either precede or follow the determiner OTHER.

- (122) Eu conheço uma destas pessoas.
 I know:1SG.PRES one PREP.these people
 'I know one of these people.'

- (123) Eu vi duas outras pessoas / outras duas pessoas.
 I see:1SG.PRET two other persons other two persons
 'I saw two other people.'

2.3.1.4 Italian

The primes ONE and TWO are expressed by means of UN / UNO / UNA, on the one hand, and DUE, on the other. The distribution of the allolexes posited in the case of UN is as in Spanish. Selective constructions using *di* 'of' are also possible. When the exponent of ONE combines with the prime OTHER, it must occur before the determiner. The exponent of TWO can occur either before or after, but in the Italian NSM it will be best if it is restricted to use before. Indeed, the meaning of a phrase such as *altre due persone* is closer to 'two *more* people' than it is to 'two *other* people'.

- (124) Ho sentito due cani e un bambino.
 hear:1SG.PPROS two dogs and one child
 'I heard two dogs and one child.'

- (125) Una di queste cose è molto grande.
 one PREP these things be:3SG.PRES very big
 'One of these things is very big.'

- (126) In quel posto ho visto un’ altra persona / due altre
 PREP that place see:1SG.PPROS one other person two other
 persone.
 persons
 ‘In that place I saw one other person / two other people.’

2.3.2 SOME

The inherently plural and indefinite SOME joined the ranks of NSM determiners and quantifiers in Wierzbicka (1996:74–76), together with the existential prime THERE IS (cf. Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1). Both are needed, both are claimed to be universal and semantically basic. Admittedly, in Italian (as in Malay; cf. Goddard 2002: 128–132), it looks as though an “existential structure” may be the only way to lexicalize the prime SOME, and the same appears to be true in French (in spite of earlier suggestions): in other words, the Italian and French translational equivalents of a sentence such as *Some people don’t like bananas* are of the type *There are people who don’t like bananas*. However, the “existential structure” differs from the existential prime, and any and all attempts to satisfactorily define SOME in terms of THERE IS have proven fruitless. The proposed exponents for SOME are as follows:

French:	IL Y A ... QUI
Spanish:	ALGUNOS
Portuguese:	ALGUNS
Italian:	C’È ... CHE

2.3.2.1 French

At first sight, regardless of what was said in the preamble, there appear to be three a priori candidates in French for the prime SOME, viz. *quelques*, *certain*s and *plusieurs*. The former two select a subset within totality (“not all”), whereas the latter implies expansion from below (“not one”). On the other hand, whereas *plusieurs* and *quelques* appear to focus on (relatively) low numbers (“not many”), *certain*s highlights contrast (“not the same”) relative to an external reference point. Crucially, though, none of the above relationships are compositional: it would be incorrect to define *quelques* as ‘not many, not all’, if only because ‘not all’ seems to imply ‘most’ (Wierzbicka 1996:76), which *quelques* certainly does not.

SOME is “a quantifier, situated somewhere between ONE and ALL” (ibid.:74); this leaves all candidate exponents intact. It refers to an “indeterminate number” (ibid.), not one which is (relatively) low; this rules out *plusieurs* and *quelques*. Most importantly, SOME implies contrast with others rather than internally; once again, this only leaves *certain*s (*certain*es [FEM]). The latter combines without difficulty

with several of the NSM nouns, especially with GENS 'PEOPLE', which imposes feminine gender on the quantifier *certain* (as in *certaines gens*). It also allows a selective valency option requiring the preposition *de*. However, the connotation referred to above is problematic, so much so that the most appropriate lexicalization in French of the prime SOME is the existential structure IL Y A ... QUI (lit. 'there are ... who / which'), to be used only with plurals. The selective valency option is realized by means of the pronoun *en* (IL Y EN A QUI).

- (127) Il y a des gens qui ne savent pas ces choses.
 there.are ART people REL NEG know:3PL.PRES not these things
 'Some people do not know these things.'
- (128) Il y en a (de ces choses) qui sont bonnes pour toi.
 there.are PREP these things REL be:3PL.PRES good PREP you
 'Some (of these things) are good for you.'

2.3.2.2 Spanish

In Spanish, a choice must be made between either *unos* / *unas* or *algunos* / *algunas*, both of which appear to be *prima facie* candidates for the prime SOME. The forms in *-os* are [MASC], those in *-as* [FEM].

- (129) En algunos / unos sitios hay muchos moscos.
 PREP some places there.is many flies
 'In some places, there are many flies.'
- (130) Algunas / unas personas pueden hacer eso, algunas / unas
 some people can:3PL.PRES do:INF this some
 personas no pueden.
 people not can:3PL.PRES
 'Some people can do this, some people can't.'

Although the two forms can be often used interchangeably, there is a subtle difference in meaning, which makes *algunos* the better of the two options before us (even though it is the plural of *alguno*, a non-specific determiner rather than a quantifier representing an indefinite number, as is SOME). *Unos* implies a higher degree of definiteness than *algunos*, and also tends to imply a smaller amount, in many contexts being better translated as 'a few'. Like the latter, it would seem to be a combination of SOME and *not many*. This can be seen, for instance, in the expression *unos cuantos*, which is also best translated as 'a few' (lit. 'some amount'). Further evidence may be found in the partitive use of *algunos*, as in the example below, where *unos* would imply a lesser quantity. The same example shows that, like the numerals UNO and DOS, ALGUNOS can be used in selective constructions, in which case the noun phrase denoting the set from which the subset is drawn takes once again the preposition *de* 'from, of'.

- (131) Algunas de estas manzanas están malas.
 some PREP these apples be:3PL.PRES bad
 ‘Some of these apples are bad.’

2.3.2.3 Portuguese

The Portuguese exponent of SOME, *ALGUNS* / *ALGUMAS* [MASC / FEM], has the same properties as its Spanish cognate.

- (132) Ele conhece algumas pessoas.
 3sg know:SG.PRES some people.
 ‘He knows some people.’
- (133) Alguns lugares são muito grandes.
 some places be:PL.PRES very big
 ‘Some places are very big.’
- (134) Algumas destas pessoas querem fazer algo bom.
 some PREP.these people want:PL.PRES do:INF something good
 ‘Some of these people want to do something good.’

2.3.2.4 Italian

At first sight, *alcuni* [MASC] and *alcune* [FEM] seem to fit the requirements of the prime SOME in Italian because they only occur before [PL] nouns (with which they must agree). They appear in subject position and, followed by *di*, express the selective meaning SOME OF, two combinatorial possibilities that are thought to be typical of the prime SOME. However, a disadvantage – from an NSM point of view – is that *alcuni* / *alcune* have a meaning which differs somewhat from the meaning of the prime and is closer to that of Spanish *unos* / *unas* ‘a few’. The latter have no cognates in Italian. Like Spanish *unos* and English *a few*, *alcuni* appears to be a combination of SOME and *not many*.

- (135) Alcune persone erano in ritardo.
 some people be:3PL.IMPF in lateness
 ‘A few people were late.’

A further disadvantage of *alcuni* is that, being inherently [PL], it cannot occur with *GENTE* ‘PEOPLE’, to refer to the all-important notion SOME PEOPLE: **alcuna gente* (with a [FEM.SG] ending) is not well-formed in Italian. *Alcune persone* is acceptable, but the best solution appears to be a different sentence construction altogether, one which (at least formally) makes use of the existential structure *c’è* ‘there is’ followed by a relative pronoun *che*, resulting in the prime *C’È ... CHE*.

- (136) C'è gente che vuole farmi del male.
 there.is people who want:3SG.PRES do:INF+me PART bad
 'Some people want to do something bad to me.'

While such a sentence might look relatively complex, it expresses the basic universal meaning of 'some people want to do something bad to me' unambiguously and without adding extra components of meaning. It is a structure which enables us to retain *GENTE*, whereas *alcune* would require *PERSONE*, and it is entirely indeterminate with regard to number (except of course that it *is* [PL]). Admittedly, this structure cannot be used in the selective construction *SOME OF*, but a different existential construction can express this (*C'È CHI* instead of *C'È ... CHE*):

- (137) C'è chi va alla festa, e chi va a casa.
 there.is who go:3SG.PRES PREP.the party and who go:3SG.PRES PREP
 house
 'Some (of the people) are going to the party and some are going home.'

2.3.3 MUCH / MANY

None of the main Romance languages make in a similarly systematic way the kind of mass / count distinction between *MUCH* and *MANY* which is made in English as well as in some other languages, such as Thai (Diller 1994:157). Goddard & Wierzbicka (2002b:72) regard *MUCH* and *MANY* as "variants of a single prime", an assumption they immediately qualify by pointing out that it is "not sacrosanct, however, and may need to be revised". For the time being, though, one single prime is posited. In the languages in our sample, it is lexicalized as follows:

French:	BEAUCOUP
Spanish:	MUCHO
Portuguese:	MUITO
Italian:	MOLTO

2.3.3.1 French

French stands out from the other Romance languages because its most likely exponent for *MUCH* / *MANY*, viz. *BEAUCOUP*, is invariable and requires a ligature *de* whenever it is followed by a noun or a noun phrase. Selective constructions (*MUCH* / *MANY OF*) are impossible, unless the determiner *THIS* (the only specifier allowed after *BEAUCOUP DE*) is inserted before the following noun. This is not expected to be problematic from the point of view of NSM syntax, which posits the universality of the valency option *MUCH* / *MANY OF*; indeed, this option seems to

be used only when the following noun has been previously mentioned, in which case the use of a demonstrative such as *THIS* is entirely legitimate.

- (138) Je connais beaucoup de gens bien.
 I know:1SG.PRES many LIG people good
 ‘I know many (good) people.’
- (139) Je connais beaucoup de ces gens.
 I know:1SG.PRES many PREP these people
 ‘I know many of these people.’

BEAUCOUP cannot be preceded by a demonstrative (as in **CES BEAUCOUP DE GENS*). However, the prime *THIS* has been used in the literature with *MUCH* / *MANY*, e.g. in Goddard’s (2005) explication of the English concept of “culture” (as in *English culture*, *Japanese culture* etc.), which contains a proposition starting off with the phrase *MANY KINDS OF PEOPLE* and followed by another proposition starting off with the phrase *THESE MANY KINDS OF PEOPLE*. Goddard’s formulation poses an interesting dilemma: either the combination should be disallowed, or *BEAUCOUP* is not an appropriate exponent. It is felt that the former approach is the safer one: after all, it is perfectly possible to replace the phrase *THESE MANY KINDS OF PEOPLE* in Goddard’s explication with a simpler *THESE KINDS OF PEOPLE*.

2.3.3.2 Spanish

The Spanish exponent of *MUCH* / *MANY* is *MUCHO* / *MUCHA* [MASC / FEM], realized as *MUCHOS* / *MUCHAS* [MASC / FEM] with [PL] count nouns.

- (140) Mucha gente piensa en ti.
 much people think:3SG.PRES PREP you
 ‘Many people think of you.’
- (141) Ella tiene muchos hijos.
 3SG have:3SG.PRES many children
 ‘She has many children.’

Like *UNO* ‘ONE’, *DOS* ‘TWO’ and *ALGUNOS* ‘SOME’, *MUCHO* can be called upon to identify a subset, provided it is followed by the preposition *de* ‘from, of’.

- (142) Muchos de los turistas fueron a la playa, pero algunos
 many PREP the tourists go:3PL.PRET PREP the beach but some
 fueron al río.
 go:3PL.PRET PREP.the river
 ‘Many of the tourists went to the beach, but some went to the river.’

2.3.3.3 Portuguese

The prime MUCH / MANY is realized in Portuguese as MUITO / MUITA [MASC / FEM] with [SG] mass nouns and MUITOS / MUITAS [MASC / FEM] with [PL] count nouns.

- (143) Eu vejo muitas coisas neste lugar.
 I see:1SG.PRES many things PREP.this place
 'I see many things in this place.'
- (144) Tem muita gente aqui.
 there.is much people here
 'There are many people here.'

In addition, like its Spanish cognate, MUITO can occur with the preposition *de* 'of' to specify a subset.

- (145) Muitos destes lugares são bons.
 many PREP.these places be:PL.PRES good
 'Many of these places are good.'

2.3.3.4 Italian

Even though *tanto* is commonly used, MOLTO is proposed as the exponent of the prime MUCH / MANY. There appears to be little difference between the two, except for the fact that the former seems to have an affective component, making it less appropriate for NSM purposes. MOLTO agrees in gender and number with the noun it quantifies; there are three other forms apart from the [MASC.SG] base form: MOLTA [FEM.SG], MOLTI [MASC.PL] and MOLTE [FEM.PL]. Finally, as expected, MOLTO also lends itself to use in the selective construction MANY OF.

- (146) Ho visto molta gente / molte cose in questi posti.
 see:1SG.PPROS much people many things PREP these places
 'I saw many people / many things in these places.'
- (147) Molte di queste cose non sono grandi.
 many PREP these things not be:3PL.PRES big
 'Many of these things are not big.'

2.3.4 ALL

The last of the NSM quantifiers, ALL, is entirely unproblematic. It is lexicalized in the main Romance languages as follows:

French:	TOUT
Spanish:	TODO
Portuguese:	TODO (TUDO)
Italian:	TUTTO

One feature, however, sets it apart from the other quantifiers, viz. the lack of a selective construction (Goddard & Wierzbicka 2002b: 49). The combination *all of* exists in none of the languages surveyed in this volume. This is not surprising: even in English, where it is quite common, it would seem that its meaning is identical to that of *all* used alone (cf., e.g. *all the guests left early* vs. *all of the guests left early*). This is presumably because the semantics of ALL precludes a selective use. One can say *one of*, *two of*, *some of* and *many of*, because it is possible to have a total number that is greater than the numbers referred to by these quantifiers. But it is impossible to have a total number that is greater than ALL, or, to put it differently, one cannot say something about ALL and at the same time say the opposite about others. For example, **all (of) the guests left early, but other guests didn't* is an unintelligible statement.

2.3.4.1 *French*

The French exponent for ALL is TOUT. There are four combinatorial alloloxes: TOUT [MASC.SG], TOUTE [FEM.SG], TOUS [MASC.PL] and TOUTES [FEM.PL].

- (148) Tous ces endroits sont loin d' ici.
all these places be:3PL.PRES far PREP here
'All these places are far from here.'
- (149) Je ne connais pas tous les mots que tu dis.
I NEG know:1SG.PRES not all the words that you say:2SG.PRES
'I don't know all the words that you say.'

In the French NSM, *tous les gens* 'all people' could be used to capture the idea expressed in English as EVERYBODY; TOUT LE MONDE, a portmanteau which literally means 'all the world', is however much more idiomatic, and entirely grammaticalized. On the other hand, there is just one quasi-substantive use which needs to be noted, viz. TOUT 'EVERYTHING'.

- (150) Ces gens voient tout, mais n' entendent rien.
these people see:3PL.PRES all but NEG hear:3PL.PRES nothing
'These people see everything, but hear nothing.'

2.3.4.2 *Spanish*

The prime ALL is realized in Spanish as TODO / TODA [MASC / FEM.SG] and TODOS / TODAS [MASC / FEM.PL].

- (151) Toda la gente piensa lo mismo.
 all the people think:3SG.PRES the same
 ‘Everybody thinks the same.’
- (152) Quiero saber todas estas cosas.
 want:1SG.PRES know:INF all these things
 ‘I want to know all these things.’

TODA LA GENTE, used in (151), is quite idiomatic; there is no need to posit a port-manteau similar to French TOUT LE MONDE ‘EVERYBODY’. *Todo el mundo* does exist, but is more colloquial. TODO can also be used as a quasi-substantive, as in the example below.

- (153) Desde la montaña podía ver todo.
 PREP the mountain can:1SG.IMPF see:INF all
 ‘From the mountain, I could see everything.’

2.3.4.3 Portuguese

In addition to allolexes for gender and number similar to those that exist in the other Romance languages, as illustrated in (154)–(155), Portuguese TODO ‘ALL’ has a unique quasi-substantive allolex TUDO, illustrated in (156).

- (154) Todas estas pessoas sabem disso.
 all these people know:PL.PRES PREP.this
 ‘All these people know about this.’
- (155) Eu vi todo o mal neste lugar.
 I see:1SG.PRET all the bad PREP.this place
 ‘I saw all the bad things in this place.’
- (156) Eu quero saber tudo.
 I want:1SG.PRES know:INF everything
 ‘I want to know everything.’

TODO (o) MUNDO ‘all (the) world’ is the most idiomatic expression of the concept expressed in English as EVERYBODY. The definite article is prescribed against and generally omitted in this expression. TODA A GENTE ‘ALL THE PEOPLE’ is another possible equivalent.

2.3.4.4 Italian

As an exponent of the prime ALL, Italian TUTTO is fairly uncontroversial.

- (157) Tutti i miei amici sono venuti.
 all the my friends come:3PL.PPROS
 ‘All my friends came.’

- (158) Ho visto tutte queste cose.
 see:1SG.PPROS all these things
 ‘I saw all these things.’

In addition, TUTTO can be used as a quasi-substantive, in which case it corresponds either to EVERYTHING (TUTTO) or to EVERYONE (TUTTI). The latter could also be lexicalized as *tutta la gente*, but TUTTI is much more idiomatic. There is no equivalent phrase in Italian to either French TOUT LE MONDE or Portuguese TODO (o) MUNDO: Italian *tutto il mondo* means, quite literally, ‘the whole world’.

- (159) Ho venduto tutto. Tutti lo sanno.
 sell:1SG.PPROS all all 3SG.CLIT know:3PL.PRES
 ‘I have sold everything. Everyone knows it.’

2.4 Summary of exponents (without allolexes)

	French	Spanish	Portuguese	Italian
I	JE	YO	EU	IO
YOU	TU	TÚ	TU / VOCÊ	TU
SOMEONE	QUELQU’UN	ALGUIEN	ALGUÉM	QUALCUNO
SOMETHING	QUELQUE CHOSE	ALGO	ALGO	QUALCOSA
PEOPLE	GENS	GENTE	GENTE	GENTE
BODY	CORPS	CUERPO	CORPO	CORPO
THIS	CE	ESTE	ESTE	QUESTO
SAME	MÊME	MISMO	MESMO	STESSO
OTHER	AUTRE	OTRO	OUTRO	ALTRO
ONE	UN	UN	UM	UN
TWO	DEUX	DOS	DOIS	DUE
SOME	IL Y A ... QUI	ALGUNOS	ALGUNS	C’È ... CHE
MUCH/MANY	BEAUCOUP	MUCHO	MUITO	MOLTO
ALL	TOUT	TODO	TODO	TUTTO

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CHAPTER 3

NSM exponents and universal grammar in Romance

Evaluators and descriptors; mental predicates

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This chapter defines exponents in French, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian (hereafter collectively referred to as “the main Romance languages”) for the following semantic primes:

Evaluators:	GOOD, BAD
Descriptors:	BIG, SMALL
Mental predicates:	KNOW, THINK, WANT, FEEL, HEAR, SEE

3.1 Evaluators and descriptors

3.1.1 GOOD and BAD

GOOD and BAD are the two evaluators required for semantic explications in NSM. Their exponents in the main Romance languages are not necessarily categorized as adjectives, though: in several instances, nouns and/or adverbs are used instead of, or in addition to, adjectives. The details are as follows:

French:	BIEN / MAL (MÉCHANT)
Spanish:	BUENO / MALO
Portuguese:	BOM / RUIM
Italian:	BENE / MALE (CATTIVO)

The use of non-adjectival material in “some languages”, specifically in contexts of the type *X thinks something good / bad about Y* and *X thinks good / bad things about Y*, was noted by Goddard (2002:311–312), and illustrated with an example from Italian and, in an endnote, some additional remarks about French. The Romance data had been brought to his attention by Brigid Maher and Marie-Odile Junker, respectively. The facts were curious enough for Goddard (ibid.:317) to call for a “detailed comparative study of these aspects of grammar and semantics across Romance languages”. What follows is a first step in that direction. Placement of the various adjectival exponents (before or after the noun) will be discussed separately, in Section 3.1.3. Details on how to refer to BAD WORDS in the various Romance NSMs elaborated in this book are contained in Chapter 4, Section 4.1.2.

3.1.1.1 *French*

In general terms, English *good* and *bad* are primarily translated into French using the adjectives *bon* and *mauvais*. For NSM purposes, though, whatever proposals may have been made before, the most suitable lexicalizations of the primes GOOD and BAD appear to be the adverbs BIEN and MAL as well as the adjective MÉCHANT ‘nasty’. MÉCHANT and MAL are in complementary distribution. The former is used when reference is made to people. MÉCHANT has the usual allomorphs for gender and number: MÉCHANT [MASC.SG], MÉCHANTE [FEM.SG], MÉCHANTS [MASC.PL] and MÉCHANTES [FEM.PL]. Some of the permissible combinations are illustrated below.

- (1) Je connais beaucoup de gens bien.
I know:1SG.PRES many LIG people good
‘I know many good people.’
- (2) Quelque chose de bien m’ est arrivé.
something LIG good me happen:3SG.PCOMP
‘Something good happened to me.’
- (3) Quelqu’un de très méchant a dit cela.
someone LIG very bad say:3SG.PCOMP this
‘A very bad person said this.’
- (4) Quelque chose de mal est arrivé à ces gens.
something LIG bad happen:3SG.PCOMP PREP these people
‘Something bad happened to these people.’

When used in combination with the verbs PENSER ‘THINK’, DIRE ‘SAY’ and FAIRE ‘DO’, sequences such as SOMETHING GOOD / BAD and GOOD / BAD THINGS are most appropriately realized by means of an “intriguing blend of adverbial morphology and substantive syntax” (Goddard 2002: 317): the portmanteaus DU BIEN and DU MAL “are nominal expressions consisting of a partitive article (*du*) and words which are identical in form to adverbs, i.e. *bien* rather than *bon* GOOD, *mal* rather than *mauvais* BAD” (ibid.).

- (5) Tu veux dire du bien de moi.
 you want:2SG.PRES say:INF PART good PREP me
 'You want to say something good about me.'
- (6) J' ai fait du mal à ces deux personnes.
 I do:1SG.PCOMP PART bad PREP these two persons
 'I have done something bad to these two people.'

The case of SENTIR 'FEEL', on the other hand, is different: here, instead of nominal portmanteaus, the usual adverbial exponents are used, in combination with QUELQUE CHOSE 'SOMETHING'.

- (7) Quand je pense à toi, je sens quelque chose de bien.
 when I think:1SG.PRES PREP you I feel:1SG.PRES something LIG
 good
 'When I think of you, I feel something good.'

In their predicative uses, BIEN and MAL have valency options of their own. Beneficiaries are introduced by means of *pour* 'for'; the clausal valency option ('it is good / bad' + dependent clause) requires a "dummy subject" (as in English) and a complementizer *si* (with finite verbs) or *de* (with infinitives).

- (8) Cela n' est pas bien pour beaucoup de gens.
 this NEG be:3SG.PRES not good PREP many LIG people
 'This is not good for many people.'
- (9) C' est mal si tu ne fais pas cela.
 it be:3SG.PRES bad if you NEG do:2SG.PRES not this
 'It is bad if you don't do this.'
- (10) C' est bien de penser à tout le monde.
 it be:3SG.PRES good COMP think:INF PREP everyone
 'It is good to think of everyone.'

3.1.1.2 Spanish

Unlike their French counterparts, the Spanish exponents of GOOD and BAD are adjectival. MALO is the [MASC.SG] base form; MALA is [FEM.SG], MALOS [MASC.PL], MALAS [FEM.PL]. The [MASC.SG] form is realized as MAL when it occurs in prenominal position.

- (11) Esta persona es una persona muy bueno.
 this person be:3SG.PRES a person very good
 'This person is a very good person.'

- (12) Algo malo me pasó a mí.
 something bad me happen:3SG.PRET PREP me
 ‘Something bad happened to me.’

Predicative BUENO and MALO occur on their own or with a valency option for an experiencer, i.e. the person something is good or bad *for*. The preposition used to introduce the latter is *para*.

- (13) Eso es malo.
 this be:3SG.PRES bad
 ‘This is bad.’
- (14) Si eso pasa, va a ser bueno para ti.
 if this happen:3SG.PRES be:3SG.FUT good PREP you
 ‘If this happens, it will be good for you.’
- (15) Eso fue malo para mí.
 this be:3SG.PRET bad PREP me
 ‘This was bad for me.’

If, rather than *ser*, as in the examples above, another copula is used, viz. *estar*, adverbs are mandatory: *eso está mal* ‘this is bad’ / *eso está bien* ‘this is good’. The difference between these expressions and those with *ser* and adjectives is very difficult to identify. As *estar* is said to refer more to conditions and *ser* to states (e.g. the nature of something or its identity), it is proposed to adopt the construction with *ser* for NSM definitions, though this remains very much a matter for further research.

Another predicative use, for the purpose of evaluating an action, an event or a situation, involves a subordinate clause, with or without a subject. Finite verbs occur with the complementizer *si* ‘if’, and non-finite verbs occur without a complementizer.

- (16) Es malo si la gente hace eso.
 be:3SG.PRES bad if the people do:3SG.PRES this
 ‘It is bad if people do this.’
- (17) No es bueno hacer eso.
 not be:3SG.PRES good do:INF this
 ‘It is not good to do this.’

With the verbs PENSAR ‘THINK’, DECIR ‘SAY’ and HACER ‘DO’, when reference is made to SOMETHING GOOD / BAD or to GOOD / BAD THINGS, the expressions ALGO BUENO and ALGO MALO are used. Adverbs would appear to provide a more idiomatic alternative with PENSAR and HACER (e.g. *pensar bien* ‘think something good’, *hacer mal* ‘do something bad’), but this option is not available with DECIR (another speech verb, viz. *hablar*, would have to be used instead) and is therefore less attractive.

- (18) Yo pienso algo bueno de él.
 I think:1SG.PRES something good PREP 3SG
 'I think good things about him.'
- (19) Tú dices algo malo de esta gente.
 you say:2SG.PRES something bad PREP these people
 'You say something bad about these people.'

A problem seems to arise with the verb SENTIR 'FEEL'. Travis (2002:195) proposed that, to express the notion of feeling something good, SENTIR ALGO BUENO 'FEEL SOMETHING GOOD' should be used. However, she pointed out that this was less than ideal because to some native speakers it suggests feeling something concrete, such as the sensation of cool beer going into one's body on a hot day, rather than the abstract notion intended in NSM explications. It is most unlikely, though, that a canonical context such as (20) would be misunderstood – even though it is slightly unidiomatic (like its English counterpart; cf. Goddard & Peeters this volume).

- (20) Cuando oí eso, sentí algo bueno.
 when hear:1SG.PRET this, feel:1SG.PRET something good
 'When I heard this, I felt something good.'

3.1.1.3 Portuguese

The Portuguese exponents of GOOD and BAD are BOM and RUIM, respectively. They are adjectives. BOM is [MASC.SG], BOA [FEM.SG], BONS [MASC.PL] and BOAS [FEM.PL]. RUIM does not have a distinct feminine form (UMA PESSOA RUIM 'ONE BAD PERSON'), but it does have a plural allolex (MUITAS PESSOAS RUINS 'MANY BAD PEOPLE').

- (21) Estas pessoas são pessoas ruins.
 these persons be:PL.PRES persons bad
 'These people are bad people.'

Portuguese also has a cognate of Spanish MALO 'BAD' (with gender/number-sensitive allolexes), viz. MAU(s) / MÁ(s), which can be used instead of RUIM (UMA COISA RUIM = UMA COISA MÁ). The choice between the two is partly dialectal or stylistic, with MAU being preferred in Portugal and in literary discourse.

In addition to functioning as modifiers, BOM and RUIM can be used predicatively as well as with valency options, as in (22)–(24). The subjunctive in (23) is syntactically motivated and adds no meaning of its own. As in Spanish, experiencers following the adjectives BOM and RUIM are introduced by means of the preposition *para*.

- (22) Esta pessoa é ruim.
 this person be:SG.PRES bad
 'This person is bad.'
- (23) Vai ser bom se as pessoas fizerem isso.
 be:SG.FUT good if people do:PL.FUT.SJV this
 'It will be good if people do this.'
- (24) É ruim para muita gente ter que fazer isso.
 be:SG.PRES bad for much people have:INF COMP do:INF this
 'It is bad for many people to have to do this.'

ALGO BOM 'SOMETHING GOOD' and ALGO RUIM 'SOMETHING BAD' function as objects of PENSAR 'THINK', DIZER 'SAY' and FAZER 'DO', even though, as in Spanish, adverbs (BEM and MAL) would usually be more idiomatic.

- (25) Eu disse algo ruim de você.
 I say:SG.PRET something bad PREP you
 'I said something bad about you.'
- (26) Você me fez algo bom.
 you me do:SG.PRET something good
 'You did something good to me.'

On the other hand, as in the French and Spanish NSMs, combinations with SOMETHING (viz. ALGO BOM and ALGO RUIM) *must* be used with SENTIR, the exponent of FEEL:

- (27) Quando isso acontece, eu sinto algo bom.
 When this happen:SG.PRES I feel:1SG.PRES something good
 'When this happens, I feel something good.'

3.1.1.4 Italian

Italian operates in a similar fashion to French. The most common lexicalizations for GOOD and BAD are adverbs; it is only when reference is made to BAD PEOPLE (GENTE CATTIVA) that an adjective is used instead.

- (28) C'è gente cattiva qui.
 There.are people bad here
 'There are bad people here.'

BENE and MALE appear either as such, as in (29)–(30), or (in contexts identical to those mentioned above for French and Portuguese) as nominal portmanteaus, as in (31).

- (29) (Mi) è successo qualcosa di male.
 me happen:3SG.PPROS something LIG bad
 'Something bad happened (to me).'

- (30) Sento qualcosa di bene quando mi dici questo.
 feel:1SG.PRES something LIG good when me say:2SG.PRES this
 'I feel something good when you say this to me.'
- (31) Questa gente pensa bene di te.
 this people think:3SG.PRES good PREP you
 'These people think something good about you.'

Noun phrases similar to French *DU BIEN* and *DU MAL* also exist: *DEL BENE* and *DEL MALE* are called into service after the verb *FARE* 'DO'.

- (32) Questa persona mi ha fatto del male.
 this person me do:3SG.PPROS PART bad
 'This person did something bad to me.'

In addition, *GOOD* and *BAD* have their own valency options, which can be illustrated as follows:

- (33) È bene se la gente faccia così.
 be:3SG.PRES good if the people do:SG.PRES.SJV like.this
 'It is good if people do this.'
- (34) Questo è male per te.
 this be:3SG.PRES bad PREP you
 'This is bad for you.'

Rather than a subjunctive, an indicative would be used in French and Spanish utterances similar to (33), as seen in (8) and (15) above.

3.1.2 BIG and SMALL

Even though *big* and *small*, in English, may refer to either physical or non-physical bigness and smallness (non-physical uses can be illustrated with examples such as *a small favor*, *a big deal*, etc.), *BIG* and *SMALL* refer to physical size only. Although the non-physical uses may well be as universal as the physical ones, they appear to be semantically complex, and have therefore no place in the NSM lexicon.

The exponents of *BIG* and *SMALL* in the main Romance languages are as follows:

French:	GRAND / PETIT
Spanish:	GRANDE / PEQUEÑO
Portuguese:	GRANDE / PEQUENO
Italian:	GRANDE / PICCOLO

3.1.2.1 French

BIG is GRAND and SMALL is PETIT. Both descriptors have separate allolexes for gender and number: GRAND and PETIT are [MASC.SG], GRANDE and PETITE [FEM.SG], GRANDS and PETITS [MASC.PL], and GRANDES and PETITES [FEM.PL]. They combine with substantives as well as with the intensifier TRÈS 'VERY', and can be used predicatively.

- (35) Je vois quelque chose de petit pas loin d' ici.
 I see:1SG.PRES something LIG small not far PREP here
 'I can see something small not far from here.'
- (36) Il y a de petits endroits et il y a de grands endroits.
 there.is ART small places and there.is ART big places
 'There are small places and there are big places.'
- (37) Cette personne n' est pas très petite.
 this person NEG be:3SG.PRES not very small
 'This person is not very small.'

Non-predicative descriptors such as *petit* in (35) must be used with QUELQU'UN 'SOMEONE' and QUELQUE CHOSE 'SOMETHING', as in QUELQU'UN DE GRAND, QUELQUE CHOSE DE PETIT, rather than with their allolexes PERSONNE 'PERSON' and CHOSE 'THING'. This is the easiest way to avoid possible mistaken interpretations of *grande personne*, which does not mean 'big person', but 'adult'.

3.1.2.2 Spanish

BIG and SMALL are realized as GRANDE and PEQUEÑO. GRANDE is neutral for gender, but has a [PL] allolex GRANDES. Allolexes for SMALL in Spanish are PEQUEÑO [MASC.SG], PEQUEÑA [FEM.SG], PEQUEÑOS [MASC.PL] and PEQUEÑAS [FEM.PL]. (38)–(40) exemplify the kinds of contexts in which the descriptors can appear.

- (38) Hay árboles grandes y hay árboles pequeños.
 there.is trees big and there.is trees small
 'There are big trees and there are small trees.'
- (39) Esta persona es muy grande.
 this person be:3SG.PRES very big
 'This person is very big.'
- (40) Veo algo pequeño en este sitio.
 see:1SG.PRES something small PREP this place
 'I can see something small in this place.'

3.1.2.3 Portuguese

The Portuguese exponents of BIG and SMALL are GRANDE and PEQUENO, respectively. Like its Spanish counterparts, PEQUENO has four allolexes, which show

both gender and number agreement (*coisa(s) pequena(s)* ‘small thing(s)’ [FEM.SG / FEM.PL], *menino(s) pequeno(s)* ‘small boy(s)’ [MASC.SG / MASC.PL]. GRANDE is invariable in gender, but does have a regular plural-agreement form.

- (41) Esta pessoa é grande.
 this person be:SG.PRES big
 ‘This person is big.’
- (42) Muitas coisas pequenas são boas.
 many things small be:PL.PRES good
 ‘Many small things are good.’
- (43) Tem árvores muito grandes neste lugar.
 there.is trees very big PREP.this place
 ‘There are very big trees in this place.’

3.1.2.4 Italian

The NSM descriptors BIG and SMALL have Italian exponents in GRANDE and PICCOLO. The distribution of allolexes is as in Spanish and Portuguese: GRANDE is gender-neutral, but does have a [PL] form GRANDI. PICCOLO varies in gender as well as in number, the [SG] forms being PICCOLO [MASC] and PICCOLA [FEM], the [PL] forms PICCOLI [MASC] and PICCOLE [FEM]. NSM uses include sentences such as the following:

- (44) Vedo qualcosa di grande.
 see:1SG.PRES something LIG big
 ‘I can see something big.’
- (45) Questa parte del corpo è piccola.
 this part PREP.the body be:3SG.PRES small
 ‘This part of the body is small.’
- (46) Non è un posto molto grande.
 not be:3SG.PRES a place very big
 ‘It is not a very big place.’

3.1.3 Placement rules for evaluators and descriptors in Romance NSMs

As illustrated above, the evaluators and descriptors admitted in the various Romance NSMs proposed in this book are either adverbs or adjectives. With adverbs in a modifier role, post-verbal position is the rule. Similarly, in combination with SOMEONE and SOMETHING, only postposition is available for evaluators and descriptors alike. The presence of a ligature such as French *de* and Italian *di* makes no difference. To illustrate with just one example, in Spanish, the evaluators BUENO and MALO must be placed after ALGO and ALGUIEN: ALGO BUENO ‘SOMETHING

GOOD'; *ALGUIEN MALO* 'SOMEONE BAD'. The reverse order is ungrammatical: combinations such as **buen algo* 'good something' and **mal alguien* 'bad someone' are impossible.

Unfortunately, the same rigor does not obtain elsewhere. The NSM adjectives belong to a subset of commonly used forms which, across the main Romance languages, are not at all unusual in pre-nominal position. It will be useful to briefly summarize the facts with respect to adjective placement for NSM purposes in each of the languages. These facts are of course consistent with placement rules outside of NSM where, however, there is greater freedom, which means that there is scope to oppose unmarked and marked positions. In NSM, importantly, there is no room for marked adjective placement.

3.1.3.1 *French*

PETIT 'SMALL' and GRAND 'BIG' are to be placed pre-nominally, even when modified by TRÈS 'VERY' (UN GRAND CORPS 'A BIG BODY', UN (TRÈS) PETIT ENDROIT 'A (VERY) SMALL PLACE'). MÉCHANT 'BAD' comes after the noun it qualifies (UNE PERSONNE (TRÈS) MÉCHANTE 'A (VERY) BAD PERSON'). The issue of placement does not arise in the case of BIEN 'GOOD' and MAL 'BAD', since they are adverbial in nature and therefore necessarily post-verbal (or post-nominal, as in DES GENS BIEN 'GOOD PEOPLE').

3.1.3.2 *Spanish*

In general terms, although some variation is allowed in Spanish, the most basic word order for NSM evaluators and descriptors alike, and the only one to be allowed in NSM definitions formulated in Spanish, is after the head noun (cf. Travis 2002). Supporting evidence is not hard to find. First of all, many adjectives (but not the NSM evaluators and descriptors) only occur in post-nominal position. Second, some adjectives have different [MASC.SG] forms pre- and post-nominally (e.g. GRAN / GRANDE), and when this is the case the post-nominal form is the one that also occurs predicatively. Thus, the phonologically more complex form appears to be the more basic of the two, since it also has the widest distribution. A third indication is that pre-nominal use of the evaluators and descriptors used in NSM is marked and generally carries a more emotive or subjective implication (something along the lines of 'I feel something when I say this'). GRANDE, for example, means 'big, large' post-nominally, but something like 'great' pre-nominally. Thus, one might refer to *un árbol grande* 'a big tree', but to *un gran poeta* 'a great poet' (cf. Solé & Solé 1977:236). Likewise, *un problema pequeño* simply means 'a small problem', while *un pequeño problema* has a more subjective implication and might be used to mitigate (at least linguistically) a problem for which one is seeking help. Finally, the intensifier MUY 'VERY' tends to trigger post-nominal placement (cf. *un árbol muy grande*, but ?*un muy gran árbol*). *Muy* + adjective can

occur pre-nominally, but only in highly subjective and therefore marked contexts: *un muy mal libro* is a pernicious book, whereas *un libro muy malo* is bad (or rather very bad) in a much more objective way.

3.1.3.3 Portuguese

As in Spanish, adjective placement generally correlates with a meaning difference (UMA PESSOA GRANDE ‘A BIG PERSON’ vs. *uma grande pessoa* ‘a great person’). When modified by MUITO ‘VERY’, the adjective must follow the noun (UM LUGAR MUITO BOM ‘A VERY GOOD PLACE’). Numerous adjectives can only appear post-nominally (e.g. *pessoa gorda / ruim* vs. **gorda / ruim pessoa* ‘fat / bad person’, *carro verde* vs. **verde carro*). Very few adjectives are restricted to pre-nominal position; none of them are lexicalizations of semantic primes. All in all, there appears to be every reason to restrict adjectives to post-nominal position in the Portuguese NSM.

3.1.3.4 Italian

To talk about *gente cattiva* ‘bad people’ (lit. ‘people bad’) in Italian is to draw attention to a key piece of new information – or, in other words, to use the adjective restrictively. On the other hand, to talk about *buona gente* ‘good people’ virtually means that the goodness of the people is taken for granted; the adjective is non-restrictive. To refer to people who are good *but* poor, i.e. to signal that, of the two adjectives, the second one has a restrictive function (and therefore a higher information value), the most appropriate Italian phrase is *buona gente ma povera* ‘good but poor people’ (lit. ‘good people but poor’). The higher information value of a post-nominal evaluator suggests that post-nominal placement is more basic. This, then, is the recommended position for the evaluators in NSM explications written in Italian. As in Portuguese, post-nominal placement is the only possibility when the evaluator is modified by the intensifier MOLTO ‘VERY’ (cf. *GENTE MOLTO CATTIVA* ‘VERY BAD PEOPLE’, but not **MOLTO CATTIVA GENTE*).

All of the above applies *mutatis mutandis* to the Italian descriptors as well. Among the latter, GRANDE is one of a set of adjectives whose meaning changes according to the position they occupy. With these adjectives, the post-nominal meaning is usually the more basic one, *and* the one carried by the corresponding prime. GRANDE is no exception: it is its post-nominal meaning which comes first to any Italian speaker’s mind. Monolingual dictionaries of the language corroborate this: they typically consider *grande* ‘great’ (as in *un grand’uomo* ‘a great man’) to be less basic than *grande* ‘big’ (as in *un uomo grande* ‘a big man’).

3.2 Mental predicates

3.2.1 KNOW

In English, as in a number of other typologically and geographically unrelated languages – e.g. Ewe (Ameka 1994: 64), Kayardild (Evans 1994: 208), Yankunytjatjara (Goddard 1994: 236–237) and Mangaaba-Mbula (Bugenhagen 2002: 12–13) – there is only one exponent for what has traditionally been called the prime KNOW. In Polish (Wierzbicka 2002: 93–96) and in many other languages, including those of the Romance group, a lexical distinction is made, even though both verbs are glossed identically (using the verb KNOW). Interestingly, wherever there are two verbs, the dividing line is drawn in very similar ways. This, then, raises a fundamental problem. Is English *know* an instance of non-compositional polysemy (Goddard & Peeters this volume), and have we been led to believe, just because it looks as though there is only one verb in English, that there is only one semantic prime KNOW, whereas in reality there are two, to be distinguished on the basis of distinct syntactic patterning? Though this is a possibility envisaged by Wierzbicka (2002: 93), there is currently no evidence to suggest that this is the case. This leaves us with two possibilities. If there is only one prime, does it correspond to a single verb in those languages that make a distinction? Or should we posit allolexy in languages that have two verbs – and therefore also synonymy (as is done for Italian by Renzi 1973: 381, who claims the only difference is syntactic)?

Of the latter two positions, the one of a single exponent was taken in the “Expanding Set” paper (Wierzbicka 1989) and also in an earlier study on French (Peeters 1994: 426), in which it was claimed that *connaître* had no place in the French NSM, and that only *savoir* was to be admitted. After the *SLU* project (Goddard & Wierzbicka 1994), this view was abandoned. Each of the following sections will therefore deal with two allolexes, the first one of which appears to have the widest distribution and is therefore considered to be the primary exponent:

French:	SAVOIR (CONNAÎTRE)
Spanish:	SABER (CONOCER)
Portuguese:	SABER (CONHECER)
Italian:	SAPERE (CONOSCERE)

One form of knowledge which appears not to be primitive – although it may well be universal – is “unconfirmed knowledge” (*not know whether P*). It includes a thought component and can therefore be explicated in terms of KNOW and THINK. For instance, if person X does not know whether person Y can come, X must have thought about whether or not Y can come, without reaching a conclusion, or without being able to know. It goes without saying that *not know whether P* is not among the combinatorial patterns that define the NSM syntax of the seman-

tic prime KNOW. The same applies to other semantically complex constructions that exist in the main Romance languages and that involve one of the exponents of KNOW, e.g. French *savoir* + infinitive ‘know how to [do something]’. A third pattern that appears not to be universally available (cf. Bugenhagen 2002:13) – although it is entirely unproblematic within the languages in our sample – is the valency option *know something about someone / something*, which may therefore have to be abandoned.

With respect to verb tenses, it must be noted that, when used with reference to the past, all exponents of KNOW will need to be in the imperfect; the use of tenses such as the *passé composé* in French or the *passato prossimo* in Italian triggers a change of meaning. Instead of a mental state, a punctual event is being referred to (‘to find out / to learn’ in the case of SAVOIR / SAPERE, ‘to meet’ in the case of CONNAITRE / CONOSCERE). Something similar applies in the case of the exponents of two other mental predicates, viz. THINK and WANT: when used in past tenses other than the imperfect, they, too, acquire different, more punctual meanings, viz. ‘produce a thought’ and ‘try, make an (unsuccessful) attempt’, respectively. In more general terms, depending on context, all NSM verbs (not only mental predicates) will require use of one past tense rather than another. Futures and conditionals may be required as well. Whatever the case, the various tense forms of a given verb are inflectional allomorphs of the corresponding forms of the present tense.

3.2.1.1 French

SAVOIR ‘KNOW’ is used to refer to propositional knowledge of the type *know P* or *know that P*, as well as (relatively) unspecified knowledge (which is often underlyingly propositional; e.g. *know something, everything, nothing*). However, NSM must also be able to refer to specific knowledge of things, people and places, a context where CONNAITRE, and not SAVOIR, is required. All of the above are basic forms of knowledge that cannot be explicated in semantically simpler concepts, and there are no known languages in which they are not lexicalized. Canonical contexts include the following:

- (47) Tu ne sais pas que je pense du mal de
 you NEG know:2SG.PRES not COMP I think:1SG.PRES PART bad PREP
 toi.
 you
 ‘You don’t know that I think something bad about you.’
- (48) C’ est bien de savoir ces choses.
 it be:3SG.PRES good COMP know:INF these things
 ‘It is good to know these things.’

- (49) Beaucoup de gens connaissent ces deux personnes.
 many LIG people know:3PL.PRES these two persons
 ‘Many people know these two people.’

For obvious reasons, *SAVOIR* and *CONNAITRE* only occur with so-called “personal” subjects (i.e. all NSM substantives, except *BODY*). All of the latter may appear, together with *PLACE*, in the complement slot of *CONNAITRE*.

3.2.1.2 *Spanish*

In terms of its NSM combinatorics, *SABER* behaves exactly like French *SAVOIR*:

- (50) Esta persona no sabe nada.
 this person NEG know:3SG.PRES nothing
 ‘This person doesn’t know anything.’
- (51) Sabemos que eso es malo.
 know:1PL.PRES COMP this be:3SG.PRES bad
 ‘We know that this is bad.’

Subordinate clauses following *SABER* are introduced by the complementizer *que*, and the verb occurs in the indicative mood. This is not to say that *SABER* always governs the indicative, as its French counterpart *SAVOIR* does. However, the indicative is expected since stating a fact is incompatible with the semantics of the subjunctive (cf. Travis 2003). Even if the main verb is negated, the indicative is required when the information contained in the subordinate clause is known to the speaker, and is being treated as a fact.

- (52) Él no sabe que estoy aquí.
 3SG not know:3SG.PRES COMP be:1SG.PRES here
 ‘He doesn’t know that I am here.’

CONOCER, on the other hand, behaves very much like French *CONNAITRE*. As with all other verbs, specific human direct objects require the preposition *a*.

- (53) No conozco este sitio.
 not know:1SG.PRES this place
 ‘I don’t know this place.’
- (54) Conozco bien a esta persona.
 know:1SG.PRES well PREP this person
 ‘I know this person well.’

3.2.1.3 *Portuguese*

Portuguese is similar to French and Spanish in its uses of *SABER* ‘KNOW’, which can have either a finite clausal complement in the indicative introduced by a complementizer or a substantive complement referring to unspecified knowledge:

- (55) Estas pessoas sabem que tem coisas boas neste lugar.
 these persons know:PL.PRES COMP there.is things good PREP.this place
 'These people know that there are good things in this place.'
- (56) Eu não sei nada.
 I NEG know:1SG.PRES nothing
 'I don't know anything.'

CONHECER, on the other hand, occurs with an animate direct object or one that designates a specific place or a specific thing:

- (57) Eu não conheço esta pessoa.
 I not know:1SG.PRES this person
 'I don't know this person.'
- (58) Muita gente conhece este lugar.
 many people know:SG.PRES this place.
 'Many people know this place.'

3.2.1.4 Italian

Like its counterparts in the other Romance languages, *SAPERE* either takes a proposition, or else *SOMETHING* (or another generic and indefinite object).

- (59) Tu sapevi qualcosa, io no.
 you know:2SG.IMPV something I not
 'You knew something, I didn't.'
- (60) So che hai fatto del male.
 know:1SG.PRES COMP do:2SG.PPROS PART bad
 'I know that you did something bad.'
- (61) So che cosa è successo.
 know:1SG.PRES what happen:3SG.PPROS
 'I know what happened.'

When the verb *SAPERE* is used negatively, it governs the subjunctive. This is unlike what happens in French and Spanish. Because selection of the subjunctive is automatic and merely provides a grammatical echo of what has already been said, it carries no additional meaning.

- (62) Non so che cosa sia successo.
 not know:1SG.PRES what happen:3SG.PPROS.SJV
 'I don't know what happened.'

There is a second exponent for *KNOW* (as in the other Romance languages). *CONOSCERE* occurs with the same structures as French *CONNAITRE*.

- (63) Non conosco questo posto / questa persona.
 not know:1SG.PRES this place this person
 ‘I don’t know this place / this person.’

3.2.2 THINK

Like the other mental predicates, THINK can take any “personal” subject, i.e. I, YOU, SOMEONE OR PEOPLE. Its post-verbal valencies include propositional content (*that P*), topic (*about Y*), manner (*like this*), and direct discourse. There also appears to be a “compound valency option” (*something good / bad about someone / something*; Goddard 2002: 310–312). The relevant exponents are as follows:

French:	PENSER
Spanish:	PENSAR
Portuguese:	PENSAR
Italian:	PENSARE

French *croire*, Spanish *creer*, etc., have been banned, even though they may sometimes sound more natural than the above, e.g. when followed by a proposition. They add an additional layer of meaning, though, viz. one of belief (their standard translation in English is indeed ‘believe’), and cannot be used in all contexts in which THINK is expected to occur (e.g. *think (something) good about a person*). On the other hand, some uses of the exponents of THINK in the main Romance languages also carry that additional layer of meaning; it follows that they are not semantically simple, and therefore not allowed in NSM. A case in point is the Italian construction *pensare di* + infinitive, as in *Penso di vedere qualcuno* ‘I think (= believe) I see someone’. Another component that is often tied up with particular uses of *think*, *penser*, *pensar* etc. is ‘intention’, as in English *I’m thinking of going*, Spanish *pienso ir*. They, too, are banned from use in NSM, again because they are not semantically simple.

3.2.2.1 French

Some of the valency options for PENSER ‘THINK’ are illustrated below.

- (64) Beaucoup de gens ne pensent pas à ces choses.
 many LIG people NEG think:3PL.PRES not PREP these things
 ‘Many people do not think of these things.’
- (65) Tu penses du bien de moi.
 you think:2SG.PRES PART good PREP me
 ‘I think good of you.’
- (66) Je pense que ces choses ont deux parties.
 I think:1SG.PRES COMP these things have:3PL.PRES two parts
 ‘I think that these things have two parts.’

In an NSM environment, *PENSER QUE* is followed by a finite verb in the indicative, whereas *NE PAS PENSER* takes a subjunctive. The rules which apply in French are the same as those which apply in Spanish and need not be spelled out separately; Travis's (2002) account of what goes on in Spanish is repeated below.

3.2.2.2 *Spanish*

The Spanish exponent of the prime *THINK* is *PENSAR*. In the canonical contexts below, different prepositions are used to express English *about* according to whether there is a direct object or not. This is not only the case in Spanish, but in the other Romance languages as well.

- (67) Pienso en ti porque estás lejos de aquí.
 think:1SG.PRES PREP you because be:2SG.PRES far PREP here
 'I think of you because you are far from here.'
- (68) Esta persona piensa algo malo de mí.
 this person think:3SG.PRES something bad PREP me
 'This person thinks something bad about me.'
- (69) Pienso: eso es muy bueno para mí.
 think:1SG.PRES this be:3SG.PRES very good PREP me
 'I think: This is very good for me.'

When *PENSAR* occurs with a propositional complement, it functions like *SABER* 'KNOW' as long as it is used positively: it takes the complementizer *que*, and the subordinate verb is in the indicative mood. In a negative environment, on the other hand, the subordinate verb is almost automatically in the subjunctive mood. The difference between the positive and negative forms (with indicative and subjunctive, respectively) is illustrated in the following examples.

- (70) Pienso que está dormida.
 think:1SG.PRES COMP be:3SG.PRES asleep
 'I think she is asleep.'
- (71) No pienso que esté dormida.
 not think:1SG.PRES COMP be:3SG.PRES.SJV asleep
 'I don't think she is asleep.'

The use of the indicative in (70) is straightforward. The speaker is asserting a proposition, something which is incompatible with the notion of 'uncertainty' associated with the subjunctive; the latter is therefore unacceptable. The use of the subjunctive in (71) is equally straightforward: a notion of "uncertainty" is implied by *NO PENSAR* 'NOT THINK', and the subjunctive is used to index this. It could be argued that, whether negated or not, *PENSAR* itself implies a degree of uncertainty or doubt, at least when compared with *SABER* 'KNOW'. However, it is not hard to see that *NO PENSAR* is a more guarded expression than *PENSAR*, as the notion of

‘not thinking’ something can also be captured by negating the subordinate clause, as in (72):

- (72) Pienso que no está dormida.
 think:1SG.PRES COMP not be:3SG.PRES asleep
 ‘I think that she is not asleep.’

In both Spanish and English (and also in French), negation of the subordinate clause implies more confidence in the proposition expressed than does the negation of the main clause, and this is indexed in Spanish (and French) by the use of the indicative, which is obligatory. Speakers who do not want to overtly mark their uncertainty use (72) rather than (71), where the subjunctive *is* an overt indication of uncertainty.

An indicative in (71) would be extremely marginal, and may be unacceptable in many Spanish dialects. This is because, with the indicative, the sentence expresses an apparent contradiction: the speaker states that s/he does not think that the proposition holds, while at the same time treating it as though it were a fact. King (1992) discusses the use of the indicative with expressions of doubt, specifically with *no creer* ‘not believe’, although the same arguments could be applied to *NO PENSAR* (which, incidentally, he lists together with *creer* ‘believe’ in the class of “assertive opinions”). He writes that the use of the indicative with *no creer* implies “that the speaker doesn’t believe what is believed to be true by someone else, or that the speaker can’t believe what he in fact knows to be true” (ibid.: 149). This is illustrated in the following example, presented by King (ibid.: 151; originally from Lleó 1979), where he argues that the use of the indicative “reports the counteropinion of the speaker”: the referent does not believe the information presented in the subordinate clause, but the speaker does.

- (73) Max no cree que la CIA participó en el
 Max not believe:3SG.PRES COMP the CIA participate:3SG.PRET PREP the
 golpe chileno.
 coup Chilean
 ‘Max does not believe that the CIA participated in the Chilean coup.’

The indicative carries a complex meaning in this environment: it is used to assert the speaker’s belief in the proposition, something that could perhaps be roughly paraphrased as ‘I say: I think this is true’. The same seems to apply in the case of *NO PENSAR* ‘NOT THINK’, and it is because of this that the use of the indicative with a first-person subject in (71) would be marginal. The indicative *could* possibly be used in a context where, for example, the speaker knows that the referent is asleep, but does not want to think about it, because s/he wants to play loud music, and does not want knowledge of the fact that she is asleep to affect that intention. A known fact is being denied. The subjunctive, on the other hand, indexes a notion

of uncertainty already inherent in the expression itself, it does not encode any language-specific meaning, and is therefore the more basic form – the form which should be used in NSM (cf. Travis 2003 for further discussion).

3.2.2.3 *Portuguese*

The exponent of THINK in Portuguese is *PENSAR*. Its NSM valency possibilities can be exemplified as follows.

- (74) Muita gente pensa nestas coisas.
 much people think:SG.PRES PREP.these things
 'Many people think about these things.'
- (75) Às vezes, eu penso algo ruim de você.
 sometimes I think:1SG.PRES something bad PREP you
 'Sometimes I think something bad about you.'
- (76) Quando isso acontece, a gente pensa: isso é
 when this happen:SG.PRES we think:SG.PRES this be:SG.PRES
 bom.
 good
 'When this happens, we think: this is good.'
- (77) Você (não) pensa que este lugar é ruim.
 you not think:SG.PRES COMP this place be:SG.PRES bad
 'You (don't) think that this place is bad.'

The indicative is appropriate in a clausal complement of *PENSAR*, whether the main clause is negated or not, as shown by (77). Although the subjunctive is often used when *PENSAR* is in the imperfect or preterit and the proposition of the complement clause is known to be counterfactual, this is not a requirement. From an NSM perspective, it is an unnecessary complication which is best avoided, since the subjunctive adds an explicable meaning which would have to be spelled out separately.

3.2.2.4 *Italian*

In Italian, the prime THINK is expressed by means of the verb *PENSARE*. Its use for NSM purposes can be illustrated as follows:

- (78) Io non penso così.
 I not think:1SG.PRES like.this
 'I don't think like this.'
- (79) Io penso bene di te.
 I think:1SG.PRES good PREP you
 'I think something good about you.'

- (80) *Molta gente pensa: non è bene morire.*
 much people think:3SG.PRES not be:3SG.PRES good die:INF
 ‘Many people think: It is not good to die.’
- (81) (Non) *penso che sia tornato.*
 not think:1SG.PRES COMP return:SG.PPROS.SJV
 ‘I (don’t) think that he has returned.’

Italian differs from French and Spanish in its requirement that a finite verb following *PENSARE* takes a subjunctive both in positive and negative sentences.

3.2.3 WANT

As first argued among NSM scholars by Harkins (1995: 124–125) and reiterated in more detail by Travis (2003), the subjunctive required after the Spanish exponent of *WANT* (at least when the main and the subordinate subjects are non-coreferential) captures an implication of uncertainty in relation to the outcome of the wanted event. Something similar could be said with respect to all the languages in our sample, which lexicalize *WANT* as follows:

French:	VOULOIR
Spanish:	QUERER
Portuguese:	QUERER
Italian:	VOLERE

The subjunctive with these verbs does not add any language-specific meaning. Despite the different morphosyntax, there is no paraphrasable difference between, say, Spanish *quiero que tú hagas algo* (lit. ‘I want that you do_{subj} something’) and English *I want you to do something*, where an infinitive is used instead. Some notion of uncertainty is simply inherent in a context where one wants someone else to do something, as it is impossible to have direct control over other people’s actions. In addition, as indicated earlier, similar implications of uncertainty also exist elsewhere, e.g. after the French, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian versions of *not think that P*. For coreferential subjects, on the other hand, no such notion of uncertainty needs to be indexed, as presumably one has more control over one’s own actions than over someone else’s. As a general rule, coreferential subjects are not overtly mentioned, and an infinitive is used instead of a finite verb.

Because, with non-coreferential subjects, the subjunctive after *WANT* is obligatory in the four languages surveyed in this volume and can never be contrasted with the use of the indicative in the same environment, it must be permitted in the NSMs based on them. There is no need to avoid the subjunctive, e.g. through the use of some sort of direct discourse – which is the approach taken by Peeters (1994: 427), where the NSM component ‘je veux que tu fasses quelque chose’ is re-

placed with a purportedly simpler phrase ‘je veux ceci: tu fais quelque chose’ (lit. ‘I want this: you do something’). The French, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian versions of the NSM *must* allow for different syntactic patterns for coreferential and non-coreferential subjects of the semantic prime WANT, the former occurring with an infinitive verb in the complement clause, the latter with the subjunctive and a complementizer.

Are there any other possibilities? It may be worth pointing out that, at least in French, in circumstances described in painstaking detail by Ruwet (1991), a finite verb in the subjunctive may occur in a context of coreferential subjects: *je veux que je...*, lit. ‘I want that I...’, is not impossible (see also Harkins 1995: 122 on Spanish). Regardless, as such structures are semantically more complex than those involving an infinitive, they are not allowed in NSM. There are therefore no implications for NSM syntax.

3.2.3.1 French

All exponents listed in the preamble (not only French VOULOIR) occur with all the “personal” subjects available in NSM. Their direct object slot can be filled by means of the substantive SOMETHING (in all its guises, and with any accompanying determiners or quantifiers) as well as with quasi-substantives such as THIS and ALL:

- (82) Je ne veux pas cela, je veux autre chose.
 I NEG want:1SG.PRES not this I want:1SG.PRES something.else
 ‘Many people do not want this, they want something else.’

When followed by propositional content, VOULOIR – and the other exponents – govern either a subjunctive or an infinitive, as explained above.

- (83) Tu veux que je sache ces choses.
 you want:2SG.PRES COMP I know:1SG.PRES.SJV these things
 ‘You want me to know these things.’
- (84) Tu veux savoir ces choses.
 you want:2SG.PRES know:INF these things
 ‘You want to know these things.’

3.2.3.2 Spanish

The Spanish exponent of WANT is QUERER, a verb which is polysemous and has an additional meaning which can be glossed as ‘love’. A similar situation exists in Yankuntjatjara, a typologically totally unrelated language (Goddard 1994: 238; Goddard & Peeters this volume). Different syntactic properties for each meaning (for relevant information on Spanish, see Travis 2002: 191–193) ensure that no ambiguity is possible. Illustrative syntactic patterns allowed for QUERER ‘WANT’ are provided below (see the previous subsection for more detail).

- (85) Quiero algo.
want:1SG.PRES something
'I want something.'
- (86) No quiero eso.
not want:1SG.PRES this
'I don't want this.'
- (87) Quiero ir al pueblo.
want:1SG.PRES go:INF PREP.the village
'I want to go to the village.'
- (88) Quiero que tú lo hagas.
want:1sg.pres COMP you 3SG.CLIT do:2SG.PRES.SJV
'I want you to do it.'

3.2.3.3 Portuguese

Portuguese QUERER 'WANT' occurs either with a substantive complement or with a subordinate clause. In the latter case, it is followed by an infinitive or a subjunctive, subject to the same conditions that apply in French and Spanish, as shown by examples (89)–(92).

- (89) Muita gente quer algo assim.
much people want:SG.PRES something like.this
'Many people want something like this.'
- (90) Eu quero isso.
I want:1SG.PRES this
'I want this.'
- (91) Estas pessoas querem que algo bom aconteça.
these people want:PL.PRES COMP something good happen:SG.PRES.SJV
'These people want something good to happen.'
- (92) Eu quero ver outra coisa.
I want:1SG.PRES see:INF other thing
'I want to see something else.'

3.2.3.4 Italian

The Italian exponent of WANT is VOLERE. Its NSM syntax can be illustrated as follows. More detail is provided in the French subsection.

- (93) Questa gente vuole qualcosa.
this people want:3SG.PRES something
'These people want something.'

- (94) Questa gente vuole sapere qualcosa.
 this people want:3SG.PRES know:INF something
 ‘These people want to know something.’
- (95) Vuoi che la gente pensi bene di te.
 want:2SG.PRES COMP the people think:SG.PRES.SJV good PREP you
 ‘You want people to think good things about you.’

3.2.4 FEEL

Wierzbicka’s (1994:461–465) comments on the search for exponents for *FEEL* in the world’s languages included recognition of the fact that this prime “raises a whole range of very interesting problems”, even in a language such as French, which is typologically quite close to English. It has become clear, in the meantime, that similar problems also exist in Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian. The Romance exponents of *FEEL* are often tied up in sometimes rather intricate patterns of polysemy, with potential consequences for other parts of the metalanguage. The most striking example of this is in Italian, which presents a case of non-compositional polysemy (Goddard & Peeters this volume), with different meanings (even within the metalanguage) to be distinguished on the basis of differences in syntactic patterning. In partial disagreement with previous suggestions, the following lexicalizations are proposed:

French:	SENTIR (SE SENTIR)
Spanish:	SENTIR (SENTIRSE)
Portuguese:	SENTIR (SENTIR-SE)
Italian:	SENTIRE (SENTIRSI)

The bracketed allolexes, which are reflexive, appear to be needed only with the NSM phrase *LIKE THIS*, indicating similarity. If, however, Junker & Blacksmith (2006) are right in arguing that *FEEL GOOD* and *FEEL BAD* are more likely to be universal combinations than *FEEL SOMETHING GOOD* and *FEEL SOMETHING BAD*, which they claim are impossible in Cree, the use of the reflexive allolexes would have to be extended. In Italian, for instance, the phrases *SENTIRSI BENE* and *SENTIRSI MALE* would have to be used instead of *SENTIRE QUALCOSA DI BENE* and *SENTIRE QUALCOSA DI MALE*.

3.2.4.1 French

To appropriately express the prime *FEEL* in French, the verbs *SENTIR* and *SE SENTIR* are needed. Their distribution is described in the preamble and can be illustrated as follows:

- (96) Ces gens sentent la même chose que moi.
 these people feel:3PL.PRES the same thing COMP me
 ‘These people feel the same thing as me.’
- (97) Quand cela est arrivé, j’ ai senti quelque chose de
 when this happen:3SG.PCOMP I feel:1SG.PCOMP something LIG
 mal.
 bad
 ‘When this happened, I felt something bad.’
- (98) Beaucoup de gens se sentent comme ça.
 many LIG people feel:3PL.PRES like.this
 ‘Many people feel like this.’

In the early days, the use of *SENTIR* was found to be awkward (Peeters 1994: 428–429). The main reason for this was that, in combination with *bon* and *mauvais* (the earlier exponents for GOOD and BAD, now abandoned in favor of BIEN and MAL), as in *je sens quelque chose de bon / de mauvais*, the first interpretation that came to mind was one that refers to smells rather than to feelings or emotions (‘I smell something good / bad’). This led to the decision to adopt *éprouver* instead. Unfortunately, as pointed out by Wierzbicka (1994: 465), the latter is actually closer in meaning to *experience* than to *FEEL* – even though it appears as an equivalent of *FEEL* in an earlier text (Wierzbicka 1986: 590). It was a decision based on advice gained from a dictionary of synonyms according to which *ressentir* (the third alternative envisaged at the time) refers to vivid and/or clear experiences only, and excludes unspecified or confused ones. As NSM phrases such as QUELQUE CHOSE DE BIEN / DE MAL (previously QUELQUE CHOSE DE BON / DE MAUVAIS) are intentionally broad, they were thought to be more appropriate after the verb *éprouver*. Their use with the verb *SENTIR* is however entirely unproblematic.

3.2.4.2 Spanish

One of the two allomorphs proposed for Spanish, viz. the verb *SENTIR*, is carried over from the earlier description in Travis (2002: 195). The other one, posited as the secondary exponent, is the reflexive verb *SENTIRSE*, used in the same way as its French counterpart. The examples below are based on the canonical contexts provided in the earlier description:

- (99) No me siento así. Siento otra cosa.
 not feel:1SG.PRES like.this feel:1SG.PRES other thing
 ‘I do not feel like this. I feel something else.’
- (100) Cuando oí eso, sentí algo bueno.
 when hear:1SG.PRET this, feel:1SG.PRET something good
 ‘When I heard this, I felt something good.’

Non-reflexive SENTIR is maintained in spite of the fact that, outside of NSM, *sentir* may refer not only to FEEL but also, depending on context, to a string of other sensations including hearing, touch, taste and smell – though not sight. This is not to say that the verb is vague and refers to some sort of fairly general perception. It is polysemous, though, as shown by attempts to combine sensations covered by *sentir* in a single verb phrase. Such attempts invariably result in ungrammaticality (for an example in Italian which could be readily transposed, see Section 3.2.4.4). Importantly, the polysemy of Spanish *sentir* is unlikely to lead to ambiguity, because of the highly controlled way in which it appears in the Spanish NSM. Of the different meanings subsumed by *sentir*, only HEAR is also needed in the meta-language, but for the latter there is an unambiguous and entirely straightforward exponent (as shown in Section 3.2.5.2).

3.2.4.3 Portuguese

Like its cognates in French and Spanish, Portuguese SENTIR is polysemous. It can refer to smell and taste in combination with nominal objects designating or implicating these sensations (*Eu senti o perfume dela* ‘I smelled her perfume’, *Eu senti um gosto amargo* ‘I tasted a bitter taste’). It cannot refer to hearing or sight. Additionally, *sentir* without any object is used to apologize (*Eu sinto muito* ‘I’m very sorry’). Nonetheless, in the absence of plausible alternative candidates for FEEL in the Portuguese NSM, SENTIR is proposed as the primary exponent of this prime. A reflexive allolex is required in most dialects for use in the same environment as in French and Spanish:

- (101) Eu não me senti assim. Senti outra coisa.
 I not feel:1SG.PRET like.this feel:1SG.PRET other thing
 ‘I didn’t feel like this. I felt something else.’
- (102) Eu sinto algo bom quando penso assim.
 I feel:1SG.PRES something good when think:1SG.PRES like.this
 ‘I feel something good when I think like this.’

3.2.4.4 Italian

The intuitive choice for FEEL in Italian is SENTIRE. As in the other languages, a reflexive form, viz. SENTIRSI, is called upon in the presence of expressions based around LIKE.

- (103) Sento qualcosa di bene perché hai detto qualcosa.
 feel:1SG.PRES something LIG good because say:2SG.PPROS something
 ‘I feel something good because you said something.’
- (104) Io non sento la stessa cosa di te.
 I not feel:1SG.PRES the same thing as you
 ‘I do not feel the same thing as you.’

- (105) Questa persona si sente così.
 this person feel:3SG.PRES like.this
 ‘This person feels like this.’

Provare would have been a possible contender, were it not for the fact that, like *éprouver* in French, it is not quite semantically equivalent to FEEL. It has an element of ‘distance’ to it which gives it a sense of ‘undergoing’ or ‘experiencing’ rather than ‘feeling’, which is stronger and more immediate. For this very reason, *amore* ‘love’ is something *che si sente* ‘that one feels’, much more than something *che si prova* ‘that one experiences’. SENTIRE, on the other hand, can be used with all kinds of emotions and physical sensations. However, especially like its Spanish and Portuguese counterparts, it is involved in an uncomfortably intricate pattern of diversified meanings. To make matters worse, closer inspection reveals that it is also the preferred exponent of another universal meaning: examples of things that one can *sentire* include *un rumore*, *un profumo*, *un gusto*, *la pelle* (‘a noise, a smell, a taste, the skin’). In other words, the Italian exponent for the prime FEEL can be used to mean not only ‘feel’, but also ‘touch’, ‘taste’, ‘smell’ and... ‘hear’ (or HEAR). As we shall see in Section 3.2.5.4, there is no convincing exponent in Italian for the latter apart from SENTIRE; in this respect, Spanish and Italian differ from one another.

That ‘feel’, ‘touch’, ‘taste’, ‘smell’ and ‘hear’ are all separate senses of the verb *sentire* can be readily inferred from the ungrammatical sentences that result when one tries to combine two of the senses into a single verb phrase, as in (106).

- (106) *Ho sentito un rumore e una grande paura.
 hear/feel:1SG.PPROS a noise and a great fear
 ‘I heard a noise and felt a great fear.’

A similarly structured sentence which uses only one sense of the verb, and which is entirely acceptable, is given in (107):

- (107) Ho sentito un rumore nel giardino e lo squillo di un
 hear:1SG.PPROS a noise PREP.the garden and the ring PREP a
 telefono.
 telephone
 ‘I heard a noise in the garden and the ring of a telephone.’

The demonstration could be easily extended to cover all the meanings referred to above. Unfortunately, concrete direct objects such as those used in (106) and (107) do not occur in NSM explications. The question therefore becomes: how do we distinguish SENTIRE ‘FEEL’ from SENTIRE ‘HEAR’? Quite simply, as in other cases of (ordinary as well as non-compositional) polysemy, our best – and in fact our only – strategy is to exploit differences in syntactic patterning. How successful this strategy is will be assessed in Section 3.2.5.4.

3.2.5 HEAR and SEE

Unlike *listen* and *look*, which include a DO component as well as a notion of intention or purpose, HEAR and SEE are semantically basic (even though, outside of NSM, their English exponents do have a number of extended uses which are neither simple nor universal). HEAR and SEE are in fact *included* in the definition of *listen* and *look*: someone who *listens to* or *looks at* something (or someone) engages in an activity which could be captured along the lines of ‘doing something because you want to hear or see something’.

Like English, the main Romance languages distinguish between the activity of listening or looking, on the one hand, and the experience of hearing or seeing, on the other. The exponents for HEAR and SEE are as follows:

French:	ENTENDRE / VOIR
Spanish:	OÍR / VER
Portuguese:	OUVIR / VER
Italian:	SENTIRE / VEDERE

3.2.5.1 French

In the French NSM, HEAR is lexicalized as ENTENDRE, and SEE as VOIR. Although the universal grammar of these primes “has not yet been explored in depth” (Goddard & Wierzbicka 2002:63), we do know that it is unlikely to be as symmetrical as might be expected. It looks as though SEE, but not HEAR, is compatible with a locational phrase; HEAR, on the other hand, may have a privileged relationship with words. Simple substantive complements as well as the quasi-substantive THIS are allowed with both.

- (108) J’ ai dit ces mots, mais tu ne les
 I say:1SG.PCOMP these words but you NEG 3SG.CLIT
 as pas entendus.
 hear:2SG.PCOMP+not
 ‘I said these words, but you didn’t hear them.’

- (109) Ces gens ont vu quelque chose dans un endroit pas loin
 these people see:3PL.PCOMP something PREP a place not far
 d’ ici.
 PREP here
 ‘These people saw something in a place not far from here.’

3.2.5.2 Spanish

HEAR and SEE are realized in Spanish as OÍR and VER. Their grammar is as described for French in the previous subsection.

- (110) Cuando oí estas palabras, sentí algo muy
 when hear:1SG.PRET these words feel:1SG.PRET something very
 bad
 malo.
 ‘When I heard these words, I felt something very bad.’
- (111) Vi alguien ahí.
 see:1SG.PRET someone there
 ‘I saw someone over there.’

In ordinary (i.e. non-NSM) Spanish, *sentir* can also be used, at least in some contexts, to mean something similar to *hear*, as illustrated in (112) (cf. Section 3.2.4.2). However, when the verbs *sentir* and *oír* share the same generic direct object, their meanings are automatically different, as illustrated in (113).

- (112) No lo sentí cuando entró.
 not 3SG.CLIT hear:1SG.PRET when enter:3SG.PRET
 ‘I didn’t hear him when he came in.’
- (113) No sentía ni oía nada.
 NEG feel:3SG.IMPF NEG hear:3SG.IMPF nothing
 ‘He / she didn’t feel or hear anything.’

The range of use of *sentir* ‘hear’ is less wide than that of *oír*. **Sentir ruido* ‘hear (loud) noise’, for instance, is impossible, whereas *oír ruido* is fine. Similarly, patients in a hearing test would not be asked to indicate whether they can *sentir* a sound signal, but whether they can *oír* it.

3.2.5.3 Portuguese

The exponents of HEAR and SEE in Portuguese are OUVIR and VER, respectively. Their grammar is similar to that of English HEAR and SEE, French ENTENDRE and VOIR, and Spanish OÍR and VER.

- (114) Eu vi alguém neste lugar.
 I see:1SG.PRET someone PREP.this place
 ‘I saw someone in this place.’
- (115) Esta pessoa disse alguma coisa mas eu não ouvi.
 this person say:SG.PRET something but I not hear:1SG.PRET
 ‘This person said something but I didn’t hear it.’

3.2.5.4 Italian

There are two contenders for HEAR in Italian. One is the entirely unambiguous *udire*, which, contrary to expectation, is *not* the most obvious choice; the other one is SENTIRE, which is also one of the Italian exponents for FEEL (cf. Section 3.2.4.4).

It is not uncommon for languages to have identical exponents (but different NSM syntax) for FEEL and HEAR (cf. Goddard & Peeters this volume); however, apart from Italian, no Romance language has adopted a word which also means FEEL as its standard word for HEAR, even though Spanish – where, often, *sentir* does mean something like ‘hear’ – comes close.

Particularly in the spoken language, *sentire* occurs much more frequently than *udire*. It is learnt much earlier by children, whereas *udire* appears mostly (though not exclusively) in literary or technical contexts. Native speakers report that *udire* is a word they do not use very often, except perhaps when talking about someone’s *ability* to hear. In many cases, the two are interchangeable (either is suitable for hearing sounds and noises, including words); however, unlike *udire*, which has a more limited meaning, *sentire* can also be used for information or meaning represented by the sounds (or words) that have been heard. Native speakers report that the use of *udire* in such cases sounds wrong or strange, whereas *sentire* is perfectly acceptable and usual.

- (116) Ho sentito / ?udito le sue notizie / la storia / che torna.
 hear:1SG.PPROS the his news the story that return:3SG.PRES
 ‘I heard his news / the story / that he is returning.’

Surely, the above limitations are directly related to the fact that *udire* does not have as simple a meaning as the prime or as the relevant sense of *sentire*. The potential for confusion between SENTIRE ‘FEEL’ and SENTIRE ‘HEAR’ is however a drawback. Most but not all of their NSM patterns are different. A sentence in which the only possible meaning of SENTIRE is ‘HEAR’ is provided in (117).

- (117) Sento queste parole.
 hear:1SG.PRES these words
 ‘I hear these words.’

Example (118) is much more problematical:

- (118) Quando ho sentito / udito questo, ho sentito qualcosa di bene.
 when hear:1SG.PPROS this feel:1SG.PPROS something LIG good
 ‘When I heard this, I felt something good.’

The second half of this sentence is unambiguous. However, QUESTO ‘THIS’ can occur in the complement slot of both HEAR and FEEL. If *sentire* is used instead of *udire* in the subordinate clause of (118), the sentence could be taken to mean ‘when I felt this...’. A similar example is *non sento niente*, for instance, which could be interpreted not only as ‘I don’t hear anything’ but also as ‘I don’t feel anything’.

It is difficult to find a way around this problem without using *udire* as the exponent of HEAR. However, the problem is more a practical than a theoretical one. It cannot be doubted that Italian possesses exponents for the proposed univer-

sals FEEL (SENTIRE and SENTIRSI) and HEAR (SENTIRE). The different meanings of SENTIRE are normally easy to tell apart, except in the case of certain combinations with other primes. Although there is a specific word for HEAR, it is so uncommon in ordinary use that one hesitates to make it a part of the Italian NSM.

A more straightforward case is that of SEE, which has an obvious and unambiguous Italian counterpart in VEDERE. It takes the same psychological subjects of the NSM lexicon as the other mental predicates. In object position, as well as QUALCOSA ‘SOMETHING’ and QUESTO ‘THIS’, it can take QUALCUNO ‘SOMEONE’, GENTE ‘PEOPLE’, MI and TI (allolexes of IO ‘I’ and TU ‘YOU’, placed before the verb). It can also include a reference to place.

- (119) Ti vedo.
you see:1SG.PRES
'I see you.'
- (120) Ho visto qualcuno in questo posto.
see:1SG.PPROS someone PREP this place
'I saw someone in this place.'

3.3 Summary of exponents (without allolexes)

	French	Spanish	Portuguese	Italian
GOOD	BIEN	BUENO	BOM	BENE
BAD	MAL	MALO	RUIM	MALE
BIG	GRAND	GRANDE	GRANDE	GRANDE
SMALL	PETIT	PEQUEÑO	PEQUENO	PICCOLO
KNOW	SAVOIR	SABER	SABER	SAPERE
THINK	PENSER	PENSAR	PENSAR	PENSARE
WANT	VOULOIR	QUERER	QUERER	VOLERE
FEEL	SENTIR	SENTIR	SENTIR	SENTIRE
HEAR	ENTENDRE	OÍR	OUVIR	SENTIRE
SEE	VOIR	VER	VER	VEDERE

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CHAPTER 4

NSM exponents and universal grammar in Romance

Speech; actions, events and movement; existence
and possession; life and death

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This chapter defines exponents in French, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian (hereafter collectively referred to as “the main Romance languages”) for the following semantic primes:

Speech:	SAY, WORDS, TRUE
Actions, events, movement:	DO, HAPPEN, MOVE
Existence and possession:	THERE IS, HAVE
Life and death:	LIVE, DIE

4.1 Speech

4.1.1 SAY

The exponents of the prime SAY in the main Romance languages (see the table below) typically have a wider range of use than their English counterpart. In some contexts, they correspond more closely to *tell* (e.g. French *dire la vérité* ‘tell the truth’). However, its non-universal meanings can be “siphoned off”, leaving an appropriate exponent for the prime SAY.

French:	DIRE
Spanish:	DECIR
Portuguese:	DIZER
Italian:	DIRE

4.1.1.1 *French*

The French exponent of SAY is DIRE, a transitive verb with an additional valency slot for an indirect object addressee – as in DIRE QUELQUE CHOSE (À QUELQU’UN) ‘TO SAY SOMETHING (TO SOMEONE).’

- (1) J’ ai dit la même chose que toi.
I say:1SG.PCOMP the same thing as you
‘I said the same thing as you.’
- (2) Elle me dit quelque chose de vrai.
3SG.CLIT me say:3SG.PRES something LIG true
‘She says something true to me.’
- (3) Tu veux dire du mal de moi.
you want:2SG.PRES say:INF PART bad PREP me.
‘You want to say something bad about me.’

When used with either DU BIEN ‘SOMETHING GOOD’ or DU MAL ‘SOMETHING BAD’, as in (3), DIRE must also take a prepositional phrase introduced by *de*, to indicate who or what is being talked (or said something) about. The direct object of DIRE can be a noun phrase (as in the above examples) or an embedded clause in the indicative. Direct discourse is another possibility.

- (4) Les gens disent que cet endroit est loin d’ ici.
the people say:3PL.PRES COMP this place be:3SG.PRES far PREP here
‘People say that this place is far from here.’
- (5) Les gens disent: Cet endroit est loin d’ ici.
The people say:3PL.PRES this place be:3SG.PRES far PREP here
‘People say: This place is far from here.’

4.1.1.2 *Spanish*

SAY is as straightforward in Spanish as it is in French. DECIR can be used to introduce direct and indirect speech, and it can occur with a direct object as well.

- (6) Dije: Eso es bueno.
say:1SG.PRET this be:3SG.PRES good
‘I said: This is good.’
- (7) Ella dijo lo mismo.
3SG say:3SG.PRET the same
‘She said the same.’

References to the addressee are obligatorily expressed by means of a pre-verbal positional allolex of I or YOU (i.e. ME, TE), or a third person clitic automatically triggered by a substantive addressee placed after the verb. In ordinary speech (i.e. outside of NSM), the positional allolexes may be reinforced by means of an oblique pronoun (*a mí* ‘to me’, *a ti* ‘to you’), as illustrated in (8).

- (8) Ella me lo dijo (a mí).
 3SG me 3SG.CLIT say:3SG.PRET PREP me
 ‘She said it to me.’
- (9) Quiero decirle algo a esta persona.
 want:1SG.PRES say:INF+3SG.CLIT something PREP this person
 ‘I want to say something to this person.’

The twofold reference to the addressee highlights the indirect object, implying something like ‘she said it to me, not to someone else’. This is clearly a more complex meaning than ‘she said it to me’, which suggests that the oblique pronoun should not be included as part of the NSM combinatorics for DECIR. Pronominal addressees should be realized only with a clitic, while all other addressees must be realized by a clitic and an NSM substantive (e.g. SOMEONE) or an NSM substantive phrase (e.g. THIS PERSON). It will be shown below that the verbs HACER ‘DO’ and PASAR ‘HAPPEN’ function in the same way with respect to *their* indirect objects.

4.1.1.3 Portuguese

SAY in Portuguese is DIZER. Like English SAY and its Romance counterparts, it can appear with a substantive complement, a finite propositional complement, or a complement expressing direct discourse and, in all cases, an optional prepositional phrase or dative pronominal clitic that designates an addressee, as illustrated in the following examples.

- (10) Esta pessoa (me) disse a verdade.
 this person me say:SG.PRET the truth
 ‘This person told (me) the truth.’
- (11) Eu disse isso (para você).
 I say:SG.PRET this PREP you
 ‘I said this (to you).’
- (12) Você disse (para mim) que tem muitas coisas neste
 you say:SG.PRET PREP me COMP there.is many things PREP.this
 lugar.
 place
 ‘You said (to me) that there are many things in this place.’

- (13) Você disse (para muita gente): Esta pessoa é boa.
 you say:SG.PRET PREP much people this person be:SG.PRES good
 ‘You said (to many people): This person is good.’

The more flexible Portuguese verb *falar* could be substituted for DIZER without any obvious change in meaning in all of the above sentences. DIZER is chosen here as the exponent of SAY because it does not have the additional non-primitive meanings illustrated in the following examples, which show that *falar*, like English *speak*, can appear without any complement or with a complement naming a particular language.

- (14) Esta pessoa fala espanhol.
 this person speak:SG.PRES Spanish
 ‘This person speaks Spanish.’
- (15) Esta pessoa não fala.
 this person not speak:SG.PRES
 ‘This person doesn’t speak.’

That *falar* indeed has a somewhat different meaning is shown by the following contrast:

- (16) Você falou muito mas não disse nada.
 you speak:SG.PRET much but NEG say:SG.PRET nothing
 ‘You spoke a lot but didn’t say anything.’
- (17) *Você disse muito mas não falou nada.
 you said:SG.PRET much but NEG speak:SG.PRET nothing
 ‘You said a lot but didn’t say anything.’

4.1.1.4 Italian

In the Italian NSM, DIRE ‘SAY’ behaves in a similar way to the mental predicates, taking the psychological subjects IO ‘I’, TU ‘YOU’, QUALCUNO / PERSONA ‘SOMEONE / PERSON’ and GENTE ‘PEOPLE’. In its obligatory complement slot it takes QUALCOSA ‘SOMETHING’, QUESTO ‘THIS’, PAROLE ‘WORDS’, or a proposition expressed as direct discourse.

- (18) Dico qualcosa / queste parole.
 say:1SG.PRES something these words
 ‘I say something / these words.’
- (19) Dico: penso bene di te.
 say:1SG.PRES think:1SG.PRES good PREP you
 ‘I say: I think good things about you.’

In more idiomatic Italian, the complementizer *che* ‘that’ would be used rather than direct discourse, but the above sentence is perfectly acceptable grammatically.

When *che* is used, the subordinate clause may take the subjunctive mood, but such a usage is not appropriate to NSM, as it is pragmatically complex, expressing the speaker's doubts about the veracity or reliability of the reported speech ('I don't want to say: I know this').

DIRE has two further valency options for an addressee and a topic. The former is introduced by the preposition *a* 'at/to', the latter by *di* 'of' (or sometimes *su* 'on' or even *su di*).

- (20) Dico qualcosa a questa persona.
 say:1SG.PRES something PREP this person
 'I say something to this person.'
- (21) Qualcuno dice male di te / di questo.
 someone say:3SG.PRES bad PREP you PREP this
 'Someone says something bad about you / about this.'

When the addressee is expressed by means of a pronoun, the latter can take the form of an oblique, e.g. *a te* 'to you', or of a pre-verbal clitic such as *ti*:

- (22) Ti dico qualcosa.
 you say:1SG.PRES something
 'I say something to you.'

As in Spanish, the oblique form is more marked than the clitic, implying something like 'to me, not to anyone else'. In an Italian NSM it will be best to use the unmarked form unless a contrast is being made, as in the example below:

- (23) Questa persona lo ha detto a me, non a te.
 this person 3SG.CLIT say:3SG.PPROS PREP me not PREP you
 'This person said it to me, not to you.'

The *passato prossimo* tense used in (23) is the appropriate past tense for DIRE.

4.1.2 WORDS

WORD (in the singular) was briefly elevated to the status of prime in Wierzbicka (1996). Its fate, however, was short-lived. It was soon to be replaced with WORDS, an indeterminate rather than plural form needed not only to adequately explicate swear-words (i.e. BAD WORDS), performative verbs, and concepts such as "language" and "paraphrase", but also to capture the effect of metaphorical or figurative usage (cf. Goddard 2004). Like the other substantives, WORDS also combines with determiners and quantifiers. The exponents of this prime in the main Romance languages are as follows:

French:	MOTS
Spanish:	PALABRAS
Portuguese:	PALAVRAS
Italian:	PAROLE

4.1.2.1 *French*

The French exponent of **WORDS** is the noun **MOTS**. The combination **D'AUTRES MOTS** 'OTHER WORDS' typically appears in an optional valency slot expressing manner, in which case it requires a preposition to link it to the verb **DIRE** 'SAY'.

- (24) Beaucoup de gens ne connaissent pas ces mots.
many **LIG** people **NEG** know:3PL.PRES not these words
'Many people do not know these words.'
- (25) Je dis la même chose, mais en d' autres mots.
I say:1SG.PRES the same thing, but **PREP** **ART** other words
'I'm saying the same thing, but in other words.'

For the concept rendered in the English NSM as **BAD WORDS**, French uses the portmanteau **GROS MOTS**. The adjective *gros* typically means something close to English *large*; however, in the phrase **GROS MOTS**, it corresponds to the English loanword *gross*, which is expressed in contemporary French by means of the word *grossier*.

- (26) Certaines personnes disent beaucoup de gros mots.
some people say:3PL.PRES many **LIG** bad.words
'Some people say many bad words.'

4.1.2.2 *Spanish*

WORDS is realized in Spanish as **PALABRAS**. No portmanteau is needed for the combination **BAD WORDS**, which is lexicalized as **PALABRAS MALAS**.

- (27) Yo no dije estas palabras.
I not say:1SG.PRET these words
'I did not say these words.'
- (28) Esta persona dijo algunas palabras malas.
this person say:3SG.PRET some words bad
'This person said some bad words.'
- (29) Mucha gente dice eso en otras palabras.
much people say:3SG.PRES this **PREP** other words
'Many people say this in other words.'
- (30) Estas palabras dicen algo más.
these words say:3PL.PRES something more
'These words say something more.'

4.1.2.3 Portuguese

The Portuguese exponent of WORDS, PALAVRAS, functions similarly to its counterparts in French and Spanish.

- (31) Esta pessoa conhece muitas palavras.
 this person know:SG.PRES many words
 ‘This person knows many words.’
- (32) Ela disse a mesma coisa com outras palavras.
 3SG say:SG.PRET the same thing PREP other words
 ‘She said the same thing in other words.’

BAD WORDS is expressed by means of a portmanteau, as in French. However, the Portuguese version consists of a single word PALAVRÕES, itself consisting of the word PALAVRAS and a semantically bleached augmentative suffix:

- (33) Quando isso acontece, eu quero dizer palavrões.
 when this happen:SG.PRES I want:1SG.PRES say:INF bad.words
 ‘When this happens, I want to say bad words.’

4.1.2.4 Italian

In the Italian NSM, PAROLE is used to refer to WORDS. BAD WORDS are PAROLACCE, a portmanteau similar in form to Portuguese PALAVRÕES. Like its Portuguese counterpart, PAROLACCE is completely lexicalized.

- (34) Non voglio dire queste parole.
 non want:1SG.PRES say these words
 ‘I don’t want to say these words.’
- (35) Molta gente dice parolacce.
 much people say:3SG.PRES bad.words
 ‘Many people say bad words.’

4.1.3 TRUE

Not all the Romance exponents of TRUE are adjectives. In Spanish and in Portuguese, it is preferable to use a noun instead of an adjective. This is also the best choice in some other languages, e.g. Polish (Wierzbicka 2002: 101). The following exponents are proposed:

French:	VRAI
Spanish:	VERDAD
Portuguese:	VERDADE
Italian:	VERO

The French and Italian exponents have quite different meanings depending on whether they occur before or after a noun. Its more basic sense, i.e. the one matching the prime, occurs post-nominally, while in pre-nominal position it has a more complex, non-universal meaning. For instance, in Italian, *una notizia vera* is ‘a true piece of news’ (i.e. not false); *una vera notizia*, on the other hand, is ‘a real piece of news’ (i.e. really a piece of news). Still, while this is the way *vero* generally behaves, it must be pointed out that a speaker, using emphasis, can give a pre-nominal *vero* the more basic sense of the prime. Conversely, a speaker will sometimes want to emphasize the non-universal *vero* by placing it after the noun. However, these are questions of pragmatics which have no effect on the way the prime is used. Indeed, the material in the following sections shows that Romance exponents of TRUE typically occur post-verbally, or else in combination with SOMETHING. There is no evidence to suggest that inflectional allolexes are needed for adjectival exponents.

4.1.3.1 French

The French exponent of TRUE is the adjective *VRAI*.

- (36) Certaines gens savaient que cela était vrai.
 some people know:3PL.IMPF COMP this be:3SG.IMPF true
 ‘Some people knew that this was true.’

The combination SOMETHING TRUE is expressed with a ligature (the preposition *de*) between the two exponents: QUELQUE CHOSE DE VRAI (cf. QUELQUE CHOSE DE BIEN / MAL / GRAND / PETIT ‘SOMETHING GOOD / BAD / BIG / SMALL).

- (37) Ces mots disent quelque chose de vrai.
 these words say:3PL.PRES something LIG true
 ‘These words say something true.’

4.1.3.2 Spanish

Although it occurs in constructions similar to French *VRAI*, the Spanish exponent of the prime TRUE is a noun (*VERDAD*) rather than an adjective (*verdadero*):

- (38) No es verdad que mucha gente piensa así.
 not be:3SG.PRES true COMP much people think:3SG.PRES like.this
 ‘It is not true that many people think like this.’
- (39) Sabes que digo algo de verdad.
 know:2SG.PRES COMP say:1SG.PRES something LIG true
 ‘You know I say something true.’

4.1.3.3 Portuguese

In Portuguese, as in Spanish, a noun is used rather than an adjective. The Portuguese exponent of the prime TRUE is the noun VERDADE.

- (40) É verdade que este lugar é bom.
 be:SG.PRES truth COMP this place be:SG.PRES good
 ‘It is true that this place is good.’
- (41) Você disse algo de verdade.
 you say:SG.PRET something LIG true
 ‘You said something true.’

4.1.3.4 Italian

The Italian exponent of TRUE is an adjective, not a noun as in Spanish and Portuguese. Examples of possible usage of VERO in the Italian NSM include the following:

- (42) È vero che non è successo niente.
 be.3SG.PRES true that NEG happen:3SG.PPROS nothing
 ‘It is true that nothing happened.’
- (43) Quando dico così dico qualcosa di vero.
 when say:1SG.PRES like.this say:1SG.PRES something LIG true
 ‘When I say this I say something true.’

4.2 Actions, events and movement

4.2.1 DO

DO is lexicalized in the main Romance languages by means of the following verbs – all of which are typically more polysemous than their English counterpart:

French:	FAIRE
Spanish:	HACER
Portuguese:	FAZER
Italian:	FARE

Spanish *hacer*, for example, is also used in a sense similar to English ‘make’, in causative constructions, and in the sense of ‘pretend’, as in the examples below.

- (44) Él hizo una torta.
 3SG make:3SG.PRET a cake
 ‘He made a cake.’

(45) Le hice lavar los platos.
 3SG.CLIT make:1SG.PRET wash:INF the plates
 ‘I made him / her wash the dishes.’

(46) Se hizo el loco.
 3REFL make:3SG.PRET the crazy
 ‘He pretended (made out) to be a crazy person.’

The *prime* HACER is needed to define these other meanings, which have a higher degree of complexity. Thus, (44) includes a DOING component from which the resultant product was a cake. (45) incorporates a causative component, capturing the notion that the speaker did something to get the causee to wash the dishes. (46) comprises a component reflecting that the referent acted in a certain way to have others think in a certain way about him.

do is transitive: it has a complement slot which is obligatory. In addition, it has a number of valency options used to refer to the person one does something *to* (beneficiary) or *with* (comitative) and to the instrument something is done *with*. Like all the verbs in this section, it has a valency option for place and can take the manner adjunct LIKE THIS.

When used in the past, the exponents of DO (like those of HAPPEN and MOVE) are in the *passé composé* (French), the *preterit* (Spanish and Portuguese) or the *passato prossimo* (Italian). This is because the use of the imperfect tense would imply that the action was either repeated or drawn out over a period of time, a more complex meaning which could be explicated using the expression FOR SOME TIME.

4.2.1.1 French

The French exponent of DO is FAIRE. It can take either a direct, or a direct *and* an indirect object – as shown in the examples below. Indirect objects are introduced by means of the preposition *à* or expressed by means of pre-verbal pronouns. The use of pronouns after the preposition *à* is allowed to draw a contrast. For an Italian example that could easily be replicated in French, see (68) below.

(47) Ces deux personnes veulent faire la même chose.
 these two persons want:1SG.PRES do:INF the same thing
 ‘These two people want to do the same.’

(48) J’ ai fait du mal à ces gens.
 I do:1SG.PCOMP PART bad PREP these people
 ‘I did something bad to these people.’

(49) Tu m’ as fait du mal.
 you me do:2SG.PCOMP PART bad
 ‘You did something bad to me.’

Comitative or instrumental complements require the preposition *avec*.

- (50) Elle a fait cela avec sa mère.
 3SG.CLIT do:3SG.PCOMP this with her mother
 ‘She did this with her mother.’
- (51) Elle a fait cela avec une hache.
 3SG.CLIT do:3SG.PCOMP this with an axe
 ‘She did this with an axe.’

4.2.1.2 Spanish

DO is realized in Spanish as HACER. It takes an action complement, realized as a direct object, as in (52) and (53). Its instrumental and comitative valency options are introduced by the preposition *con*, as in (54) and (55).

- (52) Esta persona hizo algo bueno.
 this person do:3SG.PRET something good
 ‘This person did something good.’
- (53) Quiero hacer lo mismo en otro sitio.
 want:1SG.PRES do:INF the same PREP other place
 ‘I want to do the same in another place.’
- (54) Hizo eso con una navaja.
 do:3SG.PRET this with a knife
 ‘He / She did this with a knife.’
- (55) Lo hice con mi hermano.
 3SG.CLIT do:1SG.PRET with my brother
 ‘I did it with my brother.’

HACER can also occur with a patient. As is the case for DECIR ‘say’, the latter can be mentioned either once, as a pre-verbal clitic, or twice, as both a clitic and an oblique pronoun. This is exemplified below.

- (56) Te hice algo malo (a ti).
 you do:1SG.PRET something bad PREP you
 ‘I did something bad to you.’

Once again, the reduplication places emphasis on the patient, encoding a notion such as ‘I did it to you, not to someone else’, an element of meaning not encoded in the English translation. As this is clearly not a basic meaning, the oblique pronoun should not be used in the Spanish NSM. With non-pronominal patients, however, in order to specify the identity of the patient, both the clitic and the oblique must be given, as in the following example.

- (57) Le hice algo malo a esta persona.
 3SG.CLIT do:1SG.PRET something bad PREP this person
 ‘I did something bad to this person.’

4.2.1.3 Portuguese

The situation in Portuguese is very similar to that observed in the case of French and Spanish. Although it can have such meanings as ‘make’ and ‘cause’, the verb FAZER is also the Portuguese exponent of DO:

- (58) Algumas pessoas fizeram algo ruim.
 some people do:PL.PRET something bad
 ‘Some people did something bad.’
- (59) Eu não quero fazer assim.
 I not want:1SG.PRES do:INF like.this
 ‘I don’t want to do it like this.’
- (60) Você fez algo ruim a esta pessoa.
 you do:SG.PRET something bad PREP this person
 ‘You did something bad to this person.’
- (61) Eu vou fazer isso por algum tempo.
 I do:1SG.FUT this for.some.time
 ‘I’m going to do this for some time.’

4.2.1.4 Italian

The word which expresses DO in Italian is FARE. The examples below demonstrate its usage in NSM.

- (62) Ho fatto qualcosa in questo posto.
 do:1SG.PPROS something PREP this place
 ‘I did something in this place.’
- (63) Lo faccio così.
 3SG.CLIT do:1SG.PRES like.this
 ‘I do it like this.’

The optional instrumental and comitative valency slots are both expressed using FARE CON ‘DO WITH’.

- (64) Ho fatto questo con una mano / con un’altra persona.
 do:1SG.PPROS this with one hand with an other person
 ‘I did this with one hand / with another person.’

Noun phrases involving BENE and MALE can be used with FARE to produce the constructions ‘DO SOMETHING GOOD / BAD’, as in the example below, which also demonstrates the valency option FARE A ‘DO TO’.

- (65) Questa persona ha fatto del male (a qualcuno).
 this person do:3SG.PPROS PART bad PREP someone
 ‘This person did something bad (to someone).’

Regarding the choice between obliques or pre-verbal clitics with pronominal patients of FARE, it seems best, in general, to use clitics, as the oblique form is more marked. However, the latter would be required when drawing a contrast.

- (66) Questa persona mi ha fatto del male.
 this person me do:3SG.PPROS PART bad
 ‘This person did something bad to me.’
- (67) Questa persona ha fatto del male a me, non a te.
 this person do:3SG.PPROS PART bad PREP me not PREP you
 ‘This person did something bad to me, not to you.’

4.2.2 HAPPEN

The preferred exponents of the prime HAPPEN in the languages in our sample have each their own etymon, a situation which arises for none of the other primes and which is somewhat unexpected in view of the generally strong links that bind the four main Romance languages together. The following choices were made:

French:	ARRIVER
Spanish:	PASAR
Portuguese:	ACONTECER
Italian:	SUCCEDERE

4.2.2.1 French

There are several candidate exponents in French for HAPPEN: *arriver*, *se passer* or *se produire*. All three verbs can be used either intransitively or in impersonal constructions, with the full nominal as a complement.

- (68) Quelque chose arrive / se passe / se produit.
 something happen:3SG.PRES
 ‘Something happens.’
- (69) Il arrive / se passe / se produit quelque chose.
 3SG.CLIT happen:3SG.PRES something
 ‘Something happens.’

Se passer has a duration component which is absent from *arriver* and *se produire*. It could thus be explicated using either of the latter, together with the exponent of the prime FOR SOME TIME. *Se produire*, on the other hand, might have been an adequate exponent of HAPPEN, were it not for the fact that, like *se passer*, it cannot be used with an indirect object referring to the beneficiary, i.e. the person to whom something happens. **Quelque chose s’est passé à Jean*, **Quelque chose s’est produit à Jean*, **Il s’est passé quelque chose à Jean*, **Il s’est produit quelque chose*

à *Jean* are all ungrammatical. The fact that *HAPPEN* *can* be used with a beneficiary, and often is, compels us to prefer the remaining candidate, viz. *ARRIVER*. This verb is polysemous, and is also used to mean ‘arrive’, but not in NSM. We are dealing here with a case of polysemy which is reminiscent of that of *-pet* in Mangaaba-Mbula (Bugenhagen 2002: 19). Etymologically, *ARRIVER* goes back to a reconstructed Latin verb **adripare* ‘come to the shore’, which is semantically not unrelated to *-pet* ‘to go in a seawards direction’.

- (70) Si cela arrive, je ne sais pas ce que je
 if this happen:3SG.PRES I NEG know:1SG.PRES not what I
 vais faire.
 go:1SG.PRES do:INF
 ‘If this happens, I don’t know what I will do.’
- (71) Quelque chose de mal est arrivé dans cet endroit.
 something LIG bad happen:3SG.PCOMP PREP this place
 ‘Something bad happened in this place.’

The beneficiary of *ARRIVER* may be expressed as an indirect object clitic or a prepositional phrase introduced by *à*.

- (72) Quelque chose est arrivé à Jean.
 something happen:3SG.PCOMP PREP Jean
 ‘Something happened to John.’
- (73) Quelque chose m’ est arrivé.
 something me happen:3SG.PCOMP
 ‘Something happened to me.’

4.2.2.2 Spanish

HAPPEN could be realized as either *ocurrir* or *pasar*, as in the following sentences.

- (74) Algo bueno ocurrió / pasó.
 something good happen:3SG.PRET
 ‘Something good happened.’
- (75) La misma cosa volvió a ocurrir / pasar.
 the same thing turn:3SG.PRET PREP happen:INF
 ‘The same thing happened again.’

While both these words can be used, the implication is slightly different, with *ocurrir* implying a more large scale, or serious, event or occurrence. This is therefore the word used to refer to catastrophes or earthquakes, for example (*una catástrofe / un terremoto ocurrió* ‘a catastrophe / an earthquake occurred’). The same sentence with *pasar* sounds quite strange. Thus, *PASAR* is the preferred exponent of *HAPPEN*, even though, outside of NSM, that same verb has a range of other meanings,

including ‘pass by (e.g. a place)’, ‘surpass’ etc. It is important to note that it is only in the sense of *HAPPEN* that it is included in the Spanish NSM.

PASAR can occur with a location, as in (76); it can also take a patient. As in the case of *DECIR* ‘say’ and *HACER* ‘do’, patients can be mentioned once or twice, as shown in (77).

(76) Algo malo pasó en este sitio.
 something bad happen:3SG.PRET PREP this place
 ‘Something bad happened in this place.’

(77) Algo malo me pasó (a mí).
 something bad me happen:3SG.PRET PREP me
 ‘Something bad happened to me.’

The same argument put forward for *DECIR* and *HACER* can be applied here: the oblique encodes a notion of ‘not to someone else’, and should not appear in NSM explications involving first and second person (unless a contrast is being established). It must be given for non-pronominal referents, however, in order to specify the identity of the patient.

4.2.2.3 Portuguese

HAPPEN is expressed by the monosemous verb *acontecer*, which, in spite of showing agreement with its subject when it is finite, commonly occurs in a construction with the subject (and possibly a locational phrase) following it:

(78) Pode acontecer algo ruim (em muitos lugares).
 can:SG.PRES happen:INF something bad PREP many places
 ‘Something bad can happen (in many places).’

The experiencer of the thing that happens can be expressed as a dative pronominal clitic or an object of a preposition (*com* ‘with’ or *a* ‘to’):

(79) Quando me acontecem coisas assim, sinto algo
 when me happen:PL.PRES things like.this feel:1SG.PRES something
 bom.
 good
 ‘When things like this happen to me, I feel something good.’

(80) Não acontece nada de bom com pessoas assim.
 NEG happen:SG.PRES nothing LIG good PREP people like.this
 ‘Nothing good happens to people like this.’

The verb *rolar* ‘roll’, used in (81), is beginning to replace *acontecer* in some dialects.

(81) Rolou algo meio estranho ontem.
 happen:3SG.PRES something half weird yesterday
 ‘Something kind of weird happened yesterday.’

4.2.2.4 Italian

There are a number of HAPPEN-like verbs in Italian, but the one proposed here as the exponent of the prime is *SUCCEDERE*. The other three possibilities, viz. *accadere*, *avvenire* and *capitare*, all have some extra, non-universal, shades of meaning. Being the most familiar and commonly used of the set, *SUCCEDERE* is also the intuitive choice, and a close examination of the semantics of all four verbs (which, for reasons of space, cannot be undertaken here) shows it to be the simplest and most appropriate exponent. It should be pointed out that *succedere* is a polysemous verb which can also mean ‘follow’ or ‘succeed’, but this does not create any difficulties for its use in the Italian NSM, as these other meanings occur in different environments from the prime and can be explicated using the latter.

SUCCEDERE has an optional undergoer slot (requiring the preposition *a* ‘to’), which allows it to be used to refer not just to an event but also to the event’s effect on a particular person or on a number of people. It also has an optional place slot.

- (82) Qualcosa è successo a questa persona.
something happen:3SG.PPROS PREP this person
‘Something happened to this person.’
- (83) Qualcosa di male è successo in questo posto.
something LIG bad happen:3SG.PPROS PREP this place
‘Something bad happened in this place.’

Oblique and pre-verbal clitics are used according to the same basic rules that apply elsewhere: the latter are to be considered the unmarked form, since obliques signal a contrast with another undergoer.

4.2.3 MOVE

The exponents of *MOVE* in the main Romance languages are as follows:

French:	BOUGER
Spanish:	MOVERSE
Portuguese:	MEXER-SE
Italian:	MUOVERSI

All the NSM substantives surveyed in Chapter 2 are allowed to occur in the subject slot of this verb, which also has a valency option referring to the *place* where something is moving. The verb is normally intransitive, so much so that it is unclear at present whether there is a need to include transitive uses in the metalanguage, or indeed whether such uses are universal. At any rate, the only nominal which is likely to be able to occur post-verbally in NSM is *BODY* (cf. Enfield 2002: 194), either as such or in combination with *PART* – and there are several languages (e.g. Malay and Mangaaba-Mbula; cf. Goddard 2002: 113; Bugenhagen 2002: 23–24)

where an additional allolex would be required for this purpose. Transitive uses have not been illustrated in what follows.

4.2.3.1 French

The French exponent of MOVE is BOUGER.

- (84) Je ne peux pas bouger.
I NEG can:1SG.PRES not move
'I can't move.'
- (85) Quelque chose bougeait pas loin de moi.
something move:3SG.IMPF not far PREP me
'Something was moving not far from me.'

4.2.3.2 Spanish

MOVE, in Spanish, is realized as MOVERSE. The final *-se* in the exponent is a reflexive pronoun, which must agree with the subject. Where a modal auxiliary is used, the reflexive can occur either as a post-verbal clitic, as in (86), or preceding the auxiliary (*no me podía mover* 'I couldn't move').

- (86) No podía moverme.
not can:1SG.IMPF move:INF
'I couldn't move.'
- (87) Vi algo moverse en este sitio.
see:1SG.PRET something move:INF PREP this place
'I saw something move in this place.'

4.2.3.3 Portuguese

In the Portuguese NSM, an intransitive action of generic motion can be described using the reflexive form of the verb *mexer* 'mix, move', viz. MEXER-SE. As in Spanish, the *-se* in the exponent is the reflexive pronoun, which follows the same dialect- and register-contingent placement rules as first and second person pronominal clitics (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1.3) and which agrees with the subject.

- (88) Estas coisas não se mexeram.
these things not move:PL.PRET
'These things didn't move.'
- (89) Alguém estava se mexendo perto de mim.
someone be:SG.IMPF move:PROG near PREP me
'Someone was moving near me.'

4.2.3.4 Italian

In Italian, MOVE is expressed by means of the reflexive verb MUOVERSI. Once again, the final *-si* is the reflexive pronoun, and agreement with the subject is compulsory. There is no preference for the position of the reflexive in the presence of an auxiliary: reflexives can go either before the auxiliary or occur as a post-verbal clitic, without there being any difference in meaning.

- (90) Prima, non mi potevo muovere.
before non REFL can:1SG.IMPF move
'Before, I couldn't move.'
- (91) Qualcosa si muove qui.
something move:3SG.PRES here
'Something is moving here.'

4.3 Existence and possession

4.3.1 THERE IS

The prime required to talk about the existence of people and kinds of people, things and kinds of things, animals and kinds of animals, etc., is rendered in English as *THERE IS*. It has a valency option for place. In the main Romance languages, as in English, various other allolexes must be used for explications referring to the past or the future. Number is another variable that needs to be taken into account, although its impact differs from language to language. The primary exponents are as follows:

French:	IL Y A
Spanish:	HAY
Portuguese:	TEM / HA
Italian:	C'È (CI SONO)

Whether this is in fact a different prime from the one expressed in English as *SOME* is a matter which requires more research (cf. Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2).

4.3.1.1 French

The French exponent of *THERE IS* is the expression *IL Y A*, made up of the impersonal pronoun *il* 'it', the locative pronoun *y* 'there', and the verb *avoir* 'have'. The latter is also a prime in its own right (cf. Section 4.3.2.1 below), but there is no danger of confusion as different grammatical properties are involved. *IL Y A* is uninflected for number, regardless of the tense (*IL Y A* [PRES], *IL Y AVAIT* [IMPF], *IL Y AURA* [FUT]) in which it is used.

- (92) Il y a beaucoup d' os dans le corps humain.
 there.is many LIG bones inside the body human
 'There are many bones inside the human body.'
- (93) Il n'y avait personne d' autre dans cet endroit.
 there.is:IMPF+NEG nobody LIG other PREP this place
 'There was nobody else in this place.'

4.3.1.2 Spanish

THERE IS is realized in Spanish as HAY, the [3SG.PRES] form of the verb *haber* 'have'. In modern Spanish, this verb is no longer used – except in the form *hay* and also as an auxiliary.

- (94) Hay alguien en el jardín.
 there.is someone PREP the garden
 'There is someone in the garden.'
- (95) Hay muchos tipos de murciélago.
 there.is many kinds of bat
 'There are many kinds of bat.'

HAY occurs without a subject, and in the present tense is uninflected for number (as shown in the examples above). The other tenses in which this prime is likely to appear do inflect for number: thus, in the imperfect, HABÍA is used in the singular and HABÍAN in the plural (*había alguien* 'there was someone', *habían muchos tipos* 'there were many kinds'), and likewise for the future (HABRÁ / HABRÁN). This suggests that the present tense form is more highly grammaticalized than the others.

4.3.1.3 Portuguese

The verb TER (see Section 4.3.2.3 below) also provides the Portuguese exponent of the prime THERE IS in Brazil. A subjectless construction involving a [SG] form of the verb in any tense or mood (e.g. TEM [PRES], TINHA [IMPF], TEVE [PRET], VAI TER [FUT], TENHA [PRES.SBJV], etc.) yields the meaning of the prime.

- (96) Vai ser bom quando tiver árvores neste lugar.
 be:SG.FUT good when there.is:SG.FUT.SBJV trees PREP.this place
 'It will be good when there are trees in this place.'

Although there is a moribund prescriptive tradition favoring HAVER (a verb originally meaning 'have' that now only means THERE IS), TER has essentially supplanted HAVER in all but highly formal registers in Brazil. In Portugal, however, HAVER, which is always singular and has the same range of tense/mood allomorphs

(HÁ [PRES], HAVIA [IMPF], HOVER [FUT.SBJV], etc.), continues to be the preferred exponent of THERE IS.

4.3.1.4 Italian

THERE IS is lexicalized in Italian as C'È [SG]. Italian mirrors English quite closely in its variety of allolxes for this prime. There is a separate form CI SONO [PL] for the present, and NSM explications involving past and future time reference require the imperfect forms C'ERA 'THERE WAS' and C'ERANO 'THERE WERE', on the one hand, and the future forms CI SARÀ and CI SARANNO 'THERE WILL BE', on the other hand. Formally, too, there is a close match: the pronoun *ci* is generally translated as 'there', and the verb which is involved is *essere* 'be'.

- (97) C'è molta gente in questo posto.
 there is much people PREP this place
 'There are many people in this place.'

4.3.2 HAVE

The prime HAVE expresses ownership of physical things. In many languages, including English, the exponent of this prime is also used for physical and moral qualities, kin relations, etc. Such uses, however, are excluded from the Natural Semantic Metalanguage.

French:	AVOIR
Spanish:	TENER
Portuguese:	TER
Italian:	AVERE

In NSM explications, as numerous examples in this and other chapters clearly show, French *avoir* and Italian *avere* are also needed as auxiliary verbs: combined with past participles, they give rise to the French *passé composé* [PCOMP] and the Italian *passato prossimo* [PPROS]. Portuguese *ter*, on the other hand, is an auxiliary verb which, when combined with a past participle, yields rather special meanings, not illustrated in this book: *Eu tenho feito isso*, for instance, with *ter* used in the present tense, means 'I have been doing this'. Spanish *tener*, finally, is not used as an auxiliary at all. The auxiliary forms used in verb tenses are not to be confused with occurrences of the prime HAVE; together with the past participles that follow them, they constitute allolxes of the verbs which are being conjugated.

4.3.2.1 French

HAVE is realized in French by means of the verb AVOIR.

- (98) Jean a un livre.
 Jean have:3SG.PRES a book
 'John has a book.'
- (99) Certaines gens veulent avoir beaucoup de choses.
 some people want:3PL.PRES have:INF many LIG things
 'Some people want to have many things.'

The verb *posséder* 'own, possess' has a meaning which is more complex than that of AVOIR: it implies control and possibly greed, while AVOIR is neutral.

4.3.2.2 Spanish

Although in many languages (including French and Brazilian Portuguese) the exponent for HAVE is related to the exponent for THERE IS, in Spanish, *haber* 'have' is not the primary exponent for HAVE, as it is no longer used in the required meaning (cf. Section 4.3.1.2 above). TENER is the only candidate for the realization of this prime. It should be noted that this verb is polysemous, also meaning something like 'hold' (*tenga me esto* 'hold this for me'). Furthermore, it is used to refer to age (*tiene veinte años* 'he is twenty years old') as well as to ascribe some physical sensations, such as hunger, tiredness, etc. (*tengo hambre* 'I'm hungry'). As none of these uses refers to physical possession, they are not relevant to the semantically primitive sense being discussed here. Canonical contexts for TENER are provided in (100)–(101) below:

- (100) Esta persona tiene muchas casas.
 this person have:3SG.PRES many houses
 'This person has many houses.'
- (101) Mucha gente piensa que yo tengo todas estas cosas.
 much people think COMP I have:1SG.PRES all these things
 'Many people think that I have all these things.'

4.3.2.3 Portuguese

The Portuguese exponent for the prime HAVE is TER, which, in Brazil, is also used as the exponent for the prime THERE IS (cf. Section 4.3.1.3). In addition, it is polysemous in ways similar to Spanish TENER. The HAVE meaning is distinguished from the THERE IS meaning by the presence of a possessor subject, which is pre-verbal if overt and triggers verb agreement, as illustrated by the following examples.

- (102) Muitas pessoas não têm estas coisas.
 many people not have:PL.PRES these things
 'Many people do not have these things.'

- (103) Eu não tenho nada.
I NEG have:1SG.PRES nothing
'I don't have anything.'

4.3.2.4 Italian

In Italian, the prime HAVE is expressed using the verb AVERE.

- (104) Dopo, non avrai niente.
after NEG have:2SG.FUT nothing
'After this, you won't have anything.'
- (105) Prima, questa persona aveva molte cose.
before this person have:3PL.IMPF many things
'Before, this person had many things.'

4.4 Life and death

4.4.1 LIVE

The English verb *live* is polysemous. The main Romance languages, on the other hand, often have more than one corresponding verb (such as French *habiter* and *vivre*, Spanish *habitar* and *vivir*, Portuguese *morar* and *viver*, Italian *abitare* and *vivere*), but they have only one exponent for the prime:

French:	VIVRE
Spanish:	VIVIR
Portuguese:	VIVER
Italian:	VIVERE

Italian *abitare*, for instance, which is similar in meaning, though not in register, to 'dwell', must be used for *live* in its "residential" meaning, i.e. with a complement referring to the fairly specific area or place where one abides (e.g. a street address, a town, a country). While this sense of the English *live* has never been postulated as universal, it is believed that the prime LIVE, which does not refer to this very common meaning and is intrinsically durational (as in *live long*), can occur with a location adjunct when describing more permanent living conditions such as the place where a person or an animal has its life support system (e.g. *fish live in water*; cf. Wierzbicka 1996:126; Goddard & Wierzbicka 2002:54). Comitative adjuncts referring to 'shared life' or 'shared existence' (e.g. *live with one's parents*) are also allowed.

4.4.1.1 French

LIVE is realized in French as *VIVRE*. It can take duration and location complements. Comitative complements are introduced by the preposition *avec* 'with'.

- (106) Les mouches ne vivent pas longtemps.
 the flies NEG live:3PL.PRES not a.long.time
 'Flies do not live for a long time.'
- (107) Les singes ne vivent pas dans la mer.
 the monkeys NEG live:3PL.PRES not PREP the sea
 'Monkeys do not live in the sea.'
- (108) Après cela, je vivrai avec ma sœur pour un temps.
 after this I live:1SG.FUT with my sister for.some.time
 'After this, I will live with my sister for some time.'

4.4.1.2 Spanish

The Spanish exponent of LIVE is *VIVIR*. It is used exactly like French *VIVRE*. The comitative valency option requires the preposition *con* 'with'.

- (109) En estos sitios, las tortugas viven por mucho tiempo.
 PREP these places the turtles live:3PL.PRES PREP a.long.time
 'In these places, turtles live for a long time.'
- (110) En este tiempo, él vivía con sus amigos.
 PREP this time 3SG live:3SG.IMPF with his friends
 'At that time, he was living with his friends.'

4.4.1.3 Portuguese

The exponent of LIVE in Portuguese is *VIVER*. It can be used as in the following examples.

- (111) Alguns animais vivem por muito tempo.
 some animals live:PL.PRES PREP a.long.time
 'Some animals live (for) a long time.'
- (112) Os macacos vivem nas árvores.
 the monkeys live:PL.PRES PREP.the trees
 'Monkeys live in trees.'
- (113) Eu não posso viver com você.
 I not can:1SG.PRES live:INF with you
 'I can't live with you.'

Although it cannot be used to refer to abode, inhabitation or residence in a place, which require the verb *morar* instead (*Eu moro nesta cidade* 'I live in this city'), *viver* is polysemous in another way, as it can also mean something like 'be always'

(*Você vive falando mal de mim* ‘You are always saying bad things about me’ or *Eu vivo na escola* ‘I’m always at school’).

4.4.1.4 Italian

The examples below show typical uses of *VIVERE* ‘LIVE’ in NSM explications:

- (114) Queste persone sono vissute allo stesso tempo.
 these persons live:3PL.PPROS PREP.the same time
 ‘These people lived at the same time.’
- (115) Questa persona non vive più.
 this person not live:3SG.PRES more
 ‘This person is not living any more.’
- (116) I pesci vivono nell’ acqua, la gente vive
 the fish live:3PL.PRES PREP.the water, the people live:3SG.PRES
 sulla terra.
 PREP.the land
 ‘Fish live in water, people live on land.’
- (117) Molti animali vivono con la gente.
 many animals live:3PL.PRES with the people
 ‘Many animals live with people.’

4.4.2 DIE

DIE occurs in NSM explications with or without time and place complements. Its exponents in the main Romance languages are straightforward:

French:	MOURIR
Spanish:	MORIR
Portuguese:	MORRER
Italian:	MORIRE

No further comment appears to be called for; the subsections below contain illustrative material only.

4.4.2.1 French

- (118) Elle mourra loin d’ ici.
 3SG.CLIT die:3SG.FUT far PREP here
 ‘She will die far from here.’

4.4.2.2 Spanish

- (119) Jesús murió hace mucho tiempo en Jerusalén.
 Jesus die:3SG.PRET ago a.long.time PREP Jerusalem
 ‘Jesus died a long time ago in Jerusalem.’

4.4.2.3 Portuguese

- (120) Esta pessoa morreu faz pouco tempo.
this person die:SG.PRET ago a.short.time
'This person died a short time ago.'

4.4.2.4 Italian

- (121) Questa persona è morta prima di me.
this person die:3SG.PPROS before LIG me
'This person died before me.'

4.5 Summary of exponents (without allolexes)

	French	Spanish	Portuguese	Italian
SAY	DIRE	DECIR	DIZER	DIRE
WORDS	MOTS	PALABRAS	PALAVRAS	PAROLE
TRUE	VRAI	VERDAD	VERDADE	VERO
DO	FAIRE	HACER	FAZER	FARE
HAPPEN	ARRIVER	PASAR	ACONTECER	SUCCEDERE
MOVE	BOUGER	MOVERSE	MOVER	MUOVERSI
THERE IS	IL Y A	HAY	TEM	C'È
HAVE	AVOIR	TENER	TER	AVERE
LIVE	VIVRE	VIVIR	VIVER	VIVERE
DIE	MOURIR	MORIR	MORRER	MORIRE

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NSM exponents and universal grammar in Romance

Time and space

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This chapter defines exponents in French, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian (hereafter collectively referred to as “the main Romance languages”) for the following semantic primes:

Time:	WHEN, NOW, BEFORE, AFTER, A LONG TIME, A SHORT TIME, FOR SOME TIME, IN ONE MOMENT
Space:	WHERE, HERE, ABOVE, BELOW, FAR, NEAR, SIDE, INSIDE, TOUCH

5.1 Time

5.1.1 WHEN (TIME)

English *when* is either an interrogative pronoun (as in *When did you do it?*, i.e. at which point in time) or a temporal conjunction (as in *When I thought about it, I felt something good*, i.e. at the time I thought about it). The same is true for its exponents in the main Romance languages, with the exception of Spanish, where there is a (purely orthographic) contrast between the interrogative *¿cuándo?* ‘when?’, written *with* an acute accent on the first vowel, and the temporal *cuando* ‘when’, written *without* such an accent. As the prime WHEN is not meant to be an interrogative, its basic exponents in the languages in our sample are straightforward. Additional allolexes have to be posited, though: they are needed to refer to specific

points in time, in exactly the same way that TIME is needed as an allolex for WHEN to refer to “specific WHENS” (AT THIS TIME, AT THE SAME TIME, AT ANOTHER TIME, AT A TIME LIKE THIS, ONE TIME etc.). More allolexes are needed than in English – a situation which is reminiscent of, e.g. Malay (Goddard 2002a) and Cantonese (Tong et al. 1997):

French:	QUAND (MOMENT, FOIS)
Spanish:	CUANDO (TIEMPO, VEZ)
Portuguese:	QUANDO (TEMPO, VEZ)
Italian:	QUANDO (TEMPO, VOLTA)

As will be shown below for each language separately, the first of the bracketed allolexes requires a preposition, sometimes more than one. It may be useful to recall that the various prepositions posited here are by no means additional primes: they are triggered by the relevant allolex and are therefore part of its combinatorics, in much the same way that Spanish *en* is triggered after PENSAR and English *of* after THINK when reference is made to the person or the thing one thinks of.

One final introductory remark is in order. The phrase AT THIS TIME is to be understood as referring to the past or the future: it has a [non-present] reading. This is potentially problematical, as the most intuitive meaning associated with this phrase is something like ‘now’ (for which there is a separate prime). It would be significantly more natural to use *at that time* instead, since AT THIS TIME can only be [non-present] when the time referred to is sufficiently “in focus” (cf. Peeters 1997:243, n. 3). Fortunately, this is always the way it is in NSM: the phrase only occurs immediately after a statement which relates to the past or the future. It is therefore not necessary to posit an allolex *THAT, to be added to those already in place for the prime THIS. Positing an additional prime would be totally out of the question: the contrast *this_{adj}-that_{adj}* is anything but universal. French, for instance, does not know it (cf. Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1.1). The issue discussed here arises not only in English, but also in Spanish, Portuguese and Italian. In French, on the other hand, *à CE MOMENT* is by definition [non-present] (see below). Out of context, the examples provided in the various subsections that follow may sound unusual, because of the use of the relevant Romance equivalent of THIS. The interlinear glosses will maintain the prime, but *that* will be used in the English translations.

5.1.1.1 French

The French exponent of WHEN is QUAND. *Lorsque* would have been a serious contender, were it not for the fact that it is considerably more formal. In addition, its unavailability as a knowledge complement, i.e. in combinations such as KNOW WHEN, was raised as problematical in Peeters (1997:235). Such combinations, although they appear to be universal (Mushin 1995), do not appear to be needed in the metalanguage. The usage of QUAND can be illustrated as follows:

- (1) Quand j' ai fait cela, j' ai senti quelque chose de mal.
 when I do:1SG.PCOMP this I feel:1SG.PCOMP something LIG bad
 'When I did this, I felt something bad.'

The allolex *MOMENT* (rather than *temps*; see Peeters 1994) is needed in combinations such as *À CE MOMENT* 'AT THIS TIME' [non-present], *AU MÊME MOMENT* 'AT THE SAME TIME', *À UN AUTRE MOMENT* 'AT ANOTHER TIME', *À UN MOMENT COMME ÇA* 'AT A TIME LIKE THIS'. Unlike its English counterpart, the French word *moment* does not necessarily refer to a (brief) moment: it is equally suitable for longer periods (cf. *A ce moment-là, il était à Paris* 'At that time, he was in Paris' [obviously for more than just one moment]). All of the combinations above occur in conjunction with actions and events, as well as with mental predicates, as shown in the following examples:

- (2) A ce moment (-là), je n' en savais rien.
 PREP that time there I NEG CLIT know:1SG.IMPF nothing
 'At that time, I didn't know anything about it.'
- (3) Cela est arrivé au même moment, pas à un autre
 this happen:3SG.PCOMP PREP.the same time not PREP an other
 moment.
 time
 'This happened at the same time, not at another time.'

As mentioned before, *À CE MOMENT*, normally reinforced by means of the particle *là* 'there', as in (2), can only refer to the future or to the past. To convey the meaning 'at this time [present]', *en ce moment* must be used. The preposition is different. *En ce moment* cannot under any circumstances refer to non-present times; it is not needed in the French NSM, though, since there is a prime NOW for this purpose, lexicalized in French as *MAINTENANT*. There are no compelling reasons to maintain the earlier view (Peeters 1997:238–239) according to which *en ce moment* "could be seen as a free (phrasemic) allolex of *maintenant* 'now'" (with restrictions which need not be repeated).

Finally, *FOIS* (not *MOMENT*) is the allolex to be used in combination with the quantifiers *ONE*, *TWO* and *MANY*, and also in the portmanteau *SOMETIMES* (*PAR-FOIS*). *AT ALL TIMES* requires a second portmanteau, viz. *TOUJOURS* 'ALWAYS' (lit. 'all days'). It is totally opaque; no French speaker feels uncomfortable about what appears to be a semantic clash in example (7).

- (4) Cela est arrivé une fois / deux fois.
 this happen:3SG.PCOMP one time two times
 'This happened one time (once) / two times (twice).'

- (5) Je l' ai fait beaucoup de fois.
 I 3SG.CLIT do:1SG.PCOMP many LIG times
 'I did it many times.'
- (6) Parfois, les gens disent du mal de moi.
 sometimes the people say:3PL.PRES PART bad PREP me
 'Sometimes, people say bad things about me.'
- (7) Ce chien aboie toujours la nuit.
 this dog bark:3SG.PRES always the night
 'This dog always barks at night.'

5.1.1.2 Spanish

WHEN is realized in Spanish as CUANDO.

- (8) Cuando fuimos al zoológico, vimos muchos
 when go:1PL.PRET PREP.the zoo see:1PL.PRET many
 animales.
 animals
 'When we went to the zoo, we saw a lot of animals.'

As is the case with WHEN in English and QUAND in French, CUANDO cannot occur with determiners. The allolex TIEMPO 'TIME' is used instead.

- (9) En este tiempo, no sabía nada.
 PREP this time NEG know:1SG.IMPf nothing
 'At that time, I didn't know anything.'
- (10) Al mismo tiempo, algo me pasó.
 PREP.the same time something me happen:3SG.PRET
 'At the same time, something happened to me.'

Note that the preposition to be used differs depending on the determiner, *en* occurring with ESTE, and *a* occurring with MISMO, as in (9) and (10), respectively. The use of these prepositions is consistent with the semantics of the determiners, MISMO referring to a more specific point in time than ESTE. It is because of its specificity that EL MISMO TIEMPO 'THE SAME TIME' takes the "specific point in time" preposition *a*. It is possible to say *en el mismo tiempo* 'in the same time', but – as in English – this suggests duration rather than simultaneity ('in the same *period* of time').

With quantifiers, Spanish uses the allolex VEZ (plural VECES), etymologically related to its French counterpart FOIS. In conjunction with the preposition *a* 'at', as in (13), VEZ also expresses the notion 'sometimes'.

- (11) Eso pasó dos veces.
this happen:3SG.PRET two times
'This happened two times.'
- (12) Pasó muchas veces.
happen:3SG.PRET many times
'It happened many times.'
- (13) A veces los perros ladran en la noche.
PREP times the dogs bark:3PL.PRES PREP the night
'Sometimes dogs bark at night.'

Finally, in line with what was suggested for French, SIEMPRE 'always' is proposed as a portmanteau for AT ALL TIMES. It provides a better fit than the phrase *a toda hora*, lit. 'at any hour', suggested (together with SIEMPRE) in Travis (2002:216).

- (14) Siempre hay mucha gente conmigo.
always there.is much people with.me
'There are always many people with me.'

5.1.1.3 Portuguese

The exponent of WHEN in Portuguese is QUANDO, which occurs as a subordinating conjunction with a clause whose verb is in the indicative when it indicates simultaneity in the past or present, as shown by the following examples.

- (15) Eu senti isso quando vi você.
I feel:1SG.PRET this when see:1SG.PRET you
'I felt this when I saw you.'
- (16) Quando eu estou neste lugar, eu não penso assim.
when I be:1SG.PRES PREP.this place I not think:1SG.PRES like.this
'When I am in this place, I don't think like this.'

QUANDO requires the verb of its clause to be in the future subjunctive when the main clause contains future-expressing *ir* 'go' or is otherwise marked for future tense:

- (17) Quando você estiver perto de mim, eu vou te
when you be:SG.SJV.FUT near PREP me I go:1SG.PRES you
dizer outra coisa.
say:INF other thing
'When you're near me, I'm going to tell you something else.'

As illustrated by the following examples, there are allomorphs (TEMPO, VEZ(ES)) and a portmanteau (SEMPRE), cognate with those posited for Spanish, for use with determiners and quantifiers.

- (18) Neste tempo, aconteceu algo bom.
 PREP.this time happen:SG.PRET something good
 'At that time, something good happened.'
- (19) Ao mesmo tempo, eu senti algo ruim.
 PREP.the same time I feel:1SG.PRET something bad
 'At the same time I felt something bad.'
- (20) Isso aconteceu uma vez / muitas vezes.
 this happen:SG.PRET one time many times
 'This happened once / many times.'
- (21) Às vezes eu penso assim.
 PREP.the times I think:1SG.PRES like.this
 'Sometimes I think like this.'
- (22) Você sempre diz a mesma coisa.
 you always say:SG.PRES the same thing
 'You always say the same thing.'

5.1.1.4 Italian

WHEN is expressed by QUANDO, which is used as an interclausal linker. The word TEMPO is used for TIME in expressions like AT THIS TIME and AT THE SAME TIME. The situation is entirely analogous to what is happening in Spanish and Portuguese.

- (23) Quando posso, vado in vacanza.
 when can:1SG.PRES go:1SG.PRES PREP holiday
 'When I can, I go on holiday.'
- (24) Questo è successo allo stesso tempo.
 this happen:3SG.PPROS PREP.the same time
 'This happened at the same time.'
- (25) Prima hai fatto del male, a questo tempo io non
 before do:2SG.PPROS PART bad PREP this time I not
 sapevo questo.
 know:1SG.IMPF this
 'Before, you did something bad, at that time I didn't know this.'

To refer to occurrences or instances, VOLTA must be used. This allomorph corresponds in meaning to French FOIS, Spanish VEZ etc.

- (26) È successo due volte / molte volte.
 happen:3SG.PPROS two times many times
 'It happened two times / many times.'

Not unexpectedly, the most convenient way to refer in the Italian NSM to something that happens AT ALL TIMES involves a form which is identical to the port-manteau adopted in Portuguese, viz. *SEMPRE* ‘ALWAYS’.

- (27) Penso sempre la stessa cosa.
 think:1SG.PRES always the same thing
 ‘I always think the same.’

5.1.2 NOW

NOW was added to the metalanguage because the need arose to have a prime which unambiguously refers to the present. The combination AT THIS TIME was felt to be unsuitable for this purpose, as it can also point to pasts or futures which are sufficiently “in focus” (see above). This was an instance of undesirable vagueness, eliminated with the introduction of *NOW*, which is at present well-established and has the following exponents in the main Romance languages:

French:	MAINTENANT
Spanish:	AHORA
Portuguese:	AGORA
Italian:	ADESSO

Similar to *NOW*, the exponents in the table above usually refer to a period “much longer than the moment of speech” (Wierzbicka 1996: 100). They do include that moment, though, but are meant – like *NOW* itself – to be “elastic”.

5.1.2.1 French

Wierzbicka (1996: 132) notes that the universal syntax of *NOW*, and therefore that of its French exponent *MAINTENANT*, is roughly similar to that of *WHEN*, except that it cannot combine with determiners such as *OTHER* and *SAME* (e.g. AT ANOTHER TIME, and in French À UN AUTRE MOMENT, but not *ANOTHER NOW, *UN AUTRE MAINTENANT). Also, *NOW* cannot be used to link up clauses. Constructions beginning with *now that* or *maintenant que* are therefore not allowed in NSM, as they lack universality. The canonical sentences below illustrate some of the patterns which do seem to be universal (see also the following subsections for other sentences that are readily translatable; the combination of *NOW* with *BEFORE* and *AFTER* is taken up in Section 5.1.3):

- (28) Je ne peux pas y aller maintenant.
 I NEG can:1SG.PRES not there go now
 ‘I cannot go there now.’

- (29) Je veux que tu le fasses maintenant.
 I want:1SG.PRES COMP you 3SG.CLIT do:2SG.PRES.SJV now
 ‘I want you to do it now.’

5.1.2.2 *Spanish*

NOW is realized in Spanish as *AHORA*. Its combinatorial properties are summarized in the previous subsection and can be further illustrated as follows:

- (30) Alguna gente no quiere estar en este sitio ahora.
 some people not want:3SG.PRES be:INF PREP this place now
 ‘Some people do not want to be in this place now.’
- (31) Ahora vivo en Melbourne; antes viví en
 now live:1SG.PRES PREP Melbourne before live:1SG.PRET PREP
 Canberra.
 Canberra
 ‘Now, I live in Melbourne; before, I lived in Canberra.’

It should perhaps be pointed out that, in Spanish (or at least in South American Spanish), *ahora* can also be used to refer loosely to some future time, as in the following example:

- (32) ¿Dónde nos vemos ahora?
 where we see:1PL.PRES now
 ‘Where are we going to meet up later?’

This is not a matter of vagueness but of polysemy, and there is no need to draw the conclusion that now has no direct translation equivalent in (South American) Spanish (which would contradict the NSM hypothesis regarding its universality). *Ahora* has two separate meanings, viz. NOW and ‘some time soon after now’. Evidence in support of this claim includes the fact that *ahora*, when emphasized by *mismo* ‘same, even’ can only mean ‘right now’, and cannot refer to some point in the future.

5.1.2.3 *Portuguese*

The Portuguese exponent of NOW is *AGORA*. Details on its combinatorial possibilities are provided in the French subsection.

- (33) Tem muita gente neste lugar agora.
 there.is much people PREP.this place now
 ‘There are many people in this place now.’
- (34) O momento de fazer isso é agora.
 the moment PREP do:INF this be:3SG.PRES now
 ‘The time to do this is now.’

5.1.2.4 *Italian*

Standard Italian provides two possible exponents for NOW – *adesso* and *ora* – either of which would be a satisfactory choice for our purposes. Dardano (1993: 317) cites the pair as an example of non-denotative regional variation, because while both words can be heard all over Italy, preferences vary regionally, with *ora* particularly popular in Tuscany, where it originated (De Mauro 1986: 164, 297). Since *ora* is polysemous (it also means ‘hour’), ADESSO will be adopted here.

- (35) Non voglio pensare a questo adesso.
not want:1SG.PRES think PREP this now
‘I don’t want to think about this now.’
- (36) Adesso queste persone possono fare del male a Gianni.
now these persons can:3PL.PRES do PART bad PREP Gianni
‘Now these people can do something bad to Gianni.’

5.1.3 BEFORE and AFTER

BEFORE and AFTER are used to mark anteriority and posteriority. Their *primary* exponents in the main Romance languages are as follows:

French:	AVANT / APRÈS
Spanish:	ANTES / DESPUÉS
Portuguese:	ANTES / DEPOIS
Italian:	PRIMA / DOPO

The word *primary* is important: it remains to be established whether clausal uses of BEFORE and AFTER – i.e. structures of the type *After I said this, he felt something bad* and *After saying this, he felt something bad* – are a part of universal grammar. Such structures do occur in the main Romance languages; relevant details will be provided in the subsections following this preamble. The Romance exponents of BEFORE, which are by no means unique in this respect, can also express the related notion of ‘first’ (expressed in English as *beforehand*). However, as Goddard & Wierzbicka (2002b: 68) point out, this notion is not semantically simple and can be explicated quite easily. It is important not to confuse it with the BEFORE sense used in NSM.

5.1.3.1 *French*

The primary exponents of BEFORE and AFTER in French are AVANT and APRÈS. Like their English counterparts, they can be used to express temporal as well as spatial relationships, at least outside of an NSM environment. In the metalanguage, only temporal uses are allowed, in combination with THIS, NOW or a temporal clause. CELA ‘THIS’, which must refer to an immediately preceding statement, is optional:

- (37) Ils vivent à Paris maintenant; avant (cela), ils
 3PL.CLIT live:3PL.PRES PREP Paris now before this 3PL.CLIT
 vivaient à Rome.
 live:3PL.IMPF PREP Rome
 'They live in Paris now; before (this), they lived in Rome.'
- (38) Après (cela), elle est devenue très malade.
 after this, 3SG.CLIT become:3SG.PCOMP very ill
 'After this, she became very ill.'

NOW remains implicit in the French counterparts of BEFORE NOW and AFTER NOW:

- (39) Avant, ils vivaient à Rome.
 before 3PL.CLIT live:3PL.IMPF PREP Rome
 'Before now, they lived in Rome.'
- (40) On verra ce qu' on fera après.
 3SG.CLIT see:3SG.FUT what 3SG.CLIT do:3SG.FUT after
 'We'll see what we do after now (after this).'

Finally, a subordinating *que* appears whenever AVANT and APRÈS are followed by a finite verb. The former governs the subjunctive, the latter the indicative (even though there is a growing tendency to use the subjunctive after APRÈS QUE, no doubt by analogy). On the other hand, when followed by an infinitive, AVANT becomes AVANT DE; there are no changes for APRÈS, but the infinitive must be in the past (e.g. AVOIR PENSÉ 'HAVE THOUGHT' instead of PENSER 'THINK'). Infinitives can only be used when the subject of the main verb is identical to that of the subordinate verb.

- (41) Tu dois faire cela avant de partir.
 you must:2SG.PRES do:INF this before LIG leave:INF
 'You must do this before going out.'
- (42) Tu dois faire cela avant que nous partions.
 you must:2SG.PRES do:INF this before COMP we leave:1PL.PRES.SJV
 'You must do this before we go out.'
- (43) J' ai pensé à toi après avoir dit ces mots.
 I think:1SG.PCOMP PREP you after say:INF.PAST these words
 'I thought of you after saying these words.'
- (44) Cela est arrivé après que tu es sorti.
 this happen:3SG.PCOMP after COMP you go.out:2SG.PCOMP
 'This happened after you went out.'

5.1.3.2 Spanish

BEFORE and AFTER are realized in Spanish as ANTES and DESPUÉS, respectively. They may be used as adverbials (with an implied THIS or NOW), as in the example below.

- (45) Lo hizo después.
 3SG.CLIT do:3SG.PRET after
 ‘He did it afterwards.’

The same forms, followed by *de*, which serves as a ligature, can also introduce entire clauses, with verbs being conjugated in the subjunctive or appearing as infinitives. As a general rule (there are some exceptions that cannot be dealt with here), subjunctives, which require an extra *que*, must normally be used after *both* primes whenever the main and the subordinate clauses have different subjects. In this respect, Spanish is a step ahead of French. Infinitives only occur (but not necessarily) when the subjects are identical. Examples with ANTES DE and ANTES DE QUE are given below.

- (46) Lo llamé antes de salir.
 3SG.CLIT call:1SG.PRET before LIG go.OUT:INF
 ‘I called him before going out.’
- (47) Lo llamé antes de que saliera.
 3SG.CLIT call:1SG.PRET before LIG COMP go.OUT:3SG.IMPF.SJV
 ‘I called him before he went out.’

It was pointed out in Chapter 3 (Sections 3.2.2.2 and 3.2.3) that the subjunctive can be used to avoid asserting the truth of a proposition, and that it therefore captures an implication of uncertainty. Something similar is happening here: while the indicative implies that the event expressed in the subordinate clause did take place, the subjunctive carries no such implication and can be used regardless of whether the event has or has not been realized. As outlined by Butt & Benjamin (1988: 232), “the subordinate verb is in the subjunctive only if it refers to some event which has or had not yet happened, or is or was not known to have happened”. Thus, (46) implies that the speaker did go out after making the call, whereas (47) can appear in a context where the referent ended up not going out (e.g. because the speaker called him, and told him the party was cancelled). In this respect, the following example from King (1992: 163), where the event expressed in the subordinate clause cannot have taken place, is particularly significant.

- (48) Maté el perro antes de que me matara a mí.
 kill:1SG.PRET the dog before LIG COMP me kill:3SG.IMPF.SJV PREP me
 ‘I killed the dog before it killed me.’

What the above illustrates is that the subjunctive has a more complex meaning than the indicative in this environment, in (47) being used to encode something like ‘I don’t want to say he went out’.

5.1.3.3 Portuguese

The Portuguese exponents of BEFORE and AFTER are ANTES and DEPOIS. Like their French and Spanish counterparts, they can be used as adverbials with an implied NOW:

- (49) Antes, eu pensava muito em você.
 before I think:SG.IMPf much PREP you
 ‘Before now, I thought a lot about you.’

In addition, they can have either a nominal or an infinitival complement, both of which require the insertion of a linking particle *de*, which may have to contract with a following determiner:

- (50) Depois disso, aconteceu algo bom.
 after LIG.this happen:SG.PRET something good
 ‘After this something good happened.’
- (51) Antes de fazer isso eu queria te dizer algo.
 before LIG do:INF this I want:SG.IMPf you say:INF something
 ‘Before doing that I wanted to say something to you.’

ANTES and DEPOIS can also have a finite clause complement introduced by the complementizer *que*, in which case *de* need not be and is generally not used. The verb of the clausal complement is in the subjunctive mood if the temporal space referred to has not yet been realized:

- (52) Antes que você fizer isso, quero saber
 before COMP you do:SG.SJV.FUT this want:1SG.PRES know.INF
 algo.
 something
 ‘Before you do this, I want to know something.’
- (53) Depois que aconteceu isso, eu não disse nada.
 after COMP happen:SG.PRET this, I NEG say:SG.PRET nothing
 ‘After this happened, I didn’t say anything.’

5.1.3.4 Italian

The Italian exponents of BEFORE and AFTER, i.e. PRIMA and DOPO, can be used as adverbials, or in combination with QUESTO ‘THIS’. In the latter case, BEFORE is expressed as PRIMA DI, while AFTER is generally simply DOPO, although it, too, can occur with the preposition *di*.

- (54) Prima / dopo, c'era molta gente qui.
 before after there.is:IMP much people here
 'Before / After, there were many people here.'
- (55) Prima di questo / dopo questo, pensavo bene di te.
 before LIG this after this think:1SG.IMP good PREP you
 'Before this / After this, I thought good things about you.'

The clausal linkers BEFORE and AFTER are realized as PRIMA CHE and DOPO CHE. PRIMA CHE always requires the subjunctive form of the verb in the dependent clause, whereas DOPO CHE calls for the indicative mood.

- (56) L' ho fatto prima che tu sia venuta.
 3SG.CLIT do:1SG.PPROS before COMP you come:SG.PPROS.SJV
 'I did it before you came.'
- (57) Dopo che sei partita ho lavato i piatti.
 after COMP leave:2SG.PPROS wash:1SG.PPROS the dishes
 'After you left I washed the dishes.'

When the two clauses have the same subject, the forms PRIMA DI and DOPO must be used, and the verb of the subordinate clause is in the infinitive. With DOPO, the latter is a compound form consisting of an auxiliary (in the infinitive) and a past participle.

- (58) Dopo essere arrivata ha telefonato a Serena.
 after arrive:INF.PAST telephone:3SG.PPROS PREP Serena
 'After arriving she called Serena.'

5.1.4 A LONG TIME and A SHORT TIME

The exponents of A LONG TIME and A SHORT TIME in the main Romance languages do not rely on adjectives meaning *long* and *short* (except in the case of French *longtemps*), but on the words for *much* and *little*. It follows that, in three of the four languages included in our sample, the prime A LONG TIME consists, at least formally, of two other primes (the intensifier MUCH / MANY and the noun TIME, an allolex of WHEN). Whether this has any implications for the metalanguage remains to be seen. In what follows, A LONG TIME and A SHORT TIME will continue to be treated as separate primes – but perhaps the question needs to be asked whether A LONG TIME and A SHORT TIME should be viewed as portmanteaus for the combinations MUCH + TIME and NOT + MUCH + TIME, respectively. For now, the following exponents are proposed:

French:	LONGTEMPS / PEU DE TEMPS
Spanish:	MUCHO TIEMPO / POCO TIEMPO
Portuguese:	MUITO TEMPO / POUCO TEMPO
Italian:	MOLTO TEMPO / POCO TEMPO

5.1.4.1 French

The French exponents of A LONG TIME and A SHORT TIME are not as symmetrical as their English counterparts. LONGTEMPS, although frozen and written in one word, remains extremely transparent: it literally means ‘long time’. Curiously, though, of the two possible antonyms (*bref*, *court*) of the French adjective *long*, which makes up the first syllable of the prime LONGTEMPS, neither appears in PEU DE TEMPS, which literally means ‘little time’.

A question which deserves further scrutiny is that of the use or otherwise of a preposition with these primes when reference is made to long or short duration. In English, adding *for* seems to be the preferred option, even though in some cases A LONG TIME and A SHORT TIME can be used in their own right. In French, depending on the verb (or even on the meaning of the verb) the primes are used with, depending also on whether one looks forward into the future or backward into the past, choices have to be made. Sometimes, the use of a preposition seems to be excluded, as in (59) below. Elsewhere, *pendant* or *pour* appear to be marginally or even significantly better than no preposition at all. The former typically entails past reference; the latter, future reference. According to Anscombe (1990: 92), who offers no explanation, *il a été admis pendant longtemps que...* ‘it has been admitted for a long time that...’ is better than *il a été admis longtemps que...* This may well be due to an aspectual clash: the punctual nature of the verb *admettre* conflicts with the durational value of the adverb *longtemps*. The insertion of the preposition *pendant* triggers an interpretation involving reiteration (i.e. admit several times). A change of verb confirms this. *Dormir longtemps* ‘sleep a long time’ sounds better than *dormir pendant longtemps*; the preposition appears to be redundant (except perhaps to stress duration and continuity, as in the case of Sleeping Beauty...).

To further underscore the intricacy of the problem, the same verb *vivre* ‘to live’ is used in the first two examples below. It makes one wonder whether this verb, one of the posited primes, needs to be split, with the resulting primes (VIVRE₁ and VIVRE₂) being distinguished on the basis of different valency options. The possibility of such a split was not canvassed in Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1, and is simply being raised here as a matter for further research.

- (59) Dans cet endroit, certaines gens vivent longtemps.
 PREP this place some people live:3PL.PRES a.long.time
 ‘In this place, some people live for a long time.’

- (60) Pendant longtemps, j' ai vécu avec mes parents.
 PREP a.long.time I live:1SG.PCOMP with my parents
 'I lived for a long time with my parents.'
- (61) Il va rester là pour peu de temps.
 he go:3SG.PRES stay:INF there PREP a.short.time
 'He is going to stay there for a short time.'

Of course, when reference is made, not to short or long duration, but to remoteness in the past or the lack thereof, *pour* and *pendant* (as well as *for*) are excluded. IL Y A, a portmanteau equivalent to the combination AVANT MAINTENANT 'BEFORE NOW' which must not to be confused with the formally identical prime (from which it can be distinguished on the basis of different syntactic properties), is used instead. In the gloss below, it is translated into idiomatic English using the word AGO (which to date appears to have been avoided in NSM explications in favor of the combination BEFORE NOW, although it, too, could be considered a portmanteau):

- (62) Cela est arrivé il y a (*pendant) longtemps / peu de temps.
 this happen:3SG.PCOMP ago PREP a.long.time a.short.time
 'This happened a long time ago / a short time ago.'

5.1.4.2 Spanish

A LONG TIME is realized as MUCHO TIEMPO, A SHORT TIME as POCO TIEMPO. When used to refer to duration, they occur with the preposition *por* 'for', as in (63). When used to refer to events in the past (A {LONG / SHORT} TIME AGO), the verb *hacer* 'do' is used in the third person singular, with no overt subject, as in (64). HACE is a portmanteau similar to IL Y A in French. Once again, different syntactic properties prevent it from being confused with the [3SG.PRES] form of the prime HACER.

- (63) Lo estuve haciendo por mucho tiempo / poco tiempo.
 3SG.CLIT be:1SG.PRET do:GER PREP a.long.time a.short.time
 'I did it for a long time / a short time.'
- (64) Eso pasó hace mucho tiempo / poco tiempo.
 this happen:3SG.PRET ago a.long.time a.short.time
 'This happened a long / a short time ago.'

5.1.4.3 Portuguese

To express the primes A LONG TIME and A SHORT TIME in Portuguese, the word *tempo* (also used as one of the allomorphs of the exponent of WHEN) is modified, either by means of the intensifier *muito* 'much / many' (a prime in its own right), or by means of an adverb with the opposite meaning, viz. *pouco* 'few, little'. The linking preposition *por* 'for' is optional.

- (65) Esta pessoa vai viver (por) pouco tempo / muito tempo.
 this person go:3SG.PRES live:INF PREP a.short.time a.long.time
 'This person is going to live (for) a short time / a long time.'

To locate temporal events in the past, non-idiomatic expressions can be constructed using MUITO TEMPO or POUCO TEMPO, in combination with ANTES 'BEFORE' or DEPOIS 'AFTER', as in (66):

- (66) Muito tempo antes, eu vi isso acontecer.
 a.long.time before I see:1SG.PRET this happen:INF
 'A long time before now, I saw that happen.'

However, the same meaning can be rendered more idiomatically with FAZ {MUITO / POUCO} TEMPO, a portmanteau for A {LONG / SHORT} TIME BEFORE NOW that is cognate with Spanish HACE {MUCHO / POCO} TIEMPO:

- (67) Eu vi isso acontecer faz muito tempo
 I see:1SG.PRET this happen:INF ago a.long.time
 'I saw that happen a long time ago.'

Alternatively, there is a similar construction with HÁ (lit. 'there is'; cf. French IL Y A) in place of FAZ (*Eu fiz isso há muito tempo* 'I did this a long time ago') as well as a construction based on the spatial preposition ATRÁS 'behind' (*Eu fiz isso muito tempo atrás* 'I did this a long time ago'). It is unclear on what grounds one might prefer one of these constructions over the others in the Portuguese NSM.

5.1.4.4 Italian

Like Spanish and Portuguese, Italian also uses words meaning 'much' and 'little' (*molto* and *poco*, respectively) instead of spatial adjectives meaning 'short' and 'long' in the durational expressions POCO TEMPO 'A SHORT TIME' and MOLTO TEMPO 'A LONG TIME'. Both are used with the linking preposition *per* 'for'.

- (68) Per molto tempo non sapevo questo.
 PREP a.long.time not know:1SG.IMPF this
 'For a long time I didn't know this.'

Relative remoteness in the past is expressed by means of the phrases MOLTO TEMPO FA and POCO TEMPO FA. FA is the Italian counterpart of Spanish HACE and Portuguese FAZ: etymologically speaking, it is the [3SG.PRES] of the verb *fare* 'do, make', but it is used after the primes rather than before.

- (69) Ho fatto queste cose molto tempo fa.
 do:1SG.PPROS these things a.long.time ago
 'I did these things a long time ago.'

5.1.5 FOR SOME TIME

When it is said, in English, that something *happened* for some time, it is no longer happening now. To include the moment of speech, the present perfect (*has happened*) must be used. Of these two scenarios, the latter is semantically complex and can be explicated (if something has happened for some time, it was happening for some time a short time ago *and* is happening now). The prime FOR SOME TIME is needed only to refer to scenarios of the former kind. In order to capture the durative implication of the prime FOR SOME TIME, the preposition *for* is included in the exponent and is not assigned to its combinatorics. FOR SOME TIME is expressed in the main Romance languages as follows:

French:	POUR UN TEMPS
Spanish:	POR UN TIEMPO
Portuguese:	POR ALGUM TEMPO
Italian:	PER UN PO' DI TEMPO

5.1.5.1 French

The French exponent of FOR SOME TIME is POUR UN TEMPS (lit. 'for a time').

- (70) J' ai pensé pour un temps que c' était bien
 I think:1SG.PCOMP for.some.time COMP 3SG.CLIT be:3SG.IMPF good
 de faire cela.
 COMP do:INF this
 'I thought for some time that it was good to do this.'
- (71) Cette personne a vécu ici pour un temps.
 this person live:3SG.PCOMP here for.some.time
 'This person lived here for some time.'

5.1.5.2 Spanish

FOR SOME TIME is expressed in Spanish using the same words that are used in French, viz. POR UN TIEMPO.

- (72) Él vivió en este sitio por un tiempo.
 3SG live:3SG.PRET PREP this place for.some.time
 'He lived in this place for some time'
- (73) Ella pensó en ti por un tiempo.
 3SG think:3SG.PRET PREP you for.some.time
 'She thought of you for some time.'

Instead of an indefinite article *un*, ALGUNO 'SOME' could have been selected for use in this environment (as in *por algun tiempo*), given that ALGUNOS was proposed

as the prime for SOME in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3.2.2). However, *por algun tiempo* sounds somewhat formal, and is more common in the written than in the spoken language. Furthermore, the notion expressed in the Spanish NSM as POR UN TIEMPO, and in the English NSM as FOR SOME TIME, is a *single* concept, expressed by one word in a number of languages. It is therefore not problematic that *un* should be used here (as well as in French), where *some* is used in English.

5.1.5.3 Portuguese

The Portuguese expression POR ALGUM TEMPO can be used to express the concept FOR SOME TIME, as illustrated by the following examples:

- (74) Eu pensei nisso por algum tempo.
 I think:1SG.PRET PREP.this for.some.time
 ‘I thought about this for some time.’
- (75) Por algum tempo tinha muita gente neste lugar.
 for.some.time have:3SG.PRET much people PREP.this place
 ‘For some time there were many people in this place.’

5.1.5.4 Italian

The most appropriate Italian exponent for the prime FOR SOME TIME seems to be PER UN PO’ DI TEMPO. Although, etymologically, an abbreviated form of *un poco* ‘a little’, *un po’* often expresses an unspecified quantity. The collocation PER UN PO’ DI TEMPO is one example of this. The fact that this expression means FOR SOME TIME rather than ‘for a short time’ is all the more clear if it is compared to POCO TEMPO, which is a much more appropriate match for the prime A SHORT TIME.

- (76) Ieri sono stata da Cinzia per un po’ di tempo. Siccome
 yesterday be:1SG.PPROS PREP Cinzia for.some.time because
 dovevo studiare ci sono rimasta poco tempo.
 must:1SG.IMPF study:INF there remain:3SG.PPROS a.short.time
 ‘Yesterday I was at Cinzia’s for some time. Because I had to study I only stayed a short time.’

5.1.6 IN ONE MOMENT

The prime IN ONE MOMENT is a recent addition intended to capture a notion of “instantaneousness” or “instantaneity”. It is in some sense a converse of FOR SOME TIME. An earlier proposal to use MOMENT instead and to allow combinations such as AT THAT MOMENT, AT THE MOMENT BEFORE, AT SOME MOMENT, FOR A MOMENT etc. has had to be abandoned: since the publication of the two *MUG* volumes (Goddard & Wierzbicka 2002a), new evidence has been found to suggest

that in some languages (e.g. Berber) these combinations are non-existent. It now appears they can be interpreted as composites of the newly proposed IN ONE MOMENT and ordinary temporal expressions involving the prime WHEN (or rather its allolex TIME). In other words, *at that moment*, to take just one example, is equivalent to AT THIS TIME, IN ONE MOMENT (where AT THIS TIME, as pointed out in Section 5.1.1, is [non-present]). The rationale behind this interpretation is that the phrase *at that moment* does not really “pick out” one particular moment to distinguish it from another one. Rather, what it does is characterize *how* something happened (i.e. in one moment) at a particular time. For the main Romance languages, the following lexicalizations are proposed:

French:	EN UN MOMENT
Spanish:	EN UN MOMENTO
Portuguese:	EM UM MOMENTO
Italian:	IN UN MOMENTO

Canonical contexts for the Spanish, the Portuguese and the Italian exponents must be chosen very carefully. The French exponent is the only one which, thanks to the use of the preposition *en* (rather than *dans*), is not polysemous. On the other hand, in Spanish, for instance, *en un momento* also means ‘in a short time from now’, as in *En un momento / Seguro que vas a ser mía* (first two lines of the Spanish version of U2’s song “In a little while”: ‘In a little while, surely you’ll be mine’). Furthermore, both Spanish *en un momento* and Portuguese *em um momento* can be used in contrast with *o(u)tro momento* to oppose one moment to the next (as in statements of the type *One moment I can see it, the next moment I can’t*). However, these meanings are not semantically basic. The first of the non-universal Spanish meanings, for example, can be explicated by means of the primes A SHORT TIME, AFTER and NOW.

5.1.6.1 French

The appearance of MOMENT ‘TIME’ in various combinations involving the prime QUAND ‘WHEN’ (cf. Section 5.1.1.1) does *not* make it impossible to use the same word in the French exponent of the prime IN ONE MOMENT. There is no danger of confusion, as the syntactic properties of MOMENT (the allolex) and *moment* (part of the prime EN UN MOMENT) are clearly distinct: different prepositions are involved. It could even be argued that different meanings are at stake: when preceded by *en un*, the French word *moment* loses its ability to refer to longer periods in time. Two canonical contexts for the prime appear below.

- (77) J’ ai vu toutes ces choses en un moment.
 I see:1SG.PCOMP all these things in.one.moment
 ‘I saw all these things in one moment.’

- (78) C' est bien si cela arrive en un moment.
 it be:3SG.PRES good COMP this happen:3SG.PRES in.one.moment
 'It is good if this happens in one moment.'

5.1.6.2 Spanish

Travis (2002:220) felt that there were two candidates in Spanish for the exponent of the former prime *MOMENT*, namely *momento* and *instante* 'instant'. She opted for *MOMENTO*, which is maintained in the Spanish exponent of the new prime *IN ONE MOMENT*, *viz.* *EN UN MOMENTO*.

- (79) Pasó por un tiempo, no en un momento.
 happen:3SG.PRET for.some.time not in.one.moment
 'It happened for some time, not in one moment.'
- (80) Si hago eso en un momento, siento algo bueno.
 if do:1SG.PRES this in.one.moment feel:1SG.PRES something good
 'If I do this in one moment, I feel something good.'

5.1.6.3 Portuguese

Portuguese expresses the prime *IN ONE MOMENT* by means of *EM UM MOMENTO*, as illustrated in the following examples.

- (81) Estas coisas acontecem em um momento, não por algum tempo.
 these things happen:PL.PRES in.one.moment not for.some.time
 'These things happen in one moment, not for some time.'
- (82) Algo assim não acontece em um momento.
 something like.this not happen:SG.PRES in.one.moment
 'Something like this doesn't happen in one moment.'

5.1.6.4 Italian

In line with the proposals for French, Spanish and Portuguese, *IN UN MOMENTO* is proposed as the Italian exponent for *IN ONE MOMENT*. Its use in the Italian NSM can be illustrated as follows:

- (83) Si muoveva per un po' di tempo, non in un momento.
 move:3SG.IMPF for.some.time not in.one.moment
 'It moved for some time, not in one moment.'
- (84) Ho visto tutto in un momento.
 see.1SG.PPROS everything in.one.moment
 'I saw everything in one moment.'

5.2 Space

5.2.1 WHERE (PLACE)

The prime WHERE (PLACE) behaves in a similar, though not identical, way to its temporal counterpart WHEN (TIME). Its base form functions as a knowledge complement (i.e. in contexts of the type KNOW WHERE). In combination with determiners and quantifiers, an additional allolex is needed. The latter is allowed to appear as a full-fledged predicate: BE IN A PLACE is possible, but *BE AT A TIME is not. Used as a predicate, PLACE combines with all the substantives of the metalanguage. The exponents of this prime in the main Romance languages are summarized in the table below:

French:	OÙ (ENDROIT)
Spanish:	DÓNDE (SITIO)
Portuguese:	ONDE (LUGAR)
Italian:	DOVE (POSTO)

Why ENDROIT in French, rather than *lieu*? Why SITIO and POSTO in Spanish and Italian, respectively, rather than *lugar* and *luogo*? Dictionaries tend to treat them as synonyms, but there are differences. PLACE is needed, for instance, to explicate the meaning of expressions such as *nod one's head*. The latter includes a component ('after this happened, this part of the body was in the same place as before'; cf. Wierzbicka 2002:273) in which only ENDROIT, SITIO and POSTO can be used (cf. Italian 'dopo che questo è successo, questa parte del corpo era nello stesso posto di prima'). The latter are indeterminate in size and other characteristics, which is clearly what is required of an allolex of the completely general, indeterminate WHERE.

5.2.1.1 French

In French, WHERE is lexicalized as OÙ. Its use as a knowledge complement can be illustrated as in the example below. Reference to time is optional.

- (85) Je sais où il est (maintenant).
 I know:1SG.PRES where 3SG.CLIT be:3SG.PRES now
 'I know where he is (now).'

ENDROIT 'PLACE' is the allolex required in the presence of determiners and quantifiers. Relevant phrases involving determiners include DANS CET ENDROIT 'IN THIS PLACE', DANS UN AUTRE ENDROIT 'IN ANOTHER PLACE', DANS LE MÊME ENDROIT 'IN THE SAME PLACE'.

- (86) Tu n' es pas dans le même endroit que moi.
 you NEG be:2SG.PRES not PREP the same place as me
 'You are not in the same place as me.'
- (87) A ce moment, tu étais dans un autre endroit.
 PREP this time you be:2SG.IMPF PREP an other place
 'At that time, I was in another place.'

Examples (86) and (87) show that, unlike MOMENT 'TIME', ENDROIT can act as a predicate in its own right. On the other hand, examples of use with quantifiers include DANS UN ENDROIT 'IN ONE PLACE', DANS DEUX ENDROITS 'IN TWO PLACES', DANS CERTAINS ENDROITS 'IN SOME PLACES', DANS BEAUCOUP D'ENDROITS 'IN MANY PLACES'. In the case of DANS TOUS LES ENDROITS 'IN ALL PLACES', a portmanteau such as PARTOUT 'EVERYWHERE' may be preferable.

- (88) Les gens ne peuvent pas être partout au même
 the people NEG can:3PL.PRES not be:INF everywhere PREP.the same
 moment.
 time
 'People can't be everywhere at the same time.'

5.2.1.2 *Spanish*

The primary use of the Spanish exponent of WHERE, viz. DONDE, can be illustrated as follows:

- (89) No sé dónde pasó eso.
 not know:1SG.PRES where happen:3SG.PRET this
 'I do not know where this happened.'

With determiners and other modifiers, such as THIS and SAME, WHERE is realized as SITIO 'PLACE':

- (90) En este tiempo estaba en otro sitio.
 PREP this time be:1SG.IMPF PREP other place
 'At that time, I was in another place.'
- (91) Conozco muchos sitios lejos de aquí.
 know:1SG.PRES many places far PREP here
 'I know many places far from here.'

5.2.1.3 *Portuguese*

The Portuguese exponent of WHERE is ONDE. A compound form with the preposition *a* 'at, to', viz. *aonde*, exists as an alternative. However, as the morphologically simpler *onde* is always an available and commonly used option, it is presumably

preferable in NSM. On the other hand, whenever the allolex PLACE is required in English, Brazilian Portuguese uses LUGAR.

- (92) Muita gente não sabem onde eu vi esta pessoa.
 much people not know:PL.PRES where I see:1SG.PRET this person
 'Many people do not know where I saw this person.'
- (93) Todos estes lugares são longe daqui.
 all these places be:PL.PRES far PREP.here
 'All these places are far from here.'
- (94) Agora o pé dela está em outro lugar.
 now the foot hers be:SG.PRES PREP other place
 'Now her foot is in a different place.'

In European Portuguese, there appears to be a preference for *sítio*, even though LUGAR may also be used. In Brazilian Portuguese, *sítio* only means 'little farm' or 'site'.

5.2.1.4 Italian

In Italian, DOVE 'WHERE' is used as a knowledge complement, but cannot occur with determiners like QUESTO 'THIS' and STESSO 'SAME'. In such cases POSTO 'PLACE' is used.

- (95) Non so dove tu sia.
 not know:1SG.PRES where you be:PL.PRES.SJV
 'I don't know where you are.'
- (96) È successo in questo posto / nello stesso posto.
 happen:3SG.PPROS PREP this place PREP.the same place
 'It happened in this place / in the same place.'

5.2.2 HERE

The prime HERE, which can be used as an adjunct or predicatively, raises very few problems, except in Italian, where there appear to be two *prima facie* candidates. The following exponents are proposed:

French:	ICI
Spanish:	AQUÍ
Portuguese:	AQUI
Italian:	QUI

Combinations of this prime with ABOVE / BELOW and with FAR / NEAR are illustrated in Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4.

5.2.2.1 French

The syntax of *ICI* 'HERE' is similar to that of *OÙ* 'WHERE', in much the same way that *MAINTENANT* 'NOW' has a syntax similar to that of *QUAND* 'WHEN'. The same restrictions appear: determiners are not allowed (**LE MÊME ICI* 'THE SAME HERE'), and usage as a knowledge complement (after the verb *SAVOIR*) is not possible either. Universal patterns include the following:

- (97) Je l' ai fait ici.
 I 3SG.CLIT do:1SG.PCOMP here
 'I did it here.'
- (98) Je sais où il est. Il est
 I know:1SG.PRES where 3SG.CLIT be:3SG.PRES 3SG.CLIT be:3SG.PRES
 here
 ici.
 'I know where he is. He is here.'

5.2.2.2 Spanish

HERE is realized as *AQUÍ*. Its use in the Spanish NSM can be illustrated as follows:

- (99) Viste algo aquí.
 see:2SG.PRET something here
 'You saw something here.'
- (100) El estaba aquí por un tiempo.
 3SG be:3SG.IMPF here for.some.time
 'He was here for some time.'

5.2.2.3 Portuguese

The exponent of *HERE* in Portuguese is *AQUI*. Some canonical contexts are provided in (101)–(102) below.

- (101) Eu vi esta pessoa aqui.
 I see:1SG.PRET this person here
 'I saw this person here.'
- (102) Algumas pessoas pensam que não é bom estar
 Some people think:PL.PRES COMP not be:SG.PRES good be:INF
 aqui.
 here
 'Some people think it is not good to be here.'

5.2.2.4 Italian

There are two Italian words that translate as 'here' – *qui* and *qua*. According to some grammarians, the two are not entirely interchangeable. They suggest that *qui* is used to refer to a precisely defined point, whereas *qua* lacks this precision,

indicating rather an area. It seems, however, that this analysis is clouded by the meaning of the expression *di qua*, meaning roughly ‘over here’ or ‘around here’ (there is no equivalent expression **di qui*). If we look at the use of bare *qui* or *qua*, it is harder to pin down any more complex meaning than *HERE*. It is unlikely that many native Italian speakers would pick any difference between *qui* and *qua* in the following example:

- (103) È successo *qui* / *qua*.
 happen:3SG.PPROS here here
 ‘It happened here.’

Attempts to decompose *qui* remain unsuccessful. If (103) meant something like ‘it happened right here’, it could be seen as a combination of ‘it happened here’ and another component ‘I don’t say this about any other place’. (103) is not as specific as that, however, as shown by the contrast with *È successo proprio qui*, which matches more closely the English ‘it happened right here’. On the other hand, while it is difficult to think of ways of breaking *qua* down any further, it cannot be ruled out that it might correspond roughly to ‘around here’, i.e. that it includes *qui* but also the immediate area near what is designated by *qui* – *qui o vicino a qui* ‘here or near here’. The problem with this paraphrase is that it seems to overstate somewhat the word’s fairly simple meaning. Furthermore, *proprio*, which was used above with *qui*, and which is semantically complex (being somehow a cross between English *exactly* and *really*), can combine equally well with *qua* (*È successo proprio qua*). This fact would suggest that “arealità”, or the notion of a non-specific place reference (“around here”), is not inherent in the meaning of *qua*. A better way of clarifying *qua* might be to explicate it as ‘somewhere here’, which in Italian could be phrased *qui da qualche parte*; however, the fact that *qua da qualche parte* is equally grammatical seems to suggest that this merely confuses the issue further. It seems most likely, then, that the terms are equivalent, and that either would be appropriate for our purposes. For the sake of simplicity, *QUI* will be proposed here as the prime’s exponent.

5.2.3 ABOVE and BELOW

The primes *ABOVE* and *BELOW* seek to capture a purely spatial relationship (as opposed to, e.g. a hierarchical one). In semantic explications formulated in NSM, they are always used with an explicit reference point, i.e. in an environment in which, in three of the languages surveyed in this volume (viz. French, Spanish and Portuguese), a ligature must be used. Italian requires a ligature only when the reference point is linguistically expressed by means of a pronoun. The exponents of the primes *ABOVE* and *BELOW* in the main Romance languages are as follows:

French:	AU-DESSUS / AU-DESSOUS
Spanish:	ARRIBA / DEBAJO
Portuguese:	ACIMA / ABAIXO
Italian:	SOPRA / SOTTO

5.2.3.1 French

The French exponents of the primes ABOVE and BELOW are AU-DESSUS and AU-DESSOUS, respectively. The former has never been problematical: it was clear, as soon as ABOVE was added to the list of primes, that AU-DESSUS was the most appropriate candidate in French (cf. Peeters 1994, where the ligature is posited as a full-fledged part of the prime rather than as part of its combinatorics). The latter is being readmitted at the expense of *sous*, which by 1997 had dislodged AU-DESSOUS (cf. Peeters 1997) for reasons which are not entirely clear but which may be related to the fact that, at the time, the relevant contrast appeared to involve *under* rather than BELOW. This has since been rectified. The use of the French exponents may be illustrated as follows:

- (104) Il y avait un avion au-dessus de nous.
 there.is:IMPF a aircraft above LIG us
 ‘There was an aircraft above us.’
- (105) Le ciel est au-dessus de la mer.
 the sky be:3SG.PRES above LIG the sea
 ‘The sky is above the sea.’
- (106) Cette chose est au-dessous de cette autre chose.
 this thing be:3SG.PRES below LIG this other thing
 ‘This thing is below this other thing.’

5.2.3.2 Spanish

ABOVE and BELOW are realized in Spanish as ARRIBA and DEBAJO, respectively (rather than as ARRIBA DE and DEBAJO DE, as posited in Travis 2002). As mentioned before, the notion intended to be captured by these primes is a purely spatial-relational one, as illustrated in the following examples, referring to two flags strung on a single line:

- (107) La bandera roja está debajo de la bandera azul.
 the flag red be:3SG.PRES below LIG the flag blue
 ‘The red flag is below the blue flag.’
- (108) La bandera azul está arriba de la bandera roja.
 the flag blue be:3SG.PRES above LIG the flag red
 ‘The blue flag is above the red flag.’

There is another way of expressing ABOVE in Spanish, viz. *encima*; the latter is used instead of ARRIBA in some other contexts hitherto perceived as being canonical, such as (109)–(110) below. *Encima* may be more natural in these contexts because it corresponds to a visual perception of clouds *covering* the horizon, or of the sky *covering* everything, a meaning that is however not intended to be carried by the prime ABOVE. What this suggests is that, perhaps, these so-called canonical contexts must be abandoned and replaced with others.

- (109) Hay nubes negras encima / ?arriba del horizonte.
 there.is clouds black above LIG.the horizon
 ‘There are black clouds above the horizon.’
- (110) El cielo está encima / ?arriba de todo.
 the sky be:3SG.PRES above LIG all
 ‘The sky is above everything.’

Encima can also convey an idea of contact. Its use in (111) implies that the light is actually on (i.e. placed on) the table, while *arriba* in the same context implies that it is (hanging) above it. Although in (109) and (110) this notion of contact is less apparent, it may well be that the implication of covering something is an extension of the ‘contact’ meaning.

- (111) La luz está encima / arriba de la mesa.
 the light be:3SG.PRES on above LIG the table
 ‘The light is on / above the table.’

5.2.3.3 Portuguese

The most appropriate exponents for ABOVE and BELOW in Portuguese are the prepositions ACIMA and ABAIXO.

- (112) Não tem nada acima do céu.
 NEG there.is nothing above LIG.the sky
 ‘There is nothing above the sky.’
- (113) Tem muitas coisas abaixo da terra.
 there.is many things below LIG.the earth
 ‘There are many things below the surface of the earth.’

Other compound prepositions based on *cima* and *baixo* yield similar concepts, e.g. *em cima* and *embaixo* (or *de baixo*). However, *em cima* generally designates a relationship of support or containment, due to the semantics of *em* (a glass on a table is *em cima* and not *acima*, for example). As the value of *em* with *baixo* is less clear, *embaixo* and *abaixo* tend to be more interchangeable and *embaixo* is more frequently used for ordinary spatial relationships of inferiority (*embaixo da cama* ‘underneath the bed’ is a more common way of designating the same relationship

that *abaixo da cama* designates). *Acima* and *abaixo* are generally required for non-spatial relationships (such as ‘below the normal weight’).

5.2.3.4 Italian

SOPRA and SOTTO, exponents of ABOVE and BELOW, respectively, behave in much the same way as their English counterparts. The examples below show the NSM meanings of SOPRA and SOTTO. As mentioned before, a ligature is required only when they are followed by a pronoun.

- (114) C’è una grande nuvola sopra la casa.
 there.is a big cloud above the house
 ‘There is a big cloud above the house.’
- (115) Sotto di noi c’era molta gente.
 below LIG us there.is:IMPF much people
 ‘Below us there were many people.’

5.2.4 FAR and NEAR

Unlike ABOVE and BELOW, FAR and NEAR do not require an explicit reference point: in NSM explications as well as in ordinary English, it is possible to be either far or near, or else far from or near some other place, or person, or thing. In English, there is a degree of asymmetry when a reference point is added: the former takes the preposition *from*, which emphasizes the point of origin or the starting point, whereas the latter, if it takes a preposition at all, goes with *to*, which emphasizes the endpoint. The exponents in the main Romance languages, on the other hand, are mostly symmetrical: they have the same inherent perspective, expressed by a variously pronounced preposition *de*. The only exception to the rule appears to be Italian, which uses *da* for the distance prime and *a* for the proximity prime. The exponents of FAR and NEAR (which appear to function predicatively only) are as follows:

French:	LOIN / PRÈS
Spanish:	LEJOS / CERCA
Portuguese:	LONGE / PERTO
Italian:	LONTANO / VICINO

5.2.4.1 French

In the French NSM, distance and proximity are expressed by means of the primes LOIN and PRÈS.

- (116) Cet endroit est loin; il n' est pas près
 this place be:3SG.PRES far 3SG.CLIT NEG be:3SG.PRES not near
 d' ici.
 PREP here
 'This place is far; it is not near here.'
- (117) Versailles est près de Paris.
 Versailles be:3SG.PRES near PREP Paris
 'Versailles is near Paris.'
- (118) Quand tu es loin de moi, je pense toujours
 when you be:2SG.PRES far PREP me I think:1SG.PRES always
 à toi.
 PREP you
 'When you are far from me, I always think of you.'
- (119) Cette chose est près de cette autre chose.
 this thing be:3SG.PRES near PREP this other thing
 'This thing is near this other thing.'

5.2.4.2 Spanish

FAR and NEAR are realized as LEJOS and CERCA. Travis (2002:224) included the preposition *de* in the exponents, but as mentioned in the preamble the primes may also be used without an explicit reference point.

- (120) Colombia está lejos (de Australia).
 Colombia be:3SG.PRES far PREP Australia
 'Colombia is far (from Australia).'
- (121) Estoy lejos de mi mamá.
 be:1SG.PRES far PREP my mother
 'I am far from my mother.'
- (122) Quiero estar cerca de ti.
 want:1SG.PRES be:INF near PREP you
 'I want to be near you.'

5.2.4.3 Portuguese

The exponents of FAR and NEAR in Portuguese are LONGE and PERTO, respectively. Examples of their use in NSM explications are given below.

- (123) Este lugar é longe / perto (daqui).
 this place be:SG.PRES far near PREP.here
 'This place is far (from here) / near (here).'

- (124) Estas pessoas boas querem estar perto de mim.
these persons good want:PL.PRES be:INF near PREP me
‘These good people want to be near me.’
- (125) Eu estou longe de muitos destes lugares.
I be:1SG.PRES far PREP many PREP.these places
‘I am far from many of these places.’

5.2.4.4 *Italian*

Italian is the only Romance language which constructs its reference points after VICINO ‘NEAR’ and LONTANO ‘FAR’ using different prepositions (VICINO A, LONTANO DA).

- (126) La gelateria è vicino a qui / lontano da qui.
the ice cream parlor be:3SG.PRES near PREP here far PREP here
‘The ice creamery is near here / far from here.’
- (127) Queste persone non vogliono essere lontano da me.
these persons not want:3PL.PRES be:INF far PREP me
‘These people don’t want to be far from me.’

5.2.5 SIDE

SIDE is used in NSM to indicate location with respect to a reference point, which may remain implicit and be a person, a thing or a place – as in the case of NEAR and FAR. It is always preceded by a determiner (e.g. THIS SIDE, THE OTHER SIDE, ONE SIDE, TWO SIDES, ALL SIDES). French, Spanish and Portuguese have unmistakable exponents for this prime. Italian uses a word which also serves as the exponent of the prime PART (cf. Chapter 6, Section 6.3.2).

French:	CÔTÉ
Spanish:	LADO
Portuguese:	LADO
Italian:	PARTE

5.2.5.1 *French*

The French exponent of SIDE is CÔTÉ. It is typically preceded and followed by the preposition *de*, as shown in the examples below.

- (128) Max était assis de ce côté de Véronique, pas de l’
Max be.seated:3SG.IMPF PREP this side PREP Véronique not PREP the
autre côté.
other side
‘Max was sitting on this side of Véronique, not on the other side.’

- (129) Il y a des gens des deux côtés de l' immeuble.
 there.is ART people PREP.the two sides PREP the building
 'There are people on both sides of the building.'
- (130) Je vois quelque chose de tous les côtés.
 I see:1SG.PRES something PREP all the sides
 'I see something on all sides.'

5.2.5.2 Spanish

SIDE is realized in Spanish as LADO. Its use is illustrated in examples (131)–(133). Reference points which follow LADO are introduced by means of the preposition *de* 'of'. The preceding preposition is either *a* 'at' or *en* 'in, on, at'. The preposition *a* is used to refer to something that has concrete sides, e.g. a person or a building, as in (131)–(132); *en* is used to refer to something that does not, e.g. a street, as in (133).

- (131) Ella estaba sentada a mi lado derecho.
 she be.seated:3SG.IMPF PREP my side right
 'She was sitting on my right side.'
- (132) La iglesia está al lado derecho del hospital.
 the church be:3SG.PRES PREP.the side right PREP.the hospital
 'The church is on the right side of the hospital.'
- (133) Había gente parada en los dos lados de la calle.
 there.is:IMPF people stand:PPART PREP the two sides PREP the street
 'There were people standing on both sides of the street.'

5.2.5.3 Portuguese

The word LADO exists not only in Spanish but also in Portuguese. As with many nouns, the optional nominal complement of LADO must be preceded by or must incorporate into its determiner the linking preposition *de*.

- (134) Do lado desta árvore tem algo grande.
 PREP.the side PREP.this tree there.is something big
 'At / on the side of this tree there is something big.'
- (135) Este lado é perto do outro lado.
 this side be:SG.PRES near PREP.the other side
 'This side is bigger than the other side.'

For the purpose of designating pure spatial relationships in terms of the concept SIDE, there are three basic choices for the preposition preceding LADO. Like elsewhere in the language, the preposition *em* designates inclusion due to support or containment. *No lado direito da mesa* 'on the right side of the table' (*no* = *em* 'in, on' + *o* 'the') would be said about an object on top of the table, such as a glass. The

preposition *a* ‘at, to’ designates exclusion and proximity. *Ao lado direito da mesa* ‘at the right side of the table’ could be said with reference to a chair but not a glass on the table. The highly polysemous preposition *de*, used in (134) above, could be used for either kind of relationship. *Do lado direito da mesa* ‘at / on the right side of the table’ could be used when talking either about a chair or a glass. *De* appears to be the most commonly used preposition, particularly for the ‘exclusion + proximity’ meaning.

5.2.5.4 Italian

In Italian, the prime SIDE is expressed by means of the word PARTE. Italian versions of the “side-phrases” of the NSM lexicon include *DA UNA PARTE* (DI) ‘ON ONE SIDE (OF)’, *DALLA STESSA PARTE* (DI) ‘ON THE SAME SIDE (OF)’, *DA QUESTA PARTE* (DI) ‘ON THIS SIDE (OF)’, *DALL’ALTRA PARTE* (DI) ‘ON THE OTHER SIDE (OF)’ and *DA UN’ALTRA PARTE* (DI) ‘ON ANOTHER SIDE (OF)’.

- (136) *Da una parte c’è qualcuno, dall’altra parte non c’è nessuno.*
 PREP one side there.is someone PREP.the other side NEG there.is
 nobody
 ‘On one side there is someone, on the other side there is nobody.’

PARTÈ is also the exponent of the prime PART, but it does not have that meaning here. All of the expressions above are set phrases which would mean something quite different if they were broken down into their constituent parts. *DA QUESTA PARTE*, for instance, would correspond to ‘from this part’, but as an expression of location meaning ‘ON THIS SIDE’ it is unanalyzable (compare also *DA QUALCHE PARTE* ‘SOMEWHERE’ and *DA NESSUNA PARTE* ‘NOWHERE’). It seems fair to say that context would generally make it easy to distinguish the two. Take, for example, the following sentence, in which *da questa parte* is not meant as a set phrase.

- (137) *Si può contrarre una malattia da questa parte della frutta.*
 REFL can:3SG.PRES contract an illness PREP this part PREP.the
 fruit
 ‘One can contract an illness from this part of the fruit.’

It is unlikely that anyone would take this to mean ‘one can contract an illness on this side of the fruit’. There is little risk of PARTE in expressions of location being confused with PARTE, the exponent of PART.

5.2.6 INSIDE

In the languages included in our sample, there is no etymological relationship between the exponents of *SIDE*, which is a noun, and the exponents of *INSIDE*, which is a preposition.

French:	DANS (DEDANS)
Spanish:	DENTRO
Portuguese:	DENTRO
Italian:	DENTRO

5.2.6.1 French

None of the space primitives reviewed up to this point raise significant problems of any kind in the French NSM. Their exponents are straightforward, and all combinatorial possibilities envisaged for the English version of the metalanguage exist in French as well. The story of *INSIDE* is different. Its English exponent is claimed to have four different uses, only the first of which is said to be indefinable (Wierzbicka 1996:95). Wierzbicka's examples are as follows:

- (138) People don't know what happens inside₁ a volcano.
- (139) I was inside₂ when it happened. (inside a human or an animal dwelling)
- (140) I went inside₃. (directional)
- (141) Outside China, people don't talk about it much, but inside₄ the country, people don't seem to be talking about anything else. (contrastive)

The difference between *inside*₁ and so-called contrastive *inside*₄ is not immediately clear: completion of (138) as in (142) does not seem to entail substitution of one reading of *inside* with another one.

- (142) People don't know what happens inside₁ a volcano, but what happens outside one during an eruption is clearly visible.

In other words, the contrastive use of *inside* in (141) does not equip the word with a new, complex meaning (viz. *inside*₄). Irrespective of whether three or four uses are to be distinguished, a similar case of polysemy (with a similar unclear difference between the first and last uses) arises in French, provided the appropriate exponent is chosen and the preposition *de* is added in front of a noun. Examples (138)–(141) can be translated as follows:

- (143) Les gens ne savent pas ce qui arrive à l'intérieur d'un volcan.
- (144) J'étais à l'intérieur quand cela est arrivé.
- (145) Je suis allé à l'intérieur.

- (146) En dehors de la Chine, on n'en parle pas beaucoup, mais à l'intérieur du pays on ne semble parler de rien d'autre.

However, is à *l'intérieur* (*de*) the best possible exponent for our prime? It is surely not the sort of thing one expects to hear from a 2-year old, whereas *inside* is attested at that age (Wierzbicka 1996:96). A French-speaking 2-year old is more likely to use *dans*, as in (147):

- (147) Les gens ne savent pas ce qui arrive dans un
 the people NEG know:3PL.PRES not what happen:3SG.PRES inside a
 volcan.
 volcano
 'People do not know what happens inside a volcano.'

The problem with *DANS* is that it makes one think of English *in*, which Wierzbicka appears to find less attractive an exponent than *INSIDE*. Her reasons are not entirely clear, however. Both words are polysemous (granted, *in* more so than *INSIDE*), and *in* (acquired at a very young age, exactly like *DANS*) seems to be perfectly acceptable in contexts where *INSIDE* is used in its intended meaning of total containment:

- (148) People don't know what happens in a volcano.

In the absence of alternatives that would appear to be more appropriate, *DANS* is proposed as the primary exponent of *INSIDE*, used when followed by a full NP as in (149)–(150):

- (149) Deux oiseaux ont fait leur nid dans cet arbre creux.
 two birds make:3PL.PCOMP their nest inside this tree hollow
 'Two birds have made their nest in(side) this hollow tree.'
- (150) Cela est arrivé dans la maison de mes parents.
 this happen:3SG.PCOMP inside the house of my parents
 'This happened in(side) my parents' house.'

The adverbial allolex *DEDANS* is used if the prime occurs all by itself. This includes contexts where, instead of adverbial *DEDANS*, pronominal *y* could be used before the verb:

- (151) Il y a quelque chose de bien dedans.
 there.is something LIG good inside
 'There is something good inside.'
- (152) Cette maison est très grande; beaucoup de gens
 this house be:3SG.PRES very big many LIG people
 pourraient vivre dedans.
 can:3PL.COND live inside
 'This house is very big; many people could live in it.'

5.2.6.2 Spanish

The difficulties encountered in the case of French do not arise in Spanish. *DENTRO*, rather than *en*, is the preferred exponent for the prime *INSIDE*, as *en* is a general locative preposition that can also be translated as ‘in, on, at’. Although in many contexts *en* can be used to represent *INSIDE*, in others it can’t. Thus, something *en* a bottle would be understood to be ‘inside’ the bottle (though it could also be attached to the outside of the bottle), but something *en* a table would generally be understood to mean ‘on’ the table (though it could also mean that it is ‘inside’ the table, for example, inside the wood).

With *DENTRO*, there is no such ambiguity: it is a specific preposition, representing the concept *INSIDE*, and as such it can be used to resolve any ambiguity that could be created by the use of *en*. A ligature, no longer thought to be part of the exponent (*pace* Travis 2002: 225), must be added when *DENTRO* is followed by a noun phrase referring to the containing item.

- (153) Pasó dentro de la cueva.
 happen:3SG.PRET inside LIG the cave
 ‘It happened inside the cave.’
- (154) Hay un animalito dentro (de esta nuez).
 there.is an animal:DIM inside LIG this walnut
 ‘There’s an insect inside (this walnut).’

5.2.6.3 Portuguese

INSIDE has identical exponents with essentially the same grammar in Spanish and in Portuguese. In both languages, a ligature is required in front of a noun phrase (*DENTRO DE X*):

- (155) Dentro desta coisa não tem nada.
 inside LIG.this thing NEG there.is nothing
 ‘There is nothing inside this thing.’

In the absence of a complement, the Portuguese exponent, unlike its Spanish counterpart, generally combines with the preposition *por*:

- (156) Esta coisa tem muitas coisas por dentro.
 this thing have:SG.PRES many things PREP inside
 ‘This thing has many things inside.’

5.2.6.4 Italian

DENTRO was proposed for Spanish and for Portuguese; it is also the Italian exponent of *INSIDE*. The difference, though, is that no preposition is required when a noun phrase follows:

- (157) C'è qualcosa dentro (la scatola).
 there is something inside the box
 'There is something inside (the box).'

5.2.7 TOUCH

One of the most recent additions to the NSM lexicon, mentioned but not specifically pursued in the *MUG* project (Goddard & Wierzbicka 2002a), is the prime **TOUCH**, needed to provide fully satisfactory explications for a great number of lexical items implying contact. The categories singled out by Goddard (2002b: 307) include verbs of physical action (e.g. *hold*, *scratch*, *slap* and *cut* in English), tactile adjectives (e.g. *smooth*, *rough* and *prickly*) and spatial prepositions (e.g. *on* and *against*).

Initial indications are that **TOUCH** is here to stay. In NSM explications, it can be used either transitively or intransitively, and it is lexicalized in the main Romance languages as follows (the bracketed allomorphs are required for the intransitive usage, when two objects, for instance, are said to touch – i.e. to touch one another).

French:	TOUCHER (SE TOUCHER)
Spanish:	TOCAR (TOCARSE)
Portuguese:	TOCAR (TOCAR-SE)
Italian:	TOCCARE (TOCCARSI)

5.2.7.1 French

The French exponents of **TOUCH** are **TOUCHER** (corresponding to transitive uses of **TOUCH**) and **SE TOUCHER** (corresponding to intransitive uses, where there is reciprocity). Outside of NSM, the non-reflexive *toucher* may also be used intransitively, but only in a very limited set of contexts (e.g. *défense de toucher* 'do not touch'). Examples of allowable NSM constructions follow:

- (158) Si je veux, je peux toucher cette chose.
 if I want:1SG.PRES I can:1SG.PRES touch this thing
 'If I want to, I can touch this thing.'
- (159) Si ces deux parties se touchent, il arrivera
 if these two parts REFL touch:3PL.PRES 3SG.CLIT happen:3SG.FUT
 quelque chose.
 something
 'If these two parts touch, something will happen.'

5.2.7.2 Spanish

Spanish functions very similarly to French, with *TOCAR* being used in transitive contexts and its reflexive counterpart *TOCARSE* where there is reciprocity, as in the following examples.

- (160) El árbol está tocando el cable.
 the tree be:3SG.PRES touch:PROG the cable
 ‘The tree touches the cable’
- (161) Es peligroso si los dos cables se tocan.
 be:3SG.PRES dangerous if the two cables REFL touch:3PL.PRES
 ‘It is dangerous if the two cables touch.’

As in Portuguese (cf. below), *tocar* also means ‘play (a musical instrument)’ (e.g. *tocar el piano* ‘play the piano’) – though this is a clear case of polysemy, with no implications for the word’s use in the Spanish NSM (in the relevant meaning only).

5.2.7.3 Portuguese

The Portuguese verb *tocar* displays considerable polysemy. It can, for example, mean ‘play’ as in *tocar o violão* ‘play the guitar’ or *tocar um CD* ‘play a CD’, as well as ‘ring’ as in *O telefone tocou* ‘The phone rang’. Nevertheless, it is the only viable candidate for expressing the prime TOUCH. A reflexive construction is used for reciprocal scenarios.

- (162) A mão dela tocava o meu braço.
 the hand hers touch:SG.IMPF the my arm
 ‘Her hand was touching my arm.’
- (163) Nossos corpos estão se tocando.
 our bodies be:PL.IMPF REFL touch:PROG
 ‘Our bodies are touching.’

5.2.7.4 Italian

In Italian *TOCCARE* and its reflexive variant *TOCCARSI* are used to refer to the idea expressed by the prime TOUCH, as in the following sentences:

- (164) La bottiglia tocca il tavolo.
 the bottle touch:3SG.PRES the table
 ‘The bottle is touching the table.’
- (165) Queste due cose si toccano.
 these two things REFL touch:3PL.PRES
 ‘These two things are touching.’

5.3 Summary of exponents (without allolexes)

	French	Spanish	Portuguese	Italian
WHEN	QUAND	CUANDO	QUANDO	QUANDO
NOW	MAINTENANT	AHORA	AGORA	ADESSO
BEFORE	AVANT	ANTES	ANTES	PRIMA
AFTER	APRÈS	DESPUÉS	DEPOIS	DOPO
A LONG TIME	LONGTEMPS	MUCHO TIEMPO	MUITO TEMPO	MOLTO TEMPO
A SHORT TIME	PEU DE TEMPS	POCO TIEMPO	POUCO TEMPO	POCO TEMPO
FOR SOME TIME	POUR UN TEMPS	POR UN TIEMPO	POR ALGUM TEMPO	PER UN PO' DI TEMPO
IN ONE MOMENT	EN UN MOMENT	EN UN MOMENTO	EM UM MOMENTO	IN UN MOMENTO
WHERE	OÙ	DÓNDE	ONDE	DOVE
HERE	ICI	AQUÍ	AQUI	QUI
ABOVE	AU-DESSUS	ARRIBA	ACIMA	SOPRA
BELOW	AU-DESSOUS	DEBAJO	ABAIXO	SOTTO
FAR	LOIN	LEJOS	LONGE	LONTANO
NEAR	PRÈS	CERCA	PERTO	VICINO
SIDE	CÔTÉ	LADO	LADO	PARTE
INSIDE	DEDANS	DENTRO	DENTRO	DENTRO
TOUCH	TOUCHER	TOCAR	TOCAR	TOCCARE

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CHAPTER 6

NSM exponents and universal grammar in Romance

Logical concepts; intensifier and augmentor;
taxonomy and partonomy; similarity

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This chapter defines exponents in French, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian (hereafter collectively referred to as “the main Romance languages”) for the following semantic primes:

Logical concepts:	NOT, CAN, MAYBE, BECAUSE OF, IF
Intensifier, augmentor:	VERY, MORE
Taxonomy, partonomy:	KIND OF, PART
Similarity:	LIKE

6.1 Logical concepts

6.1.1 NOT

NOT is the prime used for the purpose of negation. In the main Romance languages, it is lexicalized as follows:

French:	NE ... PAS
Spanish:	NO
Portuguese:	NÃO
Italian:	NON

When NOT is used with THINK and followed by a subordinate clause, it triggers the subjunctive mood in at least some of the languages. On the other hand, NOT combines with SOMETHING and also with SOMEONE, resulting in the portmanteau forms NOTHING and NOBODY. These facts have been discussed in earlier chapters (cf. Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2 and Chapter 2, Section 2.1.2, respectively), and will not be repeated here.

6.1.1.1 French

Coveney (1996:55) notes that, in cross-linguistic studies of sentential negation, French *ne ... pas*, corresponding to the prime NOT, is often mentioned as a typical example of a so-called “embracing” device consisting of a clitic or particle *ne* which occurs before the inflected part of the verb, and a second element *pas* which occurs after. French is the only Romance language where such a device is used, even for the simplest kinds of negation. With verbs in the infinitive, the device is not “embracing”: NE and PAS appear together on the left hand side of the verb.

- (1) Je ne peux pas ne pas faire cela.
 I NEG can:1SG.PRES not NEG not do:INF this
 ‘I cannot not do this.’ (= ‘I must do this.’)

The reason why, in the interlinear gloss above, *ne* is rendered as NEG and *pas* as *not* is that *pas* seems to carry the bulk, if not the totality, of the negative meaning. In the spoken language, *ne* is often no longer present; it tends to be dropped because it is basically redundant and has no lexical meaning of its own. Coveney (1996:55) calls the presence or absence of *ne* “possibly the best known sociolinguistic variable in contemporary French”. In the written language (on which, by and large, NSM explications are based), *ne* maintains a strong presence.

6.1.1.2 Spanish

no in Spanish is used both to say ‘no’, and to negate verbs and propositions and the like, and thus is the exponent of NOT. It occurs before the verb it negates (preceding the auxiliary if there is one), as shown in the examples below.

- (2) No, no lo vi.
 no not 3SG.CLIT see:1SG.PRET
 ‘No, I didn’t see it.’
- (3) No puedo hacerlo ahora.
 not can:1SG.PRES do:INF+3SG.CLIT now
 ‘I can’t do it now.’

6.1.1.3 Portuguese

Negation in the Portuguese NSM is by means of the pre-verbal adverb *não*, as illustrated in (4)–(5), for example.

- (4) Eu não quero estas coisas perto de você.
 I not want:1SG.PRES these things near PREP you.
 ‘I do not want these things near you.’
- (5) Esta coisa é grande mas não muito grande.
 this thing be:SG.PRES big but not very big
 ‘This thing is big, but not very big.’

A sentence-final *não* is frequently added in spoken (Brazilian) Portuguese for sentence negation, allowing the preverbal *não* to be omitted (as in *Vou comprar isso não* ‘I’m not going to buy this’). As this pattern is not the most basic one and as it is often associated with emphatic negation, there is no reason to utilize it in NSM.

6.1.1.4 Italian

The main means of negation in Italian is the pre-verbal particle *non*. In NSM explications, it appears in contexts such as the following:

- (6) Molta gente pensa: non è bene morire.
 much people think:3SG.PRES not be:3SG.PRES good die:INF
 ‘Many people think: It is not good to die.’
- (7) Se non dico così, sentirai qualcosa di male.
 if not say:1SG.PRES like.this feel:2SG.FUT something LIG bad
 ‘If I don’t say this, you will feel something bad.’

6.1.2 CAN

The English verb *can* provides a well-known example of polysemy. The corresponding prime is much more limited in use – and so are its exponents in the main Romance languages: they are closer to CAN than to *can*. In English, for instance, it is possible to say *I can ride a bike*, meaning ‘I know how to do it’; this possibility does not exist in Romance, and is not part of the meaning of the prime. *Can* also routinely combines with such verbs as *see*, *hear*, *feel* – at least in English. In the English NSM, CAN is perhaps less frequently used (this is an issue which requires further research). Its Romance counterparts, on the other hand, are not common in combinations involving the verbs *see*, *hear* and *feel*. The *can* in sentences like *I can’t see anything* is usually left out in translation: *I don’t see anything* is the structure used instead. The relevant lexicalizations are as follows:

French:	POUVOIR
Spanish:	PODER
Portuguese:	PODER
Italian:	POTERE

In NSM explications, CAN is frequently used to break down the expressions *must* or *have to*. An Italian example is given in (8):

- (8) Non puoi non farlo.
not can:2SG.PRES not do:INF+3SG.CLIT
'You can't not do it.' (i.e. 'You must do it.')

Similarly, CAN plays an important role in the explication of the negative phrase *don't have to*. In English there is some potential for confusion between *can not* and *cannot*, but in the languages in our sample word order eliminates any ambiguity. The negative particle always comes before the verb it negates. Italian can once again serve as an example:

- (9) Puoi non farlo.
can:2SG.PRES not do:INF+3SG.CLIT
'You can not do it.' (i.e. 'You don't have to do it.')
- (10) Non puoi farlo.
not can:2SG.PRES do:INF+3SG.CLIT
'You cannot do it.' (i.e. 'You can't do it.')

6.1.2.1 *French*

The French exponent of CAN is POUVOIR. It is immediately followed by another verb, which is used in the infinitive. POUVOIR can take animate as well as inanimate subjects.

- (11) Si je pouvais le faire, je le ferais.
if I can:1SG.IMPF 3SG.CLIT do:INF I 3SG.CLIT do:1SG.COND
'If I could do it, I would.'
- (12) Cela peut arriver à tout le monde.
this can:3SG.PRES happen:INF PREP everybody
'This can happen to everybody.'

6.1.2.2 *Spanish*

CAN is expressed in Spanish as PODER. It functions in exactly the same way as its French counterpart.

- (13) Es bueno si lo puedo hacer ahora.
be:3SG.PRES good if 3SG.CLIT can:1SG.PRES do:INF now
'It is good if I can do it now.'

- (14) Estas cosas no pueden moverse.
 these things not can:3PL.PRES move:INF
 'These things cannot move.'
- (15) Cosas malas le pueden pasar a gente buena.
 things bad 3SG.CLIT can:3PL.PRES happen:INF PREP people good
 'Bad things can happen to good people.'

6.1.2.3 Portuguese

In Portuguese, the prime CAN is expressed by means of the verb PODER. Its role in NSM is illustrated in examples (16)–(17).

- (16) Uma pessoa boa pode pensar assim.
 a person good can:SG.PRES think:INF like.this
 'A good person can think like this.'
- (17) Nada de ruim pode me acontecer.
 nothing LIG bad can:SG.PRES me happen:INF
 'Nothing bad can happen to me.'

6.1.2.4 Italian

The Italian exponent of CAN is POTERE. Some examples of how it is used in NSM follow.

- (18) Se fai così, può succedere qualcosa di male.
 if do:2SG.PRES like.this can:3SG.PRES happen something LIG bad
 'If you do this, something bad can happen.'
- (19) Non mi posso muovere.
 not REFL can:1SG.PRES move
 'I can't move.'

6.1.3 MAYBE

MAYBE is a prime which, intuitively, seems in some way related to CAN. The two were once thought to be allolexes of a *single* prime, a mistaken view still held in the days of the *SLU* project (Goddard & Wierzbicka 1994) and therefore reflected in Peeters (1994). We have come a long way since then (and an even longer one since the days when CAN was thought not to be a prime at all). Whereas CAN has to do with potentiality ('something *can* happen, but it doesn't have to'), MAYBE has to do with possibility ('something *may* happen, perhaps it will, perhaps it won't').

In a number of languages, including Polish (Wierzbicka 2002: 130), the exponents of CAN and MAYBE are grammatically related, reflecting a non-compositional

link between the primes. In French, this is also the case, as shown in the table below.

French:	PEUT-ÊTRE
Spanish:	TAL VEZ
Portuguese:	TALVEZ
Italian:	FORSE

6.1.3.1 French

In French, the prime MAYBE is rendered by means of the adverbial expression PEUT-ÊTRE, which may be placed either before the subject or after the inflected verb. If used clause-initially, in a main or independent clause, it is followed by a complementizer. A third possibility (sentence-initial MAYBE followed by subject-verb inversion; not illustrated here) is highly formal and as such not at its place in the French NSM.

- (20) Il viendra peut-être demain.
3SG.CLIT come:3SG.FUT maybe tomorrow
‘Maybe he’ll come tomorrow.’
- (21) Peut-être qu’ il viendra demain.
maybe COMP 3SG.CLIT come:3SG.FUT tomorrow
‘Maybe he’ll come tomorrow.’

6.1.3.2 Spanish

There are three *prima facie* candidates for MAYBE in the Spanish NSM, viz. *puede ser* (lit. ‘can be’, related – like French *peut-être* – to the exponent of CAN), *quizás* (which also occurs without a final *s*) and *tal vez*. Each of these is illustrated below.

- (22) Puede ser que llueva mañana.
can:3SG.PRES be:INF COMP rain:3SG.PRES.SJV tomorrow
‘Maybe it will rain tomorrow.’
- (23) Quizás llueva / llueve mañana.
maybe rain:3SG.PRES.SJV / rain:3SG.PRES tomorrow
‘Maybe it will rain tomorrow.’
- (24) Tal vez llueva / llueve mañana.
maybe rain:3SG.PRES.SJV / rain:3SG.PRES tomorrow
‘Maybe it will rain tomorrow.’

Syntactically speaking, *puede ser* is the most complex of the three, as it must occur with the complementizer *que* ‘that’. Furthermore, sentences with *puede ser* are often ambiguous: Spanish being a pro-drop language, *puede ser* could easily be construed as an “AUX + INF” construction referring to potentiality (‘it can / could

be that...') instead of possibility ('maybe'). *Puede ser* is thus not appropriate as the exponent of the simple concept MAYBE. In fact, *puede* on its own is yet another way of expressing the latter in Spanish (*puede que llueva*, lit. 'it can that it rains'), but here, too, two different interpretations are possible.

Deciding between *tal vez* and *quizá(s)* is less straightforward. Any difference in meaning is extremely difficult to identify, which makes it impossible to argue in favor of one or the other on purely semantic grounds. As, according to native speakers, *tal vez* is acquired before *quizá(s)*, it may be the preferred exponent – even though further research appears to be called for. It is at least slightly problematic that, in their respective entries for *quizás*, dictionaries, whether monolingual or bilingual (Spanish-English), often do not even mention it; in fact, if it is listed at all, *tal vez* typically surfaces in the entry for the count noun *vez* 'time'. This suggests that, in current lexicographers' thinking, *tal vez* is either made up of two words or does not even qualify as a word at all. That it consists of two separate words seems hard to believe: the combination *tal + vez* literally means 'such time', but this meaning has been entirely bleached out and the only possible interpretation it now has is that of the prime MAYBE.

One other issue remains to be dealt with, viz. the use of the indicative or the subjunctive in combination with the prime. As is the case for most adverbs expressing probability in Spanish (including *quizás*, discussed above, *acaso* 'perhaps', *probablemente* 'probably'), *TAL VEZ* occurs with both, as illustrated above in (24), although it is reportedly more common with the subjunctive (Solé & Solé 1977: 196; Fernández Álvarez 1987: 99). There may be a simple explanation for this. It has been noted in earlier chapters that the subjunctive implies less certainty in regards to the outcome of an event than does the indicative. On the other hand, the expression *TAL VEZ* itself inherently carries an implication of uncertainty: it implies that the speaker does not know whether the proposition expressed pertains or not. In this sense, there is a non-compositional link between MAYBE and 'I don't know', and it may be because of this link that the subjunctive is used more commonly with *TAL VEZ* than the indicative – which is the semantically more basic form in this environment. It could be argued that the subjunctive is indeed semantically more complex, as it encodes an extra element of meaning, directly related to this notion of 'not knowing'. Its use in (24), for example, gives this sentence a meaning along the lines of: 'Maybe it will rain; I don't know'. King (1992: 170) makes a similar argument, stating that "the speaker can express doubt by using (...) the subjunctive, or the speaker can allow the lexical meaning of the qualifier *tal vez* to express the reservation and employ (...) the indicative to report the situation as an assertion". The use of the indicative, therefore, appears not to encode any extra element of meaning regarding the speaker's state of knowledge and is therefore the more basic form, and the only form that should be used with *TAL VEZ* in NSM.

6.1.3.3 Portuguese

The reasons for not treating Spanish *puede ser* ‘can be’ as the exponent of MAYBE (cf. Section 6.1.3.2) hold as well for the Portuguese cognate of this expression. Therefore, the only candidate exponent for MAYBE in Portuguese is TALVEZ, written as one word (unlike in Spanish). TALVEZ ordinarily precedes the verb and the subject, but governs the *subjunctive* mood:

- (25) Talvez eu possa fazer outra coisa.
 maybe I can:SG.PRES.SJV do:INF other thing
 ‘Maybe I can do something else.’

The indicative does occur with some frequency in sentences such as (25). However, the subjunctive is generally prescribed in normative and pedagogical grammars and is a much more common alternative. Rather than a choice with semantic consequences, the indicative option, which also exists in other contexts where mood is syntactically governed, including with verbs such as QUERER ‘WANT’ (cf. Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2.3), appears to reflect sociolinguistic variation.

6.1.3.4 Italian

MAYBE is expressed in Italian by means of FORSE. Its position is similar to that of its Spanish and Portuguese counterparts:

- (26) Forse posso farlo adesso.
 maybe can:1SG.PRES do:INF+3SG.CLIT now
 ‘Maybe I can do it now.’

Like the Portuguese example in the previous subsection, this one shows that the primes CAN and MAYBE can occur together, which further reinforces Wierzbicka’s (1996:104) view that neither can be defined in terms of the other or in any other way. Even so, Italian, too, has a phrase, similar in meaning to MAYBE, which makes use of the verb POTERE ‘CAN’, viz. *può darsi*. However, the latter is not proposed here as the exponent of MAYBE, because FORSE is a more appropriate candidate. *Può darsi*, while similar to it in meaning, is actually closer to ‘could be’ than to MAYBE. FORSE cannot be decomposed, whereas *può darsi*, which is made up of the third person singular of *potere* CAN and a reflexive form of *dare* ‘give’, can be paraphrased as ‘(it) can be (true)’.

6.1.4 BECAUSE OF

The prime BECAUSE has traditionally occurred in NSM explications in two different guises. It has been used as a clausal adjunct, in combination with substantive or (more frequently) quasi-substantive material (e.g. BECAUSE OF THESE WORDS, BECAUSE OF THIS; cf. Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1); in addition, it has been called upon to

establish a direct causal link between a main and a finite subordinate clause (*X because Y*). Recent evidence (Junker, in press) suggests that the latter usage is perhaps not as universal as has been generally assumed. However, more research is needed to further corroborate this claim. In the main Romance languages, the relationship between the two usages is allolexical. In the table below, the better established of the two, which is also the most common one in NSM, is mentioned first.

French:	À CAUSE DE (PARCE QUE)
Spanish:	A CAUSA DE (PORQUE)
Portuguese:	POR CAUSA DE (PORQUE)
Italian:	A CAUSA DI (PERCHÉ)

POR could be (and for Spanish was) proposed as an alternative for A / POR CAUSA DE (cf. Travis 2002:225–226). The slightly formal nature of the current proposal might be an argument against its adoption, both in Spanish and in Portuguese. More research is needed to determine which of the two exponents is the better one.

6.1.4.1 French

The French counterpart of the clausal adjunct BECAUSE OF, viz. À CAUSE DE, requires a ligature (viz. *de*), as does the English phrase (which uses *of*). PARCE QUE (= *à cause du fait que*, ‘because of the fact that’) is an additional allolex.

- (27) Tout le monde le sait; à cause de cela, je ne
 everybody 3SG.CLIT know:3SG.PRES because.of this I NEG
 le dis pas.
 3SG.CLIT say:1SG.PRES not
 ‘Everybody knows it; because of this, I am not saying it.’
- (28) Je suis parti parce que tu me l’as demandé.
 I leave:1SG.PCOMP because you me 3SG.CLIT ask:2SG.PCOMP
 ‘I left because you asked me to.’

6.1.4.2 Spanish

In Spanish, BECAUSE OF is realized as A CAUSA DE. PORQUE (a conjunction consisting of the preposition *por* ‘for, by’ and the complementizer *que*) is used for *interclausal* BECAUSE. Examples are given below.

- (29) Había mucha bulla; a causa de eso, no me pude
 there.is:IMPF much noise because.of this not me can:1SG.PRET
 dormir.
 sleep:INF
 ‘There was a lot of noise; because of this, I couldn’t get to sleep.’

- (30) El perro murió porque el hombre le pegó
the dog die:3SG.PRET because the man 3SG.CLIT hit:3SG.PRET
en la cabeza.
PREP the head
'The dog died because the man hit it on the head.'

6.1.4.3 Portuguese

In the Portuguese NSM, causality is once again expressed by means of two distinct forms, POR CAUSA DE and PORQUE, as illustrated by the following examples:

- (31) Por causa disso, eu sinto algo ruim.
because.of.this I feel:1SG.PRES something bad
'Because of this, I feel something bad.'
- (32) Eu penso assim porque não tem nada aqui.
I think:1SG.PRES like.this because NEG have:SG.PRES nothing here
'I think like this because there is nothing here.'

6.1.4.4 Italian

In Italian, the clausal adjunct BECAUSE OF is expressed as A CAUSA DI. Interclausal BECAUSE is lexicalized as PERCHÉ.

- (33) Hai detto parolacce; a causa di questo, sento qualcosa di
say:2SG.PPROS bad.words because.of.this feel:1SG.PRES something LIG
male.
bad
'You said bad words; because of this, I feel something bad.'
- (34) Sento qualcosa di male perché hai detto parolacce.
feel:1SG.PRES something LIG bad because say:2SG.PPROS bad.words
'I feel something bad because you said bad words.'

6.1.5 IF

IF, the last of our logical concepts, is needed to express hypotheses. Its exponents in the main Romance languages are as follows:

French:	SI
Spanish:	SI
Portuguese:	SE
Italian:	SE

In the languages described in the present volume, the choice of tense and mood markers on the verbs used in an IF-clause has semantic import. In Portuguese, for instance, if the verb of the clause introduced by SE is in the present indicative, the speaker makes no commitment as to whether the state of affairs expressed in the SE clause is true or realized or not. If the verb is in the past subjunctive, the implication is that the state of affairs expressed in the SE clause has not been realized and that it is unknown whether it can or will be. If the verb is in the future subjunctive, the implication is that the state of affairs expressed in the SE clause has not been realized but can be. The only hypothetical scenarios that are deemed to be universally available are those that, in Portuguese, require a SE-clause with a present indicative or a future subjunctive. Counterfactuals, in particular, are no longer believed to be either universal or semantically simple. Current work done in this area using the NSM framework breaks the counterfactual down to a simpler IF-sentence (cf. Goddard 2002b:303–306). According to the latest thinking, the notion of counterfactuality can be explained in terms of a “short-term suspension of knowledge”; that is, though the outcome of a given event is known, one pretends for a moment that it is not, in order to consider an alternative outcome (which may have been possible, but which of course no longer is). Thus, someone (assumed male, for ease of exposition) who says *If I had a fishing rod, I would go fishing*, imagines for a moment that he does not know whether or not he has a fishing rod, and thinks what he would do if he had one. This fits in with Wierzbicka’s (1988: 148) proposed paraphrase for the subjunctive: ‘I don’t want to say: I know this’, and it is by encoding this meaning that the subjunctive can capture a notion of “suspension of knowledge”. No further comment appears warranted; the separate language sections hereafter contain illustrative material only.

6.1.5.1 French

- (35) Si je dis cela, tu diras du mal de moi.
 if I say:1SG.PRES this you say:2SG.FUT PART bad PREP me
 ‘If I say this, you will say something bad about me.’
- (36) Si tu veux le faire, tu peux le
 if you want:2SG.PRES 3SG.CLIT do:INF you can:2SG.PRES 3SG.CLIT
 faire.
 do:INF
 ‘If you want to do it, you can do it.’

6.1.5.2 *Spanish*

- (37) Si piensas así, la gente va a decir algo bueno
if think:2SG.PRES like.this the people say:3SG.FUT something good
de ti.
PREP you
'If you think like this, people will say good things about you.'
- (38) Si llueve, no voy.
if rain:3SG.PRES not go:1SG.PRES
'If it rains, I am not going.'

6.1.5.3 *Portuguese*

- (39) Se você fizer isso, eu vou pensar mal de você.
if you do:SG.FUT.SJV this I think:1SG.FUT bad PREP you
'If you do this, I will think something bad of you.'
- (40) Se estas duas pessoas podem fazê-lo, todo mundo
if these two persons can:PL.PRES do:INF+3SG.CLIT everyone
pode.
can:SG.PRES
'If these two people can do it, everybody can (do it).'

6.1.5.4 *Italian*

- (41) Se faccio così, la gente penserà male di me.
if do:1SG.PRES like.this the people think:3SG.FUT bad PREP me
'If I do this, people will think something bad of me.'
- (42) Se vuoi sapere di piú, parla con Andrea.
if want:2SG.PRES know more speak PREP Andrea
'If you want to know more, speak to Andrea.'

6.2 Intensifier and augmentor

6.2.1 VERY

The NSM's intensifier is lexicalized as follows:

French:	TRÈS
Spanish:	MUY
Portuguese:	MUITO
Italian:	MOLTO

Portuguese MUITO and Italian MOLTO were also selected to be the exponents of the prime MUCH / MANY. While this is entirely unproblematic (as will be shown below),

there is another issue that commands attention. None of the languages described in this volume allow VERY to be combined with the quantifier MUCH / MANY (French *TRÈS BEAUCOUP, Spanish *MUY MUCHO, Portuguese *MUITO_{ADV} MUITO_{ADJ}, Italian *MOLTO_{ADV} MOLTO_{ADJ}), even though Portuguese and Italian both allow adjective reduplication with the exponent of MUCH / MANY to achieve a very similar meaning. The combination had been included in NSM syntax in the 1990s, but its legitimacy is now up for review. Travis (2002: 209) identifies the augmentative suffix *-ísimo* as a *possible* alternative for the adverb *MUY*, but immediately discards it, because it is not semantically simple (it has an emotive value). She rejects as colloquial or even childish the use of reduplication (*MUCHO MUCHO), a point that could probably also be made with respect to French *BEAUCOUP BEAUCOUP (*pace* Peeters 1994: 435). The use of an adverb such as French *vraiment* (instead of TRÈS; Peeters *ibid.*) or Spanish *verdaderamente* (which, according to Travis, “sounds quite formal”) is not a convincing option either (cf. Wierzbicka 1994: 495). On the other hand, as stated earlier, Portuguese MUITO MUITO and Italian MOLTO MOLTO are quite acceptable, at least as instances of adjective reduplication. Evidence that, even in Portuguese and Italian, VERY does not combine with MUCH / MANY may be found in sentences such as those below, which clearly show that the first MUITA or MOLTA is as adjectival as the second, since both agree with the following noun GENTE (*MUITO MUITA and *MOLTO MOLTA would be ungrammatical).

- (43) *Tinha muita muita gente aqui.*
 there.is:IMPF many many people here
 ‘There were many many people here.’
- (44) *C’era molta molta gente qui.*
 there.is:IMPF much much people here
 ‘There were many many people here.’

The repetition of the adjectives *muito* and *molto* is as close as it is possible to get to expressing the combination VERY MUCH / MANY in Portuguese and Italian, and much closer than French and Spanish seem to get. A related issue arises with respect to the combinations A VERY SHORT TIME and A VERY LONG TIME. It has already been found that it is difficult or impossible to find equivalents for this type of expression in Cantonese (Tong et al. 1997: 252) and Malay (Goddard 2002a: 143–144); its place in NSM may therefore need to be reconsidered. In Spanish, it is possible to use the former (MUY POCO TIEMPO), but the latter (*MUY MUCHO TIEMPO) is disallowed. The most idiomatic way of referring to a very long time in Spanish is by means of a superlative suffix (*muchísimo tiempo*); however, as mentioned before, the use of this suffix in NSM is problematic. In Italian, MOLTO can only appear in the phrase *molto molto tempo* (lit. ‘much much time’), through adjective reduplication. The same does not apply to A VERY SHORT TIME, as *MOLTO POCO TEMPO is ungrammatical. The expression *pochissimo tempo*, which makes

use of a superlative suffix similar to *-ísimo* in Spanish, is quite common, but again the suffix lacks the semantic simplicity required of NSM expressions, as it seems to include an affective component. In addition to augmentative affixation as in Spanish, Portuguese allows both *MUITO POUCO TEMPO* ‘A VERY SHORT TIME’ and *muito muito tempo*, through adjective reduplication, for ‘A VERY LONG TIME’.

6.2.1.1 French

TRÈS, the French exponent of VERY, is used to modify adverbs and adjectives and occurs before the term it modifies.

- (45) C’ est très mal.
 it be:3SG.PRES very bad
 ‘It is very bad.’
- (46) C’ est très grand.
 it be:3SG.PRES very big
 ‘It is very big.’
- (47) Cet endroit n’ est pas très loin d’ ici.
 this place NEG be:3SG.PRES not very far PREP here
 ‘This place is not very far from here.’
- (48) Cela est arrivé il y a très longtemps.
 this happen:3SG.PCOMP ago very a.long.time
 ‘This happened a very long time ago.’

6.2.1.2 Spanish

VERY is expressed in Spanish with the word MUY, as illustrated below. It can occur with adjectives, as well as with distance and time expressions. Like its French counterpart, it is placed before the term it modifies.

- (49) No es muy bueno.
 not be:3SG.PRES very good
 ‘It’s not very good.’
- (50) Este sitio está muy lejos de aquí.
 this place be:3SG.PRES very far PREP here
 ‘This place is very far from here.’
- (51) Vivió ahí por muy poco tiempo.
 live:3SG.PRET there for very a.short.time
 ‘He lived there for a very short time.’

6.2.1.3 Portuguese

Portuguese uses one and the same exponent for VERY and for MUCH / MANY, viz. MUITO. The *grammatical* difference is that the exponent of VERY modifies an ad-

jective or a verb, rather than a noun, and consequently does not show gender / number agreement, as illustrated by the following examples.

- (52) Esta pessoa é muito boa.
 this person be:SG.PRES very good
 ‘This person is very good.’
- (53) Estas pessoas são muito boas.
 these people be:PL.PRES very good
 ‘These people are very good.’
- (54) Eu quero muito conhecer este lugar.
 I want:1SG.PRES very know:INF this place
 ‘I very much want to know this place.’

6.2.1.4 Italian

In Italian, either *molto* or *tanto* could be used to express VERY (as well as MUCH / MANY). The difference between the two Italian words is slight, and lies in the fact that *tanto* seems to imply some kind of feeling (cf. Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3.4). For this reason, MOLTO was chosen as the exponent of MUCH / MANY and will also be used to express VERY. There is no question of Italian not being able to distinguish between the two primes, because the quantifier MOLTO behaves differently from the intensifier in grammatical terms (as in Portuguese). The former is an adjective and must therefore agree in number and gender with its head noun, creating the additional allomorphs MOLTA [FEM.SG], MOLTI [MASC.PL] and MOLTE [FEM.PL]; the latter is an adverb and remains invariable.

- (55) Questa persona è molto grande.
 this person be:3SG.PRES very big
 ‘This person is very big.’
- (56) La gente pensa molto male di me.
 the people think:3SG.PRES very bad PREP me
 ‘People think something very bad about me.’

6.2.2 MORE

The prime MORE seeks to capture the dynamic notion of increase or augmentation. It is not intended as a comparative (as in *There are more people here than in the other place*). In the main Romance languages, it is lexicalized as follows:

French:	PLUS
Spanish:	MÁS
Portuguese:	MAIS
Italian:	PIÙ (DI PIÙ)

6.2.2.1 *French*

The French exponent of MORE is PLUS. Ligatures are required, both when a noun follows, as in (57), and when QUELQUE CHOSE ‘SOMETHING’ or its allolex RIEN ‘NOTHING’ precede, as in (58)–(59).

- (57) Pour un temps, il y avait plus de gens ici.
 for.some.time there.is:IMPF more LIG people here
 ‘For some time there were more people here.’
- (58) Cette personne veut quelque chose de plus.
 this person want:3SG.PRES something LIG more
 ‘This person wants something more.’
- (59) Je ne peux penser à rien de plus.
 you NEG can:1SG.PRES think:INF PREP nothing LIG more
 ‘I can’t think of anything more.’

PLUS can also be used on its own, in a positive or a negative context, or with either of the evaluators BIEN ‘GOOD’ and MAL ‘BAD’. In the latter case, portmanteaus have to be called upon: PLUS + BIEN = MIEUX ‘BETTER’, PLUS + MAL = PIRE ‘WORSE’.

- (60) Je ne veux pas que tu dises plus.
 I NEG want:1SG.PRES not COMP you say:2SG.PRES.SJV more
 ‘I do not want you to say more.’
- (61) Les gens pensent que cela est mieux.
 the people think:3PL.PRES COMP this be:3SG.PRES better
 ‘People think that this is better.’

6.2.2.2 *Spanish*

MORE is realized in Spanish as MÁS. The main difference with French PLUS is that no ligatures are required before a following noun or after ALGO ‘SOMETHING’ / NADA ‘NOTHING’.

- (62) Quiero saber más.
 want:1SG.PRES know:INF more
 ‘I want to know more.’
- (63) No sentio nada más.
 NEG feel:3SG.PRET nothing more
 ‘He / She didn’t feel anything more.’

- (64) Compré más manzanas.
 buy:1SG.PRET more apples
 'I bought more apples.'
- (65) La gente no piensa más que yo lo puedo
 the people not think:3SG.PRES more COMP I 3SG.CLIT can:1SG.PRES
 hacer.
 do:INF
 'People don't think anymore that I can do it.'

In some dialects of Spanish, *más* can combine with the evaluators *bueno* / *bien* 'good' and *malo* / *mal* 'bad' to express something like 'better' and 'worse', like in French. However, this is considered non-standard and therefore inappropriate in NSM, where the suppletive forms MAJOR 'BETTER' and PEOR 'WORSE' are used instead.

- (66) Tú dijiste algo peor.
 you say:2SG.PRET something worse
 'You said something worse.'

6.2.2.3 Portuguese

The exponent of MORE in Portuguese is similar but not identical to its Spanish counterpart. MAIS can modify collective or plural nouns or adjectives, in which case it precedes them, as well as ALGO 'SOMETHING' and NADA 'NOTHING', in which case it usually follows:

- (67) Eu quero ver mais coisas.
 I want:1SG.PRES see:INF more things
 'I want to see more things.'
- (68) Esta pessoa é mais ruim.
 this person be:SG.PRES more bad
 'This person is worse.'
- (69) Nada mais / algo (a) mais vai acontecer.
 nothing more something LIG more happen:SG.FUT
 'Nothing more / something more is going to happen.'

It can also occur as a substantive, with or without a complement in a phrase headed by *de*:

- (70) Eu quero ver mais (disso).
 I want:1SG.PRES see:INF more LIG.this
 'I want to see more (of this).'

There are portmanteaus for certain common MAIS + adjective / adverb combinations, such as MAIS + BOM / BEM, which is rendered by means of MELHOR ‘BETTER’:

- (71) Esta coisa é melhor.
 this thing be:SG.PRES better
 ‘This thing is better.’

Although MAIS RUIM, used in (68), is a possible combination, the portmanteau PIOR is more common. Other comparable portmanteaus are MAIOR (= MAIS + GRANDE ‘BIG’) and MENOR (= MAIS + PEQUENO ‘SMALL’). Subject to complex regional and sociolinguistic constraints, the analytical forms of these expressions can also be used.

6.2.2.4 Italian

In the Italian NSM, the prime MORE is realized as PIÙ when used with substantives. As a verbal complement in a positive sentence, and also after QUALCOSA ‘SOMETHING’ and NIENTE ‘NOTHING’, MORE is expressed as DI PIÙ. The combination NIENTE DI PIÙ does sound a little unusual (*nient’altro* ‘nothing else’ would be more commonly used) but is probably acceptable in the Italian NSM, as it is easily understood, although not entirely idiomatic. In a negative sentence, where English uses the allolex ANYMORE, Italian simply uses PIÙ with negation. Portmanteaus for the combinations PIÙ + BENE, meaning ‘BETTER’, and PIÙ + MALE, meaning ‘WORSE’, are MEGLIO and PEGGIO, respectively.

- (72) Dopo questo, più gente è venuta.
 after this more people come:3SG.PPROS
 ‘After this, more people came.’
- (73) Voglio dire (qualcosa) di più.
 want:1SG.PRES say something more
 ‘I want to say (something) more.’
- (74) Queste persone non vivono più.
 these persons not live:3PL.PRES more
 ‘These people don’t live anymore.’
- (75) È meglio / peggio se non dici niente.
 be:3SG.PRES better worse if NEG say:2SG.PRES nothing
 ‘It’s better / worse if you don’t say anything.’

6.3 Taxonomy and partonomy

6.3.1 KIND OF

KIND OF is intended to capture taxonomical relationships, e.g. the relationship between *dog* and *animal* (*a dog is a kind of animal*) or between *eucalypt* and *tree* (*a eucalypt is a kind of tree*). The following exponents are proposed for the main Romance languages:

French:	TYPE DE
Spanish:	TIPO DE
Portuguese:	TIPO DE
Italian:	TIPO DI

6.3.1.1 French

Of the three suggestions made in Peeters (1994: 438), viz. *espèce de* / *sorte de* / *genre de*, none deserve to be maintained. The disclaimer that more research was needed was entirely appropriate. The current proposal is to opt for *type de*, which is general enough to be used with animals, plants, people and objects. The earlier choice, *espèce de*, is ambiguous in a way that *type de* is not. Even though *espèce*, together with many of its formally related counterparts in other languages (including English *species*) is often used to refer to ‘kinds of animals’ or ‘kinds of plants’ (e.g. *espèce menacée* ‘threatened species’), it is not possible to talk about *une espèce d’animal* or *une espèce de plante* to refer to such species. *Animal* and *plante* are, so to speak, incorporated into *espèce*. To mention them explicitly almost automatically results in a change of meaning: *une espèce d’animal*, for instance, is more likely to refer to something animal-like that is not quite an animal than to a ‘kind of animal’. Example (29) in Peeters (1994: 438) (*Quand nous sommes allés au zoo, nous avons vu différentes espèces d’animaux* ‘When we went to the zoo, we saw different kinds of animals’) is rather unidiomatic; it would be far more usual to simply say that we saw *différents animaux* ‘different animals’. In addition, *espèce de* is also used in insults and other invectives (e.g. *espèce de con* ‘bloody idiot’; cf. Rosier 2002).

TYPE DE can occur with quantifiers such as BEAUCOUP (BEAUCOUP DE TYPES DE ‘MANY KINDS OF’) and determiners (UN AUTRE TYPE DE ‘ANOTHER KIND OF’, LE MÊME TYPE DE ‘THE SAME KIND OF’, CE TYPE DE ‘THIS KIND OF’), as illustrated below.

- (76) C’ est un autre type d’ oiseau.
 it be:3SG.PRES a other kind.of bird
 ‘It is another kind of birds.’

- (77) Il y a beaucoup de types de chaise.
 there.is many LIG kinds.of chair
 ‘There are many kinds of chairs.’
- (78) Ce type de livre n’ est pas bon à lire.
 this kind.of book NEG be:3SG.PRES not good PREP read:INF
 ‘This kind of book is not good to read.’

6.3.1.2 Spanish

TIPO DE ‘KIND OF’ can be used with quantifiers and with determiners such as MISMO ‘SAME’ and ESTE ‘THIS’, as in the following examples.

- (79) Hay muchos tipos de murciélago.
 there.is many kinds.of bat
 ‘There are many kinds of bats.’
- (80) Es el mismo tipo de palabra.
 be:3SG.PRES the same kind.of word
 ‘It is the same kind of word.’
- (81) Este tipo de pescado es muy bueno para comer.
 this kind.of fish be:3SG.PRES very good PREP eat:INF
 ‘This kind of fish is very good to eat.’

6.3.1.3 Portuguese

The exponent of KIND OF in Portuguese is TIPO DE. Its usage in the Portuguese NSM can be illustrated as follows:

- (82) A onça é um tipo de animal.
 the jaguar be:SG.PRES a kind.of animal
 ‘Jaguars are a kind of animal.’
- (83) A Paula é o tipo de pessoa que quer saber
 the Paula be:SG.PRES the kind.of person that want:SG.PRES know:INF
 tudo.
 everything
 ‘Paula is the kind of person who wants to know everything.’
- (84) Este tipo de coisa não acontece aqui.
 this kind.of thing not happen:SG.PRES here
 ‘This kind of thing doesn’t happen here.’

6.3.1.4 Italian

A number of Italian words are similar in meaning to the English word *kind*, including *genere*, *sorta*, *forma* and *specie*, but to express the prime KIND OF none is

as appropriate as *tipo*, followed by *di*. In NSM explications, TIPO DI can be used as follows:

- (85) Ci sono molti tipi di canguro.
 there.is:PL many kinds.of kangaroo
 ‘There are many kinds of kangaroos.’
- (86) Questo non è lo stesso pesce, ma è lo stesso
 this not be:3SG.PRES the same fish but be:3SG.PRES the same
 tipo di pesce.
 kind.of fish
 ‘This is not the same fish, but it is the same kind of fish.’

6.3.2 PART

Like KIND OF, PART is “substantive-like” (Goddard & Wierzbicka 2002:45): both can be used to form substantive phrases, in conjunction with NSM determiners and quantifiers. In its substantive-like use, the English exponent of the prime PART requires a ligature (*of*), unless it is used anaphorically (in the phrase THESE PARTS). The MUG list of primes (cf. Goddard & Peeters this volume) took the ligature to be a full-fledged part of the prime. However, it is now more fully recognized that, unlike KIND OF, PART may also be used with its relatee in subject position, viz. in the phrase HAVE PARTS, which is considered to be an allex rather than a combination of primes involving the prime HAVE. The French, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian exponents (all of which require a ligature whenever one is required in English) are entirely unproblematic:

French:	PARTIE (AVOIR DES PARTIES)
Spanish:	PARTE (TENER PARTES)
Portuguese:	PARTE (TER PARTES)
Italian:	PARTE (AVERE PARTI)

To designate the parts of a thing, expressions such as French *faire partie de* and Portuguese *fazer parte de* (lit. ‘make part of’; e.g. in Portuguese, *O coração faz parte do corpo* ‘The heart is part of the body’) provide a possibly more common alternative to the expressions suggested below (French *être une partie de*, Portuguese *ser (uma) parte de*). *Etre une partie de* and *ser (uma) parte de* are preferable, however, since they are perfectly natural and do *not* require the use of the verbs *faire* and *fazer*, which are also the French and Portuguese exponents of the prime DO, with a special idiomatic meaning.

6.3.2.1 French

The French exponents of PART and HAVE PARTS are *PARTIE* and *AVOIR DES PARTIES*. The base form normally requires a ligature (*de*). Canonical contexts illustrating the various combinatorial possibilities are provided in (87)–(90).

- (87) Les yeux sont une partie du corps.
the eyes be:3PL.PRES a part LIG.the body
'The eyes are part of the body.'
- (88) Cette chose a deux parties.
this thing have:3SG.PRES two parts
'This thing has two parts.'
- (89) Cette chose a beaucoup de parties.
this thing have:3SG.PRES many LIG parts
'This thing has many parts.'
- (90) Certaines de ces parties sont très petites.
some LIG these parts be:3PL.PRES very small
'Some of these parts are very small.'

6.3.2.2 Spanish

PART is realized as *PARTE*, the preposition *de* being used as a ligature to introduce the 'whole'. Its allolex HAVE PARTS is expressed as *TENER PARTES*.

- (91) El filo es una parte del cuchillo.
the blade be:3SG.PRES a part LIG.the knife
'The blade is a part of the knife.'
- (92) Todas estas partes son pequeñas.
all these parts be:3PL.PRES small
'All of these parts are small.'
- (93) Muchos libros tienen partes que se llaman capítulos.
many books have:3PL.PRES parts COMP REFL call:3PL.PRES chapters
'Many books have parts that are called chapters.'

6.3.2.3 Portuguese

PARTE and *TER PARTES* are the Portuguese exponents of the prime PART and its allolex HAVE PARTS.

- (94) O coração é (uma) parte do corpo.
the heart be:SG.PRES a part LIG.the body
'The heart is (a) part of the body.'
- (95) Uma flor tem muitas partes.
a flower have:SG.PRES many parts
'A flower has many parts.'

- (96) Estas partes não são grandes.
 these parts not be:PL.PRES big
 ‘These parts are not big.’

6.3.2.4 Italian

The Italian word that expresses the prime PART is PARTE, which functions in a similar fashion to its English and Romance equivalents. ‘Of’ is expressed by means of *di*. The allolex HAVE PARTS translates as AVERE PARTI.

- (97) Il piede è una parte del corpo.
 the foot be:3SG.PRES a part LIG.the body
 ‘The foot is a part of the body.’
- (98) Questa cosa ha due parti / molte parti.
 this thing have:3SG.PRES two parts many parts
 ‘This thing has two parts / many parts.’
- (99) Queste parti non si toccano.
 these parts not REFL touch
 ‘These parts do not touch.’

6.4 Similarity

6.4.1 LIKE

LIKE has been used in explications to evoke not only similarity (e.g. SOMEONE LIKE ME, SOMETHING LIKE THIS), but also manner (e.g. DO IT LIKE THIS, THINK LIKE THIS). So far, NSM theorists have conflated the two, no doubt because manner (as understood here) *implies* similarity, and because the same word LIKE (in its relevant meaning, which is posited as semantically primitive) can be used in English for both. Interestingly, the combination LIKE THIS (which is common after predicates such as DO, HAPPEN, FEEL, LIVE) is not expressed by means of the base forms in the table below; instead, a portmanteau is required – except in French, where a portmanteau does exist for manner phrases, but is best avoided in favor of another phrase (see below for more detail).

The following base exponents are proposed:

French:	COMME
Spanish:	COMO
Portuguese:	COMO
Italian:	COME

6.4.1.1 French

French *COMME* 'LIKE' can link nouns and pronouns, as in (100)–(101), or clauses, as in (102).

- (100) Tu savais que quelqu'un comme moi pourrait
 you know:2SG.IMPV COMP someone like me can:3SG.COND
 le faire.
 3SG.CLIT do:INF
 'You knew (that) someone like me could do it.'
- (101) Je suis comme toi.
 I be:1SG.PRES like you
 'I am like you.'
- (102) Je veux le faire comme tu l' as fait.
 I want:1SG.PRES 3SG.CLIT do:INF like you 3SG.CLIT do:2SG.PCOMP
 'I want to do it like you did it.'

It can also occur as a two-argument predicate with *être*, as in (103).

- (103) C' est comme du lilas, mais ce n'
 3SG.CLIT be:3SG.PRES like PART lilac but 3SG.CLIT NEG
 est pas du lilas.
 be:3SG.PRES not PART lilac
 'This is like lilac, but it is not lilac.'

Finally, in combination with quasi-substantive *THIS*, to modify clauses, nouns and verbs, *COMME ÇA* is used instead of a more clumsy-sounding *comme cela* (cf. Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1.1):

- (104) C' est arrivé comme ça: ...
 it happen:3SG.PCOMP like this
 'It happened like this: ...'
- (105) A un moment comme ça, dans un endroit comme ça, il
 PREP a time like this PREP a place like this 3SG.CLIT
 l' a fait comme ça.
 3SG.CLIT do:3SG.PCOMP like this
 'At a time like this, in a place like this, he did it like this.'

French is the only Romance language in our sample which does not require a portmanteau for the phrase *LIKE THIS*: *COMME ÇA*, whether referring to similarity or to manner, is a simple juxtaposition of two primes. *Ainsi*, a portmanteau meaning 'like this' which is used for manner only, and which has etymological counterparts in Spanish and Portuguese (see below), is not needed.

6.4.1.2 Spanish

LIKE is realized as *COMO*, which functions both to link two substantives, as in (106), and as a two-argument predicate, as in (107). It can also occur as a clausal linker, as in (108).

- (106) Pensó que alguien como yo lo podía hacer.
 think:3SG.PRET COMP someone like I 3SG.CLIT can:3SG.IMPF do:INF
 'He thought that someone like me could do it.'
- (107) Es como una rosa, pero no es una rosa.
 be:3SG.PRES like a rose but not be:3SG.PRES a rose
 'It's like a rose, but it isn't a rose.'
- (108) Hágalo como yo lo hice.
 do:3SG.SJV+3SG.CLIT like I 3SG.CLIT do:1SG.PRET
 'Do it like I did it.'

Regardless of its role (i.e. as an expression of similarity or as an adverbial manner adjunct), LIKE THIS is best rendered in Spanish by means of a portmanteau related to French *ainsi*, viz. *Así*. The use of *Así* (which in Travis 2002:233 was proposed as a manner adjunct only) is illustrated below.

- (109) Fuimos a un sitio así.
 go:1PL.PRET PREP a place like.this
 'We went to a place like this.' [similarity]
- (110) Él lo hizo así.
 3SG 3SG.CLIT do:3SG.PRET like.this
 'He did it like this.' [manner]

6.4.1.3 Portuguese

Relationships of similarity are expressed in Portuguese with *COMO*, which is similar in its grammar to its Spanish counterpart.

- (111) Pessoas como eu não fazem estas coisas.
 people like I not do:PL.PRES these things
 'People like me don't do these things.'
- (112) Esta coisa é como as coisas do outro lugar.
 this thing be:SG.PRES like the things PREP.the other place
 'This thing is like the things in the other place.'

As in Spanish, a portmanteau (*ASSIM*) is used instead of a phrase including a form of *ISSO* 'THIS' to translate the combination LIKE THIS:

- (113) Pessoas assim não fazem estas coisas.
 people like.this not do:PL.PRES these things
 'People like this don't do these things.' [similarity]

- (114) Algumas pessoas pensam assim.
some people think:PL.PRES like.this
'Some people think like this.' [manner]

6.4.1.4 Italian

In Italian, LIKE is expressed by means of COME. Its use in NSM explications can be illustrated as follows (for details, see Section 6.4.1.2 above):

- (115) Questa persona è qualcuno come me.
this person be:3SG.PRES someone like me
'This person is someone like me.'
- (116) Il suo naso è come il mio naso.
the his / her nose be:3SG.PRES like the my nose
'His / her nose is like my nose.'
- (117) Come tu, faccio molte cose.
like you do:1SG.PRES many things
'Like you, I do many things.'

Where Spanish uses *Así* and Portuguese *Assim*, Italian uses *così*:

- (118) Hai detto qualcosa così.
say:2SG.PPROS something like.this
'You said something like this.' [similarity]
- (119) Lo faccio così.
3SG.CLIT do:1SG.PRES like.this
'I do it like this.' [manner]

6.5 Summary of exponents (without allollexes)

	French	Spanish	Portuguese	Italian
NOT	NE ... PAS	NO	NÃO	NON
CAN	POUVOIR	PODER	PODER	POTERE
MAYBE	PEUT-ÊTRE	TAL VEZ	TALVEZ	FORSE
BECAUSE OF	À CAUSE DE	A CAUSA DE	POR CAUSA DE	A CAUSA DI
IF	SI	SI	SE	SE
VERY	TRÈS	MUY	MUITO	MOLTO
MORE	PLUS	MÁS	MAIS	PIÙ
KIND OF	TYPE DE	TIPO DE	TIPO DE	TIPO DI
PART	PARTIE	PARTE	PARTE	PARTE
LIKE	COMME	COMO	COMO	COME

Acknowledgments

The Spanish materials in this chapter are largely based on Travis (2002). Text and examples which are either close or identical to the 2002 wording were reused with the author's permission.

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PART II

The Natural Semantic Metalanguage applied

CHAPTER 7

Sfogarsi

A semantic analysis of an Italian speech routine and its underlying cultural values

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This paper offers clear and precise paraphrases for the different meanings of the Italian key word *sfogarsi* which, in its most common use (roughly, ‘to vent one’s negative feelings’), refers to a way of releasing emotions that might otherwise build up inside a person in a dangerous way. It proposes two so-called “cultural scripts” aimed at describing some of the Italian folk theories (cultural norms and values) relevant to the expression of emotions. The use of the simple, universal concepts of the natural semantic metalanguage allows for both the paraphrases and the scripts to be tested against the intuitions of native speakers, and will help people from other language backgrounds gain a better understanding of selected aspects of Italian culture.

7.1 Introduction

Speech acts and emotion vocabulary have both been the subject of considerable linguistic research, especially within the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) framework (see e.g. Goddard 1998; Harkins & Wierzbicka 2001; Maher 2002; Wierzbicka 1987, 1994, 1999). The way a language categorizes different speech acts and the way its speakers describe emotions are fascinating topics not only from a purely semantic point of view, for the challenge they provide to those wishing to explicate meaning, but also for the cultural values they encapsulate. Lexical differences between languages give us an insight into differences in cultural values and priorities. Emotion words and speech act verbs are particularly illuminating in this regard because they go right to the heart of the way people interact with each other.

This chapter looks at an Italian key word with links to both these areas of meaning – a speech act verb describing one way people can talk about their emotions. The verb is *sfogarsi*, which (in the sense to be discussed here) can be

translated as ‘to vent one’s feelings’ or ‘to get things off one’s chest’, though these expressions are not fully equivalent to the Italian word. However, the analysis will begin not with *sfogarsi*, a reflexive verb, but with a brief discussion of its non-reflexive counterpart *sfogare* (roughly, ‘to vent’) which can be either transitive or intransitive and has both metaphorical and non-metaphorical meanings. After this introduction to the *sfogare* “family”, a detailed semantic analysis of *sfogarsi* will be undertaken, leading to a full explication of its meaning using the NSM’s restricted lexicon of simple, universal concepts. The word *sfogarsi* will then be taken as a starting point for describing certain Italian cultural values. In order to capture these, again in the simple, culture-free terms of NSM, two short cultural scripts will be proposed at the end of this chapter.

7.2 *Sfogare* and its closest English counterpart *to vent*

Sfogarsi, a reflexive verb, is the main focus of this paper, but before examining its meaning it will be helpful to look at the non-reflexive form *sfogare*. Both as a transitive and as an intransitive verb, *sfogare* is fairly close in meaning to the English verb ‘to vent’. Its literal sense matches the literal sense of *vent*, used in relation to gases to mean something like ‘to let out’ or ‘to escape’:

- (1) Il gas sfoga attraverso il tubo. (Zingarelli 1970)
‘The gas “vents” [is vented] through the tube.’
- (2) A superstack [is] used to vent the company’s smelter. (Cobuild)

The metaphorical sense of *sfogare* means (very roughly) expressing, getting rid of, or “letting out” pent-up emotions. It seems that Italian shares with English the conceptual metaphor THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS described by Lakoff & Kövecses (1987:198), and the verbs *sfogare* and *sfogarsi* refer to ways of getting these emotions “out” of the body.

The kinds of emotions one can *sfogare* are similar to the ones that appear most frequently as the object of *vent* in English, which has a similar metaphorical extension of the literal meaning. Many dictionaries give as an example of use the expression *sfogare la rabbia* (‘vent [one’s] anger/rage’). Zingarelli (1970) also mentions *sfogare la stizza* (‘temper’), and *sfogare l’ira* (‘ire’), and DISC (1997) includes *sfogare il malumore* (‘vent one’s ill humor / bad mood’).¹ Lakoff & Kövecses (1987:198–199) posit for American English the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER, which can entail metaphors like INTENSE ANGER PRODUCES STEAM and INTENSE ANGER PRODUCES PRESSURE ON THE CONTAINER, as reflected in expressions like *I was fuming* and *I could barely contain my rage*. The fact that *sfogare* combines so frequently with *rabbia* and similar emotions

suggests that in Italian there could be a similar metaphorical conceptualization of *rabbia* to that proposed for the English ANGER, a concept Lakoff & Kövecses appear to use to cover emotions like *rage*, *ire* and *temper* as well as *anger*.

While *rabbia* and similar emotions seem to be the most natural candidates for direct object position of *sfogare*, *dolore* ‘pain’ can also be used here. Take the following, said of a character in the film *Da zero a dieci*:

- (3) Cerca la violenza dello scontro fisico per sfogare il dolore quando il dolore è insopportabile. (<http://www.einaudi.ge.it/File/liga.html>)
 ‘He seeks the violence of physical conflict to *sfogare* the pain when the pain is unbearable.’

Duol, an archaic form of *dolore* (translated below as ‘sorrow’), is used with *sfogare* by Friar Alberigo in Dante’s *Inferno* (Canto 33, ll. 112–114). The Friar is one of those condemned to suffer for eternity in the icy depths of Hell, where weeping only increases one’s anguish, as tears freeze instantly forming “crystal visors” in the sinners’ eyes. The Friar begs for help from Dante and Virgil:

- (4) levatemi dal viso i duri veli
 sí ch’io sfoghi ’l duol che ’l cor m’impregna
 un poco, pria che ’l pianto si raggeli.
 ‘Lift from mine eyes the rigid veils, that I
 May vent the sorrow which impregns my heart
 A little, e’er the weeping recongale.’
 (trans. H. W. Longfellow 1895)

These two examples also show us that *sfogare* does not require *saying* anything, as the characters mentioned “vent” their ‘sorrow / pain’ through violence and tears respectively, not through words. In many cases, certainly, one would *sfogare* ‘vent’ emotions by talking about how one feels, by shouting or complaining or verbally attacking someone, to suggest just a handful of possibilities, but it does not have to be so.

Another important thing to consider when building up a picture of the meaning of *sfogare* is whether the emotions in question have to be negative (‘I feel something bad’). As mentioned earlier, one’s instinct when thinking about *sfogare* is to cite examples using *rabbia* ‘anger/rage’. However, this seems to be only a typical, rather than an essential, feature of *sfogare*, as an internet search turns up a handful of occurrences of *sfogare la gioia* (‘*sfogare* one’s joy’). Of course, it is possible that the results of a search like this do not constitute a fully representative sample of the scope of the collocation *sfogare la gioia*, but that is a matter for a more comprehensive corpus-based study. The fact that this usage occurs and is acceptable means that any definition of *sfogare* should predict it. Interestingly, of seven examples found of *sfogare la gioia*, four were about soccer and one about

competitive chess. One wonders whether there could be something about the psychology of sport which particularly favors first the suppression and then the release of strong positive emotions. The following example is particularly instructive:

- (5) Abbiamo tenuto un urlo bloccato in gola (...) prima di sfogare la gioia. Ora si può esultare... (http://www.centurini.it/arretrati/2002-6.htm)
 'We held a shout blocked up in our throats (...) before "venting" our joy. Now we can rejoice...'

I would suggest that there is a fairly straightforward explanation for the fact that *sfogare* typically applies to the expression (verbal or otherwise) of negative emotions. For *sfogare* to take place, emotions must previously have been contained ("pent up"), and, in Italian culture (indeed, in many cultures) one is far more likely to feel obliged to suppress bad feelings than good feelings. Positive emotions, such as happiness, joy or relief, can usually be expressed a little more freely than, say, anger or pain, as they are less likely to result in others feeling or thinking bad things. Those sport-related examples of *sfogare la gioia* probably reflect the fact that usually great tension and stress build up during competitive sporting matches, and these emotions, along with the positive emotions of relief and joy can only be "vented" when a definitive positive result has been achieved after a long period of anxiety, effort or concentration.

The English verb *to vent* behaves in a similar way to *sfogare*. It deals primarily with negative emotions, as can be seen by looking at the collocations in which *to vent* occurs in Cobuild's *Bank of English*. Of 46 examples of the relevant metaphorical use, more than a third mentions *anger*, *fury*, or *rage*, around a fifth mentions *frustration(s)*. Other collocations are with the expressions *bad temper*, *animosity*, *discontent*, *confusions*, and *feelings* (which from the context can be seen to be negative feelings). There are also some occurrences of the expression *to vent one's spleen*. The relevant sense of *spleen* is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as 'violent ill-nature or ill-humour; irritable or peevish temper'. The only potentially positive emotion vented in the Cobuild Corpus is *savage mirth*, a combination which hardly reflects wholly positive feelings. In general internet searches, occurrences of *vent one's happiness* and *vent one's joy*, though certainly not common, do appear, as do collocations of *vent* with *sorrow*, *grief* and *pain*. In short, an examination of the use and meaning of this metaphorical sense of the verb *vent* shows that it has a great deal in common with the corresponding sense of *sfogare*, including the range of emotions with which it can combine.

Now that the main features of *sfogare* and its near-equivalent *vent* have been outlined, *sfogarsi*, which is far less easily translated, will be analyzed.

7.3 Sfogarsi

The word *sfogarsi* is polysemous. It occurs in three main syntactic frames, and its meaning is different in each one. These syntactic frames can be summarized as follows:

1. *sfogarsi*₁ (no interlocutor mentioned) / *sfogarsi*₁ *con qualcuno* ('with someone')
2. *sfogarsi*₂ *su qualcuno* ('on someone')
3. *sfogarsi*₃ *a* + INF ('doing something')

All three will be examined and explicated here, but the focus will primarily be on *sfogarsi*₁ – a speech routine that involves, roughly speaking, talking to another person about one's emotions. This sense of the word is quite close in meaning to *sfogare* (in its metaphorical sense, as discussed above). However, it contains some semantic components which are not shared by *sfogare* and poses somewhat more of a mystery for the English speaker, because it is quite hard to translate satisfactorily with any single equivalent. As mentioned earlier, *sfogarsi* is a reflexive verb (one might imagine a form like 'to vent oneself') and, as will be discussed below, this different grammar is partly responsible for some differences in meaning from *sfogare*.

7.3.1 A dictionary definition and some examples

To provide a preliminary idea of the meaning of *sfogarsi*, let us begin by taking a look at a dictionary definition. It has to be said, however, that the dictionaries consulted for this study were not entirely successful in encapsulating the meaning of *sfogarsi*. Part of the problem lies with the complex defining vocabulary used, which results in vague yet complicated definitions. Confusion about the extent of the polysemy of *sfogarsi*, which will be discussed in some detail below, also means that lexicographers have trouble creating generalizations to describe the entire range of use of the word. The "pitfalls of defining" (Goddard 1998:26) have been discussed by a number of scholars specializing in NSM (cf. in particular Goddard 1998; Wierzbicka 1996:258–286), and indeed, the dictionaries consulted for this chapter exhibit many of the flaws that those studies have highlighted, including obscurity, disjunction and a failure to capture the semantic invariant. The situation is further complicated by the fact that *sfogarsi* is polysemous, and not all dictionaries explicitly recognize this.

One recurrent problem is the use of complex metaphorical expressions in explaining *sfogarsi* (which – let us not forget – is itself a metaphorical extension of 'to let escape / to vent / to let out'). For example, part 1 of the Zingarelli (1970) definition reads

Alleggerirsi delle proprie pene, preoccupazioni, ansie e sim[ile] spec[ialmente] confidandole a qc. [qualcuno]

‘To lighten oneself of one’s pain, worries, anxieties and similar, esp. confiding them to someone.’

To attempt to explain a metaphor (that of “venting”) with another metaphor (that of “lightening”) goes against the fundamental rule of lexicography and semantics that complex things should be explained in terms of simpler things (cf. e.g. Goddard 1998). The definition above also fails to capture the semantic core of *sfogarsi*, that is, the invariant part of the meaning. It lists a number of feelings that can be involved in *sfogarsi*, but the use of *e sim.* ‘and sim[ilar]’, just like its cousin in English lexicography, *etc.*, fails to place any limits on what other feelings might be included. It is left to the dictionary user to guess what other “similar” emotions might be. Presumably one would only need to “lighten oneself” of “heavy” emotions, but which ones are they exactly? Can *rabbia* ‘anger, rage’ be included or not? What about *umiliazione* ‘humiliation’, *passione* ‘passion’, *tristezza* ‘sadness’, *paura* ‘fear’? These are important questions, as a definition needs to be predictive, to make it clear to readers exactly how the word can be used. This one does not even make clear whether *sfogarsi* is restricted to negative emotions.

The final phrase of the definition quoted above is also problematic. It seems almost an afterthought: ‘esp. confiding them to someone’. If this phrase does not describe a constant and essential part of the meaning of *sfogarsi* it should not be there, since, as mentioned earlier, the purpose of a dictionary definition (or indeed any semantic paraphrase) should be to capture only the invariant meaning of a word or expression and exclude any other clutter from the definition, otherwise the definition will not be predictive. In this case, the dictionary user needs to know whether one can *sfogarsi* without confiding one’s problems to someone else. For example, if you “lighten” yourself of your worries etc. by putting them in the back of your mind, does this qualify as *sfogarsi*, or would it have to be described using some other word or expression? If confiding (or more simply ‘talking about’) things is necessary for something to be called *sfogarsi*, then the *spec.* ‘esp.’ should be removed. If confiding is not necessary, then the whole last phrase can be removed, under the principle of Ockham’s Razor. Zingarelli (1970) also includes definitions for the other two senses of the word *sfogarsi*, which will be further discussed below.

Numerous other dictionaries consulted struggle with similar problems of obscurity, but as it is not the purpose of this paper to undertake a critique of lexicography, the example above will suffice for now. The search for the full meaning of *sfogarsi* will continue with an examination of some examples of use found in internet searches carried out between April and June 2004. It is interesting to note that the internet, particularly the recent phenomenon of the “weblog” or “blogging”, seems to be providing a useful outlet for many people to *sfogarsi*. The following oc-

currence comes from *Aiuto Parkinson*, a website for sufferers of Parkinson's disease and their families:

- (6) Il mio consiglio è uscire dal silenzio e sfogarsi, sfogarsi e sfogarsi ancora per poter uscire dalla solitudine del Parkinson.

(<http://www.geocities.com/MadisonAvenue/8042/intro.htm>)

'My advice is to escape the silence and *sfogarsi*, *sfogarsi* and *sfogarsi* still more to be able to escape the loneliness of Parkinson's.'

A comment posted in 2003 to a website for sufferers of scleroderma reads as follows:

- (7) Penso che sia un sentimento comune la necessità di parlare e confrontarsi. anche perché questa patologia porta con sé la sensazione di non essere capiti. è poco nota e poche riescono a capire i nostri problemi. per questo ho pensato di inserire tra i topics questa sezione "voglia di sfogersi [sic]". per dare uno spazio a tutti quelli che hanno voglia di sfogarsi e confrontarsi, per ricevere e dare parole di conforto, per sentirsi un po' meno soli...

(<http://www.sclerodermia.net>)

'I think it's common to feel the need to talk and debate things, because this disease brings with it the feeling of not being understood. It's little known and few are able to understand our problems. For this reason I thought of including among the topics in this section "wanting to *sfogarsi*". To give space to all those who want to *sfogarsi* and talk about things, to receive and give words of comfort, to feel a bit less lonely.'

A young woman's account of the difficulties she had to face early on in her practical training as a social worker includes this sentence, written in 2001:

- (8) Le ho raccontato anche di voi, di come mi sono sfogata "in lista" all'inizio alla ricerca di orientamento e di quanto sia stato utile per me il vostro aiuto.

(http://www.serviziosociale.com/studenti/tiroc_arcobaleno.htm)

'I also told her about you [pl.], about how I got everything off my chest (*mi sono sfogata*) "online" at the beginning, looking for a sense of orientation, and about how useful your help was to me.'

A gay man's testimony about coming out to his mother (quoting an article from the newspaper *La Repubblica*) goes like this:

- (9) In realtà è stata mia madre ad anticiparmi, un mese fa, ormai aveva capito tutto: dimmi la verità, sei omosessuale?, mi ha chiesto. A quel punto le ho detto tutto, mi sono sfogato, le ho raccontato di Internet, dell'incontro sulla chat, e tutto il resto. Alla fine ci siamo abbracciati, baciati, io felice, lei che

mi diceva di stare tranquillo, va tutto bene, non ci sono problemi, al babbo glielo dico io.

(<http://www.gayroma.it/cronache/attualita/at-8agosto2001.htm>)

‘Actually, my mother brought it up before I did, a month ago, by then she’d worked it all out: tell me the truth, are you homosexual?, she asked me. Then I told her everything, I got it all off my chest (*mi sono sfogato*), I told her all about the Internet, the chat-room meeting, and all the rest. At the end we hugged and kissed each other, me happy, her telling me to relax, everything’s fine, it’s no problem, I’ll tell your dad about it.’

The glosses provided for *sfogarsi* in the above examples do not come close to fully capturing the word’s meaning. Partial equivalents include ‘expressing one’s feelings,’ ‘getting things off one’s chest’ and ‘getting it all out (i.e. all the emotions)’.

7.3.2 Explicating *sfogarsi*

7.3.2.1 What? The kinds of emotions involved

From the examples above, it is clear that to come up with a complete explication of the meaning of *sfogarsi* as a speech routine (*sfogarsi₁*), we need to say something about the nature of the emotions involved. Being a reflexive verb, *sfogarsi* has no object position (other than the one occupied by the reflexive pronoun), so unlike the transitive *sfogare*, where the emotion involved appears as the verb’s object, speakers generally do not explicitly mention the emotions that are being experienced by a person who carries out this speech routine. Instead, the focus of a verb like *sfogarsi* is primarily on the person carrying out the speech act and the results for them (since the subject of the verb is also the person affected by the act).² Nevertheless, the kinds of emotions that make a person want to *sfogarsi₁* can be ascertained from semantic analysis of examples of the word’s use in full context, as well as consultations with native speakers, and the results of this research indicate that *sfogarsi₁* is a way of dealing with negative emotions (feeling something bad). Examining in more detail the uses of *sfogarsi₁* cited above, it is clear that the Parkinson’s and Scleroderma websites aim to give people an opportunity to talk about the bad feelings brought on by the suffering those diseases bring (one would imagine these feelings could include pain, fear, frustration and loneliness). In the other examples, the apprentice social worker and the homosexual man respectively are clearly referring to the expression of negative emotions – she was facing difficulties during her internship, he was anxious about how his parents would react to his sexuality. Out of context, whenever any mention is made of the speech routine *sfogarsi*, one always knows the speaker is referring to the expression of bad feelings. The fact that the emotions linked to *sfogarsi₁* are necessarily negative is one feature

that sets the word apart from the transitive *sfogare* which does occasionally occur in collocations with positive emotions (as discussed in Section 7.2).

7.3.2.2 *How? The role of SAY*

The next question to consider is *how* a person “gets out” these negative emotions. As noted above, the Zingarelli (1970) definition of *sfogarsi* fails to specify whether or not “confiding” (or, more simply, SAYING something) is an *essential* part of the meaning of *sfogarsi*. Some of the other dictionaries consulted appear to think that it is, for example:

- (10) Cercare sollievo al proprio affanno, facendone parte ad altri (Melzi 1981)
‘Seeking relief from one’s worries by sharing them with others’
- (11) To confide (...), to unburden [oneself], to open one’s heart (Sansoni 1989)

In contrast, DIB (1996) makes no mention at all of how *sfogarsi* is achieved, while the definitions provided by IPT (1986), DISC (1997) and Devoto-Oli (2001) rely on vague words like *esprimere* ‘express’, *manifestare* ‘show’ and *esternare* ‘externalize’, which leave the dictionary user to guess the details of what might constitute *sfogarsi*:

- (12) Liberarsi da un sentimento represso (DIB 1996)
‘To free oneself of a repressed feeling’
- (13) Esprimere, manifestare il proprio stato d’animo senza ritegno, abbandonando ogni prudenza o altro riguardo (IPT 1986)
‘To express, reveal, one’s feelings without restraint, abandoning all caution and any other considerations’
- (14) Manifestare fino in fondo uno stato d’animo o un impulso, attenuando la tensione che provocava (DISC 1997)
‘To show in full one’s feelings or an impulse, lessening the tension it was causing’
- (15) Esternare quanto ci rode o deprime internamente, alla ricerca di un conforto o di un sollievo (Devoto-Oli 2001)
‘To externalize what “gnaws at” or depresses one internally, in search of comfort or relief’

It is at this point that another sense of this polysemous word needs to be looked at more closely. It needs to be defined separately in order to avoid the kind of incomplete, vague, or even misleading definitions seen above. As mentioned earlier, *sfogarsi*₁ describes a speech routine, so as such it does include SAY as part of its meaning (so does *sfogarsi*₂, but we will look at that later, in the next section). It passes Goddard’s (1998: 137) test for identifying speech act verbs in that it is perfectly correct to say *dicendo così, mi sfogavo* ‘in saying that I was X-ing’ (where X is

the suspected speech act verb) and *dicendo così cercavo di sfogarmi* ‘by saying that I was trying to X’. It should be remembered that the universal SAY of NSM is fairly broad in meaning and refers not only to speech, but to saying things more generally, and it is therefore entirely acceptable to speak of ‘saying’ things with gestures or in writing, for example, over the internet. All the examples of use given above were of this sense of *sfogarsi*, and indeed, it is the main focus of this chapter.

In the non-speech-routine sense of *sfogarsi*, which I will call *sfogarsi*₃, one can *sfogarsi* by *doing* something (other than talking). It often appears in the form *sfogarsi a* + INF(INITIVE). The Sansoni bilingual dictionary (1989), includes the example sentences ‘*sfogarsi a correre* to run wild; [...] *sfogarsi in lacrime* to have a good cry; *sfogarsi mangiando* (o *a mangiare*) to eat one’s fill’. A poem titled *Sfogarsi*, posted on the internet by Loretta Angiolini (<http://www.egm.it/poesie/sfogarsi.html>) lists many other possibilities, including *sfogarsi a scarabocchiare* (‘scribbling’), *a scrivere* (‘writing’), *a leggere* (‘reading’), *a saltare* (‘jumping’). From these expressions, both the more common ones appearing in dictionaries and the ones from the poem, we can clearly see that we are dealing with a separate sense of *sfogarsi* from the speech routine which is the main focus of this paper. The meaning of *sfogarsi*₃ can be loosely paraphrased as ‘to do something one wants very much to do for as long as one wants until one no longer wants to do it’ (a little like the English expression ‘to get something out of one’s system’). By contrast, when the word *sfogarsi* is used without these extra specifications, it is understood that ‘saying something’ is involved.

De Mauro (2000) is one dictionary which does clearly distinguish these senses of *sfogarsi*, defining what I have labeled as *sfogarsi*₃ as *soddisfare un istinto, un impulso* ‘to satisfy an instinct, an impulse’. The DLCIC (1985) dictionary does not posit polysemy of the sort I have outlined, but nor does it succeed in its attempt at a unitary definition to cover its own range of examples, which includes *sfogarsi*₁, which can be assumed to involve ‘saying something’, and *sfogarsi*₃ used in expressions like *sfogarsi a correre* ‘*sfogarsi* running’. Instead, DLCIC presents the reader with a definition that includes no less than five instances of disjunction (that is, use of the word *o* ‘or’), thus failing to capture any invariant meaning for *sfogarsi*:

- (16) Liberarsi da un senso di repressione, o anche soddisfare in tutto o in parte, manifestandolo o attenuandolo, un sentimento o uno stato d’animo, un impulso o un desiderio (DLCIC 1985)
 ‘To free oneself from a feeling of repression, or also to satisfy, wholly or in part, by showing it or by attenuating it, a feeling or a mood, an impulse or a desire’

I would suggest that the *o anche* ‘or also’ here actually separates the two distinct senses of the word *sfogarsi*, which warrant two separate explications as they cannot be combined into one meaning without disjunction or inaccuracy. An explication

of *sfogarsi*₃ will be provided in Section 7.3.2.5; in what follows, the analysis of *sfogarsi* as a speech routine (senses 1 and 2), will continue.

7.3.2.3 To whom? The interlocutor in the *sfogarsi* speech routine

Having established that the speech routine *sfogarsi* involves saying something about one's bad feelings, our next step is to consider *to whom* one says these things. One does not have to explicitly mention the addressee in a sentence using *sfogarsi*, but when one does wish to, there are two ways of doing it: *sfogarsi con qualcuno* 'sfogarsi with someone' and *sfogarsi su qualcuno* 'sfogarsi on someone'. The different prepositions used in these two syntactic frames are a key to the different meanings of these two expressions (see Wierzbicka 1987: 24–26 on the importance of syntactic properties to the semantic structures of speech act verbs). As the reader might be able to guess, *sfogarsi* 'with' someone, rather like talking *with* someone, involves an exchange between two conversation partners and, as will be discussed below, is seen as a positive kind of talk. It could be loosely translated as 'to pour one's heart out to someone'. All the examples of *sfogarsi* presented so far were instances of this kind of interaction, even though they did not explicitly mention the person with whom the act was carried out. *Sfogarsi* 'on' someone is quite a different thing, in some ways similar, though not equivalent, to the English expression 'to take it out on someone' (where 'it' can be understood to stand for some negative emotions, for example, one's anger, frustration or anxiety). The illocutionary purpose of *sfogarsi* 'on' someone is not the same as doing it 'with' someone. In *sfogarsi* 'on', the person at the receiving end of the speech act is more of a 'victim' than a confidant. It occurs in a situation where the "build-up" of bad feelings is of such intensity that the "sufferer" can no longer suppress them, and when they "come out", they do so in a negative way. This means the person says or does many bad things to the "victim", things that may well be undeserved, as is sometimes the case with the English *taking it out on someone* – e.g. '...the referee just lost control. He seemed to take it out personally on our players', 'when my work isn't going too well I take it out on him, which isn't fair at all' (*Cobuild*).³ *Sfogarsi su* 'on' a person is not viewed in a positive light nor seen as in any way constructive, unlike the *con* 'with' syntactic frame. When dictionaries include this *sfogarsi su* in their definitions, words like *ingiustamente* 'unjustly' are often used to describe the speaker's behavior towards the "victim" (cf. e.g. De Mauro 2000; Zingarelli 1970). The expression *sfogarsi su* is quite different from the *sfogarsi* that occurs in the examples of use in Section 7.3.1, and in fact it constitutes a separate sense of the word, which I will call *sfogarsi*₂. This sense of the word will be explicated separately from *sfogarsi*₁ (*con*) in Section 7.3.2.5.

First, however, we need to tease out some final aspects of the meaning of the only kind of *sfogarsi* that remains – *sfogarsi*₁, where the interlocutor is either not mentioned or appears as the object of the preposition *con* 'with'. This is the sense

appearing in the examples quoted in Section 7.3.1. This form of expression is viewed more positively. It involves an interaction in which one person (the “sufferer”) talks for some time about their bad feelings, feelings they probably have not been able to talk about much or at all previously (hence the need for “release”) to another person, who they hope will listen sympathetically. The listener will almost certainly respond in some way, probably with words of comfort, advice or understanding. We see this from the example of the young gay man telling his mother about his sexuality – he is able to talk to her about his worries and fears because she seems understanding and encourages him to speak. Afterwards they hug and kiss and she speaks some more comforting words (‘relax, everything’s fine, it’s no problem’). The trainee social worker quoted above mentions the help she received from the people to whom she confided online, and the Parkinson’s Disease website is intended to provide people with support and help them escape loneliness, so this too implies some kind of response to those who choose to *sfogarsi*₁. The person who writes to the scleroderma website makes quite explicit links between *sfogarsi*₁ and the need to be understood and comforted. Nevertheless, one could imagine a scenario in which someone confided their troubles in the manner of *sfogarsi*₁ but then found the person they were talking to was not sympathetic or understanding, or simply changed the subject without making any comments about their problems. Since the main purpose of *sfogarsi*₁ is to let out pent-up feelings, the speech routine can be carried out even if the listener turns out not to be sympathetic or helpful. Although of course from the speaker’s point of view this would be far from an ideal instance of *sfogarsi*₁, it still constitutes the speech routine. What this means is that in the interests of faithfully capturing the semantic invariant of this sense of *sfogarsi*₁, no typical listener response can be included in the explication, as all manner of different responses (not always sympathetic, comforting and understanding) are possible. The *desired* response can be included in the explication, however, since it seems we can say something about the kind of person and reaction the speaker wants when they choose to *sfogarsi*₁ with someone.

One’s addressee would in many cases be a person one knew well, but this is not a necessary component of the meaning of *sfogarsi*₁, as attested by the following comment on a website for young people:

- (17) A volte penso che sfogarsi sia una cosa positiva. Però, dipende con quali persone ti sfoghi. Ci sono alcune persone che quando ti sfoghi si sentono in colpa per te, mentre altre no. Allora mi è venuta in mente una cosa: per sfogarsi e stare meglio tutti non è bene sfogarsi con un completo sconosciuto? ovviamente disposto ad ascoltare. Magari lui non si sentirebbe in colpa o dispiaciuto per te e se ne dimenticherebbe nel giro di poco...

(<http://www.smokeandcoffee.it/Rory%20page.htm>)

‘Sometimes I think *sfogarsi* is a positive thing. But it depends on who you do it

with. There are some people who feel bad for you when you “talk about your bad feelings” (*ti sfoghi*), while others don’t. Well something occurred to me: to *sfogarsi* and for everyone to feel better isn’t it good to *sfogarsi* with a complete stranger? obviously [someone] willing to listen. Maybe he won’t feel guilty or sorry for you and he’ll forget about it in a short time...’

The writer of this comment clearly considers it important to choose one’s interlocutor well when one wishes to *sfogarsi*₁ with someone. Ideally, the person would be willing to listen and would not react in a way the “sufferer” does not want. The need for this element of trust makes it likely that one would choose to *sfogarsi*₁ with someone one knew well, but as the above example shows, this is not an invariant part of the word’s meaning. Furthermore, in an extreme situation, one might even *sfogarsi*₁ with someone one already expected would be unsympathetic, simply due to the lack of any better alternative. After all, at least one would have succeeded in “releasing the pressure” caused by the pent-up emotions, even if one didn’t receive much sympathy or understanding. This range of variation in the possible interlocutor for the speech routine *sfogarsi con qualcuno* means that its explication will have to be quite vague about the listener, in order to be able to predict how the expression *sfogarsi con qualcuno* can be used. If our explication includes too much information about, for example, the listener, or the situation in which the two people find themselves and the kind of relationship they have, or other contextual details regarding the kinds of people who tend to engage in this speech routine, the explication will be too narrow, and will not cover all possible uses of the word.

7.3.2.4 Why? What one can get out of *sfogarsi*

This leads us to ask about the reasons one would wish to *sfogarsi*₁ with someone. It is clear from the way people speak about this act in the examples in Section 7.3.1 (and in many more that were collected in research but could not be included here for reasons of space), that *sfogarsi*₁ with someone is seen as a good thing to do. The belief is that talking with a trusted person about one’s troubles or fears can result in solace, comfort, and even improved health. At the very least, it will make one feel a little better than before. Attitudes to *sfogarsi*₁ are accompanied by a folk philosophy of “better out than in”, expressing the idea that repressed negative emotions are bad for a person, as they create a build-up of pressure inside them. It is primarily for this reason that *sfogarsi*₁ is considered a positive process that can leave one feeling better afterwards. This is attested not only by explicit discussions about the benefits of *sfogarsi*₁, but also by the kinds of comments people often make after having completed this speech act. Some that occur frequently on the web and in spoken Italian include:

- (18) Basta, mi sono sfogato.
 ‘Enough, I’ve got it off my chest.’

- (19) Ecco, mi sono sfogato.
'There, I've got it off my chest.'
- (20) OK, ora mi sono sfogato.
'OK, now I've got it off my chest.'
- (21) Vabbe', un po' mi sono sfogata.
'Well then, I've got a bit of stuff off my chest.' (lit. *mi sono sfogata* a little)
- (22) Mamma mia, ora mi sono sfogata abbastanza!
'Goodness me, now I've got a fair bit off my chest!' (lit. *mi sono sfogata* enough)

Such comments indicate a feeling of conclusion and satisfaction, and reflect the kind of "release" one would feel after letting a lot of emotional "pressure" escape from inside one's body.

Imagine for a moment a man who got away with some terrible crime in his past, say, a murder, and has lived with this dreadful secret for 40 years. In his old age, perhaps on his death bed, he might want finally to have some release from this burden of guilt, and might choose to tell his story to someone. This does not seem an implausible reaction for our hypothetical murderer. He has bad feelings inside him, primarily feelings of guilt, that he has not been able to talk about and has therefore had to repress for a long time. He now talks to someone about it all, and in so doing releases these bad feelings, and afterwards he feels better. He is unlikely to feel all his guilt dissipate, and he may suffer punishment, blame, and ostracism from those he speaks to, but he will have gained a degree of emotional relief. The expression *sfogarsi con qualcuno* would be the perfect description for the man's behavior.

7.3.2.5 Explications

On the basis of the preceding semantic analysis of *sfogarsi* in its various incarnations, I propose three different explications, one for each of the different senses of the word. The explications are formulated in the simple universal concepts of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage. First up, *sfogarsi*₁ (i.e. *sfogarsi con qualcuno*):

La persona X si è sfogata₁ con la persona Y ('Person X "vented him/herself" with person Y')

- (a) X felt something very bad
when X thought about this X could think:
I feel something very bad now
this thing is like something inside me
I don't want it to be inside me
- (b) because of this, X wanted to say something about this to someone
X wanted someone to say something like this:

I know that you feel something very bad
this is bad

- (c) because of this, for some time, X said many things about this to Y
when X said these things, it was as if X was saying at the same time:

I feel something very bad

I want you to know this

- (d) after this, because of this, X thought something like this:

I don't feel something very bad like I did before

this something is not inside me any more

An explication of *sfogarsi*₁ has to begin with the emotions of the person involved, before it can move on to the speech act these emotions lead to. This is the intention of part (a) of the explication, which outlines X's bad feelings. The component 'this something is like something inside me' seeks to explain the metaphor of the "build-up" of emotion inside a person which has to take place in order for the person to "vent". The emotion is described only in very general terms, and this is intentional, since *sfogarsi*₁ can combine with negative emotions as diverse as anger, fear, sadness and anxiety. For this reason, there are no components like 'something bad happened', 'someone did something bad to me', or 'maybe something bad will happen', because anything like this would define X's emotions too narrowly.

Part (b) of the explication describes X's desire to talk about this with someone and to receive a certain kind of response. The desired response is also phrased in broad terms to allow for variation in what might be going through the head of the "sufferer" in the *sfogarsi* speech act. As mentioned earlier, Y, the listener, may end up responding in a totally different way; part (b), therefore, only outlines the kind of response X *would like*. While it can be argued that, in a desperate situation, one might even be prepared to *sfogarsi* with someone who one *knows* will not be interested or respond in a sympathetic fashion, this does not mean that one wouldn't still *want* them to respond in the way outlined in part (b) ('X wanted someone to say something like this: I know that you feel something very bad, this is bad').

With part (c) we reach the point where the bad feelings are actually expressed, as X says 'many things about this to Y'. The explication does not include any specifications about Y because, as discussed in Section 7.3.2.3, we cannot say that X knows Y well, and it is probably also an exaggeration to say that X necessarily feels good things towards Y. The prime FOR SOME TIME is required to describe X's speech act because *sfogarsi* has to have a certain duration – a single short utterance about some worries or sadness would not constitute *sfogarsi*.

Y's reaction to X's emotional "outpouring" would in context be part of the speech routine, but it does not need to be included as part of the meaning of *sfogarsi*. Many reactions are possible, from the hoped-for comfort and understanding, to indifference, blame or the proffering of (possibly unwelcome) advice. More

importantly, *sfogarsi* takes place regardless of the reaction of Y, since the main purpose of the speech routine is to get all the emotions out. It is due to this release of emotions that X feels better afterwards, even if Y's reaction was not ideal. In NSM this "feeling better" is expressed as 'I don't feel something very bad like I did before'. It should be noted that this does not mean the same as simply 'I don't feel something bad', because X may well still have many troubles (*sfogarsi* would rarely solve everything), and thus is likely still to 'feel something bad'. The explication should not imply that X is now walking on sunshine without a care in the world, but the bad feeling of repressed emotion, as described in part (a) of the explication, will be gone after *sfogarsi* has taken place, so the speaker will not 'feel something very bad like I did before'.

To demonstrate the translatability of this explication, versions in two Romance languages, Italian and Spanish, appear below.

La persona X si è sfogata₁ con la persona Y (Italian version)

- (a) X sentiva qualcosa di molto male
quando pensava a questo, poteva pensare:
 sento qualcosa di molto male adesso
 questa cosa è come qualcosa dentro di me
 non voglio che sia dentro di me
- (b) a causa di questo, X voleva dire qualcosa su questo a qualcuno
voleva che qualcuno dicesse qualcosa così:
 so che senti qualcosa di molto male
 questo è male
- (c) a causa di questo, per un po' di tempo, X ha detto molte cose su questo a Y
quando diceva queste cose, era come se dicesse allo stesso tempo:
 sento qualcosa di molto male
 voglio che tu sappia questo
- (d) dopo di questo, a causa di questo, X ha pensato qualcosa così:
 non sento qualcosa di molto male come prima
 questa cosa non è più dentro di me

La persona X si è sfogata₁ con la persona Y (Spanish version)

- (a) X sentía algo muy malo
cuando pensaba en eso, podía pensar:
 siento algo muy malo ahora
 esta cosa es como algo dentro de mí
 no quiero que esté dentro de mí
- (b) a causa de eso, X quería decir algo sobre eso a alguien
quería que alguien dijera algo así:
 sé que sientes algo muy malo
 eso es malo

- (c) a causa de eso, por un tiempo, X dijo muchas cosas sobre eso a Y
cuando dijo estas cosas, era como si dijera al mismo tiempo:
siento algo muy malo
quiero que tú sepas eso
- (d) después de eso, a causa de eso, X pensó algo así:
no siento algo muy malo come antes
esta cosa no está más dentro de mí

A different explication is required for *sfogarsi*₂ (i.e. *sfogarsi su qualcuno*), a speech routine in which the listener is a kind of “victim” who has to bear the brunt of the speaker’s outpouring of negative emotions:

*La persona X si è sfogata*₂ *sulla persona Y* (‘person X “vented him/herself” on person Y’)

- (a) X felt something very bad when X thought about Y
when X thought about this, X could think:
I feel something very bad now
this something is like something inside me
I don’t want it to be inside me
- (b) because of this, X said many things about this to Y
when X said these things, it was as if X was saying at the same time:
I feel something very bad because of you
I feel something very bad when I think about you
- (c) after this, because of this, X thought something like this:
I don’t feel something very bad like I did before
this something is not inside me any more
- (d) people think it is bad if someone does something like this

This explication does not specify whether or not Y previously did anything bad to X. X’s resentment or other bad feelings may or may not be justified, but either way, *sfogarsi su qualcuno* is seen as a bad thing to do, so this judgment needs to be included as part of its meaning – see part (d). As with *sfogarsi*₁ we see in this explication the “build-up” of negative emotions, and the feeling of release after they are expressed. Translations of this explication into the Italian and Spanish versions of NSM appear below.

*La persona X si è sfogata*₂ *sulla persona Y* (Italian version)

- (a) X sentiva qualcosa di molto male quando pensava a Y
quando pensava a questo, poteva pensare:
sento qualcosa di molto male adesso
questa cosa è come qualcosa dentro di me
non voglio che sia dentro di me

- (b) a causa di questo, X ha detto molte cose su questo a Y
quando ha detto queste cose, era come se dicesse allo stesso tempo:
sento qualcosa di molto male a causa di te
sento qualcosa di molto male quando penso a te
- (c) dopo di questo, a causa di questo, X ha pensato così:
non sento qualcosa di molto male come prima
questa cosa non è più dentro di me
- (d) la gente pensa che sia male se qualcuno fa così

La persona X si è sfogata₂ sulla persona Y (Spanish version)

- (a) X sentía algo muy malo cuando pensaba en Y
cuando pensaba en eso, podía pensar:
siento algo muy malo ahora
esta cosa es como algo dentro de mí
no quiero que esté dentro de mí
- (b) a causa de eso, X dijo muchas cosas sobre eso a Y
cuando dijo estas cosas, era como si dijera al mismo tiempo:
siento algo muy malo a causa de tí
siento algo muy malo cuando pienso en tí
- (c) después de eso, a causa de eso, X pensó así:
no siento algo muy malo como antes
esta cosa no está más dentro de mí
- (d) la gente piensa que es malo si alguien hace así

Finally, *sfogarsi₃* requires yet another explication. Translations into the Italian and Spanish NSMs follow the English version.

X si è sfogato₃ a W (VERBO) ('X "got it out of their system" W-ing')

- (a) X wanted to do something (W) very much
for some time, X couldn't do W
X thought something like this:
I want this very much
this is like something inside me
I don't want it to be inside me
X felt something bad because of this
- (b) X did W for some time
after this, because of this, X didn't think any more:
I want very much to do W
X thought something like this:
I don't feel something bad like I did before
this something is not inside me any more

X si è sfogato₃ a W (VERBO) (Italian version)

- (a) X voleva fare qualcosa (W) molto
per un po' di tempo, non poteva fare W
ha pensato così:
voglio questo molto
questo è come qualcosa dentro di me
non voglio che sia dentro di me
ha sentito qualcosa di male a causa di questo
- (b) X ha fatto W per un po' di tempo
dopo questo, a causa di questo, non ha più pensato:
voglio fare W molto
ha pensato così:
non sento qualcosa di male come prima
questa cosa non è più dentro di me

X si è sfogato₃ a W (VERBO) (Spanish version)

- (a) X quería hacer algo (W) mucho
por un tiempo, no podía hacer W
pensó así:
quiero eso mucho
eso es como algo dentro de mí
no quiero que esté dentro de mí
sintió algo malo a causa de eso
- (b) X hizo W por un tiempo
después de eso, a causa de eso, X no pensó más:
quiero mucho hacer W
pensó así:
no siento algo malo como antes
esta cosa no está más dentro de mí

By comparing explications for the different senses of *sfogarsi*, we can see not only what distinguishes them, we can also pick out easily the components of meaning they share because, as is to be expected with a case of polysemy, the three different senses of *sfogarsi* have a number of aspects of meaning in common. What exactly these shared aspects of meaning are only really becomes clear after looking at explications like those above, which allow us to compare meanings component by component. The main similarity is the idea that someone can have an emotion or desire that feels like it is inside them, causing them to feel something bad, and that by doing or saying something, this bad feeling can be reduced, because the thing is no longer inside them. However, the differences among the three explications are also important. It is quite clear that no single explication could cover all the

different examples of use across these three different categories, so there can be no doubt as to *sfogarsi*'s polysemy.

7.4 Some cultural values reflected in Italian communication

As mentioned in Section 7.1, the way people talk about emotion, and talk about talking about emotion, can be very culturally revealing. *Sfogarsi*₁, in particular, captures something about Italian cultural attitudes to the expression and discussion of emotions, more specifically, negative emotions. It would be interesting to see whether other aspects of Italian culture and communication reflect *sfogarsi*'s folk philosophy of the importance of releasing the repressed emotions building up within a person and causing them harm. In order to make convincing generalizations in this regard, a body of linguistic evidence from the language would need to be collected, and this is beyond the scope of this paper. However, some preliminary hypotheses could be made. There are of course widespread stereotypes of Italians as very expressive of their emotions, but alone these are not of much use if they cannot be shown to have a basis in fact, in the way speakers of Italian actually communicate. Attempts to characterize "Italian culture" are complicated, but of course this is true of any culture. Cultures are constructs, and talking about them can alienate people who fear that generalizations fail to take individual difference into sufficient consideration. Furthermore, cultures are made up of many subcultures. For example, in Italy, there are considerable cultural differences between the north and the south, and even on a more local level, between the regions, including of course the two island regions, Sicily and Sardinia. The same is true of the English language, which has many different varieties, including African American, Aboriginal Australian, Scottish, New York Jewish, Singapore, and so on. In addition, in Italy, as in English-speaking countries, communication style varies greatly according to gender, and this is particularly pertinent when considering norms regarding the expression of emotion. A number of informants have mentioned differences along these lines in attitudes relating to '*sfogarsi*₁ with someone', which appears to be considerably more common among women than men in Italy.

It is because culture can be so difficult to pin down, understand, and describe that, when proposing cultural scripts, linguistic evidence is relied upon first and foremost. A language's concepts and systems are recognized by its speakers, even if they personally do not subscribe to them. Linguistic evidence can help us to get an idea of what matters most in a given culture, but then these cultural values have to be described, and this must also be done through language. But with language influenced and shaped to such a great extent by culture, it is very hard to talk about another culture in one's own language without letting one's own cultural values creep into the description. For example, the meanings of complex English

words like *dependence* and *interdependence*, *directness*, *high/low context*, *authoritarianism*, *emotionality* and *hierarchy* are shaped by the values of Anglo culture, and applying such labels to other cultures, with different values and priorities, is ethnocentric. It is for this reason that the Natural Semantic Metalanguage has been so useful in describing cultures. Because its lexicon consists exclusively of simple concepts which appear to occur in all the languages of the world, cultures can be described clearly and accurately in straightforward “cultural scripts” which can be easily understood by non-experts. These cultural scripts can be translated into any language and, most importantly, tested in consultation with members of the cultures they describe.

Research from an NSM perspective into the cultural values reflected in the Italian language is still in its early stages, so for the present I will limit myself to proposing just two tentative scripts based on the folk philosophy embodied in the word *sfogarsi* (particularly in senses 1 and 3). The next step, something for future research, will be to explore these cultural scripts in more depth, and to look for other ways in which their importance may be reflected in the way Italian is used, as well as to seek other cultural scripts of Italian reflected in other aspects of Italian language and communicative style. Naturally, all manner of regional cultural scripts could also be researched, using linguistic evidence from dialects or regional varieties of Italian, just as for English, Anglo-Australian, African American or Singapore English cultural scripts can be proposed on the basis of linguistic evidence from those varieties of English (cf. e.g. Wierzbicka 2002 and 2003: 183–185; Wong 2004).

The first cultural script I would like to propose expresses Italian attitudes to the expression of emotions. It seems fair to say at the very least that in Italian culture, talking about one’s emotions, be they negative or positive, is generally considered acceptable – there is no cultural norm that says it is bad to say what you think and feel. This is expressed in the cultural script below:

Acceptability of expression of emotions

if I feel something

I can say things about this to other people if I want to

I don’t have to think:⁴

I can’t say anything about this

it is bad if people know I feel like this

This is a simple cultural script, and it no doubt actually operates in conjunction with any number of other scripts of Italian, scripts which will need to be researched further. To an Italian, a script of this kind is likely to appear to be stating the obvious. It is one of the features of cultural scripts that they often appear to the cultural insider to express something so obvious and so basic to everyday life and communication that it is hardly worth writing down, but in most cases this is simply an

indication of how much one takes for granted one's own cultural norms. Cross-cultural research shows us that this script does not by any means express a cultural universal. In Malay culture, speaking about one's emotions, be they positive or negative, is frowned upon, and "the ideal demeanour [is] one of good-natured calm" (Goddard 1997:192). Some Anglo English-speaking cultures also tend to be much more circumspect about the expression of emotions, especially negative emotions, than is Italian culture. In these Anglo cultures it is generally seen as "good and 'normal' to control one's emotions" and "bad and 'abnormal' to be out of control" (Wierzbicka 1995:33; cf. also Wierzbicka 2003:53–54). Emotions tend to be played down and "kept to oneself", and great importance is placed on "being reasonable" (Wierzbicka 2006:Chapter 4). If one talked for some time to someone about how one 'feels many bad things' (in the manner of *sfogarsi*), one might risk coming across as melodramatic or emotional. In Anglo-Australian culture, this kind of behavior could even be construed as *whingeing*, and "nobody likes a whinger". (For a discussion of whingeing and the Australian cultural values it reflects, see Wierzbicka 2003:180–183.)⁵

Because the descriptive tools used in cultural scripts are not complex English-specific words but rather the simple and universal concepts of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage, the script above can easily be translated into Italian (or indeed any other language), thus minimizing the risk of ethnocentrism, and enabling it to be tested against the intuitions of native speakers (see the end of this section for two translations of this script).

It can already be seen from the examination just of the concept *sfogarsi* that the theme of the script above – roughly speaking, talking about emotions – can be expanded upon. I would like to propose another cultural script for Italian which expresses the folk theory so tied up with the notion of *sfogarsi*, viz. that certain emotions can "build up" inside a person and that at some point, if one is to lead a healthy emotional life, they need to be expressed, that is talked about.

The importance of expressing negative emotions

sometimes, if a person feels something very bad

 this something can be like something inside this person

it is bad when this happens

something bad can happen to this person because of this

if this person says many things about this to someone

 after this, because of this, this something can be not inside this person
 any more

this is good

because of this, when someone feels something very bad,

 it can be good if this person can say many things about this to someone
 else

This script expresses the very simple folk philosophy of Italian culture that it can be bad to keep one's negative emotions entirely to oneself, and that one should try to talk about them with another person.

I include below translations into two Romance languages, Italian and Spanish, of the two cultural scripts which have been proposed in this section.

Acceptability of the expression of emotions (Italian version)

se sento qualcosa
posso dire cose su questo a altre persone se voglio
non devo pensare:
non posso dire niente su questo
è male se la gente sappia che mi sento così

The importance of expressing negative emotions (Italian version)

a volte, se una persona sente qualcosa di molto male
questa cosa può essere come qualcosa dentro di questa persona
è male quando succede questo
qualcosa di male può succedere a questa persona a causa di questo
se questa persona dice molte cose su questo a qualcuno
dopo questo, a causa di questo, questa cosa può non essere più dentro
questa persona
questo è bene
a causa di questo, quando qualcuno sente qualcosa di molto male,
può essere bene se questa persona possa dire molte cose su questo a
qualcun altro

Acceptability of the expression of emotions (Spanish version)

si siento algo
puedo decir cosas sobre eso a otras personas si quiero
no tengo que pensar:
no puedo decir nada sobre eso
es malo si la gente sabe que me siento así

The importance of expressing negative emotions (Spanish version)

a veces, si una persona siente algo muy malo
esta cosa puede ser como algo dentro de esta persona
es malo cuando pasa eso
algo malo puede pasar a esta persona a causa de eso
si esta persona dice muchas cosas sobre eso a alguien
después de eso, a causa de eso, esta cosa puede no estar más dentro de esta
persona

eso es bueno
a causa de eso, cuando alguien siente algo muy malo,
puede ser bueno si esta persona puede decir muchas cosas sobre eso a otra
persona

7.5 Concluding remarks

This chapter has sought to explain accurately and in full the meaning, or rather meanings, of an Italian speech routine that is of interest both semantically and culturally. Through semantic analysis and the creation of clear, precise explications couched in NSM, it has been possible to reach a better understanding of and to compare the different senses of the word *sfogarsi*, senses which many dictionaries fail to spell out clearly to their users. *Sfogarsi* is not easily translated into English, but it can be explained using simple universal concepts, in a way that is intelligible to non-experts and to people unfamiliar with the Italian language.

Culturally speaking, it seems that *sfogarsi*₁, in particular, might encapsulate some ideas or values, typical of Italian culture, about what constitutes successful “management” of one’s emotional health. These values, too, can be described in the simple culture-free concepts of NSM, in the form of so-called cultural scripts. Further research into communicative styles in Italian will no doubt highlight ways in which the cultural scripts proposed here can be improved and embellished upon, but they do hopefully provide a useful example of the way in which the semantic analysis of an Italian key word can be used as a starting point for the exploration of some important aspects of Italian culture reflected in the language.

Notes

1. The glosses of emotion words in this paper are only very approximate. In particular, the ‘anger’-related words mentioned – *rabbia*, *collera*, *ira*, *stizza* – do not have exact equivalents in English, and one-word glosses such as ‘anger’ or ‘rage’ can only give a rough idea of the meaning of the Italian; just enough of an idea, it is hoped, for readers to be able to get an insight into the range of use of *sfogare*. For a comparison of *anger* and the Italian *rabbia*, see Wierzbicka (1995); for discussions of anger-related words in some other languages see Durst (2001), Harkins (2001), Kornacki (2001). On linguistic diversity in the area of emotion vocabulary in general, see Wierzbicka (1999).

2. Wierzbicka (1996: 419) defines the prototypical meaning of the reflexive construction as

someone did something
because of this, something happened to the same person at the same time

This helps to explain the semantic emphasis *sfogarsi* places on the person involved.

3. One key difference between the Italian and the English is that one can “take it out on someone” by being grumpy or morose with them, or snapping at them; one does not actually have to talk at any length about the things they have done to upset, frustrate or anger one, as is the case with *sfogarsi su qualcuno*. The full meaning of the Italian expression will become clearer when it is explicated in Section 7.3.2.5.
4. ‘I don’t have to think’ is an idiomatic rendering of I CAN + NOT THINK and is therefore allowable in NSM.
5. It seems likely that the features described here as characteristic of some Anglo cultures are more typical of British and Australian Anglos than those of the United States. On the whole, American cultural discourse advocates rather more the open discussion of one’s problems and emotions, cf. e.g. Carbaugh’s (1988) examination of the speech genres “sharing” and “communicating” in the American talk-show Donahue. This interest in the expression of emotions is also reflected in popular psychology, and is, of course, also beginning to make its mark in some areas of British and Australian society. It is important to note that while there are surface similarities between *sfogarsi*₁ and Carbaugh’s “sharing” and “communicating”, there are also a number of key differences in meaning and in the cultural attitudes attached to these concepts. For example, in the case of “communicating”, the focus is not really on releasing negative emotions, but rather on the fact that people should be able to know what others are feeling, particularly within a close relationship, such as a marriage, but also in the workplace or among friends, and that they can find this out through the act of communicating. Furthermore, for this speech routine to be successful, both (or all) parties involved must contribute more or less equally by speaking up about their feelings, whereas in the case of *sfogarsi*₁, it is generally one person who does most of the talking, while the other’s role is primarily to listen. “Sharing”, as analyzed by Carbaugh, is also different from *sfogarsi*₁. It generally involves disclosing one’s experiences or feelings regarding a particular topic, and often a number of people in a group share, for example, in a self-help group, or on a talk show. By sharing, one gives others a window onto one’s feelings and those listeners provide support in return. It is generally considered that what a “sharer” says is valuable to the listeners, they can learn something from it, and that is one of the main reasons the Donahue audience considers it a valuable way of speaking. While one can feel a “need” to share, and after sharing one might feel better, this is not quite the same as the feeling of pent-up emotions needing release that is the key to *sfogarsi*.

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CHAPTER 8

Portuguese *saudade* and other emotions of absence and longing

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Relying on semantic primes and universal syntax, this study underscores the culture-specificity and explicates the meaning of the Portuguese emotion word *saudade*. It makes comparisons with related concepts in Portuguese and, to some extent, English. Among the kinds of evidence included are claims encountered in previous studies, native-speaker intuitions about the acceptability of constructed expressions employing the word in different ways, actual use in literary works and internet sources, aspects of the word's grammar and its distributional properties, and contrasts with respect to these matters between *saudade* and other emotions. The approach differs from that of earlier work not only in its use of the natural semantic metalanguage but also in its heavy reliance on distributional evidence and colloquial corpora.

8.1 Introduction

Saudade is a quintessential Brazilian and Western Iberian emotion concept. The word does not exist in Spanish, except in some translations of Portuguese works and perhaps in the form *soledad* 'solitude', which apparently could at one time be used in a way similar to *saudade* (Vasconcellos 1914:67–72). *Saudade* does, however, occur in Galician, with a meaning much like that of the Portuguese cognate (Piñeiro 1953; García 1985).¹ Expressing sentiments shared by many who have studied this word, the 19th century Portuguese poet Almeida Garrett declares in a note on his epic poem *Camões* that *saudade* is the sweetest, most delicate, and most expressive word of Portuguese and that, although this emotion is surely felt in other cultures, having a specific word for it “não o é de outra nenhuma linguagem senão da portuguesa” ('is the case for no other language but Portuguese'; Castro 1980:8). *Saudade* constitutes a salient theme in Portuguese poetry, from Luís de Camões to Fernando Pessoa, and pervades the lyrics of Brazilian bossa nova and the popular novels of Jorge Amado. Being at least equally common in

routine informal discourse, it is among the most frequent emotion words in the Portuguese language.

The following piece of natural discourse (a letter to a loved one posted on the internet) contains some typical examples of the way this term is used colloquially and succinctly and neatly reveals some key notions related to the prototypical scenario associated with *saudade*, viz. separation and distance from someone who is dear, longing to be together again with this person, and heart-felt pain:

- (1) Estou com saudades de você. Há algum tempo não te vejo. A distância tem nos impedido de estarmos juntos, e meu coração muito apegado não consegue estar alegre. Me sinto às vezes muito só, sem a sua presença e isso não tem sido muito agradável. (...) É sempre muito bom quando estamos juntos, e quero voltar a ter esses momentos. Estou com saudades, muitas saudades e espero que breve possamos estar juntos novamente.

(<http://www.emocoesecarinhos.hpg.ig.com.br/estoucomsaudade.htm>)

'I'm feeling *saudades* for you. It's been a while since I've seen you. The distance has kept us from being together, and my heart is all tied up and can't manage to feel joy. I sometimes feel so alone, without your presence and this hasn't been very pleasant. (...) It's always so good when we're together, and I want to go back to these moments. I'm feeling *saudades*, lots of *saudades*, and I hope that we can be together again soon.'

It is difficult to translate *saudades de você* into English, not only because of the lack of an English word for *saudades* but also because of the imperfect correspondence between English and Portuguese prepositions and their semantic vagueness and/or polysemy in both languages. Although *de* is fundamentally ablative, it is difficult to pinpoint a clear semantic contribution for it in many cases, including when it is used with certain emotion words, as in the case of *Eu gosto de você* 'I like you' (see Farrell 2004). In general, *for* will be used in attempts at idiomatic English translations, even though it is not basically an ablative preposition. The reason is simply that *for* is the preposition of choice for the emotion nouns in English that are semantically closest to *saudade*, as in the case of *homesickness* or *nostalgia for* – but not **of*, **about* or **from* – you.

Homesickness is one English term that is sometimes used to translate *saudade*. Although 'I'm feeling homesick for you' is a conceivable translation of the first sentence of the passage above, *homesickness* is not a feeling that is routinely focused on people and this translation fails to convey the same kind of intimacy. Even an expression like *I get homesick for those times we had together* lacks the interpersonal resonance of *saudade*. Another common translation is 'longing'. However, *I'm longing for you* focuses on the 'desire' part of the experience and lacks the complexity of *Estou com saudades de você*. Only by combining *longing* with other words explicitly expressing some of the conceptual content embedded in *saudade*

is it possible to approximate the meaning, as in *I'm longing for you to be back with me now*. Probably the simplest and most common English translation of *Estou com saudades de você* is 'I miss you.' Yet, if one were given the task of translating *I miss you* into Portuguese, regardless of context, both of the following would be possible:

- (2) Eu sinto falta de você.
(lit.) 'I feel lack of you.'
- (3) Eu estou com saudades de você.
(lit.) 'I am with *saudades* of you.'

On the assumption that (2) and (3) have the same meaning, the English verb *miss* could be said to have this meaning as one of its own. On the contrary assumption that these two sentences have different meanings, it is difficult to see how the meaning of *I miss you*, which is apparently unambiguous, could be equivalent to both. Even if the meaning of *I miss you* could be said to be general enough to encompass both, this would not constitute equivalence.

In order to sort such matters out, it is necessary to specify with precision the meanings of such expressions as *sentir falta*, *saudade*, *missing*, *longing*, and *homesickness*, independently of each other. Given that such expressions designate subtle and complex matters of human experience that are not directly observable, it should be clear that specifying their meanings is a non-trivial task. Traditional dictionary definitions are of limited use, since these typically depend on language-specific concepts which in many cases are themselves equally complex and in need of explication. The *Dicionário Universal da Língua Portuguesa*, for example, provides the following definition for *saudade*:

- (4) lembrança triste e suave de pessoas ou coisas distantes ou extintas, acompanhada do desejo de as tornar a ver ou a possuir; pesar pela ausência de alguém que nos é querido; nostalgia.
'sad and pleasant memory of distant or extinct persons or things, accompanied by desire to see or have them again; sorrow caused by the absence of someone who is beloved to us; nostalgia.'

Although this is in certain respects an insightful and useful attempt at a definition, for reasons to which I return below, it depends on such concepts as *triste* 'sad', *suave* 'pleasant', *pesar* 'sorrow, grief', *querido* 'dear', and *nostalgia* 'nostalgia', whose meanings are not obvious and may only correspond approximately to the English glosses I have chosen.² The difficulty of providing a precise, accurate, and satisfying definition becomes quite clear when one considers the definitions attempted for these other terms. *Pesar*, for instance, is defined simply with a list of quasi-synonyms, including *tristeza* 'sadness' and several of the quasi-synonyms that figure in the definition of *tristeza*, such as *melancolia* 'melancholy'. Similarly, the definition of *nostalgia* depends on *tristeza* and *melancolia*, as well as

saudade. There are no doubt shared features among e.g. *saudade*, *nostalgia* and *tristeza*; but it is far from clear that one actually experiences either *tristeza* or *nostalgia* when one feels *saudade* and therefore unclear whether a definition of *saudade* that depends on these other concepts is accurate. In the following excerpt (<http://www.supertextos.com/Texto.asp?texto=269>), the respondent clearly distinguishes the feeling of *saudade* from that of *tristeza*. The context is a discussion of the respondent's brother, who recently died.

- (5) Q: Mas você não está triste por isso?
 'But you're not sad because of this?'
 A: Estou com saudade, não triste.
 'I'm feeling *saudade*, but (am) not sad.'

Portuguese-English dictionaries are of even less help. For *pesar*, for example, they simply give long lists of possible translations, such as *chagrin*, *pain*, *sorrow*, *regret*, *grief*, *sadness*, *woe*, etc.

Most linguistic theories of conceptual semantics (e.g. Jackendoff 1990; Langacker 1987–1991; Talmy 2000) are of similarly limited use, as they have focused largely on specifying the meanings of verbs in terms of the number of participants in the event type that they designate and such matters as the force dynamics between the participants, how a participant moves from or to a place or a state, whether there is resistance or cooperation among the participants, and so forth. For verbal expressions such as *estar com saudades* and *miss*, which designate states of affairs not primarily characterized by motion, change of state, or force-dynamic action, not much can be said about their meaning beyond 'X is in a state characterized by *saudade/missing*'. There is no obvious decomposition of the words *saudade* or *missing* with a corresponding predicate-calculus or image-schematic representation for the meat of the concepts.

In this paper I attempt to explain the concept *saudade*, posit an explication for it in the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) framework developed by Anna Wierzbicka and colleagues, and compare it with certain other similar concepts in Portuguese and, to some extent, English. The goals are, on the one hand, to test the ability of NSM to capture the meaning of this concept and appropriately differentiate it from similar concepts and, on the other, to provide a basis for determining the extent of its culture-specificity. I approach the problem of discovering the meaning of *saudade* by considering what has been claimed in previous studies and investigations; relevant aspects of the word's grammar and its distributional properties; evidence from actual use, both in literary works and in the vast and rich corpus provided by the internet; native-speaker intuitions concerning the possibility and appropriateness of constructed expressions employing the word in different ways; and contrasts with respect to these matters between *saudade* and other linguistic expressions for similar emotion concepts. This approach to

saudade differs from that of most previous studies not only in its use of NSM but also in its heavy reliance on distributional evidence and colloquial corpora. Other work has relied mostly on evidence from literary examples and has been primarily philological and/or introspective and philosophical in its orientation.

Although Brazilian Portuguese figures heavily in the investigation, particularly in the constructed examples and examples found in internet discourse, such as (1), no attempt is made here to either specifically exclude or include evidence from other dialects of Portuguese or to systematically make explicit whatever cross-cultural differences may exist with respect to the distributional or conceptual features of *saudade* or other emotion words to be considered.³

8.2 Key features of *saudade*

Certain important aspects of the *saudade* concept are pointed to in the definition in (4). They include the following:

- *saudade* is primarily an afflictive feeling (as it involves or resembles sorrow and sadness);
- it is stimulated by a distant loved one (or thing);
- it involves wanting this distance to be removed.

In this section I elaborate on these aspects of the concept and provide evidence for their importance. I also comment on the relevance of certain other aspects of the concept, viz.:

- It is typically an intense feeling.
- It is a feeling that is thought to occur in the *coração* ‘heart’.
- It can be an edifying feeling.

8.2.1 *Saudade* as emotional affliction

The dictionary definition in (4) associates *saudade* with the word *pesar*, which is a noun zero-derived from the verb meaning ‘weigh’ and can, figuratively, mean ‘burden, sorrow, sadness, grief’, etc. Poets are more likely to use words such as *dor* ‘pain, affliction, sorrow’ (< Lat. *dolore* ‘pain’) and *mágoa* ‘bruise, hurt, anguish, sorrow, grief, pain’ (< Latin *macula* ‘spot, stain’) which more fully evoke what I consider to be the afflictive character of *saudade*. Inherent in the common expression *matar saudades* ‘kill *saudades*’ (as in *Para matar as saudades eu olho para sua foto* ‘To ease my *saudades* I look at a photo of you’) is the notion that *saudade* is something that people want to do something about so that they can cease to experience it or lessen its intensity.

That *saudade* can be construed as a life-threatening affliction is evident in literary characterizations, as exemplified in the following popular Portuguese and Brazilian verses dedicated to *saudade*:

- | | | |
|-----|--|--|
| (6) | <p>Todos os males se curam
Com remédios da botica.
Só as saudades não saram,
Quem as tem, com elas fica.
(Castro 1980:33)</p> | <p>'All bad things are cured
With medicine from the pharmacy
Only <i>saudades</i> don't heal,
Whoever has them, keeps them.'</p> |
| (7) | <p>Saudades que trago n'alma
saudades que me maltratam
Se não matar as Saudades
estas Saudades me matam.
(Albano Lopes de Almeida; Pându 1968:56)</p> | <p>'<i>Saudades</i> that I carry in my soul,
<i>saudades</i> that mistreat me
If I don't kill the <i>saudades</i>
these <i>saudades</i> will kill me.'</p> |
| (8) | <p>A saudade nas noites de frio
Em meu peito vazio virá se aninhar

A saudade é dor pungente, morena
A saudade mata a gente.
(Antônio Almeida & João de Barro; from the song "A Saudade Mata a Gente")</p> | <p>'<i>Saudade</i> on cold nights
In my empty chest will come back
to nest

<i>Saudade</i> is a bitter pain, girl
<i>Saudade</i> kills us.'</p> |

Saudade is also used in routine discourse, in ways that provide additional evidence for claiming that it is conceptualized as a kind of emotional affliction. As it is a noun that is not derivationally associated with a verbal form,⁴ it belongs to a class of nouns designating feelings (e.g. *vontade* 'desire', *medo* 'fear', *raiva* 'anger', *compaixão* 'compassion', and *fome* 'hunger') that can be used by a speaker to describe a particular instance of the experience in question only in combination with a verb or verbal phrase. The most common conventional constructions for this purpose, which differ only subtly in their meanings, are illustrated by the following examples:⁵

- | | |
|------|--|
| (9) | <p>Eu sinto medo / raiva / saudade de meu irmão.
(lit.) 'I feel fear / anger / <i>saudade</i> of my brother.'</p> |
| (10) | <p>Eu estou com medo / raiva / saudade de meu irmão.
(lit.) 'I am with fear / anger / <i>saudade</i> of my brother.'</p> |
| (11) | <p>Eu tenho medo / raiva / saudade de meu irmão.
(lit.) 'I have fear / anger / <i>saudade</i> of my brother.'</p> |

Although the construction shown in (9) is less common with *saudade* than the other two,⁶ it is the only one of the three that is available for *falta*, with the

emotional meaning of missing. If *falta* appears in the other two constructions, a non-emotive 'lack' meaning is what shows up:

- (12) Eu sinto falta da minha mãe.
'I miss my mother.'
- (13) Eu estou com falta de ar / desejo / dinheiro.
'I'm lacking air / desire / money.'
- (14) Eu tenho falta de dentes / energia / tempo.
'I'm lacking teeth / energy / time.'

Presumably, the core meaning of the noun *falta* is conceptually supplemented by *sentir* 'feel' in such a way as to evoke the emotion concept. However, the emotive meaning of *falta* does not require the presence of the verb *sentir*. For example, a relatively common alternative way of saying *I miss you* is *Você me faz falta* 'You make *falta* to me.' Another factor is that the *estar com* 'be with' construction seems to be most felicitous with emotions that are conceived of as afflictions, as evidenced by the fact that it is incompatible with *felicidade* 'happiness', *alegria* 'joy', and *compaixão* 'compassion', for example:

- (15) Eu sinto felicidade / alegria / compaixão.
'I feel happiness / joy / compassion.'
- (16) *Eu estou com felicidade / alegria / compaixão.
(lit.) 'I'm with happiness / joy / compassion.'
- (17) Eu tenho felicidade / alegria / compaixão.
(lit.) 'I have happiness / joy / compassion.'

Native speaker judgments match the evidence from internet searches, which find lots of sentences like (15) and (17), but none like (16).

An analysis of 200 randomly chosen results (second and fifth sets of 100 pages) from Google searches for the phrase *estou com* shows that it occurs most often (49% of examples) in expressions of non-emotional affliction or difficulty, such as 'problems, cavities, depression, cancer, hunger, fatigue, doubt' etc. Expressions of emotion (29%) are the next most common; and these are restricted to *medo* 'fear', *raiva* 'anger', and especially *saudade*.⁷ Expressions of accompaniment (13%), for example, *Estou com Marcos* 'I'm with Marcos', and expressions of desire (7%), particularly *vontade* 'wanting' and *desejo* 'desire', account for most of the remaining examples. In fact, desire can plausibly be considered emotional affliction, inasmuch as it entails the concepts WANT and NOT HAVE. This interpretation is supported by the fact that these nouns occur quite frequently in the *morrendo de* 'dying of' construction discussed below. It seems reasonable to suppose that *saudade*, on the other hand, is at home in the *estar com* construction because it shares conceptual features with such words as *fome* 'hunger', *medo*, and *raiva*.

Nostalgia and *falta* seem to contrast with *saudade* in this respect. As noted, the emotional sense of *falta* is incompatible with the *estar com* construction. *Nostalgia* is at least not very comfortable there. A web search for *sentir/estar com/ter nostalgia* ‘feel/be with/have nostalgia’ constructions with 1st and 3rd person singular present tense verb forms yielded a total of 197 web pages. *Estar com* occurred on only 4 of these. It appears that although the *estar com* + N construction has a number of possible uses, the prototypical scenario is one in which the N designates an affliction, ailment or difficulty. The fact that the *estar com* construction is frequently used with *saudade* suggests that the experience that it designates is conceived of as an emotional affliction in a way that *nostalgia* and *falta* are not.

Further distributional evidence for this claim comes from the metaphorical *morrendo de* ‘dying of/from’ construction illustrated by the following examples.

- (18) A minha irmã está morrendo de vontade de conhecer ele.
(lit.) ‘My sister is dying from wanting to meet him.’
- (19) Eu estou morrendo de fome / cansaço.
‘I am dying of hunger / fatigue.’

In spite of the fact that this is a relatively flexible metaphor, used to indicate the intensity of a feeling or sensation, it is felicitous to varying degrees with different emotional and cognitive experiences:

- (20) Eu estou morrendo de raiva / inveja / saudades (de você).
(lit.) ‘I’m dying of anger / jealousy / *saudades* (of you).’
- (21) *Eu estou morrendo de fé / paz / nostalgia / compaixão.
‘I am dying of faith / peace / nostalgia / compassion.’
- (22) ?Eu estou morrendo de alegria / felicidade.
‘I am dying of joy / happiness.’

As might be expected, one can be conceived of more easily as dying from intense emotions, especially those that are readily thought of as afflictive. Interestingly, based on how frequently *saudade* appears in the *morrendo de* construction in internet discourse, this emotion appears to be more “life-threatening” than hunger or, as far as I can tell, any other emotion or non-emotive ailment.⁸ A Google search found the phrase *morrendo de saudade(s)* on 8,530 Portuguese-language pages, which is considerably more than was found for the *morrendo de X* construction containing any of the following nouns of emotion or affliction: *fome* ‘hunger’ (4,270), *medo* ‘fear’ (2,430), *vontade* ‘wanting’ (1,760), *inveja* ‘envy’ (1,100), *raiva* ‘anger’ (573), *alegria* ‘joy’ (31), *solidão* ‘solitude’ (22), *falta* ‘lack, missing’ (8), and *nostalgia* (0).⁹ This effect cannot be attributed to differences in overall frequency. If for each noun the number of pages on which it occurs in the *morrendo de X* construction is divided by the number of pages that it was found to occur on

overall, *saudade(s)* (4.9%) turns out to have a higher ratio than any of the others: *fome* (3.7%), *medo* (3.0%), *vontade* (0.6%), *inveja* (2.5%), *raiva* (1.0%), *alegria* (0.02%), *solidão* (0.05%), *falta* (0.0002%), *nostalgia* (0%). Notably, the same emotions that are likely to occur in the *estar com* construction and which can be easily conceived of as afflictions occur much more often in the *morrendo de* construction than do other emotions. Moreover, it seems pretty clear that *saudade* is conceived of as much more afflictive than *nostalgia* and *falta*. Indeed, of the few cases where *morrendo de falta* was found to occur, only two were cases of emotive “missing” (e.g. *estou morrendo de falta dela* ‘I’m dying from missing her’). The other cases involved such metaphorical and literal expressions as *morrendo de falta de CDs* ‘dying from a lack of CDs’ and *morrendo de falta de ar* ‘dying from a lack of air’.

8.2.2 *Saudade* vs. *saudades*

As should be clear from several of the examples discussed above, the plural form *saudades* is often used. When used as a kind of synonym for the nouns *cumprimentos* or *saudações* ‘greetings, salutations’, which are essentially always plural, *saudades* is required, as in (23).¹⁰ It is also very frequently employed in formulaic letter closings, as in (24), which may be similarly salutatory.

(23) A Paula manda *saudades*.

‘Paula sends *saudades*.’

(24) Muitas *saudades*. Beijos.

‘Lots of *saudades*. Kisses.’

Although *muita saudade* ‘lots of *saudade*’ would be possible in (24), the plural form is highly preferred. But it is also preferred whenever people reveal that they are feeling *saudade* about anyone or anything. The phrase *estou com saudades de* ‘I’m feeling *saudades* for’, which occurs in all kinds of narrative discourse, shows up on 1,400 Portuguese language pages; the same phrase with singular *saudade* shows up on only 320. The singular form is more likely to occur in cases where the concept itself is being discussed in the abstract (e.g. *A saudade é uma emoção* ‘*Saudade* is an emotion’) or when the object of affection is not identified, for whatever reason, as in (8) – although, as can be seen from (6) and (7), this is a tendency at most.

It is unexpected, in some sense, that the plural form is used so frequently, given that most other emotion nouns occur only or virtually always in the singular. One exception is *ciúme* ‘jealousy’. *Estou com ciúmes* ‘I’m jealous’ is at least as common as *Estou com ciúme*. Moreover, in Brazilian Portuguese, at least, plurality tends to be avoided in favor of singular nouns with a mass construal (Farrell 1998, 2000). A plausible explanation is that plurality symbolizes intensity and *saudade* is an intensely felt emotion and people want other people to know how much they feel

it. That is, plurality is preferred with *saudade* essentially for the same reason that *saudade* is more likely to occur in the *morrendo de* construction than other emotion nouns and for the same reason that it frequently occurs in discourse contexts such as the following:

- (25) Amor tô morrendo de saudadessss ... Te amo te amo te amo ...
 (<http://www.scriptmaster.com.br/asp/gb/readgb.asp?memberid=140>)
 'Dear I'm dying of *saudadessss* ... I love you I love you I love you ...'
- (26) Amor escrevo, aqui, para que todos saibam que te amo mais que tudo nessa vida. E que ja estou morreeeeeeeeendo ... de saudades.
 (<http://www.usjt.br/servicos/mural/mensagens/>)
 'Write (to me) dear, here, so that everyone will know that I love you more than anything in this life. And that I'm already dyyyyyyyyyying ... of *saudades*.'

Incredibly, I found 59 pages with the word *saudadessss*, with exactly 5 instances of the letter 's' at the end, and 21 with 7 instances.

8.2.3 What stimulates *saudade*

It is possible to omit the complement of *saudade* and conceptually background the stimulus – as, for example, in the verses in (6)–(8). However, in a discourse in which the speaker reveals a personal experience of *saudade*, the stimulus is usually expressed in a prepositional phrase headed by *de* 'of, from' – as, for example, in (2)–(3) and the first sentence of (1) – or is recoverable from the discourse context. In (25)–(26), for example, it is clear that *saudades* unambiguously means *saudades de você* 'saudades for you'. The dictionary definition in (4) is accurate in pointing out that *saudade* can be focused on persons or things, but also in implying that it is primarily person-focused. Echoing Francisco Manuel de Melo's famous *Amor e ausência são os pais da saudade* 'Love and absence are the parents of *saudade*' (from "Epanáforas de Vária História Portuguesa", Lisboa, 1676; cited in Castro 1980:25), the Brazilian poet Oscar Batista notes that *A saudade é a companheira do amor, da ausência e da mágoa* 'Saudade is the companion of love, absence and pain' (Pându 1968:48). *Amor* in this context, and indeed by default, refers to an interpersonal emotion. The prototypical experience of *saudade* is that of the mother remembering her son who is away at sea, the widower thinking about his beloved wife who he believes awaits him in heaven, or the lover pining for a boyfriend exiled in another country, i.e. emotional affliction caused by the absence of a loved one. The song "Pedaco de Mim" by the contemporary Brazilian artist Chico Buarque provides a good example of how love for another, separation and pain are integral to the *saudade* concept. The author asks the loved one, experienced as a piece of him that has been torn asunder, to make it impossible for him to bring her to mind, because the *saudade* is too much to bear:

- | | | |
|------|---------------------------------|--|
| (27) | Oh, pedaço de mim | 'Oh, piece of me |
| | Oh, metade afastada de mim | Oh, half broken off of me |
| | Leva o teu olhar | Take away your gaze |
| | Que a saudade é o pior tormento | Because <i>saudade</i> is the worst torment |
| | ... | |
| | Oh, pedaço de mim | Oh, piece of me |
| | Oh, metade adorada de mim | Oh, half adored by me |
| | Leva os olhos meus | Take away my eyes |
| | Que a saudade é o pior castigo | Because <i>saudade</i> is the worst punishment |

The centrality of the person concept to *saudade* can be glimpsed from an analysis of what occurs after the preposition *de* in the expression *estou com saudades de* 'I'm feeling *saudades* for'. In the examples in a random set of 200 of the 1,240 pages found to contain this phrase in an internet search, 88% had the stimulus of *saudades* as a specific person or set of people.¹¹ Many of the other examples had the stimulus as a person or people via metonymy in one of two ways: a part of the person (2%), as in (28), or an activity associated with a person or people (4%), as in (29). The only other significant stimulus category was a cherished place (5%), particularly a city of residence or homeland, as in (30).

- (28) Estou com saudades de teu olhar carinhoso / seu beijo.
'I feel *saudades* for your loving eyes / your kiss.'
- (29) Estou com saudades de visitar os amigos / ouvir você falar.
'I feel *saudades* for visiting my friends / hearing you talk.'
- (30) Estou com saudades da minha cidade / de você Brasil.
'I feel *saudades* for my city / for you, Brazil'

Given that it is possible to feel for all kinds of things what one typically feels for people that have been part of a significant relationship, the stimulus of *saudade* can, in principle, be almost anything. In poetry at least, it is possible, for instance, to say things like *Da saudade tem-se tal necessidade que até a gente na vida tem saudade da saudade* 'Of *saudade* we have such need that in this life we even feel *saudade* for *saudade*' (Aderbal Melo, in Pându 1968:61). At the same time, given the characteristic intensity of the feeling and the prototypicality of a distant significant person in the *saudade* scenario, it is not surprising that the following types of sentences border on the absurd.

- (31) *Estou com saudades de uma pessoa que possa me ajudar com a tarefa.
'I feel *saudades* for a person that might be able to help me with my homework.'
- (32) *Estou com saudades do dedo que eu perdi.
'I feel *saudades* for the finger that I lost.'

- (33) *Estou com saudades da funcionalidade do Windows.
 'I feel *saudades* for the functionality of Windows.'

The problem with (31) is that an unspecified person that one does not even know and with whom there has been no relationship cannot give rise to *saudades*. In the case of (32), the situation is one of separation from a known entity; but, it is hard to imagine a significant, loving relationship with one's own finger, although there could certainly be a relationship of utility or need. Similarly, with (33), it is hard to conceive of the functionality of a computer operating system that is no longer used being sufficiently like a distant loved person as to evoke the same feelings.

Sentir nostalgia 'feel nostalgia' and *sentir falta* 'miss' differ from *estar com saudades* with respect to the centrality of the person concept. *Nostalgia* focuses on a temporal domain in the past and associated experiences, whereas *falta* is less restricted as to the nature of the stimulus. The phrase *nostalgia do passado* 'nostalgia for the past' occurs on 214 Portuguese language web pages; *nostalgia de / por você* 'nostalgia for you' occurs on only one. From 197 pages containing *sentir / ter / estar com nostalgia* 'feel / have / be with nostalgia' (with the verb showing present tense and 1st or 3rd person subject agreement), only one had an example of a (figurative) person stimulus (*Cada alma sente nostalgia de Deus* 'every soul feels nostalgia for God'). The typical scenario involves evoking memories of the past and wanting to experience the same things again, as in the following examples:

- (34) Sinto nostalgia pelos guias de TV do passado, quando o número de canais era baixo. (<http://www.uol.com.br/mundodigital/colunas/parem/para1506.htm>)
 'I feel nostalgia for the TV guides of the past, when the number of channels was small.'
- (35) Ando pelas ruas e é claro que sinto nostalgia, mas o que podemos fazer. Temos que olhar adiante, temos que reconstruir nossa cidade.
 (http://www2.uol.com.br/JC/_1999/0703/in0703a.htm)
 'I walk in the streets and of course I feel nostalgia, but what can we do. We have to look in front of us, we have to rebuild our city.'

That *sentir falta* is less person-centered than *estar com saudades* is evident from the fact that (32) and (33) would be fine with *sinto falta* (*Sinto falta do dedo que eu perdi* 'I miss the finger that I lost'; *Sinto falta da funcionalidade do Windows* 'I miss the functionality of Windows'). Indeed, of the examples from a random set of 200 of the 7,740 Portuguese language pages containing the phrase *sinto falta*, only 22% had a person or people as stimulus. The remaining examples included a large variety of stimuli, many of which would be odd – if not impossible – with *saudades*, such as *droga* 'drugs', *sol* 'sunlight', *criatividade* 'creativity', *poder usar relógio* 'being able to use a watch', *a coragem que eu tinha* 'the courage that I had' and *o cheiro de sangue em minha lâmina de barbear* 'the smell of blood on my razor'.

8.2.4 Where *saudade* is felt

It has long been recognized that *saudade* is associated with the feeling part of people conceptualized as the *coração* ‘heart’ (Castro 1980:8). This is implied in the passage from the song “A Saudade Mata a Gente” in (8), which talks of *saudade* coming to nest in an empty chest. Not only in poetry but in informal discourse as well, it is easy to find evidence that people think of *saudade* as occurring in the *coração*. In the letter to a distant loved one in (1), for example, the author associates inability to feel joy with a *coração muito apegado* ‘[a] heart all tied up’ because of *saudades*.

When one is overwhelmed by certain feelings, one can be said to have *o coração cheio de* ‘the heart filled with’ them. Presumably, only feelings that occur in the heart are likely to be thought of as filling it. It is clearly acceptable to talk about a heart filled with *amor* ‘love’, *alegria* ‘joy’, and *saudades*, whereas it is not possible to talk about a heart filled with *ideias* ‘ideas’, *monotonia* ‘boredom’, or *tesão* ‘sexual desire’, for example. 1,013 pages were found in a Google search for the phrase *coração cheio de* occurring with a selection of 35 feelings, including all of those identified by native speakers as likely to be used in this expression. *Amor* is by far the most frequent (41%). *Saudade* (5%), is among the top seven, which also includes *alegria* ‘joy’ (13%), *angústia* ‘anguish’ (7%), *esperança* ‘hope’ (6%), *ódio* ‘hatred’ (4%), and *fé* ‘faith’ (4%). *Saudade* contrasts with such feelings as *nostalgia* and *falta* ‘missing’, which do not occur at all and which strike native speakers as inappropriate in this construction. The association of *coração* and *saudade* is not surprising, given that *saudade* is intimately connected with *amor*, and *amor* appears to be what the *coração* is principally devoted to.

The *alma* ‘soul’ is another possible locus of *saudade*, as evidenced for example by the poem in (7), in which the author speaks of the *saudades* that he carries in his soul. In general, however, feelings that can be thought of as occurring in the *coração* can also be thought of as occurring in the *alma*. A person that seemingly feels no emotions can be described as follows:

- (36) Parece uma máquina (...) um robô ou um trator, sem alma, sem coração.
 (http://www.vaniadiniz.pro.br/ka_anjoseducator.htm)
 ‘(He) seems like a machine ... a robot or a tractor, without soul, without heart.’

Not having an *alma* seems to go hand in hand with not having a *coração*. It would be incongruous to say that a person, like a machine or a robot, has no *alma* but has a *coração*. A natural account of the relationship between these concepts is that the *coração* (i.e. the place of feelings) is conceived of as part of the *alma*. Hence, being thought of as occurring in the *coração*, *saudade* is also thought of as occurring in the *alma*. It follows from this account that feelings that figure promi-

nently in religious discourse concerned with activities of the *alma*, including *amor* ‘love’, *alegria* ‘joy’, *esperança* ‘hope’, and *fé* ‘faith’, are also among the most frequent *coração*-filling feelings.

8.2.5 *Saudade* as an edifying emotion

Although *saudade* is primarily afflictive, it also typically involves feeling something good. Almeida Garrett in the first canto of *Camões* speaks of *saudade* as the *delicioso pungir de acerbo espinho* ‘[the] sweet prick of a wicked thorn’. This sweet (literally ‘delicious’) aspect of *saudade* is hinted at in the dictionary definition in (4), which calls it a memory that is both *triste* ‘sad’ and *suave* ‘pleasant, sweet, delicate’. It is also what presumably leads the poet Aderbal Melo to say that people feel *saudades* for *saudade* (see Section 8.2.3) and what leads Geraldo Guimarães to say:

- (37) Por mas que nos fira e doa ‘As much as it wounds us and hurts
a saudade um bem nos faz. *saudade* does us some good.
É o resto da “coisa boa” It is what remains of the “good thing”
que o tempo deixou para trás. that time left behind.’
(Pându 1968:66)

In ordinary discourse, people commonly modify *saudade* with the adjective *gostosa* ‘wonderful (literally: tasty)’, as in the following internet greeting card:

- (38) A saudade que eu sinto de você já se tornou parte de mim. Todos os dias eu sinto a sua falta (...) No fundo é uma saudade gostosa porque me lembra muito você. (<http://www.emocoesecarinhos.hpg.ig.com.br/saudqsinto.htm>)
‘The *saudade* that I feel for you has already become a part of me. Every day I feel your absence (...) Deep down it’s a wonderful *saudade* because it reminds me of you.’

As brought out in this example, one feels *saudade* in connection with thoughts of a distant loved one. Thinking of the loved one evokes good feelings (edification). Wanting this person to be near and knowing that this is not possible right now is what makes one feel something bad (affliction).

The edification part of *saudade* distinguishes it from most other afflictive emotions. Lacking some special set of circumstances, it is odd to talk of *raiva* ‘anger’, *tristeza* ‘sadness’, or *ódio* ‘hatred’ as being *gostoso* or *gostosa* ‘wonderful’, for example. Unlike the expression *saudade gostosa*, which can be found on more than 100 Portuguese language pages on the internet, *ódio gostoso* and *raiva gostosa* show up on none and *tristeza gostosa* on only one. *Falta* ‘lack, missing’, likewise is infelicitous with *gostosa* (*a falta* [**gostosa*] *que eu sinto de você* ‘the [**wonderful*] missing that I feel for you’). *Nostalgia*, on the other hand, inasmuch as it is evoked by

pleasant memories of the past, is typically associated with good feelings and can be modified by *gostosa*:

- (39) O romantismo e a nostalgia gostosa que o trem ou o bonde despertam nas pessoas (...) (http://www.lothequipamentos.com.br/pr_home.htm)
 ‘The romanticism and wonderful nostalgia that trains and trolley cars awaken in people ...’

8.3 NSM and *saudade* / *nostalgia* / *falta*

In Natural Semantic Metalanguage, *saudade* can be explicated as follows.

Saudade (*Eu estou com saudades de você*)

- (a) sometimes a person (X) thinks about someone else (Y):
- (b) Y is like a part of me
- (c) because of this I feel something very good when Y is near me
- (d) I very much want Y to be near me now
- (e) I know that Y cannot be near me now
- (f) when X thinks this X feels something very bad
- (g) I feel like this
- (h) because I think something like this about you

(Portuguese version)

- (a) às vezes alguém (X) pensa de outra pessoa (Y):
- (b) Y é como uma parte de mim
- (c) por causa disso eu sinto algo muito bom quando Y está perto de mim
- (d) eu quero muito que Y esteja perto de mim agora
- (e) eu sei que Y não pode estar perto de mim agora
- (f) quando X pensa isso X sente algo muito ruim
- (g) eu me sinto assim
- (h) porque penso algo assim de você

The person-focus of the *saudade* scenario is expressed by the constraint in (a) on what a person that feels *saudade* thinks about. That the prototypical person stimulating *saudade* is a loved one is expressed by (b) and (c). (b) borrows the idea from Chico Buarque’s song in (27) that the stimulus of *saudade* is thought of as a part of the experiencer. The way people commonly talk about relationships involving *amor*, as in the examples taken from internet discourse in (40)–(44), provides evidence for such an underlying concept.

- (40) Sem você eu ...
 ‘Without you I ...’

não existo / me sinto vazio / sou metade / sou nada / sou um navio sem velas /
 sou uma estrela sem luz / sou noite sem madrugada
 'don't exist / feel empty / am half / am nothing / am a ship without sails / am
 a star without light / am night without dawn'

- (41) Você me completa. (194 web pages)
 'You complete me.'
- (42) Você é meu coração / alma. (104 web pages)
 'You are my heart / soul.'
- (43) você no meu coração (163 web pages)
 'you in my heart'
- (44) Você é / faz parte de mim. (147 web pages)
 'You are / make up a part of me.'

One cannot feel *saudades* for someone sitting beside them, under normal circumstances. The requisite separation that gives rise to *saudades* is expressed by (e). (d) expresses the longing part of the concept, the desire that the loved one not be separate. The intensity of the *saudade* experience is expressed by the intensifier VERY associated with the bad feeling that the thinking script evokes (f) as well as the intensifiers associated with the feelings in the thinking script. Presumably, thinking about feeling something entails feeling it, at least in some way. The edification aspect of the concept can be attributed to (c) and (d): the memory of feeling something very good and the thought of feeling the same thing now. Although the thinking script is constrained by the prototypical scenario, the possibility of feeling *saudades* for places and things is left open: if one thinks *like* this about anyone or anything one can experience *saudades*. The fact that *saudades* is less often felt for possessions, for example, than for currently distant places with which one has had a significant relationship (*saudades do Brasil* 'saudades for Brazil', for example) follows from the ease with which such places can be conceived of as being like people. As one of my informants suggests, it is possible to feel *saudades* for Brazil because Brazil has an *alma* 'soul'.

What is not directly expressed in the explication is the association of *saudade* and *coração* 'heart' (and *alma*). Although one could add to (f), for example, the locative phrase *in his/her coração* (where *coração* is a molecular rather than an atomic concept), I assume that this association in effect follows from *saudade* involving feeling something with person-focus and *coração* being conceived of as the usual locus for this kind of feeling, *amor* 'love' being the prototype. I suggest that the meaning of *coração* is essentially as follows – with *alma* being a semantic molecule (Goddard & Peeters this volume; Wierzbicka in press) that could be explicated along lines suggested for the English word *soul* in Wierzbicka (1992).

Coração

- (a) a part of the body
- (b) people cannot see this part
- (c) because of this part people can live
- (d) sometimes people think:
- (e) this part is a part of my 'alma'_M
- (f) because of this part I can feel many things
- (g) because of this part I can feel things for other people

(Portuguese version)

- (a) uma parte do corpo
- (b) as pessoas não podem ver esta parte
- (c) por causa desta parte as pessoas podem viver
- (d) às vezes as pessoas pensam:
- (e) esta parte é uma parte de minha alma_M
- (f) por causa desta parte eu posso sentir muitas coisas
- (g) por causa desta parte eu posso sentir coisas por outras pessoas

Nostalgia is a concept similar to *saudade* in that it involves separation from something that evokes good feelings, wanting there to be no separation, and feeling something bad as a result. The main differences are that the thinking associated with *nostalgia* focuses on past experience rather than on a person or people and the feeling is much less intense (although the feeling is bad, it is odd to talk about dying from it, for example). I suggest the following meaning for this concept.

Nostalgia (*Eu sinto nostalgia* (*de Y*))

- (a) sometimes a person (X) thinks:
- (b) things happened some time ago
- (c) because of this I felt something good
- (d) I think I will feel something good if these things happen now
- (e) I want these things to happen now
- (f) I know that these things cannot happen now
- (g) when X thinks this X feels something bad, not very bad
- (h) I feel like this
- (i) because I think something like this (because of Y)

(Portuguese version)

- (a) às vezes alguém (X) pensa:
- (b) aconteciam coisas algum tempo atrás
- (c) por causa disso eu sentia algo bom
- (d) eu penso que vou sentir algo bom se estas coisas acontecerem agora
- (e) eu quero que estas coisas aconteçam agora

- (f) eu sei que estas coisas nao podem acontecer agora
- (g) quando X pensa isso X sente algo ruim, não muito ruim
- (h) eu me sinto assim
- (i) porque penso algo assim (por causa de Y)

Sentir falta is somewhat harder to understand than either *saudade* or *nostalgia*. The reason for this is that there are fewer constraints on the stimulating factor. The key components of the meaning of *falta*, which alternates between noun and verb, are NOT and HAVE, as evidenced by the following typical examples:

- (45) A causa mas comum da anemia é falta de ferro.
'The most common cause of anemia is lack of iron.'
- (46) A única coisa que me falta é dinheiro.
'The only thing that I don't have is money.'

It would seem that *sentir falta* must fundamentally mean to feel something because of not having something. Indeed, the stimulus of *sentir falta* is commonly something that people conceive of in terms of having, the only apparent constraint being that it must be wanted because of some kind of palpable good effect, as illustrated by the following examples.

- (47) Ela sente falta de tempo para ler.
'She misses (having) time to read.'
- (48) Eu sinto falta de amigos.
'I miss (having) friends.'
- (49) Eu não deveria sentir falta de dinheiro.
'I shouldn't miss (having) money.'
- (50) ?Ela sente falta de câncer.
'She misses (having) cancer.'

(50) is odd because it is hard to imagine anyone wanting cancer or thinking that it does something good. I suggest that the emotion meaning of *falta* is as follows:

Falta (Eu sinto falta de você)

- (a) sometimes a person (X) thinks about something (Y):
- (b) good things happened to me when I had Y some time ago
- (c) I think good things can happen to me if I have Y now
- (d) because of this I want to have Y now
- (e) I know that I cannot have Y now
- (f) when X thinks this X feels something bad
- (g) I feel like this
- (h) because I think something like this about you

(Portuguese version)

- (a) às vezes alguém (X) pensa de algo (Y):
- (b) me aconteceram coisas boas quando tinha Y algum tempo atrás
- (c) eu penso que podem me acontecer coisas boas se eu tiver Y agora
- (d) por causa disso eu quero ter Y agora
- (e) eu sei que não posso ter Y agora
- (f) quando X pensa disso X sente algo ruim
- (g) eu me sinto assim
- (h) porque penso algo assim de você

That *sentir falta* is conceived of as less intense and less afflictive than *saudade* can be attributed to the fact that (f) does not contain the intensifier *very* used in the corresponding component of the explication for *saudade*, as well as to the fact that the thinking script in (b)–(e) does not focus on intense or person-focused feelings, for which reason, presumably, this is also not typically a feeling of the *coração*. That *sentir falta*, unlike *saudade*, cannot be modified by *gostosa* ‘wonderful’ can be attributed to the fact that feeling something good is not an integral part of the *sentir falta* concept. That the stimulus of *sentir falta* can be lots of different things, including a person or people, follows from the ease with which the scenario of wanting to have something can be extended, i.e. presumably due to the same kind of metaphorical process that allows one to talk about wanting to *ter um namorado ou uma irmã* ‘have a boyfriend or a sister’ as easily as wanting to have a house or a car, for example.

8.4 The culture-specific nature of *saudade*

There are undoubtedly complex emotion concepts that occur in various languages. The properties of *nostalgia* in English, for example, do not differ significantly from those of Portuguese *nostalgia*. I have encountered no cases where one would not be able to satisfactorily translate Portuguese sentences using this word with its English cognate, and vice-versa. I know of no reason not to claim that the word *nostalgia* designates the same concept in both languages. *Saudade*, on the other hand, appears to be a concept that is much more specific to Luso-Brazilian culture, as has often been claimed.

Being concerned with a kind of emotive “sickness” having to do with absence from home, which is a place associated with good feelings, English *homesickness* is obviously a concept like *saudade* in certain respects. It is as natural to speak of dying of homesickness as it is to speak of dying of *saudade*, for example. However, precisely because of the centrality of “home” in *homesickness*, there are significant differences. The phrase *be homesick*, unlike *estar com saudades*, does not require

the expression of a stimulus in a complement or in the discourse context. No preceding discourse is required to understand what the stimulus of *I'm homesick* is. It is "home" by default. It is, of course, possible to specify a distinct stimulus, as in *I'm homesick for San Francisco*; but this is a marked option. Of 2,614 English language web pages found in a Google search for the expression *I'm (feeling) homesick*, only 506, or 19%, were found to include a *for* phrase. Of those examples in a random subset of 200 of those pages containing *homesick for*, 88% had a place as the specified stimulus (e.g. *Ireland, my hills, the Old Twin Pines dairy, my school, the beach*). 8% had a person or people (e.g. *you, my old Pineland friends, my relatives, my family*). The remainder had a variety of things (e.g. *a memory, the sand and shells beneath my feet, basic local food, 1982*). Thus, a key difference between *homesickness* and *saudade* appears to be this: whereas the prototypical stimulus of *homesickness* is home or a place like home (and one can feel this for other things, especially people), the prototypical stimulus of *saudade* is a loved person (and one can feel this about other things, especially places like home). Following from this difference, *saudade* is more a feeling of the heart than *homesickness*. An internet search for *heart filled with homesickness* and *homesickness in my heart* on English language pages only retrieved one example, which is much less than, say, for *love* in the same constructions (13,490) or *sorrow* (4,534). Although I won't attempt an explication for *homesickness* here (see however Wierzbicka 1992: 122), it should be clear that it names a concept for which there is no word in Portuguese.

English *miss* (see Wierzbicka 1992: 123) corresponds much more closely to Portuguese *sentir falta* than to *saudade*. Apart from occurring much more frequently in internet discourse than *homesickness*,¹² *miss* seems to designate a less afflictive and less intense feeling than both *homesickness* and *saudade*. It is much less natural to speak of dying from missing someone or something (4 internet examples found) than it is to speak of dying of homesickness (22 internet examples found). It is also less natural to talk about suffering from missing someone or something (9 internet examples) than suffering from homesickness (160 internet examples). Furthermore, for most of the examples discussed in Section 8.2 where *sentir falta* was found to be preferable to *estar com saudades*, it would be unproblematic to use *miss* in an English translation, for example:

- (51) Sinto falta / *estou com saudades da funcionalidade do Windows.
'I miss the functionality of Windows.'
- (52) Sinto falta / *estou com saudades de tempo para ler.
'I miss having time to read.'
- (53) Sinto falta / *estou com saudades de poder usar relógio.
'I miss being able to use a watch.'

This suggests that *miss* is not such an intense feeling as to be at all unnatural with an abstract stimulus. Although the stimulus of *miss* is commonly a person or people, this is not central to the concept *miss* in the way that it is to *saudade*. With *miss*, a person does not appear to be the default for a stimulus, as indicated by the fact that the question *What do you miss most?* occurs more frequently on the internet (found on 2,660 web pages) than the question *Who do you miss most?* (104 pages).

Although English *miss* and Portuguese *sentir falta* may differ in terms of certain precise details of their meaning, they are similar enough as to be essentially functionally equivalent. The meanings of *saudade* and *homesickness* are quite different, both from each other and from *nostalgia*, *sentir falta*, and *miss*. Just as English has no word that adequately translates *saudade*, Portuguese has no word that adequately translates *homesickness*.

There is no reason to believe that the concept that *saudade* designates is not lexicalized in other languages. However, how widely or even if it remains to be discovered. Spanish (and Catalán) *añoranza*, for example, seems much closer to *homesickness*, given that its stimulus when specified is much more commonly a place than a person and it is not routinely spoken of as something that can fill a *corazón* 'heart', unlike *love*, *hope*, and *joy*, for example. Vasconcellos (1914) and Castro (1980) have given good reasons to believe that such emotion words as German *Sehnsucht* and French *nostalgie* differ semantically from *saudade*. While claiming that *saudade* has no equivalent in other Romance languages or in Germanic, Castro also claims that Arabic *saudah*, which he argues is the etymological source, has the same meaning. Unfortunately, no evidence is given to substantiate this claim. Although an understanding of *saudah* must wait, it is clear what kinds of evidence one might look for and how the meaning might be specified in a useful way in NSM. Of emotion words with NSM explications that I am aware of, the closest to *saudade* is Polish *tęsknota* (Wierzbicka 1992: 121), which is characterized as an afflictive feeling caused by distance from someone for whom one feels something good, and which appears to differ from English *miss* and *homesickness* in much the same way that *saudade* does. A much closer look at *tęsknota* would be needed to see how deep this apparent similarity is.

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Notes

1. The etymology of *saudade* remains controversial (Santos & Chagas 1992). The prevailing theory is that it derives from Latin *solitudo* 'solitude', which also yields Spanish *soledad* 'solitude' and which has a related Latin form which yields Portuguese *solidão* 'solitude'. By normal phonetic processes the evolution is *solitudo* > *soletate* > *soledade* > *soedade* ~ *soidade*. The form *saudade*, it is claimed, involves "influence" of *saudar* 'greet', *saudação* 'greeting', and *saúde* 'health, salvation (archaic)' (< Lat. *salutare*) (cf. Vasconcellos 1914; *Dicionário Universal da Língua Portuguesa* [<http://www.priberam.pt/DLPO/>]). An alternative theory is that *saudade* originated as a borrowing of Arabic *saudah*, a word with essentially the same meaning (cf. Castro 1980).
2. No attempt at glossing *saudade* will be made; glosses provided for other Portuguese words, particularly emotion words, are not intended to indicate that the English and Portuguese concepts are the same.
3. An anonymous reviewer notes that *saudade* in Portugal is a "deeper" emotion than in Brazil, associated both with Portuguese fatalism in general and the classical *fado* (< Lat. *fatum* 'fate') folksong, which has as its other salient recurring themes unrequited love, exile, sadness, and longing for bygone times, etc. There are undoubtedly at least some systematic and substantive differences not only between the Portuguese and Brazilian (and, for that matter, Galician) concepts of *saudade* but also between the concepts of the wealthy Brazilian urbanite and the poor rural worker in Brazil. The precise nature of such differences is an interesting question that leads well beyond the modest scope of this paper.
4. One might claim, on etymological grounds, that there is a derivational relationship between the verb *saudar* 'greet' and *saudade*. However, 'greeting' is at most a highly peripheral sense of *saudade* (cf. Note 1); and *saudar* does not mean 'feel *saudade*'.
5. I render *estar com* as 'be with' in literal translations. It would be more idiomatically rendered as 'have' in most cases, although when the object of *com* is a person (e.g. *Eu estou com você* 'I'm with you'), it could only be rendered as 'be with' in English. It is also possible to make the experiencer of the emotion dative or accusative in a causative construction, such as *Aquilo me deixa com / dá / faz / causa saudades / medo* 'That leaves me with / gives me / makes me / causes me saudades / fear'. This is a less common strategy, especially with *saudades*. An internet search of Portuguese web pages, for example, showed 4,130 pages with at least one instance of *estou com saudades* and only 83 of *me dá / faz / causa saudades* (with the verbs in all possible present tense subject-agreement forms). The construction with *dar* 'give' has the highest frequency and is relatively common with some emotions.
6. A Google search for the phrases *sinto/estou com/tenho saudade(s)* turned up 16,140 pages. 39% of these had *estou com*, whereas 35% had *tenho* and 26% had *sinto*. The huge number of results gives another indication of how common this emotion word is. As noted below, a search for *nostalgia* with the same set of verbs but with both 1st and default singular agreement morphology only turned up 197 pages, reflecting the highly literary quality of this word. The common colloquial phrase *Estou triste* 'I'm sad' was found to occur on 5,200 pages.
7. Of course, although they did not appear in the examined sample, other emotion nouns that are easily conceived of as designating afflictions also occur in this construction, such as *ciúmes* 'jealousy' and *inveja* 'envy'. Also, although the sample had no such examples, it is clearly possible to use *estar com* as an alternative to *ter* 'have' with nouns designating concrete objects (e.g. *Não estou com troco* 'I don't have change'). The key point is that when this construction is used with a feeling-denoting noun, there is a preference for the feeling to be of an afflictive kind.

8. Beyond the words considered in detail here, internet searches also show that the words for such diseases as cancer and AIDS and such afflictive emotions as *ciúme(s)* 'jealousy', *tristeza* 'sadness' and *pena* 'grief' don't come close to occurring as often in the *morrendo de* construction as *saudade(s)* and have a general frequency of occurrence that is only somewhat lower than that of *saudade(s)*.

9. As noted below (Section 8.2.2), *saudade* frequently occurs in its plural form, unlike the other items under consideration. Thus, both the singular and plural forms of only *saudade* were searched for. Since *falta*, unlike the other emotion words in this analysis, can also be a common verb form (non-1st singular subject, present indicative), the searches for *falta* were limited to *falta de* 'lack of', which guarantees examples of the noun *falta*.

10. The *Dicionário Universal da Língua Portuguesa* adds the following to the definition shown in (4) (see also Castro 1980: 18):

(no pl.) lembranças afectuosas a pessoas ausentes; (no pl.) cumprimentos.
'(plural) affectionate remembrances to absent people; (plural) salutations.'

11. I include the one occurrence of *Deus* 'God' in the count of person stimuli. The context is a religious text in which the author expresses a desire to return to an intimate relationship with God, through prayer.

12. 45,500 pages were found with the word *homesickness* on them. More than 7,000,000 were found to have *missing*. A close examination of a random set of 300 of these revealed that about 2% of the cases involved emotive "missing". Thus, emotive "missing" appears to occur about three times more often than *homesickness*.

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CHAPTER 9

The development of a key word

The deictic field of Spanish *crisis*

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This study represents a preliminary investigation into the application of the principles of the natural semantic metalanguage approach in historical linguistics. It offers synchronic evidence of key word status for Spanish *crisis* and, using semantic primes and universal syntax, demonstrates how the word itself developed over time. It uses the process of formulating semantic explications as the foundation of a methodology by which to assess change of meaning. The detailed comparison of the explications employs a “configuration method” aimed at offering insight into the semantic components of key word development. The method combines Bühler’s field theory with functional sentence perspective and emphasizes the dynamism of metalinguistic elements in order to track diachronic change.

9.1 Introduction

In the last four hundred years or so, the frequency of Spanish *crisis* has increased manifold. According to the CDE database (*Corpus del Español*, <http://www.corpusdelespanol.org>; 100 million words),¹ it doubled from the 1700s to the 1800s and quadrupled from the 1800s to the 1900s. Frequency measurements on 17th century texts in the database identify a mere 0.9 occurrences of the word *crisis* for every one million words. For the 18th century, the figure suddenly climbs to 11.6, then to 24.1 for the 19th century. The CDE data for the 20th century are subdivided in three categories: literary written texts (27.7 occurrences for every one million words), non-literary written texts (185.7 occurrences) and oral texts (134.9 occurrences). Analysis of the CDE corpus indicates that *crisis* has become a key word (Wierzbicka 1997: 16; Peeters this volume) occurring in diverse contexts that exemplify “conflict”. This paper offers synchronic evidence of key word status for *crisis* and addresses its diachronic development using the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) approach. In order to track semantic change in the deictic field (Bühler 1934) of the word *crisis*, the explications or metatexts for-

mulated in the course of the paper will be analyzed and compared employing a method which combines Bühler's field theory with functional sentence perspective (Čmejrková & Štícha 1994) and which highlights the dynamism of metalinguistic elements. The method described here offers insight into the semantic components of key word development (DuBartell 1998). The study as a whole represents a preliminary investigation of the applicability of NSM explications in historical linguistics.

9.2 Synchronic evidence for *crisis* as a key word

Crisis is a key word in Spanish. It is a common word that occurs in dozens of collocations indicating conflict as the semantic domain at issue.

9.2.1 The "common word" criterion

The 20th century CDE frequency statistics for oral texts and non-literary texts indicate that *crisis* is a common word. In non-literary written texts, comparison of *crisis* with *hablar* 'to speak' shows a similar range (103.4 words per million), although the total frequency for *hablar* is greater (304.3 words per million). An additional indication of key word status is provided by a quick check in the dictionary. A perusal of two entries for *crisis* in the *Diccionario de la lengua española*, approximately 50 years apart, shows that the word has increased its range of meanings. The entry for *crisis* in the 18th edition (DRAE 1956) offers the following definitions:

1. Mutación considerable que acaece en una enfermedad, ya sea para mejorarse, ya para agravarse el enfermo
'Significant change that occurs at a certain point in an illness, indicating whether the sick person improves or worsens'
2. Momento decisivo de un negocio grave y de consecuencias importantes
'The decisive moment, of important consequence, in serious negotiations'
3. Juicio que se hace de una cosa después de haberla examinado cuidadosamente
'Judgment about something after having carefully examined it'

The entry for *crisis* in the 22nd (DRAE 2001) offers additional definitions:

1. Cambio brusco en el curso de una enfermedad, ya sea para mejorarse, ya para agravarse el paciente
'Serious change in the course of an illness, indicating whether the patient improves or worsens'

2. Mutación importante en el desarrollo de otros procesos, ya de orden físico, ya históricos o espirituales
'Important change in the development of other processes, whether natural, historical or spiritual'
3. Situación de un asunto o proceso cuando está en duda la continuación, modificación, o cese
'A situation regarding a matter or process when there is doubt about whether it will continue, change, or discontinue'
4. Momento decisivo de un negocio grave y de consecuencias importantes
'The decisive moment, of important consequence, in serious negotiations'
5. Juicio que se hace de algo después de haberlo examinado cuidadosamente
'Judgment about something after having carefully examined it'
6. Escasez, carestía
'Poverty, want'
7. Situación dificultosa o complicada
'A difficult or complicated situation'

While a comparison of dictionary entries cannot be a primary tool for analysis, it does show that the meaning of *crisis*, an ordinary word (like all key words) uttered by speakers on a daily basis, has expanded noticeably and conspicuously. It is this rather straightforward information, available to anyone who consults the dictionary, which ought to be studied further, in detail, and using a reliable method.

9.2.2 The “semantic domain” criterion

An interesting and rather obvious feature of the word *crisis* in particular and of “conflict” as a semantic domain in general is that they apply to so many aspects of Latin American and Peninsular Spanish culture. *Crisis* describes all kinds of conflict in numerous areas of human life and activity (e.g. economics, sanitation, theater, self-confidence, sex, politics, war, finance, human rights, terrorism, marriage, oil trade, sports, ethnicity, society, disease, nerves, inflation, and the Middle East, just to mention a few). Conflict, on the other hand, exists *between* and *within*: between people, between ideas, between behaviors, choices, between nations, ethnicities, governments, between a person and a germ, between psycho-emotional states; within aspects of self-identification and decision-making, a community, a marriage, a family, within the human body, the government, industry, within an institution, the human soul. All of the above, and more, can be linked to the word *crisis* by means of the prepositions *de* and *en*, which collocate more than any others with this key word. In the CDE database, *crisis de* and *crisis del* rank 1st and 3rd in a group of 300 collocations, with frequencies of 15.8 words per million and 5 words per million, respectively; *crisis en* ranks 5th at 4.3 words per million.

- (1) Hace años que vengo pensando como escaparle a la crisis de este país.
(Víctor Winer, *Freno de mano*)
'For years I have been considering how to liberate this country from its *crisis*.'
- (2) Las transformaciones de Roma culminaron en la crisis del sistema republicano, la creación del principado de Augusto y el consiguiente Imperio romano.
(*Enciclopedia Edad Antigua*)
'The changes in Rome culminated in the *crisis* within the republican system, the creation of Augustus' principality and consequently the Roman Empire.'
- (3) Hay una crisis en la Administración de justicia en cuanto a su lentitud, su carestía, y su ineficacia.
(*España Govt.*)
'There is a *crisis* in the Justice Administration with regard to its slowness, its high expenditure, and its inefficiency.'

In 20th century Spanish, *crisis* indicates a sense of dangerous proportion in which the unchecked escalation of the perceived problem will lead to personal or social conflict.

- (4) Pues aquí estuve estudiando hasta que me llegó lo que se llama la crisis que le llega a todo el mundo en un momento.
(*Habla culta*)
'Well here I was studying until that which is called *crisis*, which comes to everyone in an instant, came to me.'
- (5) En estas épocas de crisis es responsabilidad de todos los ciudadanos colaborar con las autoridades y eso esperamos de usted. (Pancho Oddone, *Week-end*)
'In these times of *crisis* it is the responsibility of all the members of the community to cooperate with the authorities and that is what we expect of you.'
- (6) La obra dramática de Jean Cocteau está fecundada por los mitos clásicos. Sobre su espectro proyecta crisis y obsesiones personales y la aguda mirada de un entorno contemporáneo.
(*España ABC*)
'Jean Cocteau's dramatic work is filled with classic myths. He adds *crisis* and personal obsessions and a keen glance with a modern tilt into his spectrum of works.'
- (7) La aflicción de Alicia era más de rabia que de verdadero pesar. Habían podido más que ella. Pasada la crisis, exclamó: – Ahora mismo voy a ver al comisario de policía para decirle que se han llevado a mi marido sin mi consentimiento.
(Emilio Bobadilla, *A fuego lento*)
'Alicia's affliction was more from rage than true sorrow. They had been able to accomplish more than she. After the *crisis* passed, she exclaimed: – Right now I'm going to see the police commissioner to tell him that they have gotten my husband without my consent.'

Crisis indicates political conflict as well as economic conflict. In the previously mentioned list of 300 collocations, *crisis económica* ranks 2nd, at 10.3 words per

million, *crisis financiera* ranks 7th, and *crisis política* ranks 8th. Governments and agencies are expected to mediate and resolve conflicts. Countries become personified; *crisis* can affect the individual and the collective.

- (8) (...) el próximo gobierno no tendrá otra alternativa, deberá acometerlas so pena de llevar al país a una crisis económica sin precedentes. (*Semana*)
'The next government will have no other alternative; it will have to undertake them on pain of leading the country into an economic *crisis* without precedent.'
- (9) la gravísima crisis económica, social, política y moral que sufre España
(Arbos Balleste Santiago, *España ABC*)
'the most serious economic, social, political and moral *crisis* that Spain suffers'
- (10) Chile, donde todo se hallaba perturbado con la crisis económica
(Luis Luco Orrego, *Casa grande*)
'Chile, where everybody was perturbed by the economic *crisis*'

Crisis relates to crime, the military, and war, situations that place people in danger and conflict with one another. The conflict, which typically requires assistance in order to achieve resolution, comes quickly, it surprises people, and it has negative consequences.

- (11) cuando hay falta de reposo, cuando hay unos abusos sexuales, etcétera. El sujeto se ve bruscamente sorprendido por esta crisis (*España oral*)
'when there is no peace of mind, when there are cases of sexual abuse, etc. The subject finds him/herself suddenly surprised by this *crisis*'
- (12) Lo mismo ocurriría frente a la violencia, el disparate, la revolución, la crisis, el conflicto ingobernable. (Pancho Oddone, *Week-end*)
'The same would occur in conjunction with violence, shootings, revolution, *crisis*, the uncontrollable conflict.'
- (13) o ha sido el resultado inmediato de la crisis de Irak (*Cortes de Castilla*)
'or has been the immediate result of the *crisis* in Iraq'

Crisis indicates conflict within the public.

- (14) que eso está provocando la crisis de la opinión pública.
'that that is rousing a *crisis* of public opinion'

Crisis describes legal conflict, which requires arbitration.

- (15) (...) la curiosa circunstancia de que las nuevas propuestas de códigos de buen gobierno arrancan de la crisis generada por el caso Enron.
'the curious circumstances from which new proposals for a code of laws of good conduct arise from the *crisis* caused by the Enron case.'

- (16) En mi opinión (...) la crisis que está atravesando la justicia pasa. (*Habla culta*)
 'In my opinion, the *crisis* that is piercing justice is advancing.'

Crisis relates to medical issues. In the human struggle against disease-causing agents, time is typically a concomitant factor, whether it refers to a season or a period indicating the course of illness.

- (17) La razón está en que estas crisis coinciden con infecciones respiratorias, tanto en otoño como en invierno. (Alberto Aguirre de Carcer, *España ABC*)
 'The explanation is that these *crisis* [PL] coincide with respiratory infections, more often in fall than in winter.'
- (18) Durante tres días sufrió varias crisis cardíacas.
 'He suffered several cardiac *crisis* [PL] over three days.'
- (19) con una crisis de asma que se prolongó por varios días
 (Gabriela García Márquez, *Cien años de soledad*)
 'with an asthma *crisis* that lasted for several days'

Crisis designates religious conflict; the conflict may be at the institutional level or the personal level. This variance between the collective aspect of the experience of conflict and the individual aspect of the experience is a common semantic feature of *crisis*.

- (20) crisis de los predicadores y de los sermones y otros escritos
 (José Francisco de Isla, *Epistolario*)
 '*crisis* of the homilists and the sermons and other writings'
- (21) [Mi hermano] vivió, apenas adolescente, una crisis religiosa.
 (Leo Mendoza, *Cuento rojo pero muy cursi*)
 'Barely an adolescent, my brother experienced a religious *crisis*.'

Crisis signifies change in the world of art:

- (22) Vivimos hoy en una situación de crisis en todos los sentidos, y en arte esa crisis viene marcada por el poder del mercado. (Interview)
 'Today we live in a situation of *crisis* in all senses, and in art that *crisis* becomes stamped by market influences.'
- (23) En el ámbito musical, la crisis ha afectado en primer lugar al sector clásico.
 (Interview: Jose Luis Rubio)
 'In the music sphere, the *crisis* has affected in the first place the classical sector.'

Crisis marks conflict in interpersonal relationships:

- (24) la disolución como respuesta a la crisis matrimonial (Cortes de Castilla)
 'the break-up as a response to the marriage *crisis*'

- (25) a describir las crisis de amor de dos personajes
 'in describing the love *crisis* [PL] between two characters'

Very interestingly, *crisis* indicates the reassessment of historical events in terms of modern concepts of conflict.

- (26) cercano ya el centenario de la gran crisis nacional de 1898
 (Manuel Rios Ruiz, *España ABC*)
 'already close to the centennial of the great national *crisis* of 1898'
- (27) Hay momentos de crisis grave en el mundo, desde los romanos hasta nuestra era.
 (Interview: Blanca Berasategui)
 'There are instances of serious world *crisis* [PL], from the time of the Romans until our era.'
- (28) porque la situación económica en aquella época era muy mala, una situación de crisis profunda
 (*España oral*)
 'because the economic situation in that period was very bad, a situation of intense *crisis*'

To summarize, the range of conflict covered by the word *crisis* is quite broad; *crisis* identifies the psychological conflict of the individual and foretells the danger to civilization:

- (29) estoy en una de mis crisis emocionales
 (Emilio Bueso, *Justicia ciega*)
 'I am in one of my emotional *crisis* [PL]'
- (30) el problema de la decadencia, la crisis de nuestra civilización, el problema de la contaminación
 (*Habla culta*)
 'the problem of decadence, the *crisis* of our civilization, the problem of contamination'

The CDE corpus shows not only an increase in the frequency of *crisis*, but also a like increase in the synonyms for *crisis*. *Crisis* is associated early on in the 1200s with synonyms like *cambio* 'change', *peligro* 'danger', *riesgo* 'peril', *ruina* 'destruction', and *aprieto* 'difficulty'. The frequency of *cambio* 'change' increases from 16.5 words per million in the 1700s to 118.7 words per million in the 1800s and 264.7 words per million in the 1900s. The frequency of *peligro* 'danger' increases from .9 words per million in the 1600s to 110.4 words per million in the 1900s; *riesgo* 'peril' increases from 1.4 words per million in the 1400s to 37.8 words per million in the 1500s and 114.9 words per million in the 1600s. In the 1700s, a new synonym for *crisis* appears, viz. *depresión* 'depression'. Other synonyms indicative of conflict as the semantic domain also increase in frequency by the 20th century: *compromiso* 'predicament', *apuro* 'affliction', *ruina* 'ruin', and *trance* 'critical moment'.

Table 1. Some examples of ‘verb + a form of *crisis*’ collocations from the CDE

Onset	Magnitude	Duration	Outcome
<i>provocar</i> provoke	<i>padecer</i> be hurt	<i>estar en</i> be in	<i>solucionar</i> solve
<i>precipitar</i> precipitate	<i>sufrir</i> suffer	<i>durar</i> to last	<i>superar</i> overcome
<i>sortear</i> risk	<i>violentar</i> force	<i>entrar en</i> enter into	<i>resolver</i> resolve
<i>causar</i> cause	<i>llorar</i> bewail	<i>paliar</i> extenuate	<i>dejar</i> relinquish
<i>hacer</i> create	<i>afrentar</i> defy	<i>atravesar</i> go through	<i>desaparecer</i> disappear
<i>plantearse</i> state	<i>pesar de</i> ponder	<i>sentir</i> endure	<i>suponer</i> suppose
<i>producir</i> produce	<i>contener</i> repress	<i>parecer</i> seem	<i>suceder</i> follow
<i>aparecer</i> appear	<i>dilatar</i> enlarge	<i>pasar</i> pass through	<i>desatar</i> dissolve
<i>aguijar</i> incite	<i>aliviar</i> relieve	<i>implicar</i> entangle	<i>vencer</i> defeat
<i>determiner</i> specify	<i>acentuar</i> accentuate	<i>hablar de</i> discuss	<i>remover</i> remove
<i>brindar</i> invite	<i>soportar</i> bear	<i>afectar</i> influence	<i>terminar</i> end
<i>preceder</i> precede	<i>explotar</i> exploit	<i>ayudar</i> assist	
<i>empezar</i> begin	<i>ahondar</i> deepen	<i>vivir</i> continue	
<i>enfrentar</i> face	<i>estallar</i> explode	<i>constituir</i> constitute	
<i>poner</i> set	<i>disminuir</i> diminish	<i>tener</i> sustain	
<i>crear</i> create	<i>prolongar</i> lengthen	<i>esperar en</i> wait for	
<i> sintetizar</i> synthesize	<i>reflejar</i> consider	<i>existir</i> exist	
<i>generar</i> generate	<i>ver</i> examine	<i>aguardar</i> wait for	
<i>traer</i> bring		<i>repetir</i> repeat	
<i>exigir</i> exact			
<i>suscitar</i> promote			
<i>conjurar</i> avert			
<i>evitar</i> avoid			

9.2.3 The “phraseological cluster” criterion

Crisis in 20th century Spanish enters into more than 300 collocations indicating conflict of one sort or another, and new derivations appear: *poscrisis* or *postcrisis*, *anticrisis*, and *minicrisis*; taken together with the high frequency of *crisis*, such derivations lend more weight to the status of *crisis* as a key word. *Crisis* enters into phraseological clusters with verbs, adjectival constructions, nominals, and adverbials that are semantically compatible with conflict. It enters into hundreds of collocations and forms phraseological clusters with verbs and adjectives specifically indicative of the onset, magnitude, duration, and outcome of the conflict situation (Table 1).

The ‘adjective + *crisis*’ pattern functions semantically to emphasize magnitude and duration; the ‘*crisis* + adjective’ pattern more typically emphasizes the types of conflict, although magnitude and duration may also be expressed (Table 2).

The ‘*crisis* + *de* + nominal’ pattern also specifies numerous categories of conflict: sociological, psychological, medical, political, geographical, agricultural, biological, temporal, religious, personal (Table 3).

Table 2. Adjective collocations with *crisis* (CDE)

adjective + <i>crisis</i>	<i>crisis</i> + adjective
<i>catastrófica</i> catastrophic	<i>ideológica</i> ideological
<i>inevitable</i> unavoidable	<i>inminente</i> imminent
<i>gran</i> great	<i>solemnes</i> confirmed
<i>última</i> extreme	<i>gobierno</i> government
<i>gravísima</i> most grave	<i>profunda</i> profound
<i>verdadera</i> real	<i>fatal</i> deadly
<i>mayor</i> principal	<i>terrible</i> terrible
<i>peor</i> worse	<i>accidental</i> accidental
<i>profunda</i> profound	<i>nerviosa</i> nervous
<i>colosal</i> colossal	<i>intelectual</i> intellectual
<i>misera</i> wretched	<i>monetarias</i> financial
<i>severa</i> severe	<i>religiosa</i> religious
<i>seria</i> serious	<i>doméstica</i> domestic
<i>próxima</i> next	<i>peligrosa</i> hazardous
<i>propia</i> peculiar	<i>mortal</i> destructive
<i>sucesiva</i> successive	<i>general</i> prevalent
<i>presente</i> current	<i>amarga</i> bitter
<i>rampante</i> rampant	<i>ministerial</i> ministerial
<i>diferentes</i> different	<i>energética</i> active
<i>actual</i> present	<i>luego</i> prompt
<i>larga</i> extended	<i>grave</i> serious
<i>aguda</i> acute	<i>violenta</i> violent
<i>fortísima</i> most terrible	<i>revolucionaria</i> revolutionary
<i>reciente</i> recent	<i>pecuniaria</i> pecuniary
<i>prolongada</i> prolonged	<i>industrial</i> industrial
<i>varias</i> various	<i>económica</i> economic
<i>irreversible</i> irreversible	<i>agrícola</i> agricultural
<i>desesperante</i> maddening	<i>locales</i> local
<i>toda</i> complete	<i>moral</i> moral
<i>inexplicable</i> inexplicable	<i>política</i> political
<i>fuerte</i> terrible	<i>agrarian</i> agrarian
<i>dura</i> long	<i>etílica</i> ethylic
<i>extrema</i> extreme	<i>social</i> social
<i>endémica</i> endemic	<i>fisiológica</i> physiological
<i>insostenible</i> indefensible	<i>amorosas</i> love
<i>transcendentales</i> transcendental	<i> europeas</i> European
<i>extrañas</i> foreign	<i>emocionales</i> emotional

9.3 Diachronic evidence for the emergence of *crisis* as a key word

While synchronic analysis establishes key word status, diachronic analysis tracks key word development. Within a language L, the increase in frequency of a word X over time, in addition to other relevant factors such as use in a particular se-

Table 3. Nominal collocations of *crisis* (CDE)

<i>crisis</i> + <i>de</i> + nominal	
<i>de conciencia</i> of conscience	<i>de euphoria</i> of euphoria
<i>de angustia</i> of anguish	<i>de la familia</i> the family's
<i>del comunismo</i> in communism	<i>de mi vida</i> in my life
<i>de la izquierda</i> leftist	<i>de la disciplina académica</i> in academia
<i>del liberalismo</i> in liberalism	<i>de gobierno</i> in government
<i>del partido</i> the party's	<i>de la Reforma religiosa</i> of the Reformation
<i>de Italia</i> Italy's	<i>del Medio Oriente</i> in the Middle East
<i>de sofocación</i> of suffocation	<i>de la vida</i> of life
<i>de adaptación</i> of adaptation	<i>de la pubertad</i> of puberty
<i>de Japón</i> Japan's	<i>del tabaco</i> in the tobacco industry
<i>del petróleo</i> in petroleum	<i>del arroz</i> in the rice industry
<i>del capitalismo</i> with capitalism	<i>del olivo</i> in the olive industry
<i>de 1930</i> in 1930	<i>de los últimos años</i> in the most recent years
<i>de sufrimiento</i> of tolerance	<i>del Imperio carolingio</i> in the Carolingian Empire
<i>de Irlanda</i> Ireland's	<i>de personalidad</i> of individuality
<i>de la paz</i> of peace	<i>de hipertension</i> of hypertension
<i>de ese cambio</i> of that exchange	

mantic domain, proverbs, songs, titles and so on, is symptomatic of the status of key word. An increase in frequency over time of a particular word is an indicator of the cultural salience of the word. In Spanish, the frequency of *crisis* increases as semantic components shift and accrue to the meaning of the word. The increase in frequency of Spanish *crisis* over the decades and centuries corresponds with the appearance of additional contexts for *crisis* that continue to expand the use of the word as an indicator of conflict, the semantic domain with which it is associated. In general, *crisis* represents a case of semantic broadening within a particular semantic domain, although aspects of shift and pejoration also appear over time. As the specific semantic components of that semantic broadening, shift and pejoration can be revealed by means of semantic explications written in the NSM framework, the research method entails the following steps: (1) constructing the semantic explications to represent the uses, or senses, of *crisis*; (2) examining semantic primes in the deictic field; (3) determining strings, or configurations, of primes; (4) assessing functions of primes and of strings of primes; (5) identifying co-referential strings of primes across explications.

The pragmatic aspects of *crisis* hold linguistic clues to its development into a key word. The data for *crisis*, the earliest CDE Spanish attestation of which occurs in the 13th century, indicate that *crisis* is a word associated with the educated elite of the late medieval period. Such people would have had knowledge of Latin, Greek, the classics, law, and especially medicine. At this time, *crisis* represents an educated judgment, *juicio*, about a medical condition. As the temporal record of the database moves on, three additional semantic aspects become noticeable: first,

that *crisis* refers to the medical condition (shift) and eventually to situations of all types involving conflict (broadening); second, that after about the 18th century, the connotation of *crisis* can no longer be good or bad, but only bad (pejoration); third, that by the 20th century, *crisis* appears to be written (and possibly spoken) increasingly by people representative of various social and professional classes (housewives, music aficionados, students, social commentators, journalists, dictators, economists, authors, and even fictional characters); *crisis* is no longer strictly associated with knowledge of classical languages or learned fields. In addition, the shift in the perspective from 3rd person to 1st person, as will be presented below, seems to hint in a not too subtle way at the deictic field as the nexus for semantic changes.

Words, symbols, have meanings, but as Bühler (1934) notes through his application of Gestalt psychology to language study, the meanings derive from a context, a field; hence, meaning is always field-derived. Bühler perceived that a study of the *Zeigfeld*, the deictic field, would yield not only information about the deictic modes of Indo-European languages, but a systematic model of those deictic modes in all languages; he believed this task was not impossible to accomplish because humans cannot point in an infinite number of ways. His concept of a universal deictic field complements current NSM research. With reference to deictic modes, Bühler (1934:83) writes: “what we ask as theoreticians aims further, by presenting an examination of the systematic concept [of deixis], towards a model not only for Indo-European languages but for deixis in all languages, so that, in human language, pointing in the singular can be surveyed”.² In addition to the deictic field, he posits the *Symbolfeld*, the symbolic field. It is in the symbolic field that words function. Wierzbicka’s requirement that we examine collocations as evidence for key word status in effect provides the *Symbolfeld* for a word in question by providing the specific context of its use; from the context, a semantic domain is established, and from the semantic domain, semantic explications can be posited. NSM semantic explications as metatexts contribute towards an understanding of the deictic field and hence the *Umfeld*, the larger surrounding field that includes both the deictic and the symbolic fields in which words function and meaning is ascertained. Garvin (1994) interprets the symbolic field as linguistic context and the deictic field as extralinguistic setting; the surrounding words which appear with another, particular word form the immediate linguistic context while the circumstances governing the word’s use form the deictic field. The historical track that *crisis* takes as it develops into a key word may be illuminated by a metatext analysis of the semantic explications for *crisis* and of the semantic prime categories of substantive, determiner, time, and space, indicators in the deictic field. The numerous and varied collocations for *crisis* offer evidence for the expanding *Symbolfeld* and as the *Zeigfeld*, the deictic field, shifts accord-

ingly, the *Umfeld* grows to accommodate further linguistic expression about the types of conflict that speakers experience.

Firbas (1992:6), who also views utterances as a field of relations, describes text analysis in terms of functional sentence perspective, FSP, a theory that emphasizes communicative purpose: "The element towards which a sentence or subclause is oriented conveys the information that completes the development of the communication taking place within the sentence or subclause. It contributes most to this development and is therefore the most dynamic element within the sentence or the subclause." Firbas is interested in dynamic semantic functions (DSFs), which reveal "the interplay of factors determining the functional sentence perspective" (1995:52). The term *dynamic* indicates that the semantic content of a word is not unrelated to surrounding words, but rather derives its meaning from the definite contextual conditions of the communication (Firbas 1992); this is what Bühler (1934) refers to as "field-derived" meaning. The purpose of FSP is to analyze the distribution of information in the sentence or utterance as a field of relations. The NSM semantic explication presents a field of relations; the relations among semantic primes become apparent when we write several semantic explications to explicate the meaning of a word at various points in time. The FSP framework can be utilized to point out the functional relations among primes that form the meaning of a particular word (analogous to Firbas' concept of communicative dynamism) at a given point in time relative to previous points in time. In a metatext analysis, NSM primes function to foreground and perspective information about *crisis*; change in these functions over time signals change in the meaning of the key word. For example, in semantic explications for medieval *crisis*, the 3rd person elements SOMEONE and THIS PERSON are foregrounded as information about *crisis* is perspectived towards that specific deictic point of view; however, in later centuries that point of view shifts to primarily 1st person I, the new foregrounded element, towards which other primes perspective meaning.³

Although NSM explications do not represent natural language, certain principles of FSP research can be applied to the NSM explications in order to derive the perspectived information in the meaning of *crisis* since the FSP approach addresses form, function, and meaning from a system point of view. For this reason, the application of a modified FSP framework to the study of the deictic and symbolic fields of NSM explications yields results. It is rather obvious that anyone can note that a word's meaning seems to have changed over time when presented with such evidence as is available from surviving texts or several dictionaries. What is needed is a systematic way to go about trying to understand how such, perhaps obvious, change has happened. In what way(s) has a word's meaning become different? The analyst must be able to retrieve those specific semantic components and retrievability requires a method that addresses the significance of the linguistic context. Firbas claims that retrievability of information depends on co-referential linguis-

tic elements forming links and strings: “a co-referential link is formed by two, and a co-referential string by more than two, expressions sharing the same referent” (1994: 122). NSM semantic explications provide the compact metatextual domain of co-referential structures from which deictic and contextual information about *crisis* can be retrieved; NSM explications for different time-periods permit the tracking of links and strings of semantic primes, the linguistic elements of meaning under examination. Links and strings of primes which appear from metatext to metatext provide stability in the system; changes in those links and strings, the appearance of new primes and discontinuation of established primes, provide flexibility (“dynamaticity”) in the system of language. The application of specific principles of FSP to the semantic explications of the NSM approach permits direct access, so to speak, to functional elements within the deictic and symbolic fields.

The diachronic analysis that follows presents 5 semantic explications; these explications illustrate changes in the meaning of *crisis* over the course of the 8 centuries of language data included in the CDE corpus.

9.3.1 *Crisis* as medical judgment

Spanish *crisis* derives from Latin *crisis*, from Greek *krísis* ‘decision’, ‘judgment’, or ‘turning point of a disease’, from the verb *krinein* ‘to separate or decide’; the PIE root is *sker-* ‘to cut, separate, sift’ (Buck 1949). Etymological information from Liddell & Scott’s *Greek-English Lexicon* (accessible on-line at <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu>) cites Greek *krísis* as meaning:

- I. 1. separating, distinguishing; 2. decision, judgment; 3. choice, election; 4. interpretation of dreams or portents
- II. 1. judgment of a court; 2. trial of skill or strength; 3. dispute
- III. 1. event, issue to be decided; 2. turning point of a disease, sudden change for better or worse
- IV. 1. middle of the spinal column

Given the important long-standing role of Latin and the relatively small number of people who were fluent in Latin during the early medieval period (Collins 1990), it is not surprising that the classical sense of *crisis* as ‘judgment’ should persist for so many centuries as a borrowing into Spanish. Mass literacy, the result of technological innovation (the printing press), may have contributed to the extended meanings of *crisis*; by the 18th century, metaphorical extensions of *crisis* that include additional contexts of conflict (e.g. economy, politics, nature, military, theology, and so on) become evident. The written corpus data from the 13th through the 16th centuries indicate the continued influence of (written) classical Greek and Latin thought and exegesis on Spanish. In the 17th century, Antonio Liñán y Vergugo notes the meaning of *crisis*:

- (31) crisis es un vocablo de naturaleza griego, de la facultad de la arte médica, que quiere decir juicio, del verbo crino, que es juzgar

(*Guía y avisos forasteros que vienen a la Corte*)

‘...*crisis* is a word of Greek origin, from the knowledge of medical arts, that means judgment, from the verb *crino*, which means to judge.’

In the CDE corpus, the earliest sense of conflict in the meaning of *crisis* involves decision-making, most frequently in the medical context. A decision, or judgment, conclusively settles contention or uncertainty about an issue, yet arriving at a decision initiates a process of weighing contrastive, incompatible, or antithetical ideas; in order to “decide”, one must resolve a conflict (of ideas, actions, or beliefs, for example). The physician or other knowledgeable person must assess a particular situation, weigh variables about that situation, and pronounce a judgment about the sick person’s condition as well as the procedures that healing must entail; in the 1200s, *crisis* as judgment can be both “good” and “bad”, two antithetical notions. This connotation of conflicting ideas in modern Spanish survives in part in the noun *crítica* ‘criticism’, the adjective *crítico* ‘critical’, and the verb *criticar* ‘to criticize’. The modern Spanish popular expression *determinación de la naturaleza de una enfermedad* ‘determination of the kind of illness’ or the medical term *diagnosis* ‘diagnosis’ relates more closely to Medieval Spanish *crisis* in terms of the medical provider’s knowledge-based judgment. There are only two entries in the CDE database for the 1200s, both from the same work. The excerpts relate *crisis* in the sense of ‘judgment’ to *el enfermo* ‘illness’ in both cases.

- (32) El sexto catamiento es: enque tiempo sanara desta enfermedat; o enque tiempo morra el enfermo. El vijo. Catamiento es: en saber las crisis buenas o malas.

(Ali Ben Ragel, *Judizios de las estrellas*)

‘The sixth rule is about the time during which this illness be cured or at what time the sick person will die. The seventh rule is in knowing good or bad *crisis* [PL]’

- (33) La. vija. parte deste capitulo enla crisis + Il Cata esto dela//dela enfermedat. Luna. que la luna llegare a infortuna; puia la enfermedat & se esfuerça. (ibid.)
‘The seventh part of this chapter on *crisis* + the part of the illness. Moon. That the moon brings misfortune; the illness worsens and becomes stronger.’

Six CDE entries for the 1300s, all from the *Historia troyana* by Guido de Columna, mention *crisis* or *Crisis*, a knowledgeable priest who advises the Greeks, in the description of Trojan sacrifices made to Apollo. The continued literary influence of classical study presents interesting aspects of *crisis* as judgment “incarnate” or “personified”: the judgment is provided by a member of the ‘high culture’, the priest in classical or the physician in medieval times, members of an elite literate caste.

- (34) Titulo ciento y quarto de como el sacerdote Crisis consejo alos griegos que se fiziesse vn caualllo de arambre que cupiesen enel mil hombres & asi fue fecho. 'Chapter 104 about how the priest *Crisis* advised the Greeks to construct a horse from scraps in which 1000 men hid and so it was done.'
- (35) En esta razon eso mesmo colcas con otro sacerdote que se llama crisis. 'In this way, that same one takes up a position with another priest who is called *crisis*. .'

The number of CDE entries representing the 1400s increases to thirty-one and are gleaned from several sources, viz. Antonio de Nabrija's *Dictionarium hispano-latinum*, Alfonso de Palencia's *Universal Vocabulario de Latín en Romance*, Lanfranco de Milano's *Cirugía Mayor*, as well as several medical volumes by Bernardo de Goronio (*Lilio de Medicina*, *Prognostica: Las Pronósticas*, and *De Regimine Acutorum Morborum: Regimento de las Agudas*). The first edition of the *Dictionarium hispano-latinum* was published in 1492. In his entry for *crisis*, de Nabrija relates *crisis* to judgment; he renders Latin *crisis* as Spanish (Castilian) *crisis* and notes the earlier etymology from Greek:

- (36) LAT. iudicium.ij. iudicatus.us. Juizio del censor. LAT. censura.ae. Juizio dela apelacion. LAT. recuperatio.onis. Juizio en griego. LAT. [crisis] crisis

Alphonso de Palencia's *Universal Vocabulario en Latín y en Romance*, originally published in 1490, is a Latin-Castilian dictionary attempting to elucidate Latin vocabulary for the author's contemporaries. In the entry for Latin *crisis*, de Palencia provides a definition linked to medical decision-making:

- (37) Crisis. Discussió o cognoscimiêto de salud termino de enfermedad. Ca crisis es tomar termino dende se dize día cretico: el que tienen por terminatiuo dela enfermedad.
'Crisis. The discussion or knowledge of health, a term of illness. This word *crisis* is construed from the term called 'judgment day' that they have respective to the illness.'

Lanfranco de Milano's *Cirugía Mayor* is a text on medical surgery. Spanish *crisis* is mentioned in the sense of 'judgment' of the physician on how to proceed, particularly in the sense of *buena crisis* 'good judgment':

- (38) E los conualesçentes de enfermedat non son de sangrar espeçialmente quando toujeren buena crisis.
'And the experts on illness are not to bleed especially when they follow good *crisis*.'

The semantic explication proposed below for *crisis* up to this point in time focuses on decision-making and the dichotomy between GOOD and BAD and between LIVE and DIE. It incorporates relevant contextual material in which the word was

used because it is through context that meaning arises. Bühler (1934) stressed the importance of linguistic context when he claimed that meaning is field-derived (see above). The approach is similar to the one adopted in several NSM writings. Wierzbicka (1992: 133), for instance, formulates her semantic explication for the English adjective *ashamed* under the heading “(X is) ashamed”. Similarly, she includes human agency in her description of abstract nouns such as Greek *apatheia*, Czech *litost*, German *Vaterland*, and Latin *libertas* (Wierzbicka 1997).

(Someone [X] has) *crisis*

- (a) X knows many things
- (b) X knows what is good for the body
- (c) X knows what is bad for the body
- (d) other people do not know these things
- (e) X knows if someone else will live
- (f) X knows if someone else will die
- (g) X wants other people to live, not die
- (i) when X thinks for some time about someone else’s body
- (j) X can say something true
- (k) X can do good to this person
- (l) this is good for this person’s body
- (m) because of this, after this, this person can live

(Spanish version)

- (a) X sabe muchas cosas
- (b) X sabe lo que es bueno para el cuerpo
- (c) X sabe lo que es malo para el cuerpo
- (d) otra gente no sabe estas cosas
- (e) X sabe si otra persona va a vivir
- (f) X sabe si otra persona va a morir
- (g) X quiere que otra gente viva, no muera
- (i) cuando X piensa por un tiempo en el cuerpo de otra persona
- (j) X puede decir algo bueno
- (k) X puede hacer algo bueno para esta persona
- (l) eso es bueno para el cuerpo de esta persona
- (m) a causa de eso, después de eso, esta persona puede vivir

Although *crisis* is the decision or judgment or final conclusion, the person making the decision cannot be extracted from the semantic explication of the word; human agency is inherent in its meaning. On the basis of an implicit comparison with chronologically later explications (see below), it can be said that, in the one above, foregrounded primes include SOMEONE (X), KNOW, THINK, SAY, DO, all of which relate to human agency, and also BODY, LIVE, DIE, GOOD, and BAD. Per-

spectiving (strings of) primes, on the other hand, include MANY THINGS, OTHER PEOPLE, SOMEONE ELSE, and SOMETHING TRUE. The 3rd person perspective of *crisis* arises from a sense of someone (X) pronouncing the judgment. The evidence suggests a person who has the specialized skill, the ability ('X knows'), to pronounce a judgment and who is obviously an authority figure. The knowledge held by this person is not commonly held by other members of the culture. Other people depend on this person to help them; they look up to this person for guidance because this person possesses certain skills. The temporal indication in the metatext about *crisis* relates time to the period of decision-making. In subsequent metatexts, 'time' remains as a semantic component of *crisis*, but temporal indications will shift away from decision-making as 'X thinks' loses its foregrounding function.

9.3.2 *Crisis* as medical situation

It has become undeniable that several connotations of a word exist concurrently, although decreased frequency for connotations and uses varies and may ultimately lead to a word becoming archaic or obsolete. Lanfranco de Milano's *Cirugía Mayor*, already quoted in (38), where *crisis* has the older meaning, also contains the following passage relating to pregnancy, fever, and ear abscesses and tumors:

- (39) El apostema que es fecha sola rrayz del oreja algunas vezes se faze por via de crisis por termjñación dela fiebre quando la natura non es poderosa por la su flaqueza o por la munchedunbre o groeza dela materia expelilla.
 'The abscess which is at the moment only located in the ear is sometimes signified by way of *crisis* at the end of the fever, when nature is not strong enough, through weakness or through masses or through the copiousness of expelled material.'

Bernardo de Goronio's writings also provide evidence that semantic components of *crisis* were shifting as early as the 1400s:

- (40) (...) algunas vezes con frenesi & algunas vezes por apostema dela lengua (...) & vniuersalmente es mala crisis & sospechosa. (*Lilio de medicina*)
 'Sometimes with frenzy and sometimes with a tumor of the tongue (...) and generally it is a bad *crisis* and suspicious.'
- (41) Tres cosas nos conuiene saber. Primero que sea sabido el comienço dela enfermedad. Segundo que no caya y yerro. Tercero si el crisis continuare por tres dias que sea sabido (...). (*Prognostica*)
 'Three things really matter. First that the origin of the illness be known. Second that the symptoms do not abate or become stagnant. Third that, if the *crisis* continues for three days, it be known (...).'

A semantic explication for *crisis* in the sense of ‘medical situation’ must capture the significant shift from the person making a medical judgment to the situation that warrants medical judgment, from ‘someone knowing’ to ‘something happening’:

(Someone [Y] *has*) *crisis*

- (a) something is happening inside someone (Y)’s body
- (b) this thing happens for some time
- (c) maybe this thing will happen for a long time
- (d) maybe this thing will happen for a short time
- (e) maybe this thing is something bad
- (f) if it is something bad, people do not want it
- (g) some people know if this thing is bad for the body of other people
- (h) maybe one of these people (X) can do something for Y’s body
- (i) this is good for Y’s body
- (j) if X can do something for Y’s body, perhaps Y can live after this

(Spanish version)

- (a) algo pasa en el cuerpo de alguien (Y)
- (b) esta cosa pasa por un tiempo
- (c) tal vez esta cosa va a pasar por mucho tiempo
- (d) tal vez esta cosa va a pasar por poco tiempo
- (e) tal vez esta cosa es algo malo
- (f) si es algo malo, la gente no la quiere
- (g) algunas personas saben si esta cosa es mala para el cuerpo de otra gente
- (h) tal vez una de estas personas (X) puede hacer algo para el cuerpo de Y
- (i) eso es bueno para el cuerpo de Y
- (j) si X puede hacer algo para el cuerpo de Y, tal vez Y puede vivir después de eso

The information about *crisis* is still perspectived towards the 3rd person singular, but it is the ‘something happening’ to a sick person that becomes foregrounded against the person pronouncing a judgment; some of the previously foregrounded primes (particularly SOMEONE (X), KNOW and BODY) now function to perspective meaning towards the ‘(some)thing’ that is ‘happening inside someone’s body’. At this point in time, the GOOD / BAD dichotomy gives way to BAD. The situation generally seems to be bad, so SOMETHING, BAD, and HAPPENING are the foregrounded dynamic semantic primes; they are the primes towards which other elements of the explication relate, including the person knowing and doing something good (i.e. making a medical judgment). MAYBE is another foregrounded prime, which underscores the idea that the *crisis* situation is going to last for an unknown period, and that the outcome is uncertain. The prime FOR SOME TIME is now perspectived towards ‘this thing happens’ and foregrounded are the new primes A LONG

TIME and A SHORT TIME. Hence, the dynamaticity in the system derives from the appearance of new primes and functional shifts in (strings of) continuing primes.

In short, in the 1400s, *crisis* continues as a term associated with the medical context;⁴ however, it gradually comes to signify the medical situation or condition of the patient, not exclusively the judgment of the physician about the medical condition. Although *crisis* is evolving from medical judgment about a condition or situation to the medical condition or situation itself, the more recent connotation of *crisis*, ‘something happening’, does not immediately replace the older ‘someone knows’. The use of *crisis* as ‘medical judgment’ continues, and in the semantic explication for *crisis* as ‘medical situation’, some of the components from *crisis* as ‘medical judgment’ remain, either as such (e.g. ‘this is good for Y’s body’) or as closely related components (e.g. ‘some people know’, ‘one of these people (X) can do something’). The development of *crisis* as a key word advances on a chronological continuum along which semantic changes about conflict relate to shifts in the centers and peripheries of the distribution or organization of the semantic primes. The semantic explications allow us to look at the inventory of functional semantic primes at any given time in a particular context.

9.3.3 *Crisis* as a negative situation

The CDE data for the 1600s attest to the continued expansion of contexts for *crisis*. It becomes a word that relates to other potentially bad situations and is no longer limited to a medical context. Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora, in 1672, employs a medical metaphor of crisis to describe natural catastrophes:

- (42) otras malignas mutaciones de los astros, a las que la Tierra, infectada o como hinchada y atacada por alguna enfermedad gravísima, expele como en una crisis; y si no fueran ellas expelidas, sucederían terremotos, incendios, inundaciones, furores de tempestades, cambios de reinos

(*Libra astronómica y philosophica*)

‘other evil changes in the stars, different from those that Earth, infected or like swollen and attacked by some grave illness, expels as if in a *crisis*; and if they were not expelled, there would come about earthquakes, fires, floods, furies of storms, changes in kingdoms’

The *crisis* situation can refer to politics and economics:

- (43) no tanto cuerpo de su historia cuanto alma de su política; no narración de sus hazañas, discurso sí de sus aciertos; crisis de muchos reyes

(Baltasar Gracián, *El político don Fernando el Católico*)

‘not so much a body of history as a spirit of politics; not a narration of their exploits, but instead discourse about their abilities; the *crisis* of many kings’

- (44) Nosotros tenemos un banco cuya excelente organización se acreditó en las terribles crisis de que ha salido, salvando su existencia y su crédito.
 (Francisco Gregorio, Marqués de Valle Santoro, *Elementos de economía política con aplicación particular a España*)
 ‘We have a bank whose excellent organization gained a reputation in the terrible *crisis* [PL] that have occurred, preserving its existence and its reputation.’

Even as *crisis* continues to denote judgment, the context is not limited to medicine:

- (45) Las palabras muestran la entereza, pero mucho más las obras. Aquí es menester el extravagante reparo, la observación profunda, la sutil nota y la juiciosa crisis. (Baltasar Gracián, *Oráculo manual y arte de la prudencia*).
 ‘Words demonstrate fortitude, but deeds much more so. Here is the need for extreme reflection, profound observation, acute notice, keen critique, and wise *crisis*.’
- (46) Los números, ¿quién no sabe que tienen virtudes ciertas ? En la música, la octava, la sexta, quinta y tercera y sus compuestos dan gusto; todos los demás disuenan, y la consonancia puede hasta en los brutos y peñas. El número septenario honró Dios, virtud encierra; y tiene en contados días su crisis cualquier dolencia. ¿Quién no sabe que hay virtudes en las piedras y en las yerbas? (Juan Ruiz de Alarcón y Mendoza, *La Cueva de Salamanca*).
 ‘Numbers, who does not know that numbers possess real powers? In music, the octave, the sixth, fifth and third [interval of degrees in a diatonic scale] and their compositions are pleasing; others are discordant, and harmony has force even on beasts and stones. The number seven honored God, power embraced; and any affliction has its *crisis* in these numbered days. Who does not know that there are powers in the stones and in the grass?’

The semantic explication for *crisis* meaning ‘negative situation’ reflects a general sense of conflict in areas other than medicine:

(There is a) *crisis* (somewhere)

- (a) something bad is happening
- (b) this thing happens for some time
- (c) maybe this thing will happen for a long time
- (d) maybe this thing will happen for a short time
- (e) people do not want this thing to happen
- (f) people want something good to happen after this
- (g) maybe someone can do something
- (h) if this person does this, this thing will not happen after this
- (i) some people know if there is someone like this

(Spanish version)

- (a) algo malo está pasando
- (b) esta cosa pasa por un tiempo
- (c) tal vez esta cosa va a pasar por mucho tiempo
- (d) tal vez esta cosa va a pasar por poco tiempo
- (e) la gente no quiere que esta cosa pase
- (f) la gente quiere que algo bueno pase después
- (g) tal vez alguien puede hacer algo
- (h) si esta persona hace eso, esta cosa no va a pasar después
- (i) algunas personas saben si hay alguien así

Noticeably absent are those strings of dynamic functional semantic primes and prime strings that refer to the body (BODY, SOMEONE ELSE'S BODY, THE BODY OF OTHER PEOPLE); SOMEWHERE becomes a foregrounded functional prime as it replaces the locatives SOMEONE ELSE'S BODY and THE BODY OF OTHER PEOPLE (since the space of the situation is no longer limited in this way). Now, 'something is happening' and this "something" can apply to several types of situations. This thing can only be BAD. The concept of knowledgeable authority figures persist, but is now generalized as the 'some people' who 'know' whether something can be done about this situation; this person is not necessarily someone with medical knowledge. Temporal concepts related to *crisis* become complex. The primes FOR SOME TIME, A LONG TIME and A SHORT TIME remain stable, although they are now perspectived towards the SOMETHING SOMEWHERE. The idea that the *crisis* situation is going to last for an unknown period remains foregrounded. Line (f) introduces an additional foregrounded temporal string, AFTER THIS, towards which 'people want something good' becomes perspectived.

9.3.4 The *crisis* worsens

An FSP analysis of the CDE data shows that, from the 18th century onward, 'urgency' and 'climax' become highlighted features of *crisis*. The medical context persists, but (as before) is no longer exclusive.

- (47) la crisis (...) de la enfermedad pestilencial
(Benito Jerónimo Feijoo, *Cartas eruditas y curiosas*, vol. 4)
'the *crisis* (...) of the pestilential illness'
- (48) Los niños suelen padecer varias erupciones, todas indicantes de una crisis violenta de la naturaleza (...).
(Josefa Amar y Borbón, *Discurso sobre la educación física y moral de las mujeres*)
'Children are prone to suffering from various outbreaks, all indicative of a violent *crisis* of temperament.'

The data for the 1700s provide adjective collocations such as *muchas crisis* 'numerous crisis', *crisis fatal* 'fatal crisis', *crisis cruel* 'cruel crisis', *crisis peligrosas* 'dangerous crisis' [PL], *crisis extraordinarias* 'extraordinary crisis' [PL], 'evil crisis' 'evil crisis', even *juiciosa crisis* 'wise crisis' and *buena crisis* 'good crisis', the last two signifying the dwindling positive connotation of the word. Verbs entering collocations include: *faltar* 'lack', *salvarse* 'escape' (from danger), *parecer* 'seem', *desear* 'wish', *formarse* 'develop', *bataallar* 'struggle', *proponer* 'resolve', *hacer* 'do', and *observer* 'examine'. The data for the 1800s show collocations indicating increased intensity of the conflict: *las supremas crisis* 'the final crisis' [PL], *esa laboriosa crisis* 'that painful crisis', *tremenda crisis* 'awful crisis', *la ultima crisis* 'the last crisis'. Verbs entering collocations include: *provocar* 'provoke', *prescindir* 'do without', *sorprender* 'surprise', *estallar* 'explode', *complicarse* 'become entangled', *acercarse* 'approach', *acometer* 'overtake', *sufrir* 'suffer', *contener* 'restrain', and *caer* 'languish', among many more that connote a sense of escalation, inevitability, and tension.

- (49) Semejante crisis económica era nueva en el mundo; y nosotros no supimos entonces evitar el riesgo, que amenazaba, de la ruina de nuestras fábricas.
(Pedro Rodríguez Campomanes, *Discurso sobre la educación popular de los artesanos y su fomento*)
'Similar economic crisis was new in the world; and we did not know then to avoid the risk, that threatened, of the ruin of our factories.'
- (50) Cuarto, los que andaban solos antes de esta crisis rehúsan algunas veces, no sólo el andar, sino el tenerse en pie, y es crueldad querer obligarlos por fuerza.
(Josefa Amar y Borbón, *Discurso sobre la educación física y moral de las mujeres*)
'Fourth, those who go alone before this crisis deny sometimes, not only the pace, but also the stand, and it is cruelty to want to force them by strength.'
- (51) La protección ahoga la industria, hincha los talleres de productos inútiles, altera y descalabra las leyes del comercio, amenaza con una tremenda crisis, crisis de hambre y de ira, a los países en que se mantiene. Sólo la libertad trae consigo la paz y la riqueza.
(José Martí, *En los Estados Unidos. Escenas norteamericanas*)
'Protectionism [the tariff system] stifles industry, inflates factories with useless products, changes and damages commercial law, and threatens an awful crisis, a crisis of hunger and ire, in the countries which support it. Only freedom brings with it peace and wealth.'

By the mid-1800s, the idea of a *crisis* coming seems to be an inescapable concomitant of destiny. Humans cannot avoid the experience of a *crisis*. The future certainly holds *crisis* and will be known for the spectacular, unavoidable problems yet to come.

- (52) Sobre este pueblo ha llovido en pocos años cuantas plagas son imaginables: crisis económicas que han reducido a polvo en una noche fortunas tradicionales; epidemias asoladoras que han diezmado las familias.
(José María de Pereda, *Escenas montañosas*)
'On this town, in just a few years, every imaginable plague has rained down: economic *crisis* [PL] that have reduced traditional fortunes to dust in one night; destructive epidemics that have decimated families.'
- (53) (...) todos estos hechos múltiples inspiraban natural temor a un conflicto que pudiese incendiar toda la tierra y traer al género humano dolorosas crisis.
(Emilio Castelar, *Historia del año 1883*)
'all these multiple deeds inspired a natural dread of a conflict that could incinerate the entire world and bring all humans sorrowful *crisis* [PL].'
- (54) Cada nuevo avance de las industrias químicas fundadas en la síntesis orgánica, provocará una crisis, todavía mayor que la padecida ya por la vainilla y por la granza, en el sello de la Agricultura: crisis del olivo, crisis de la viña, crisis de los cereales, crisis de la cañamiel y de la remolacha, crisis del tabaco, crisis de la palma, crisis del corcho, crisis de la almendra, crisis del lúpulo, crisis del arroz, crisis del ganado. El siglo XX está llamado a ser el siglo de las crisis agrícolas; crisis terribles.
(Joaquín Costa, *La fórmula de la Agricultura Española*)
'Every new advance in the chemical industries founded on organic synthesis will provoke a *crisis*, greater – whichever way you look at it – than the one suffered already by vanilla and by madder, in the area of agriculture: the olive *crisis*, the vine *crisis*, the grain *crisis*, the sugar-cane and sugar beet *crisis*, the tobacco *crisis*, the palm tree *crisis*, the cork *crisis*, the almond *crisis*, the hops *crisis*, the rice *crisis*, the cattle *crisis*. The twentieth century is set to become the century of agricultural *crisis* [PL]; terrible *crisis* [PL].'
- (55) La criatura humana, desde que puede considerarse como ser moral, es decir, desde que tiene noción suficiente del mal y del bien, y poder para realizar el uno o el otro, lo cual acontece en los primeros años de la vida hasta el fin de ella si no es muy breve (...) tiene crisis, casi metamorfosis.
(Arenal Concepción, *Informes presentados en los Congresos penitenciarios de Estocolmo, Roma, San Petersburgo y Amberes*)
'Human beings, as soon as they can consider themselves to be ethical beings, that is, as soon as they have some notion of evil and good, and the power to effect one or the other, which occurs in the early years of life until the end of it if it is not very short (...), experiences *crisis* [PL], almost metamorphosis [PL].'

A semantic explication for *crisis* in a context referring to an urgent situation or a climax must continue to emphasize the broader sense of a crisis occurring anywhere. As the *crisis* develops, which it does rather quickly, people do not yet understand how or why it has happened, cannot control it, do not want it to hap-

pen, and do not know if the situation will eventually improve. There is a sense of inevitability.

(*There is a crisis (somewhere)*)

- (a) something very bad is happening
- (b) this thing happens for some time
- (c) maybe this thing will happen for a long time
- (d) maybe this thing will happen for a short time
- (e) maybe people do not know how this thing happens
- (f) a short time ago, people thought:
- (g) this thing cannot happen now
- (h) now, people know: this thing is happening
- (i) because of this, people want to do something
- (j) nobody can do anything now
- (k) people do not want this thing to happen
- (l) people want something good to happen after this
- (m) maybe something good will happen after this
- (n) people do not know this

(Spanish version)

- (a) algo muy malo está pasando
- (b) esta cosa pasa por un tiempo
- (c) tal vez esta cosa va a pasar por mucho tiempo
- (d) tal vez esta cosa va a pasar por poco tiempo
- (e) tal vez la gente no sabe cómo esta cosa pasa
- (f) hace poco tiempo, la gente pensó:
- (g) esta cosa no puede pasar ahora
- (h) ahora, la gente sabe: esta cosa está pasando
- (i) a causa de eso, la gente quiere hacer algo
- (j) nadie puede hacer nada ahora
- (k) la gente no quiere que esta cosa pase
- (l) la gente quiere que algo bueno pase después
- (m) tal vez algo bueno va a pasar después
- (n) la gente no sabe eso

At this point in time, the situation comes to be perceived as very negative; the idea of *buena crisis* is no longer possible. A *crisis* is by definition a very bad thing. The information is perspectived towards the foregrounded dynamic semantic primes SOMETHING VERY BAD, SOMEWHERE, and NOW, the last prime representing an addition to the temporal frame and hence indicating a new deictic element in the meaning of *crisis*. The primes FOR SOME TIME, A LONG TIME, A SHORT TIME and the combination AFTER THIS continue to figure as perspectiving temporal components

of *crisis*. Another deictic shift, one that started with a singular SOMEONE in the first metatext and moved towards a plural – first SOME PEOPLE, then (in the metatext above) PEOPLE at large –, has reached its conclusion; information becomes perspectived towards the many from the one or the few. Collocations appearing at this time include: *suprema crisis* ‘supreme crisis’, *tremenda crisis* ‘dreadful crisis’, *laboriosa crisis* ‘painful crisis’, *funesta crisis* ‘mournful crisis’, *última crisis* ‘extreme crisis’, *grave crisis* ‘serious crisis’; *crisis más profunda* ‘most intense crisis’, *crisis mortal* ‘deadly crisis’, *crisis terribles* ‘terrible crisis [PL]’, *crisis accidental* ‘accidental crisis’, *crisis peligrosas* ‘dangerous crisis [PL]’.

9.3.5 The *crisis* life-style of the 20th century

The entries for the 1900s continue with similar data for the meaning of *crisis*, the urgency, the inevitability, but the following admits a ray of hope for change, even possibly for avoiding the crisis altogether:

- (56) Si a esta simple atracción del interés se une la *multiplicación cooperativa*, las crisis se hacen imposibles; y si, por fin, se admite un tercer factor compuesto, la asociación de inteligencias, entonces los filósofos se estremecen en sus sepulcros, porque ya está salvado el mundo.

(Joaquín Costa, *Notas pedagógicas*)

‘If *cooperative multiplication* is added to this simple arousal of interest, *crisis* [PL] become impossible; and if, finally, one admits a third compound factor, the association of intellects, then philosophers will start turning in their graves, because the world is already saved.’

My observation about the connotation of *crisis* in the 20th century data is that the experience of *crisis* has become a stable, expected way of life in the industrial world. One hopes to escape *crisis*, yet it is everywhere and it is instantaneous. However, everyone has experienced it and so anyone can analyze it, describe it, talk about it, and live *with* it.

- (57) Somos una Comunidad autónoma con el problema del terrorismo y de la crisis industrial, y Bilbao es una ciudad en declive, con muchas dificultades.

(Interview: Franco María Luisa García)

‘We are an independent community, faced with the problem of terrorism and of industrial *crisis*, and Bilbao is a city in decline, with many difficulties.’

- (58) Su visión previno que la crisis explotara sistemáticamente y aún que se convirtiera en un problema económico internacional.

(Interview: Ernesto Zedillo)

‘His vision prevented the *crisis* from erupting in a systematic way and even from becoming an international economic problem.’

- (59) Las crisis de angustia pueden comenzar muy rapidamente, alcanzando el punto de gravedad máxima en unos diez minutos, y suelen durar una hora.

(Interview: Esther Armora)

‘*Crisis* [PL] of anguish can begin very quickly, reaching the point of maximum seriousness in about ten minutes and they can last an hour.’

Crisis becomes a matter of personal experience, even a *rite de passage*.

- (60) Mi última novela reflexiona sobre todas estas cosas, es una novela sobre la crisis de la pasión y sobre el miedo a la pasión, y he tenido que reflexionar mucho y salir de mí. (España oral)

‘My latest novel reflects on all these things, it’s a novel about the *crisis* of passion and the fear of passion, and I’ve had to reflect a lot and transcend myself.’

- (61) es cierto que estamos viviendo una crisis

(Interview: Mireya Hernandez Perez)

‘it is certain that we are living through a *crisis*’

- (62) Mis pensamientos empezaron a desordenarse, como me pasa siempre que estoy en una de mis crisis emocionales. (Emilio Bueso, *Justicia ciega*)

‘My thoughts began to unravel, as always happens to me when I am in one of my emotional *crisis* [PL].’

A semantic explication for the most recent use of the word *crisis* must do justice to the fact that we are now dealing with a personal experience, involving personal assessment or evaluation of a situation. Now, I “knows” a *crisis* is occurring; I does not need the validation of SOMEONE ELSE identifying SOMETHING as VERY BAD.

(*There is a crisis (somewhere)*)

- (a) something very bad is happening now
- (b) I know this thing is happening
- (c) maybe this thing will happen for a long time
- (d) maybe this thing will happen for a short time
- (e) I do not want this thing to happen
- (f) if I do something,
- (g) maybe this thing will not happen after now
- (h) maybe something good will happen after this
- (i) I want to do something
- (j) maybe I cannot do anything for some time
- (k) maybe nobody can do anything
- (l) I want something good to happen after this

(Spanish version)

- (a) algo muy malo está pasando ahora
- (b) yo sé que esta cosa está pasando

- (c) tal vez esta cosa va a pasar por mucho tiempo
- (d) tal vez esta cosa va a pasar por poco tiempo
- (e) no quiero que esta cosa pase
- (f) si hago algo,
- (g) tal vez esta cosa no va a pasar después de ahora
- (h) tal vez algo bueno va a pasar después
- (i) quiero hacer algo
- (j) tal vez no puedo hacer nada por un tiempo
- (k) tal vez nadie puede hacer nada
- (l) quiero que algo bueno pase después

Interestingly, *crisis* still involves the integral concepts of judgment, the unknown time period, and the urgent situation; however, the foregrounded dynamic functional prime strings are I KNOW, I DO NOT WANT, I WANT, and I CANNOT DO. Based on personal knowledge, judgment, or belief, I now perceives the situation as *crisis*. Previously foregrounded information, including SOMETHING VERY BAD, HAPPENING NOW, temporal strings (NOW, A LONG TIME, A SHORT TIME, AFTER NOW, AFTER THIS), is now perspectived towards the 1st person. The deictic field has shifted away from the 3rd person. Dynamaticity lies in the deictic shift as well as in the loss of the prime strings PEOPLE KNOW, PEOPLE WANT and PEOPLE THINK.

9.4 Dynamism as evidence of semantic change

Research in functional sentence perspective and field theory provides a means of understanding the organizing principles of language, the focus of many endeavors of Prague School research, and while such research typically applies to natural language utterances, the concepts of “communicative dynamism”, “distributional field”, and “extralinguistic reality” also relate to metatext analysis and to the goals of the NSM research agenda, which in essence seeks to understand the relationship between words and cultural ideas. Linguistic elements, semantic primes, convey meaning in the semantic explications; this establishes a field. Over time, new semantic primes emerge, others discontinue, and some remain, but with a change in function; these processes reveal changes in the deictic field as a manifestation of the extralinguistic reality.

Dynamic functional primes indicate the evolution of meaning for a key word because they are retrievable from the semantic explications. The configuration method offers a procedure that allows such retrievability by providing the necessary metatexts for the analysis as a first step. The application of FSP principles to the metatexts demonstrates that the progression of semantic change does not necessarily eliminate all earlier functional primes and so several meanings of a

word may exist at the same time (*crisis* today could still be used to indicate a judgment, though rarely, or a medical situation). Rather, it is the functional status of a prime as foregrounded or perspectiving at a given point in time relative to an earlier point in time that signals change in meaning; of course, the appearance (e.g. 1st person *ī*) and disappearance of primes (e.g. *GOOD*) over time relates directly to foregrounded and perspectiving elements. The Prague School concepts of “foregrounding” and “perspectiving” have been invaluable to the configuration method as these theoretical constructs permit an analysis that designates the relation of certain linguistic units to other particular linguistic units within the system. The configuration method achieves the goal of the present historical semantic analysis: specificity in the delimitation of semantic primes.

Notes

1. All data used in this paper (with the exception of contemporary dictionary entries) are from this corpus. Author / speaker and title / source of examples are as cited in the corpus.
2. “was wir als Sprachtheoretiker fragen, zielt weiter, zielt ab auf eine Einsicht in den Systemgedanken, auf ein Modell, aus dem nicht nur die indogermanischen, sondern die Zeigarten aller Sprachen, das Zeigen der menschlichen Sprache im Singularis überblickbar wird”.
3. *Foregrounding* is a term derived from the work of Prague School theoreticians; Crystal (1997: 155) defines *foregrounding* as “a term used in *STYLISTICS* (especially *POETICS*) and sometimes in *PRAGMATICS* and *DISCOURSE* analysis, to refer to relative prominence in discourse, often involving deviance from a linguistic norm; the analogy is of a figure seen against a background (and the rest of the text is often referred to as *backgrounding*).”
4. It also continues in the broader, learned sense, especially in texts which hark back to a classical motif.

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The French connector *certes*

A Natural Semantic Metalanguage interpretation

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This paper looks at the meaning and use of the French discourse marker *certes* in sequences involving an assertive-concessive adverb *certes* (equivalent to English *certainly*, *admittedly*, *granted*, *of course* etc.) followed by an apodosis starting with *mais* ('but') or an equivalent adversative expression (as in *une faute certes, mais qui est pardonnable* 'a mistake, admittedly, but a forgivable one'). An explication in natural semantic metalanguage shows that *certes* is at the heart of a "diaphonic" situation: a duality of voices can be heard in the text, of which the second reinterprets, reformulates and integrates the first. The explication also accounts for the fact that *certes* critically contributes to text coherence, by creating a thematic-rhematic structure.

10.1 Introduction

What do dictionaries say about *certes*? They inform us that it is both an affirmative and a concessive adverb. Monolingual French dictionaries indicate that, as an affirmative adverb, it is equivalent to phrases such as *certainement*, *à coup sûr*, *en vérité*, *bien sûr*, *évidemment*, *c'est vrai*, and so on. Bilingual dictionaries translate it as 'indeed', 'most certainly', 'surely', etc. Consider (1):

- (1) La plus grande douleur qu'on puisse éprouver, certes, est la perte d'un enfant pour une mère, et la perte de la mère pour un homme.

(Guy de Maupassant, *Les contes de la bécasse*)

'The greatest sorrow / grief that one can experience is, surely, a mother's loss of a child, and a man's loss of his mother.'

Dictionaries frequently mention that affirmative *certes* is archaic, formal or precious, and add that, in this function, it usually occurs in exchange situations between two speakers. Within the French school of discourse analysis known in French as *théorie de l'énonciation*, such exchange situations are referred to as being "dialogal". *Énonciation*, here, designates a specific domain of discourse analysis,

viz. the one that deals with the relationship between utterances (*énoncés*) and utterers (*énonciateurs*). The French school of discourse analysis is interested in particular in the organization of dialogues and monologues as well as in the various levels of reported speech that coexist within a discourse unit, and it seeks to trace utterances back to their utterers. The term *dialogal* describes conversational or interview utterances that occur in speech turns and are produced by two different utterers. It is to be distinguished from the synonymous terms *dialogic* and *diaphonic* (French *dialogique* and *diaphonique*; cf. Section 10.2.3.5 below) which refer to a single utterance, produced by a single speaker, consisting of elements among which some are the utterer's own words, while others are to be attributed to other sources ('voices'). Similarly, the term *monologal*, meaning 'produced by a single speaker', is to be opposed to the term *monologic* (French *monologique*), which describes utterances produced by a single speaker and to be attributed to only one source (see for example Roulet et al. 1985:72).

The dialogal use of *certes* can be illustrated as in (2)–(3) below.

- (2) – Votre bonheur n'avait d'égal que le mien, Charley.
 – Vous pleurez, Mary, à ces souvenirs. Certes, je crois que vous m'aimiez alors.
 (Gaston Leroux, *Un homme dans la nuit*)
 '– Your happiness was equalled only by mine, Charley.
 – You are crying, Mary, when you recall these memories. *Surely*, I think that you loved me at the time.'
- (3) (Discussion about the École Polytechnique)
 J. K.-M.: ... le classement de sortie est maintenu et les choix ne sont pas fonction de la vocation des élèves, mais de ce classement. Cela n'a pas changé.
 Le Figaro: Tout comme son succès.
 J. K.-M.: Certes. L'X accueille des jeunes gens qui n'ont pas démerité.
 (France-Amérique, 23–29 July 2005)
 'J. K.-M.: ... the end-of-studies ranking is maintained and [career] choices are not a function of student vocation, but of this ranking. That hasn't changed.
 Le Figaro: The school's success has not changed either.
 J. K.-M.: Indeed. The X [Polytechnic School] accepts young people who excel.'

It should be observed that (2) and (3) provide instances of reported speech in literary and journalistic discourse. In ordinary contemporary French conversations, *certes* is hardly heard, except possibly with ironic or pretentious overtones.

As a concessive adverb, on the other hand, *certes* is glossed by dictionaries as *sans doute* ('certainly, admittedly, granted') or *bien sûr* ('of course'). Consider (4):

- (4) Mozart était certes joué, mais il n'était pas vraiment pris au sérieux à cette époque.
 (Le Monde, 9 November 1999)
 'Admittedly, Mozart's works were played, but he was not taken seriously in those days.'

In this second function, as a concessive marker, *certes* is almost exclusively found in argumentative prose,¹ in particular in journalistic and scientific discourse. Most of the examples in this paper, which focuses on the adverb *certes* as it is used in contemporary argumentative French prose, i.e. as a connector, are taken from the French newspaper *Le Monde* (both the daily issues and the international weekly selection).² The primary aim of the chapter is to provide a description – both in English and French – of the meaning and function of *certes*, using the NSM method of semantic analysis. The explication proposed will cover both the semantics (symbolic / invariant meaning) and the pragmatics (context-dependent / indexical meaning) of the word (cf. Lucy 1993; Silverstein 1993). The NSM approach is particularly apt for this analysis as it allows to decompose syntagmatically the meaning of the connector into its basic elements and to account chronologically for its functioning by detailing the various argumentative moves involved. To this day, French connectors in general have been studied against the backdrop of the *théorie de l'énonciation*, but not yet within the NSM framework. The two approaches – NSM and *théorie de l'énonciation* – will be combined here, the results arrived at in *énonciation* discourse semantics serving as a point of departure for the discussion of *certes* in NSM. *Certes* will be analyzed with respect to both its meaning and its usage and function in discourse. In addition, it will be shown how a shift in the semantic contents of *certes* has taken place in contemporary French: the adverb which initially functioned equally well as a pure affirmative marker and as a concessive marker, has gradually come to be used only with its concessive value, through its repeated association with the conjunction *mais* 'but', especially in the written language.

First I will briefly describe *certes* in its affirmative function (dialogal and monologal) and then divert attention to concessive *certes* in its prototypical use, i.e. in binary structures where it is associated with *mais*.³ The *certes... mais* sequence is a staple of modern argumentative French prose. The explication that will be proposed for the sequence will make it clear that *certes* is at the center of a diaphonic (not a dialogal) event, i.e. that a duality of voices can be heard in the text, the second voice integrating the first one. The explication will also account for the fact that *certes* critically contributes to the coherence of the text, by creating a thematic-rhematic structure.

10.2 The affirmative *certes*

10.2.1 Dialogal *certes*

Although in contemporary French, as mentioned above, the dialogal use of the connector is not the dominant one, formally reported conversations offer many examples of it. *Certes* can even constitute a reply in its own right, as in (5).

- (5) – Il vous a dit que je n'aimais plus le prince?
 – Certes. (Gaston Leroux, *Un homme dans la nuit*)
 ‘– Did he tell you that I didn’t love the prince any longer?
 – Yes, indeed.’

In cases like the above, the meaning of *certes* can be represented by means of the explication below, in which the primes I and YOU refer to the two interlocutors. P is a proposition, i.e. a statement in which something is affirmed or denied, one which can be characterized as true or false. P, stated by one of the interlocutors, is subscribed to by the other, who ‘wants to say the same’, i.e. who considers that in his / her world P is valid (‘I think: P is true’). *Certes*, therefore, indicates that the two interlocutors agree.

Certes

you say something (P) because you think: P is true

I want to say the same because I think: P is true

I want you to know this

(French version)

tu dis quelque chose (P) parce que tu penses: P est vrai

je veux dire la même chose parce que je pense: P est vrai

je veux que tu le saches

But often, as in (2)–(3) above, the *certes* reply is more developed. It contains, in addition to *certes*, an amplification of, or a comment on, someone else’s words (‘I want to say more’). We will call this new proposition Q. The user of *certes* adheres to P because there is no contradiction between P and Q, but feels a need to expand on it or give it more substance. This point is important: as will be seen later, the presence of *certes* in a sentence almost invariably imposes a discursive progression.

Certes, Q

you say something (P) because you think: P is true

I want to say the same because I think: P is true

I want to say more (Q)

I say it because I think: Q is true

when I say Q, you will know that I think that P is true

(French version)

tu dis quelque chose (P) parce que tu penses: P est vrai
 je veux dire la même chose parce que je pense: P est vrai
 je veux dire plus (Q)
 je le dis parce que je pense: Q est vrai
 quand je dis Q, tu sauras que je pense que P est vrai

10.2.2 Monological *certes*

The amplification / reorientation effect captured by the component ‘I want to say more (Q)’ is also present in the monological uses of *certes* found in the written language. Consider (6):

- (6) Il s’établit un lien – certes vraiment diabolique ce lien-là – entre lui et moi.
 (Umberto Eco, *Le nom de la rose*)
 ‘A relationship is being established – indeed a truly diabolic one – between him and me.’

An NSM explication for *certes* in this sort of environment could take the following form:

P, certes Q

I say something (P) because I think: P is true
 I want to say more (Q)
 I say it because I think: Q is true
 when I say Q, people will know that I think that P is true

(French version)

je dis quelque chose (P) parce que je pense: P est vrai
 je veux dire plus (Q)
 je le dis parce que je pense: Q est vrai
 quand je dis Q, les gens sauront que je pense que P est vrai

It should be noted that in this explication the statement ‘I want to say the same’ has disappeared since the structure is non-dialogal. However, the belief that P is true and that its truth is the reason for the assertion of P remains. It is the trigger for the use of *certes*. It is common to the three explications: each time, we have someone who thinks that something (P) is true, and who therefore says it. This shared component, expressed either as ‘you say something (P) because you think: P is true’ or as ‘I say something (P) because I think: P is true’ captures the fact that, across the three contextual variants of *certes* illustrated above, assertion of a perceived truth is a constant and integral element in the semantics of the adverb. The explications differ however in other respects. The first two (capturing the meaning of *certes*

and of *certes*, Q) establish the presence of two interlocutors in the discursive event, identified respectively as YOU and I, whereas the third (capturing the meaning of P, *certes* Q) refers to one speaker only. The latter two explications, but not the first one, suggest that *certes*, in addition to its affirmative value, signals that a new point of view emerges (expressed in Q), and that this new point of view builds upon P. The three notions (assertion, dialogue and dynamic increase) combine in a more complex fashion in the concessive *certes* structures, to which we now turn.

10.3 The concessive *certes* in binary structures: *Certes... mais*

10.3.1 Summary of features

In the sequences under consideration, *certes* introduces a segment which requires a closure. This closure is normally realized by a *mais* segment, as in (7) and (8), but occasionally equivalents are found, e.g. *néanmoins*, as illustrated in (9):

- (7) La ville n'était certes pas grande, mais sa traversée nécessitait de périlleux slaloms entre cortèges de dromadaires, charrettes menées par des ânon, calèches tirées par de petits chevaux.

(*Le monde, Sélection hebdomadaire*, 13 March 1999)

'The town was [certainly] not very big, but to travel across it one had to slalom dangerously between convoys of camels, carts pulled by donkeys, coaches pulled by ponies.'

- (8) Lorsqu'il sait ce qu'il veut, Romano Prodi ne transige pas. Il négocie, certes, (...) mais il reste fidèle à la lettre de ses conceptions.

(*Le monde, Sélection hebdomadaire*, 3 April 1999)

'When he knows what he wants, Romano Prodi does not compromise. He negotiates, of course, but does remain faithful to his ideas.'

- (9) Certes les Etats-Unis refusent toujours de reconnaître leur Etat [= l'Etat des Palestiniens]. Ils ont néanmoins adopté une position encourageante.

(*Le monde, Sélection hebdomadaire*, 3 April 1999)

'To be sure, the United States still refuses to recognize their [= the Palestinian] state. It has however adopted an encouraging position.'

Table 1 provides a summary of the main features (formal, semantic, pragmatic, etc.) that characterize the sequence *certes... mais*. This synopsis is mainly based on the argumentation theory advocated by Ducrot and his followers (Anscombe & Ducrot 1983; Ducrot 1984; Ducrot et al. 1980), on Roulet's work on connectors (Roulet et al. 1985), as well as on studies and/or remarks by Adam (1990), Grieve (1996), Maingueneau (1991), Moeschler (1985), Moeschler et al. (1994),

Table 1. Synthesis of the properties of the *certes*... *mais* sequence

Binary sequence (‘parenthésage’)	[----- protasis	----->] apodosis
Lexical markers	<i>certes</i> (adverb)	<i>mais</i> (coordinating conjunction)
Lexical meaning of markers	assertive (epistemic modality)	adversative (‘counter-argumentative’)
Syntactic structure (two co-ordinated grammatical segments in a fixed order)	conjunct 1: X certes X X certes X X certes	conjunct 2: Y mais Y
Semantic content of sequence (See Table 2; all content is based on an interpretation of the context)	Proposition P is associated with X Its conclusion is C1	Proposition Q is associated with Y Its conclusion is C2 (= non-C1)
Attribution of what is said (there are two ‘voices’)	S1 validates / takes responsibility for <i>certes</i> P	S2 validates / takes responsibility for <i>mais</i> Q
Argumentative act – diaphonic structure (<i>discours comme négociation</i>) – concessive argumentation	‘Conceded’ utterance <i>Certes</i> indicates that the speaker/writer gives (provisionally) some sort of agreement to P	Counter-argument <i>Mais</i> indicates that the speaker/writer rejects P because the conclusion drawn from P is in direct contradiction with the conclusion drawn from Q
Discursive (scalar) structure resulting in a reorientation of the discourse	backgrounded, weaker argument theme: agreed-upon information; consensual	foregrounded, stronger argument rheme: new information; disputable, open
Phonological level	special intonation (high or low)	special intonation

Moeschler & Reboul (1994), Reboul & Moeschler (1998a, 1998b), Nyan (1998) and insights in discourse analysis from the Prague functionalist school.

10.3.2 Formal features

The sequence comprises a protasis including *certes* and an apodosis beginning with *mais*. Together, they constitute a unit – sometimes called *parenthésage* (‘bracketing’; cf. Adam 1990). In the protasis segment, *certes* is a sentential adverb whose lexical meaning is assertive. It has to do with epistemic modality, i.e. with the truth-value of a proposition, validated by a speaker. The apodosis segment contains *mais*, a coordinating conjunction with an adversative meaning. In his typol-

ogy of discourse connectors, Roulet et al. (1985: 133–144) places *mais* (in this kind of sequencing) among the “counter-argumentative” markers.

There are two clauses or segments, i.e. grammatically defined elements in the sequence, viz. X and Y. The segments are of variable length; *certes... mais* sequences can span whole paragraphs. Compare for example the length of the *certes* segments in (10) and (11).

- (10) En refusant de se soumettre à des inspections approfondies de ses fabrications illicites, l'Irak enfreint la loi internationale, une faute certes, mais qui n'est pas pendable. (*Le monde, Sélection hebdomadaire*, 14 February 1998)

'By refusing to submit to in-depth inspections of its illicit productions, Iraq fails to comply with international law, an offense admittedly, but one which is not a hanging matter.'

- (11) Certes, une partie des journalistes allemands estimaient, vendredi matin, que le chancelier avait cédé à ses partenaires espagnols, britanniques et surtout français sur le dossier agricole. Le nouveau chancelier n'aurait guère fait mieux, à leurs yeux, que son prédécesseur Helmut Kohl, accusé en décembre 1998 par M. Schröder d'avoir mené par le passé une diplomatie de “carnet de chèques” pour acheter les accords européens. Mais, note un commentateur, M. Schröder, qui a longtemps fait preuve d'euroseptique, a gagné dans l'affaire ses galons d'européen.

(*Le monde, Sélection hebdomadaire*, 3 April 1999)

'On Friday morning, some of the German journalists certainly felt that the Chancellor had given in on agricultural issues to his Spanish, British, and especially to his French partners. The new Chancellor did not fare any better, in their eyes, than his predecessor Helmut Kohl, accused in December 1998 by Mr. Schröder of having used “*chequebook diplomacy*” in order to clinch European deals. A commentator remarks however that Mr. Schröder, a long-time Euro-sceptic, has now gained his European stripes.'

Certes can occupy a variety of positions in its segment. It can be segment-initial (X *certes*), segment-final (*certes* X) or segment-medial (X *certes* X). *Mais*, however, must always be segment-initial (*mais* Y). The X and Y segments are coordinated and follow each other in a fixed order. This will be reflected in the order of phrases in the NSM explication. The protasis-apodosis word order contrasts with the interchangeable order of the linked elements in semantically similar structures involving conjunctions such as *bien que* 'although' and *même si* 'even if'. In addition, X and Y form a tight concatenation. Indeed, the two conjuncts are so closely associated that, as soon as readers come across an instance of *certes* in a newspaper or scientific article, they automatically look for an instance of *mais*, and they are rarely disappointed: a *certes* protasis calls for a *mais* apodosis. *Certes* is submitted

to “une contrainte d’incomplétude” (‘a constraint of non-fulfilment’; Charolles 1986:88).

10.3.3 Semantic features

The semantic analysis of the *certes... mais* sequence will be based on example (7), repeated as (12) below:

- (12) La ville n’était certes pas grande, mais sa traversée nécessitait de périlleux slaloms entre cortèges de dromadaires, charrettes menées par des ânon, calèches tirées par de petits chevaux.
 ‘The town was [certainly] not very big, but to travel across it one had to slalom dangerously between convoys of camels, carts pulled by donkeys, coaches pulled by ponies.’

The two markers connect two semantic entities, viz. P and Q, corresponding to the grammatical forms X and Y, respectively. P and Q are propositions. Finding the meaning of a *certes* X... *mais* Y utterance requires the reader to associate in some way the semantic entities P and Q with X and Y. The condition for a successful interpretation is as follows: P must be an argument in favor of a conclusion C1, and Q an argument in favor of the inverse conclusion C2 (i.e. C2 = non-C1). This is further illustrated in Table 2.⁴

Inspection of the context of the speech situation is essential in order to successfully understand P and Q, if the right conclusions are to be drawn. *Certes... mais* sequences are indexical, in the sense intended by Jakobson (1971): they become fully meaningful only when they are linked to the reference points (time, place, individual speaking, etc.) contained in the utterances in which they are included. In newspaper writing, recovering P and Q can be a painstaking process. A case in point is provided in (13) below.

Table 2. The meaning of example (12)

Grammatical level	Certes X	Mais Y
	.	.
	.	.
Semantic level	P	Q
	La ville n’était pas grande	La ville était très encombrée
	[The town was not big]	[The town was very congested]
	↓	↓
	Conclusion C1	⇔ Conclusion C2 = non-C1
	On y circulait facilement	On n’y circulait pas facilement
	[It was easy to move around]	[It was not easy to move around]

- (13) Et puis il y a le Kosovo. Certes, le président démissionnaire du RPR ne prononce pas ce mot dans sa lettre expliquant son geste. Mais le seul fait que l'engagement de l'armée française dans une guerre ne l'ait pas empêché de claquer la porte suffit à confirmer que, sur les Balkans aussi, M. Seguin n'était plus en phase avec le chef de l'Etat.

(*Le monde, Sélection hebdomadaire*, 24 April 1999)

'And then there is Kosovo. Admittedly, the resigning President of the RPR does not mention the word in the letter explaining his decision; but the mere fact that the involvement of the French army in a war did not stop him from slamming the door is evidence enough that, even on the topic of the Balkans, Mr. Seguin no longer sees eye to eye with the Head of State.'

Mr. Seguin did not mention Kosovo in his letter of resignation (P). This appears to imply that Kosovo was unimportant in Seguin's decision to resign (C1). On the other hand, the French army was involved in Kosovo, and this would normally require Seguin to stay on. However, he resigned (Q). Kosovo was therefore crucial in his decision (C2), for on the Kosovo matter, as in other matters, he was in disagreement with the President of the Republic.

10.3.4 Pragmatic features

An original aspect of Ducrot's pragmatic theory is to have questioned the unicity of the speaker and the homogeneity of discourse, and to have introduced the notion of polyphony. Argumentative utterances can be conceived as the product of several points of view (or "voices", to use Bakhtine-inspired terminology). In *certes... mais* sequences, for instance, two distinct voices are involved. Through the use of *certes*, argument P is assigned to a (potential) speaker, voice S1. S1 takes responsibility for P, i.e. validates the truth of P. A second (potential) speaker, voice S2, is given responsibility for Q. The person who produces the utterance, U (the utterer, the actual speaker/writer),⁵ supports S2. A *certes... mais* sequence therefore constitutes diaphony. Diaphony, as defined by Roulet et al. (1985: 72–84), is a duality of voices in an utterance; it is the repetition, the re-formulation and integration of the interlocutors' (S1 and S2) speech into the speaker's (U) discourse. Diaphony is different from dialogue; in the latter, the voices of the two interlocutors remain distinct, one responding to the other in successive turns. In a diaphonic structure, two voices are being reinterpreted by a single utterer.

Consider example (8), repeated as (14) below.

- (14) Lorsqu'il sait ce qu'il veut, Romano Prodi ne transige pas. Il négocie, certes, (...) mais il reste fidèle à la lettre de ses conceptions.
'When he knows what he wants, Romano Prodi does not compromise. He negotiates, of course, but does remain faithful to his ideas.'

An initial assertion (A), the main point the writer wishes to support, is clearly stated in this passage and comes before the *certes... mais* sequence (for another clearly stated initial assertion, see example (13)). It is the starting point of the argument. Then, asserted by S1, comes argument P, which is qualified by means of *certes*: Prodi usually negotiates. It is followed by argument Q (Prodi remains faithful to his ideas), asserted by S2. U, the writer, attributes P to an objector, with whom he agrees provisionally but not wholeheartedly, via *certes*, and Q to a counter-objector S2, with whom he identifies, via *mais*. The movement marked by *certes* is sometimes termed an *act of concession*. S2+U immediately reject S1's point of view in favor of Q, which leads to a diametrically opposite conclusion (see Table 2 above), and by doing so U revalidates the initial assertion (A). *Certes*, therefore, "acknowledges the validity of an objection to the main point and also foreshadows a demonstration that the objection is not as valid as the objector thinks" (Grieve 1996: 164). The argumentative utterance is presented as a negotiation.

10.3.5 Discursive structure: Thematic coherence

The components of a *certes... mais* sequence are not equivalent from the point of view of their communicative function. In the Prague functionalist school tradition, a basic distinction is made between the theme, i.e. the object of the speech event, and the rheme, i.e. the segment containing the information the speaker wants to convey about it. The theme / rheme distinction has another dimension, which is cognitive in nature (Halliday 1967; Chafe 1976). Information provided in first position (in other words, thematic information) is normally situationally or contextually given, and known to the addressee: it corresponds to old information. On the contrary, rhematic information is presumed not to be known. It is therefore more important and the addressee needs to focus on it.

It could be argued that *certes... mais* sequences represent typical theme / rheme structures. Argument P, or the *certes* argument, which is given first, is thematic in nature: it expresses what is given and it is the locus of converging views. It serves as the basis for argument Q, or the *mais* argument, which coincides with the informational focus of the utterance. It should be noted, too, that from a functional point of view the importance of proposition P is diminished, its truth-value rectified, and its impact modified and restricted. It is subordinated to proposition Q, which – to the contrary – is reinforced and strengthened.⁶ This results in a re-orientation of the discourse and a forward movement of the text. We are dealing here with a progressive argumentative movement which is a fundamental feature of *certes... mais* sequences.

10.4 An NSM explication of the *certes... mais* sequence

Based on the discussion in the previous section, the following explication is proposed for concessive *certes* which, as mentioned above, is in an obligatory association with *mais* (or its equivalent). Illustrations for the various paraphrases, written in italics, are based on examples (12) and (14).

(a) I think A

*(it was difficult to travel through the town;
Prodi firmly holds on to his beliefs)*

I don't say A is true

because I know that perhaps you do not think like this

(b1) I think like this:

someone (S1) says P because S1 thinks:

P is true

(the town was not big; Prodi negotiates)

because of this, C1

*(because the town was not big, it was easy to move around;
because Prodi negotiates, he must be flexible)*

I want to say the same

because I know that S1 thinks: C1 is true

I can think what S1 thinks

because of this, I say: *certes* P

(b2) I want to say more because I think like this:

someone else (S2) says Q because S2 thinks:

Q is true

*(one had to slalom dangerously to move around;
Prodi remains faithful to this ideas)*

because of this, C2

*(because the town was full of slow traffic, it was not easy to move
around; because Prodi is faithful to his ideas, he doesn't compromise)*

I want to say the same because now I think C2 is true

I know that if C2 is true, C1 is not true

I know that C2 is like A

because of this, I say: *mais* Q

(c) I say this because I want you to think A

The French version of this explication runs as follows:

(a) je pense A

je ne dis pas que A est vrai

parce que je sais que peut-être tu ne penses pas comme ça

(b1) je pense comme ça:

quelqu'un (S1) dit P parce que S1 pense:

P est vrai

à cause de cela, C1

je veux dire la même chose

parce que je sais que S1 pense: C1 est vrai

je peux penser ce que pense S1

à cause de cela, je dis: *certes* P

(b2) je veux dire plus parce que je pense comme ça:

quelqu'un d'autre (S2) dit Q parce que S2 pense:

Q est vrai

à cause de cela, C2

je veux dire la même chose parce que maintenant je pense que C2 est vrai

je sais que si C2 est vrai, C1 n'est pas vrai

je sais que C2 est comme A

à cause de cela, je dis: *mais* Q

(c) je dis cela parce que je veux que tu penses A

In this explication, as in the previous ones, the utterer and the addressee are given first and second person attributes, respectively. The utterer is pictured as a person who looks at the argumentation process from his or her own point of view, the addressee as someone who needs to be convinced of its validity. A (the initial assertion or opinion, explicit or implicit in the text), P (a proposition), Q (a proposition), C1 (the conclusion to be derived from P) and C2 (the conclusion to be derived from Q) are variables and cannot be specified more precisely. As mentioned in Section 10.3, the connectors *certes* and *mais* are indexical: what they concede or argue against is entirely determined by the *hic* and *nunc* of the particular speech situation in which they are used. As Moeschler & Reboul (1994: 185–186) point out, argumentative connectors are procedural. Their meaning is to give pragmatic instructions, i.e. conditions of use of the connected elements and conditions of interpretation, which define the inferences implied by the presence of the connector in the argumentation.

Component (a) expresses U's (the speaker / writer) inner conviction. It seeks to capture the attitude of objectivity, neutrality and impartiality which characterizes the utterer of argumentative *certes*, described by Ducrot (1984: 230–231) as “an open-minded person, capable of taking into consideration the point of view of others”.⁷ It should not be forgotten, however, that *certes* is proleptic, prolepsis being the figure in rhetoric by which concessions are made and objections are anticipated in order to weaken their force.

Component (b) describes the strategy used by U to realize the aim conveyed by component (c), viz. to bring the addressee to accept the utterer's point of view.

There are two subcomponents. Subcomponent (b1) represents the *certes* part of the sequence. U starts off by mentally creating the first character (S1) of an imaginary dialogue. S1 asserts P and vouches for the truth of C1, which is derived from P. Then comes the act of concession: U is willing to provisionally accept S1's point of view ('I can think what S1 thinks'). U asserts P with the help of *certes*, even though in U's world C1 is not true (it is true only in S1's world, which U has merely imagined). Subcomponent (b2) first reorients the concession movement and opens the way for the second part of the *certes... mais* sequence (*I want to say more*). The second character of the imaginary dialogue imagined by U is being introduced. S2 asserts Q and takes responsibility for the conclusion it entails. U fully agrees with S2, and with the truth of C2 in S2's world. U manifests that agreement by asserting Q with the support of *mais*, all the while fully aware that C2 is in harmony with the initial assertion or opinion A, that C2 is the exact opposite of C1 ('if C2 is true, C1 is not true') and that C2 overrides C1. We have come full circle (or, as the French say, *la boucle est bouclée*). The addressee is expected to be able to see the validity of A; this was the ultimate aim of U, as marked in component (c).

10.5 Concluding remarks

It is essential when studying connectors (and other linguistic forms for that matter) to draw a basic distinction between two types of functions for linguistic signs: semantic and pragmatic. In other words, linguistic signs have a semantic and a pragmatic meaning.

Semantic meaning is symbolic and independent of use in any given speech context (i.e. invariant). We could say that what constitutes the inherent meaning of *certes* is the epistemic modality of assertion which is represented in all the explications by a component of the type 'L says y, because L thinks: y is true'.

Pragmatic meaning, on the other hand, is connected with ongoing usage, with the context of communication. For *certes*, this context-dependent meaning clusters around three main features, which may be present or absent, depending on how the adverb is used: a) dialogic/diaphonic alternation of voices; b) expression of concession; c) reorientation of discourse.

The combination of the three features, associated with the inherent feature of assertion, defines the prototypical meaning / function of *certes* in contemporary French. From a diachronic point of view, it is obvious that *certes* has acquired this highly frequent contextual meaning from its constant use in *certes... mais* sequences in argumentative prose. This suggests that the boundary between the semantics and pragmatics of a linguistic form is not set in concrete. Languages change. When pragmatic usages become more predictable and certain patterns of language use more stereotypic, they are conceptualized as regularities of mean-

ing and begin to enter the realm of semantics. This seems to be the direction in which *certes* is going: concession *cum* discourse reorientation may be in the process of becoming an inherent component of the semantics of *certes*, with the fourth NSM explication proposed here progressively displacing the first three, which are simpler. Because of this frequent concessive use in scientific and journalistic discourse, *certes* now belongs to the class of forms which Rosier (1999) calls *discordantiels de l'énonciation*. Their function is to draw attention to a discontinuity, to a discrepancy in discourse, by signaling and then integrating two diverging points of view.

A complete evaluation of the discourse semantics of *certes* would have to ask the question why, in contemporary French, *certes* has increasingly become a connector associated with argumentative prose, while its synonyms *bien sûr* and *évidemment* still belong both to the spoken (dialogal) language, as pure affirmative markers, and to the written (monological) language, as affirmative-concessive markers. Why is *certes* prototypical, compared to the other two, in proleptic structures involving *mais*? Which features in the inherent meaning of the three adverbs can be responsible for this situation? *Certes* seems less marked semantically than *bien sûr* (which in addition to assertion implies certainty) or *évidemment* (which also suggests an idea which imposes itself to the mind). *Bien sûr* and *évidemment* appear more loaded than *certes*, and thus more adequate in conversation, where the conative function of language is fully at work. *Certes* seems more neutral, more rational, less prejudiced (see the Ducrot quotation in Section 10.4). However, these are suggestions only. A thorough contrastive corpus study of the three adverbial expressions would be needed to give a convincing answer.

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank the anonymous reviewer whose remarks and comments have helped me improve this chapter.

Notes

1. For a definition and discussion of the nature of argumentative prose, see for example van Eemeren et al. (1997).
2. The data used here were collected for a research project on French connectors in journalistic discourse, undertaken in collaboration with Linda R. Waugh.
3. Although *certes* and *mais* are typically associated in these argumentative structures, there are other possible combinations (e.g. *bien sûr* and *mais*, *évidemment* and *mais*) which would need to be compared to the prototype, but will not be studied in this paper.

4. We are following Ducrot's analysis of the argumentative variant of the conjunction *mais*, sometimes called *mais 'carré'* because P, Q, C1 and C2 form a square in graphic presentations such as that in Table 2. Cf. Ducrot (1980:93–130).
5. S1 and S2 are *énonciateurs*, i.e. discursive beings, not real individuals. In Ducrot's theory, L (the *locuteur*) is not an empirical being either. L presents and organizes (*met en scène*) the *énonciateur(s)* [voice(s)] with whom he agrees or disagrees. The *sujet parlant* is the real speaker, the one who effectively produces the utterance. These distinctions are not needed in the analysis of *certes*. We will therefore combine *locuteur* and *sujet parlant* under U (the actual utterer).
6. Specific intonational patterns are associated with the two connectors in *certes... mais* sequences. In writing, these patterns are often conveyed by means of punctuation. Normally *mais* receives a high intonation level, emphasizing the fact that it introduces the counter-argument. *Certes* has as a higher intonation level if it is located at the beginning of the protasis, but a lower one at the end or in medial position.
7. "un homme à l'esprit ouvert, capable de prendre en considération le point de vue des autres".

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Francamente, el rojo te sienta fatal

Semantics and pragmatics of some expressions of sincerity in present-day Spanish

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This study, which deals with “sincerity” in Spanish, focuses on the use of clausal adverbs such as *sinceramente* ‘sincerely’, *honestamente* ‘honestly’, *francamente* ‘frankly’, and of phrases with the verbs *hablar* ‘speak’ and *decir* ‘say’ (e.g. *hablar/decir con sinceridad, francamente, con el corazón en la mano* ‘speak/say [something] with sincerity, frankly, with your heart in your hand’). In addition, the authors look at conditional structures in peripheral positions (e.g. *si quieres que te diga la verdad* ‘if you want me to tell you the truth’). The study involves an analysis, using the natural semantic metalanguage, of semantic differences between the concepts of *sinceridad* ‘sincerity’, *franqueza* ‘frankness’ and *honestidad* ‘honesty’, and of the pragmatic and discursive functions of these expressions.

11.1 Introduction

In this study we carry out a semantic and pragmatic analysis of some expressions used by Spanish speakers to manifest their *sinceridad* or sincerity. The relevance of the concept of sincerity in verbal interaction has been noted by several language philosophers (cf. Haverkate 1984:261–262). In speech act theory, for instance, sincerity is an essential psychological state: it is one of the necessary conditions needed for the taxonomy of illocutionary types, with the general illocutionary object of each type demanding a specific psychological state of sincerity (Searle 1969). Grice (1975) included sincerity in one of the famous maxims that make up the Cooperative Principle; his maxim of quality (“Try to make your contribution one that is true”) is specified in two submaxims, viz. “Do not say what you believe to be false” and “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence”.

Linguists, too, specifically those working in intercultural semantics and pragmatics, have recently turned their attention to the study of sincerity. In view of the results achieved in research on other languages (e.g. Goddard 2001 on Malay

and English; Wierzbicka 2002 on English and Russian), it was felt that a comparative study of the nuances carried by different *Spanish* expressions customarily included under the general concept of sincerity would prove worthwhile. To pursue this study, the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) method, also used in the abovementioned studies, was chosen. NSM has proven to be an extremely useful tool for three basic reasons. First, it has enabled us to describe the semantic specificity of each of the expressions that are in some way affiliated to the semantic nature of *sinceridad*, but that can in no way be considered synonymous. The merits of NSM have been clear since Wierzbicka's now classic dictionary of English speech act verbs was released in 1987. Using this method, we were able to avoid the circularity that frequently plagues present-day Spanish dictionaries, especially in this lexical field, including those we relied on in this study, viz. the *Diccionario de Uso del Español* (DUE), the *Diccionario del Español Actual* (DEA) and the *Diccionario de la Lengua Española* (DRAE). Second, the use of NSM has enabled us to capture the precise *discourse values* of a number of modalizing expressions available to speakers to describe their own speech as well as that of their interlocutor(s) as *sincero*. Third, NSM provides a method to advance our knowledge of the semantics of this type of value terms, not only within a certain language and culture – as in this study – but also from a cross-cultural point of view: “The very fact that people use a certain collection of value words on a daily basis gives meanings of these words an inherent cultural interest. But it is impossible to study the meanings of culture-specific words without a rigorous, verifiable, and essentially language-neutral method of semantic description” (Goddard 2001:659).

11.2 The modalizing expressions of *sinceridad*

Ever since Grice, sincerity has been considered to be a norm or an attitude *inherent* to proper communicative activity. However, speakers quite often explicitly show that what they say is what they really know, feel, or think. They show that what they say is not deceptive, or ironic, or said jokingly. For this, Spanish has a series of expressions of an adverbial nature that function as discourse modalizers. Consider the following examples:¹

- (1) David, con una alegría que no terminaba de entender, puso en mis manos el manto de lino blanco que yo había adquirido en la tarde del pasado jueves en la tintorería de Malkiyás y del que, honestamente, me había olvidado.

(J. J. Benítez, *Caballo de Troya*, 1984, España)

‘David, with a cheerfulness that I could not quite understand, placed in my hands the white linen cloak which I had bought last Thursday evening at Malkiyás’ dry cleaner’s and which, *honestamente*, I had forgotten about.’

- (2) – A lo largo de su infancia, usted padeció varias enfermedades. ¿Cree que esto ha podido influir en su sensibilidad?
 – No lo había pensado, sinceramente, pero ahora que me lo dices...
 (ABC Cultural, 05/07/1996, España)
 ‘– All through your infancy, you suffered from many diseases. Do you think this may have affected your sensitivity?
 – I hadn’t thought about it, *sinceramente*, but now that you say so...’
- (3) Me pareció que al fin había encontrado la excusa adecuada para marcharse. Su actitud me desconcertó pues, a decir verdad, no encontraba ningún motivo evidente en el que pudiera fundarse su ostensible incomodidad.
 (A. García Morales, *La lógica del vampiro*, 1990, España)
 ‘I felt that, at last, he had found the right excuse to leave. His attitude bewildered me because, *a decir verdad*, I couldn’t find any clear reason on which his obvious discomfort might be based.’
- (4) ATÉ. De verdad, con el corazón en la mano, ¿tú sabes estas cosas por las cartas o tienes otras fuentes?
 PENIA (sonríe). Digamos que las cartas me confirman sospechas.
 (I. Hidalgo, *Todas hijas de su madre*, 1988, España)
 ‘ATÉ. *De verdad, con el corazón en la mano*, do you know these things because of the cards or do you have other sources?
 PENIA (smiling). Let’s say that the cards confirm my suspicions.’
- (5) Si quieres que te diga la verdad, el banquillo no le gusta a nadie, ni siquiera a los entrenadores.
 (La Vanguardia, 17/06/1994, España)
 ‘*Si quieres que te diga la verdad*, nobody likes the bench, not even trainers.’
- (6) Como cuando me dijiste que te mandaba la agencia. Entonces hablabas de un cheque muy sustancioso. De acuerdo, que sea sustancioso... pero razonable. No estoy tan interesado en comprar, si te soy sincero.
 (A. Diosdado, *Trescientos veintiuno, trescientos veintidós*, 1991, España)
 ‘Like when you told me that the agency had sent you. You then spoke about a very substantial cheque. Okay, it can be substantial... but reasonable. *Si te soy sincero*, I’m not so interested in buying.’
- (7) Pero, para ser sincero, no me convenció, porque como pinche periodista me gusta entender las cosas de manera sencilla, pues, al fin y al cabo, nuestro trabajo consiste en explicar de manera comprensible lo que sucede.
 (Prensa Libre, 10/07/1996, Guatemala)
 ‘But, *para ser sincero*, it didn’t convince me because, damn journalist that I am, I like to understand things simply, ‘cause our work ultimately consists in explaining what happens in an understandable way.’
- (8) Me molestó muchísimo tener que llamarla desde un escondite, perseguido, angustiado, para ser franco, cagado de miedo, en circunstancias en que ella, sin duda, acababa de celebrar la muerte de Salvador Allende con gritos de

entusiasmo y con botellas de champagne descorchadas (...)

(J. Edwards, *El anfitrión*, 1987, Chile)

'It upset me to have to call her from a hiding place, pursued, anguished, and *para ser franco*, shitting with fear, in circumstances in which she, no doubt, had just celebrated the death of Salvador Allende with shouts of enthusiasm and with open champagne bottles (...)'

The sequences illustrated in these excerpts – be they lexical adverbs of manner in examples (1)–(2), adverbial phrases in examples (3)–(4), conditional clauses in examples (5)–(6) or purposive clauses in examples (7)–(8) – have different internal structural complexities. All share a connection with the Gricean quality maxim: by using these expressions, the speaker underscores the truthfulness of his words or, in the case of example (4), asks the hearer to adhere to the quality maxim in his response.

From a syntactic point of view, all the constructions of sincerity that we have just identified, their different degrees of internal structural complexity notwithstanding, belong to the extra-predicative level. Functionally, they are part of the vast and heterogeneous world of sentence modalizers which make a metadiscursive comment on the speaker's contribution – or, as indicated above, when combined with the interrogative modality, as in example (4), refer to the hearer's discourse (cf. González Ruiz 2000: 305). According to Dik's functional grammar (Dik 1997a, 1997b),² for instance, the expressions of sincerity in the above examples are to be included in the most external level of grammatical analysis, viz. the illocutionary level, in which a speech act is designated. The expressions we are referring to function as illocutionary satellites, and constitute linguistic means which serve to particularize and, above all, to modify the illocutionary enunciation value (either through intensification or attenuation).³ In this sense, these expressions of sincerity are not motivated by the transmission of factual information; instead, they fulfil the interpersonal function of regulating interactive relationships and, in short, control the interpretation of linguistic exchanges – hence, the “conditional regulative” label proposed by Montolío (1993) for peripheral conditional constructions of sincerity, like those in (5)–(6), as well as for other constructions with a similar function.

The focus of this paper is on lexical adverbs of manner (all ending in *-mente*) and on free as well as on partially grammaticalized phrases (as opposed to finite clauses). These adverbs and phrases, illustrated in examples (1)–(4), have been given different names: *disjuntos de estilo* ‘style disjuncts’, *modalizadores de la enunciación* ‘utterance modalizers’, *adverbios performativos* ‘performative adverbs’, *adverbios orientados al hablante y el oyente* ‘adverbs oriented towards the speaker and hearer’, *adverbios pragmáticos* ‘pragmatic adverbs’, *adverbios ilocutivos* ‘illocu-

tionary adverbs', *adverbios de acto de habla* 'speech act adverbs', *complementos de verbo enunciativo* 'speech verb complements', etc.

Speech modalizers (including those associated with the expression of sincerity) behave in specific ways (Gutiérrez Ordóñez 1996:99). It is not our aim to present a detailed review of the formal evidence on the basis of which this particular type of sentential adverbs can be differentiated from the others (cf. the review in González Ruiz 2000:§3.2). In (9)–(13) below, we list a few examples where the adverbial expression appears as an adjunct of a generic speech act verb.

- (9) Sinceramente, no me gusta el deporte.
'*Sinceramente*, I don't like sports.'
- (10) Te digo sinceramente que no me gusta el deporte.
'*Te digo sinceramente* that I don't like sports.'
- (11) Hablo sinceramente: no me gusta el deporte.
'*Hablo sinceramente*: I don't like sports.'
- (12) Dicho con sinceridad, no me gusta el deporte.
'*Dicho con sinceridad*, I don't like sports.'
- (13) Hablando sinceramente, no me gusta el deporte.
'*Hablando sinceramente*, I don't like sports.'

Let us look at examples (10)–(11). Adverbs able to function autonomously as speech modalizers often appear as adjuncts of the verbs *decir* 'say' and *hablar* 'speak', both of which, in lexematic terms,⁴ are archilexemes in the lexical field of speech act verbs. The "speech act verb + adverbial expression" structures of sincerity constitute *normal* combinations (in the Coserian sense of the term), i.e. combinations that arise because of the tendency for some elements to appear together with others. The latter are expressions that belong to the phraseological sphere of *colocaciones* (*collocations*), a term increasingly known in the Spanish-speaking world. In these collocations, the speech act verb frequently appears in the first person singular of the present indicative tense, in such a way that the collocation with *hablo* 'I speak' or *digo* 'I say', especially with the latter, also constitutes a procedure by means of which speakers manifest themselves as being sincere, frank, serious and truthful. Additional examples appear below:

- (14) Le digo honestamente: si entre los últimos equipos están los grandes, tendrían que descender. Si así no fuera yo me tendría que ir del fútbol, porque no creería en la seriedad del torneo. (*Hoy*, 17/07/1984, "Fútbol", Chile)
'*Le digo honestamente*: If the big ones are amongst the teams at the bottom, they should go down. If this wasn't so, I would have to quit football, because I wouldn't believe in the seriousness of the championship.'
- (15) Yo no creo que haya esa voluntad política, y no creo tampoco que hayan mejorado las prisiones, sinceramente lo digo, porque mejorar para mí no es que el

espacio físico sea más moderno, indiscutiblemente hoy se abren las puertas se abren con botones, no se abren con (...)

(Oral, TVE 1, *Vida y muerte en las cárceles*, 05/02/87, España)

'I don't think there is a political will, nor do I think that prisons have improved, *sinceramente lo digo*, because for me improving does not mean that the physical space has to be more modern. Unquestionably, today doors are opened with buttons, they are not opened with (...)

- (16) Conozco casi toda Europa, menos un país que me encantaría conocer, que es Grecia, y los estados socialistas, que no conozco ninguno, pero no me ha dado tanta curiosidad, le digo sinceramente. (Oral, 1980, Perú)

'I know almost all of Europe, except one country that I would love to know, which is Greece, and also the socialist countries, of which I know none, but I don't feel so curious about them, *le digo sinceramente*.'

- (17) A mí no me interesa, y lo digo francamente, quién pueda ser tal o cual funcionario, su nombre o su físico; lo importante es el programa que se comprometió a aplicar, que la plataforma que lo llevó al gobierno se esté aplicando. (Proceso, 19/01/1997, México)

'I'm not interested, and *lo digo francamente*, in who such-and-such a public servant could be, his name or his appearance; what is important is the program that he formally agreed to apply, that the platform that led him to the government is being fulfilled.'

- (18) Acabamos de poner uno. No creo que una política económica en este país pasa por que este país deje de tener industrias. Lo digo francamente.

(Televisión Madrid, 14/01/92, España)

'We've just installed one. I don't think economic policy in this country should consist in closing down industries. *Lo digo francamente*.'

Across the whole range of their formal manifestations, which will not be described in detail now, it can be seen that constructions with *digo*, just like speech verb complements, appear in some way to be detached from what is enunciated (either they dominate the whole structure as in (14), or they are situated in parenthetical positions as in (15)–(17), or they constitute independent speech acts, as marked by the prosodical features of example (18).

11.3 Sincerity, cooperation and communicative strategy

In Section 11.4, we shall proceed to a semantic and pragmatic analysis of some of the adverbial units of sincerity illustrated above. In particular, we will describe the adverbial units whose lexical base codifies the contents of sincerity, honesty and frankness. We will focus our attention on the adverbs *sinceramente* 'sincerely',

honestamente ‘honestly’ and *francamente* ‘frankly’, and also on the less frequently used phrases *con sinceridad* ‘with sincerity’, *con honestidad* ‘with honesty’ and *con franqueza* ‘with frankness’. We will envisage both their function as speech modalizers, and their role as adjuncts in collocations with the verbs *decir* and *hablar* in the first person singular of the present indicative tense. We shall also dwell on the marking of sincerity (or of frankness or honesty) of the speaker in assertive acts, given that it is in these linguistic acts that linguistic units (the objective of this study) are seen to be most productive (cf. Aznárez Mauleón & González Ruiz 2006).

Before centering on the core objective of this study, we would like to make one brief clarification. We are not unaware that one of the most severe criticisms of Gricean pragmatics (including Grice’s views on sincerity) was leveled at the author’s limited cultural outlook (cf. e.g. Ochs 1998). In this respect, it should never be forgotten that the scope of the quality maxim differs from one culture to another (cf. Hernández Sacristán 1999: 126–129; Palmer 2000: 230–238). However, we believe that it is meaningful to ask the following question: why do speakers, at least in our culture, so often underline their contributions as being sincere, thereby showing that they are not speaking about something the truth of which they are not sure of, or cannot establish with sufficient certainty? Apart from any strategic reasons they may have, it needs to be emphasized that, by using these modalizers, speakers are presented from the outset as “co-operators”, subject to rules complied with as part of what has been called the “deontology of communication”. In this respect, attention has to be paid to the following restriction: there are no speech modalizers whose meaning represents a speaker who is a non co-operator, particularly an insincere speaker. As Montolío (1993: 124) points out, there are no such protases like **si quieres que te mienta* ‘if you want me to lie to you’; nor do we have *insinceramente* ‘insincerely’ as an autonomous speech modalizer or as part of a collocation with a generic speech act verb in the first person of the present indicative tense (e.g. **te digo insinceramente* ‘I tell you insincerely’). We could answer the question posed by turning to a basic principle that governs discourse, which could be formulated as follows: “by explicitly underlining a condition which is normally guaranteed, speakers present its fulfillment as doubtful”. As Nef & Nølle (1982: 48) stress, adverbs like *sinceramente* or *honestamente* have the function of reminding the enunciator or co-enunciator of the cooperative principle. For instance, by using an adverb like *sinceramente*, speakers are in some way “preconstructing” the possibility that their adherence to the “deontological” rules of interaction might be questioned and they ascertain that any doubts cast on their *sinceridad* ‘sincerity’ are unjustified. In other words, in communicative conditions specifically marked by the possibility of infraction of the cooperative principle, the enunciator makes it clear that his or her contribution is not mendacious, ironic or jocular. This is particularly clear in contexts that mark the passage from a joke or an ironic comment

to a serious contribution (e.g. *no, ahora en serio* ‘no, now seriously speaking’. In any case, it is unquestionable, as Montolío (1993: 125) points out, that “the desire to show sincerity should not be taken to mean that speakers are essentially ‘good’, unable to distort, even in the slightest, the correctness of the information they transmit (our daily experience provides unquestionable evidence to the contrary); instead, such an attitude reveals that speakers find it appropriate to *come across as being sincere* in a certain situation (either for cooperative or for selfish reasons)”.⁵ What happens on certain occasions is that speakers consider it relevant to *show* themselves as sincere – which is not the same as *being sincere*, as the same author also points out, following Wilson & Sperber’s (1991) critique of Grice’s model of communication, especially the quality maxim. In what follows, special reference will be made to contexts in which the use of expressions of sincerity obey strategic reasons, viz. to preserve the speaker’s good image and to attenuate the possible negative effects of verbal contributions on interpersonal relationships.

11.4 Semantics and pragmatics of speech modalizers of “frankness”, “honesty” and “sincerity”

The various expressions of sincerity, honesty and frankness used in Spanish as modalizers of the “way of saying” (something) appear in basically the same contexts; in fact, in many cases, they are interchangeable. However, there are noticeable differences, which can be identified if we take a look at dictionary definitions for the corresponding adjectival bases (*sincero*, *honesto* and *franco*). The most explicit dictionary in this respect is the *Diccionario de uso del español* (DUE), which offers important information about the difference between *sincero* and *franco* in the usage notes corresponding to the latter:

Aunque los adjetivos *franco* y *sincero*, así como los nombres correspondientes *franqueza* y *sinceridad*, son intercambiables en todos los casos, hay diferencias de matiz entre sus respectivos significados primarios: la persona franca lo es más bien por temperamento y la franqueza es una actitud habitual que puede degenerar en rudeza; la persona sincera lo es consciente y reflexivamente y la sinceridad puede ser ocasional y, cuando constituye una cualidad, se atribuye como virtud. (...) [A] cada uno de ellos le es atribuible como matiz secundario de significado el que lo es primario en el otro.

‘Although the adjectives *franco* and *sincero*, and the corresponding nouns *franqueza* and *sinceridad*, are interchangeable in all cases, there are subtle differences between their respective primary meanings: frankness is something one is naturally disposed to, a habit that can degenerate into rudeness; sincerity is a matter of conscience and reflexion, it can be occasional and, when it

is seen as a quality, it is a credit to one's personality. (...) What is primary in one is secondary in the other, and vice versa.'

Clearly, we are not dealing with synonyms: there are contexts in which there is a preference for one or the other. As their corresponding adverbial derivatives retain the same conceptual meaning, they, too, in their use as speech verb complements, show a tendency to appear in certain types of contexts, or to contribute certain discourse values. The adverbs and the adjectives differ in categorical meaning only. Similarly, we are of the opinion that there is no difference in (conceptual) meaning between the adverbial derivative with an intraphrasal function and the same adverbial form with a function outside the syntagmatics of the proposition. In fact, contrary to what is usually claimed, with regard to *francamente*, *sinceramente*, *honestamente* and many other adverbs, we are not dealing with homonymous signs that carry out different syntactical functions (intraphrasal and marginal); we are dealing with a single unit, not two.

In the present paper, apart from bearing in mind the definitions of the adjectival bases given in the dictionaries, we will focus on examples in which interchangeability is not an option. This will allow us to infer and spell out the meaning of the speech act complements dealt with in this paper using Spanish and English versions of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage as a descriptive tool.

11.4.1 *Hablar sinceramente*

Let us start by looking at the information DUE, DEA and DRAE offer s.v. *sincero*:

Se dice del que habla o procede mostrando lo que piensa o siente o su manera de ser (DUE)

'Said of those who, when speaking or acting, show what they think or feel. Also said of someone's way of being'

Persona que dice lo que piensa o siente (DEA)

'A person who says what they think or feel'

Que actúa con sinceridad. Sinceridad: Sencillez, veracidad, modo de expresarse libre de fingimiento (DRAE)

'Someone who acts with *sinceridad*. *Sinceridad*: Simplicity, veracity, a way of expressing oneself without pretence'

These definitions, like those corresponding to *franco* which will be presented later, refer to the desire to express one's own thoughts or sentiments. Looking at examples which show a preference for *sinceramente* as a modalizing adverb indicating the speaker's sincerity, it is possible to isolate a feature that characterizes this adverb. Observe the following instances:

- (19) Por eso yo creo que hay servicios fundamentales, el de la Justicia es uno de ellos, la Sanidad y la Educación, que están fallando en su propia base en este momento y a mí es lo que más me preocupa del actual estado de cosas, te lo digo sinceramente. (Oral, *Querido Pirulí*, TVE 1, 09/03/88, España)
 ‘That’s why I think there are basic services, Justice is one of them, and Health and Education, which are failing us at this moment, and that’s what worries me most about the current state of matters, *te lo digo sinceramente*.’
- (20) Pregunta. ¿Por qué se presenta a la reelección por cuarta vez consecutiva?
 Respuesta. Porque me lo han pedido muchos médicos. Y, sinceramente, yo no pensaba presentarme. (*El Mundo*, 31/03/1996, España)
 ‘Question. Why are you standing for re-election for the fourth consecutive time?
 Answer. Because many doctors have asked me to. And, *sinceramente*, I had not thought of standing.’
- (21) Sinceramente, como periodista me siento ofendida porque mi profesión – el oficio de ser los escritores de la historia en tiempo presente – se pueda convertir en algo que se recibe por correspondencia.
 (*Hoy*, 05–11/01/1987, “Periodismo”, 1987, Chile)
 ‘*Sinceramente*, as a journalist I feel offended because my profession – the job of being a writer of history in the present tense – can turn into something that one trains for through a correspondence course.’

The common denominator in these examples is the desire of the speaker not only to manifest his or her thoughts or feelings, but to do so in order to communicate something about him- or herself. From these examples one can infer that people who speak “with sincerity”, who refer to their own speech using an expression that contains this lexeme, wish to say something about themselves. They direct what they are saying towards their own “I”. It is this desire of speakers to say something about themselves that distinguishes *sinceramente* from *francamente* and motivates a preference for the former in examples (19)–(21). Expressions of sincerity appear regardless of whether speakers wish to reveal positive or negative aspects about themselves. *Sinceridad* fits in with the Western idea that says that people should express their real thoughts or feelings: “We shouldn’t try to appear ‘good’ to other people. Rather, we should try to reveal ‘to the world’ our uniqueness, and this involves, above all else, our ‘badness’ [...]” (Wierzbicka 2003: 117). The following is an example of this:

- (22) Entonces, yo creo que sería demasiado falso si fuera de... porque yo yo creo que hay algunas personas que realmente van de que lo saben todo, de que leen muchos libros. Yo no, yo lo digo sinceramente, no leo libros, no me gusta leer.
 (¿*Pero esto qué es?*, TVE1, 1989, España)
 ‘So, I think that it would be excessive if I went round... because I think there

are some people who really go round thinking that they know everything, that they read a lot of books. I do not, *lo digo sinceramente*, I do not read books, I don't like to read.'

Here, the speaker knows that, by admitting he doesn't read books, other people may have a poor opinion of him, as the act of not reading, in our society, is usually considered a characteristic that threatens the positive face of a person.⁶ However, he does not hide this fact, in spite of the risk of damaging his image; he mentions it, because he wishes to manifest the truth about himself.

Further evidence of the difference between expressions of sincerity and of frankness lies in the frequent appearance of the former – and the unusualness of the latter – with predicates which, in some way, emphasize a subjective attitude, such as the doxastics (e.g. verbs like *creer*, *pensar*, *opinar* 'believe, think, provide an opinion', etc.) or those predicates whose meanings are affiliated with expressive speech acts, like *agradecer* 'thank', *felicitar* 'congratulate', *dar el pésame* 'express one's condolences', *desear algo a alguien* 'wish something to someone':

- (23) Creo sinceramente / ?francamente que es un asunto muy difícil.

'I *sinceramente* / ?*francamente* think it's a very difficult matter.'

- (24) Te lo agradezco sinceramente / ?francamente.

'I *sinceramente* / ?*francamente* thank you.'

In light of what has been said, the expression (*digo/hablo*) *sinceramente* / *con sinceridad* '(I speak/say) sincerely / with sincerity' can be characterized as follows. First, as underscored in the dictionary definitions above (cf. *que habla o procede mostrando lo que piensa o siente* 'who speaks or acts, showing what he / she thinks or feels'; *que dice lo que piensa o siente* 'who says what he / she thinks or feels'; *que se expresa libre de fingimiento* 'who expresses him- or herself without pretence'), it is essentially speech-related. In fact, sincerity is a *way of saying* (something). Goddard (2001:670) points this out with reference to the English adverb *sincerely*: "the term *sincerely* implies some 'act of saying'", "what is *sincere* or *insincere* is not the *hope* (*admiration*, *belief*, etc.) itself, but the expression of that *hope* (*admiration*, *belief*, etc.)". Second, the examples demonstrate that speakers who use this speech act complement wish, above all, to communicate something about themselves, they want the listener to know something about their personal sentiments, thoughts or opinions, although this could well be to their own detriment. They seek to communicate the truth and do so because they want to, not for other reasons (e.g. out of courtesy). A clear example of this is given in (25):

- (25) MERCEDES. – Es usted muy galante.

ALBERTO. – Quédese.

MERCEDES. – ¿Sinceramente?

ALBERTO. – Con toda sinceridad.

MERCEDES. – Entonces, de acuerdo.

(A. Diosdado, *Trescientos veintiuno, trescientos veintidós*, 1991, España)

'MERCEDES. – You are very gallant.

ALBERTO. – Stay.

MERCEDES. – ¿*Sinceramente*?

ALBERTO. – *Con toda sinceridad*.

MERCEDES. – All right, then.'

In (25), Mercedes uses *sinceramente* to ask if Alberto's request for her to stay conveys his real thoughts or feelings, or is merely a product of the rules of verbal courtesy. She wants to make sure that what Alberto said is the result of a desire to express a genuine request rather than of a desire to engage in an act of courtesy. Alberto, for his part, by using the expression *con toda sinceridad*, tries to prevent his words from being interpreted as a mere gesture of conventional positive politeness. (25) is but one example of the widespread use of this type of phrase in expressive speech acts directed towards the listener (such as compliments, congratulations, or gratitude) by a speaker trying to avoid his or her words being construed as solely obeying common rules of courtesy.

In view of the above, the following explication for speaking or talking *sinceramente* or *con sinceridad* can be proposed:

Hablo (digo) sinceramente / con sinceridad

- (a) I say something
- (b) I say this because I want you to know what I think
- (c) you can know what I think because of this
- (d) I don't want not to say it because of this
- (e) I say it because it is true

(Spanish version)

- (a) digo algo
- (b) lo digo porque quiero que sepas lo que pienso
- (c) puedes saber lo que pienso a causa de eso
- (d) no quiero no decirlo a causa de eso
- (e) lo digo porque es verdad

The above explication clearly reflects the two defining characteristics of phrases such as *digo sinceramente*. It insists on its speech-relatedness and on the speaker's desire for personal expression as the only motivation for saying something, in spite of any unwelcome consequences for the person's positive face.

By observing the use of *sinceramente* and related expressions, we have also been able to ascertain that they appear in discourse with a very important strategic value. On the one hand, as can be seen in example (22), the explicit assertion of

sincerity plays a strategic role; being sincere and explicit about it is superior to the fear-driven hypocrisy of saying something that is not true, in an attempt to prevent oneself from being judged negatively. The justifying value that *ser sincero* 'being sincere' possesses in Spanish is somewhat similar to that of 'being honest' in English according to Carbaugh (1988: 140–141), who writes that "the risks to self in 'being honest' (the potential discredit the disclosure may bring) are potentially mitigated by the social value in being honest", and also that "an honest act by an individual can – directly or indirectly – mitigate previous wrongdoings, thus purging one of (at least some of) the guilt associated with the discreditable act(s)".

On the other hand, as can be seen in example (25), the explicit appearance of a commitment to quality is also motivated by the existing conflict between the expression of personal truth, on the one hand, and courtesy, on the other, in other words by the speaker's as well as the listener's awareness that politeness can lead us to say something that we do not really think or believe. Along similar lines, it may be of interest to point out that the conflict between the quality maxim and verbal politeness maxims also appears to be the basic component of the English adverb *sincerely*, for which Wierzbicka (2002: 423) proposes the following explication:

I said it sincerely

- (a) I said: I think something now
I feel something because of this
- (b) it was true
- (c) people think that it is good to say things like this to other people at times like this
- (d) I didn't say it because of this

Components (b), (c) and (d) signal that the use of the English adverb is restricted to cases in which the desire to express real sentiments or reasons is more of a motivating factor than the satisfaction of *social* expectations. This usage restriction does not exist in the case of Spanish *sinceramente*. In this respect, *sinceramente* shows greater similarity to Russian *iskrenno*, which Wierzbicka (ibid.: 424) explicates as follows:

Ja éto skazala iskrenno (I said this *iskrenno*)

- (a) I said: I think something
I feel something because of this
- (b) it was true
- (c) I said it because I wanted to say what I thought (felt)
- (d) I didn't say it because of anything else

From this explication, we can infer that *iskrenno* appears to lack the component of 'risk' to the speaker which is found in *sinceramente*.

11.4.2 *Hablar honestamente*

The adverb *honestamente*, which is used less frequently than the other two described in this paper (cf. below), has a specific meaning which does not coincide with that of the English adverb *honestly*. The first thing that sets this lexeme apart is that it does not necessarily imply a speech act (unlike *sinceramente* and *francamente*). In fact, the adverbial derivative *honestamente* also appears in combination with verbs that have nothing to do with verbal acts, like *trabajar* ‘work’, *cumplir* ‘fulfill’, *vivir* ‘live’. What we are interested in here is the use that is made of this adverb as a speech modalizer, i.e. as an independent speech adverb, or in conjunction with a speech act verb.

Our three dictionaries define *honesto* as follows:

(adj.; aplicado a las personas y a sus palabras y actos). Incapaz de engañar, defraudar o apropiarse lo ajeno. Cumplidor escrupuloso de su deber o buen administrador de lo que tiene a su cargo (...) (DUE)

‘(adj.; used with reference to people and their words and acts). Incapable of deceit, defrauding, or appropriating something from somebody else. (One who is) a scrupulous fulfiller of one’s obligation(s) or a good administrator of what one is in charge of’

2. adj. Persona recta y honrada (DEA)

‘2. adj. An upright and honorable person’

4. adj. Probo, recto, honrado (DRAE)

‘4. adj. Straight, upright, honorable’

Thanks to these definitions, insights can be gained into the peculiarities that distinguish this word from (*hablo/digo*) *sinceramente* and (*hablo/digo*) *francamente*. The first thing that stands out in the dictionary information is the connection between *honesto* and morality (cf. phrases such as *cumplidor de su deber* ‘fulfiller of his obligation’; *probo, recto, honrado* ‘straight, upright, honourable’).⁷ Something similar shows up in the use of its adverbial derivative in examples like the following:

- (26) Yo le digo muy honestamente que no he sentido ninguna desventaja de ser mujer para escribir. (Oral, Bolivia, 1992)
‘I *digo muy honestamente* to you that I have not felt any disadvantage at being a woman when it comes to writing.’
- (27) Si nuestros jueces no pueden siquiera aplicar una condena en un caso penal, porque están sometidos a presiones de poderosos sectores o porque se corrompen, honestamente hablando resulta una utopía y hasta una ofensa a la inteligencia de la opinión pública suponer que cuando se trata de campesinos

despojados de su tierra por terratenientes que se adueñan de lo que pertenece a comunidades humildes, los tribunales van a resolver conforme a derecho.

(*La Hora*, 10/06/1997, "Problema agrario", Guatemala)

'If our judges cannot even apply a sentence in a penal case, because they are subjected to pressure from powerful sectors or because they are corrupt, *honestamente hablando* it is utopian and even an offence to the intelligence of the general public to assume that, when peasants have been stripped of their land by landowners who take possession of what belongs to humble communities, tribunals will resolve these matters according to the law.'

- (28) En una entrevista que le hace Jorge Semprún (antes de ser ministro), asegura González: "Se puede decir con toda objetividad, *honestamente*, que la perspectiva política es la de una hegemonía del socialismo democrático en España por un período de veinte o veinticinco años".

(José Luis Gutiérrez & Amando de Miguel, *La ambición del César. Un retrato político y humano de Felipe González*, 1989, España)

'When interviewed by Jorge Semprún (before he was appointed a minister), González affirmed: "It can be said in all objectivity, *honestamente*, that the political outlook is for democratic socialism to dominate in Spain for a period of twenty to twenty-five years".'

These examples show speakers saying something out of a sense of obligation, in accordance with what they consider to be the truth. Being truthful, here, has a moral aspect, because the truth is seen as something one *should* say. The assertion that is being made is not one inspired by a desire for self-revelation, as was the case with *sinceramente*, but one dictated by a moral duty to state what they feel is truthful, objective and correct, even when doing so is potentially harmful since the view or views that are being put forward may not coincide with the broader public opinion. Other people may not agree with what is being said, but the speaker is committed to his or her view, and shows it through the use of the adverb *honestamente*. Thus, in example (26), the speaker claims that, contrary to what is usually thought in our society, her career has not suffered any setbacks because of the fact that she is a woman. Examples (27) and (28), on the other hand, imply that the truth should be told because it is something objective, something intelligent, contrary to what other people might think or say, contrary to alternative views which are deceitful and manipulative. It is important, at the same time, to remind ourselves (cf. above) of the fact that a show of honesty, of purportedly meeting an obligation to tell the truth, is not necessarily proof of actual honesty.

The explication proposed for speaking *honestamente* or *con honestidad* is as follows:

Hablo (digo) honestamente / con honestidad

- (a) I say something

- (b) I know that maybe it will be bad for me if I say it
- (c) I say it because it is true
- (d) I must say it (= I cannot not say it) because it is true

(Spanish version)

- (a) digo algo
- (b) sé que tal vez va a ser malo para mí si lo digo
- (c) lo digo porque es verdad
- (d) debo decirlo (= no puedo no decirlo) porque es verdad

Like that of *sinceramente*, the use of lexemes such as *honestamente* also has strategic value. In both cases, an adverb is being used to justify a view which may not be approved of by other people. Once again, telling the truth is seen as a speech act with a positive social value, although in the present case obligation plays a more prominent role than self-revelation.

The relative scarcity of the adverb *honestamente* in 20th century Spanish (less than a quarter of the number of occurrences found for the other two adverbs) may be related to the distinction that has been pointed out. Judging by the number of examples in our data, the strategic value of *sinceramente* and *francamente* appears to be higher in present-day Spanish. It may be the case that, in contemporary society, which values liberty so much, it is more effective to show oneself as someone who expresses what he or she really thinks or believes, simply because he or she wants to, than as someone who does so to fulfil a moral obligation. In earlier periods, the use of *honestamente* was more widespread than at present. Roughly speaking, the examples from the 16th and 17th centuries found in the *Corpus diacrónico del español* (CORDE) compiled by the *Real Academia Española* show that *sinceramente* and *honestamente* were both commonly used and had a similar frequency, while in the documents from the last quarter of the 20th century included in CREA *sinceramente* appears much more widely than *honestamente*.

11.4.3 *Hablar francamente*

Last but not least, we shall examine the expression (*digo/hablo*) *francamente* / *con franqueza* ‘(I speak/say) frankly / with frankness’. DUE, DEA and DRAE offer the following definitions for the adjective *franco*:

- 7. Aplicado a personas y a sus palabras o manera de hablar, se dice de quien expresa sin inconveniente lo que piensa o siente, aunque no sea favorable para él mismo o para otros, o que descubre fácilmente su intimidad (DUE)
- ‘7. Used with reference to people and to their words or way of speaking; said of those who express what they think or feel without reserve, although it may

not be advantageous either for themselves or for others; or [of those] who easily reveal their intimacy'

1. Persona sincera o que expresa abiertamente lo que piensa o siente (DEA)

'1. A person who is sincere or who openly expresses what they think or feel'

1. Sencillo, sincero, ingenuo y leal en su trato (DRAE)

'1. Simple, sincere, ingenuous and loyal in one's dealings (with people)'

In line with the definitions provided in DUE and DEA (DRAE is less precise), *hablar francamente* is basically to be understood as "speaking without reserve",⁸ even though what is said might "not be advantageous" for the speaker or for others. The latter component appears to open the door to using the adverb *francamente* in contexts such as (22), where the speaker says something negative about himself. Nevertheless, *sinceramente* is the preferred choice in this example, which suggests there has to be a difference. In fact, one who speaks *francamente* or *con franqueza* is not saying something "disadvantageous for oneself" but rather something that might harm oneself, as what is said is something unfavorable for other people. Speakers who manifest themselves as being *franco* do not focus on a desire to communicate something about themselves, as was the case in (22), but on saying something that could be offensive to other people and therefore also harmful to themselves. It is in such contexts that a preference for the use of *francamente* etc. can be observed, as in the following examples:

- (29) Estabas deseando de que llegaran las ferias para para estar de fiesta, ¿no? Y ahora, ahora se ha perdido bastante. Sí, bueno. Vienen yo creo que la feria realmente la hace pues eso, las atracciones que van allí a montar. No es divertido. Francamente no es divertido. Ahora prácticamente ni se va ya, vamos.

(*Conversación 13*, Universidad de Alcalá de Henares, 1992, España)

'You were longing for the arrival of the fair to have a good time, weren't you? And now, now the fair has lost quite a lot (of its attraction). Well, people come to the fair for the attractions they are going to enjoy. It is not enjoyable. *Francamente*, it is not enjoyable. Now people hardly go (to fairs).'

- (30) Hay un señor bastante provocador él, y, a mi juicio, creo que medio trastornado, lo digo francamente, por las cosas que hace, por los rollos que arma, por las broncas que tiene con su propia gente, que tal vez lo que necesite es una atención psiquiátrica, no lo digo por ofender, estoy hablando francamente, no lo digo por ofenderlo.

(*Comparecencia de Fidel Castro para tratar temas de actualidad nacional*, 1999, Cuba)

'He's a man who is quite provocative and, in my opinion, I think he is half crazy. *Lo digo francamente* because of the things he does, the scenes he makes,

the rows he has with his own people. Perhaps he is in need of psychiatric care; I am not saying this to offend him, *estoy hablando francamente*, I am not saying it to offend him.’

- (31) (...) entre los errores de España, a mi juicio, realmente, lo digo con franqueza, entre los hechos morales, hechos de carácter moral de los que no puede enorgullecerse España está el haber hecho entrega del Sáhara Occidental a Marruecos.

(Fidel Castro, *Sobre la deuda externa impagable de América Latina*, 1985, Cuba)

‘(...) among Spain’s errors, in my opinion, really, and *lo digo con franqueza*, among moral matters, matters of a moral nature that Spain cannot be proud of is the hand-over of the Western Sahara to Morocco.’

- (32) – ¿Qué pasa, Miguel? ¿Desconfías de mí?
– Francamente, sí. No acabo de entender cuál es tu papel en todo esto, pero me parece que no me lo dices todo.

(Fernando Savater, *Caronte aguarda*, 1981, España)

‘– What’s wrong, Miguel? Don’t you trust me?’

– *Francamente*, no. I don’t quite understand what your role in all this is, but I feel that you are not telling me everything.’

All of the above show instances of speakers saying something unfavorable to someone, something that can be offensive to some third party: in (29) to those who organized the fair, in (30) to the man considered to be provocative, in (31) to Spain, and in (32) to the interlocutor who is implicitly characterized as being not very reliable. It looks as though there is a preference for frankness modalizers on the part of speakers who, rather than to tone down their discourse and to protect themselves with expressions of sincerity signaling communication of “real” personal “beliefs”, do not shy away from controversy. The speech modalizers in the following examples function rather as disagreement intensifiers or as signposts of reproach, criticism, protest, etc. It is this distancing function which is characteristic of *francamente*.

- (33) – ¿Y no cree que sería bueno que TVE fuese como la BBC?
– Yo, sinceramente, creo que la televisión pública española es homologable en todo a la BBC. Es más, creo que TVE es una de las televisiones públicas mejores del mundo.
– Muchos se van a llevar una sorpresa cuando lean esa afirmación...
– ¡Ah!, sí. Pues, francamente, no sé por qué. (*Cambio* 16, 19/02/1990)
‘– And don’t you think that it would be good if TVE could be like the BBC?
– I sincerely think that the Spanish broadcasting service is equal in everything to the BBC. What’s more, I think that TVE is one of the best public broadcasters in the world.

– Many people will be surprised when they read this statement...

– Oh yes. Well, *francamente*, I don't know why.'

- (34) El portavoz parlamentario de CiU, Joaquín Molins, consideró ayer que el jefe del Ejecutivo se equivoca cuando dice que los silbidos al cantante Raimon fueron una anécdota. No entiendo nada, *francamente*, con todos los respetos, enfatizó Molins, que dice que se lo pensará dos veces antes de volver a asistir a un acto de este tipo. (ABC Electrónico, 19/09/1997)

'The CiU parliamentary spokesperson, Joaquín Molins, yesterday considered that the head of the government was mistaken when he said that the booing whistles against Raimon, the singer, were only a minor issue. "With all respect, *francamente*, I don't get it," emphasized Molins, who said that he would think twice before attending this type of event again.'

- (35) – Dime, Luis, con toda sinceridad, ¿podemos estudiar la fusión Bilbao-Popular con urgencia?

– ¡Hombre!, José Ángel, así a bote pronto...

– Es que yo necesito una respuesta ya...

– Pues mira, si es con esas prisas, *francamente*, no.

(J. Cacho Cortés, Asalto al poder. La revolución de Mario Conde, 1998)

– Tell me Luis, in all sincerity, can we look straight away at a merger of the Bilbao-Popular (banks)?

– Good heavens! José Ángel, like this, all of a sudden...

– I need an answer now...

– Well, look, if it's this sudden, *francamente*, no.'

The following semantic explication of (*hablo/digo*) *francamente* / *con franqueza* is put forward:

Hablo (digo) francamente / con franqueza

(a) I say something

(b) I know that maybe someone will feel something bad if I say it

(c) I don't want not to say it because of this

(d) I say it because it is true

(Spanish version)

(a) digo algo

(b) sé que tal vez alguien va a sentir algo malo si lo digo

(c) no quiero no decirlo a causa de eso

(d) lo digo porque es verdad

Component (a) underlines the speech-related nature of frankness modalizers, just as component (a) in the explication of (*hablo/digo*) *sinceramente* / *con sinceridad* did with respect to sincerity modalizers. Component (b) shows the "risk" that

frankness entails: a risk which is different from the one associated with sincerity, a risk which stems from a desire to deliberately flout Leech's (1983: 135) approbation maxim. Whoever uses a frankness modalizer is consciously acting against this rule, because what is said can harm another person, can be offensive and, therefore, can make this person 'feel something bad'. Lastly, components (c) and (d) express the speaker's desire to say what is considered to be true, in spite of courtesy rules. The component that can be considered basic and differential in the description of expressions of frankness is (b), because in those contexts in which something that can harm another person is said, there is a clear preference for this type of expression. The examples clearly illustrate that expressions of frankness are used as self-protection and redress strategies, in the presence of negative information about the interlocutor or another person. In such cases, the quality maxim turns out to be a higher rule, one that justifies discourtesy, one that excuses the speaker from adhering to Leech's approbation maxim, according to which one should not say unpleasant things about another person.

11.4.4 *Sinceridad, honestidad, franqueza* and socially approved behavior

It is by no means coincidental that our three sets of expressions appear in large numbers in political discourse. Politicians often speak out, and need to make sure they do not lose (too much) public support. To do so, they rely on the speech markers at the heart of this study, and use them as devices for self-protection. Politicians, and speakers in general, know that the fact of being seen as *sincero*, *honesto* or *franco* (any of these three possibilities) works in their favor. As mentioned before, since speech modalizers have to do with the cooperative principle, they appear in discourse for strategic reasons. In particular, speakers turn to an explicit manifestation of sincerity to counteract any harm that their verbal statements might bring to their image. This brings us to consider that another component, one which alludes to socially approved behavior, should be added to each of the explications above. This component, which is part and parcel of the semantics of the three sets of markers that were analyzed, can be formulated as follows: *La gente piensa que es bueno hacer eso* 'People think it is good to do this'.

11.5 Concluding remarks

Adverbial speech modalizers, particularly the expressions of sincerity we have referred to, are not merely interspersed in discourse to make a pre-supposed communicative rule explicit. Rather, they are used as beacons for the process of interpretation. From the initial analysis of the semantics and some of the discourse functions of the expressions that have been the objective of this work, it can be seen

that their use often reveals certain tensions in discourse between self-revelation and the maintenance of social harmony. Wierzbicka (2003: 120), referring to sincerity in Anglo-American society, also detects a tension “between the desire to express one’s real self (‘this is what I feel / want / think’) and the desire to have friendly interpersonal relations with other people and to ensure that ‘everyone feels something good’”. Similarly, by looking at the use of the Spanish expressions analyzed in this chapter, we have been able to observe how speakers often opt for self-revelation, all the while seeking to preserve their image by showing themselves sincere, frank or (on fewer occasions) honest.

Throughout this paper three sets of expressions have been analyzed, two of which – (*digo/hablo*) *sinceramente* and (*digo/hablo*) *francamente* – are extremely common, not only in peninsular Spanish, but also in Latin America. Although they share the same function of protecting the speaker’s image, they have specific values. (*Hablo/digo*) *sinceramente* ‘(I speak/say) sincerely’ announces discourse with a personal content, in which the speaker wishes to manifest his/her ‘I’, whether positive or negative. (*Hablo/digo*) *honestamente* ‘(I speak/say) honestly’ announces discourse with a more objective content, in which the speaker wishes to say what *should* be said. (*Hablo/digo*) *francamente* ‘(I speak/say) frankly’ announces discourse which refers to the interlocutor or to other parties, and in which the speaker wishes to say something negative about them.

To further illustrate the full translatability of NSM explications, without any loss of crucial information or any addition of potentially misleading (culturally specific) details, it may be useful to provide versions in a second Romance language. French has been, quite arbitrarily, chosen for this purpose. The supplementary component identified in Section 11.4.4 has been added.

Hablo (digo) sinceramente / con sinceridad

- (a) je dis quelque chose
- (b) je le dis parce que je veux que tu saches ce que je pense
- (c) tu peux savoir ce que je pense à cause de cela
- (d) je ne veux pas ne pas le dire à cause de cela
- (e) je le dis parce que c’est vrai
- (f) les gens pensent que c’est bien de faire cela

Hablo (digo) honestamente / con honestidad

- (a) je dis quelque chose
- (b) je sais que peut-être ce sera mal pour moi si je le dis
- (c) je le dis parce que c’est vrai
- (d) je dois le dire (= je ne peux pas ne pas le dire) parce que c’est vrai
- (e) les gens pensent que c’est bien de faire cela

Hablo (digo) francamente / con franqueza

- (a) je dis quelque chose
- (b) je sais que peut-être quelqu'un se sentira mal si je le dis
- (c) je ne veux pas ne pas le dire à cause de cela
- (d) je le dis parce que c'est vrai
- (e) les gens pensent que c'est bien de faire cela

It is hoped that our incursion into the semantics of sincerity in Spanish, using NSM, will be a starting point for further research, not only in Spanish but also in the other Romance languages. Without a doubt, NSM is set to provide many interesting results in this area, and contrastive and cross-cultural studies are certain to benefit if the approach taken here is pursued further.

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Notes

1. All data used in this paper, with the exception of constructed examples and dictionary entries, are drawn from the *Corpus de Referencia del Español Actual* (CREA) and from the *Corpus Diacrónico del Español* (CORDE), both compiled by the *Real Academia Española* (<http://www.rae.es>). Indications of author / speaker and title / source are those given in the corpora.
2. Dik (1997a: Chapter 3), following proposals put forward by Kees Hengeveld, organizes grammar in four levels or basic strata, viz. nuclear predication, extended predication, the proposition level and the clause or illocutionary level. For a presentation of functional grammar with special reference to the illocutionary layer, see Ruiz de Mendoza (1999).
3. Dik et al. (1990: 38–39) offer a semantic classification of illocutionary satellites of different degrees of internal complexity (cf. also Ruiz de Mendoza 1999: 125–126).
4. *Lexematics* is Eugenio Coseriu's framework for a functional and structural semantics, widely known and advocated among linguists writing in and/or about Spanish.

5. “la voluntad de mostrar sinceridad no debe entenderse como que el hablante es esencialmente ‘bueno’, incapaz de tergiversar, sea levemente, la rectitud de la información que transmite (lo que, de manera indudable, nuestra experiencia desmiente a diario), sino que tras tal actitud se ha de interpretar que al hablante le parece pertinente mostrarse sincero en una situación determinada (sea por razones cooperativas, sea por motivos egoístas)”.
6. The concept of positive face is borrowed from Brown & Levinson’s (1987) verbal politeness theory, and is complementary to the concept of negative face. The former relates to the individual’s desire to be valued, to receive approval and recognition from the other members of the society. The latter refers to the individual’s desire for self-determination, for others not to hinder his or her acts.
7. The adverbial derivative of the adjective *honrado*, viz. *honradamente*, can also appear as an utterance modalizer. It, too, is linked to morality. The DEA defines it as follows in its second meaning (English translation provided only): “A person whose behavior complies with the moral rule, especially that concerning truth, and with regard to somebody else’s property”.
8. The DUE relates *franqueza* ‘frankness’ to the act of expressing oneself “plainly and straightforwardly” or “without disguise”.

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Towards a description of Spanish and Italian diminutives within the NSM framework

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This paper uses the natural semantic metalanguage approach to describe Spanish and Italian diminutives, which are able to express a number of diverse emotional nuances ranging from the “affectionate” to the pejorative. Different dialects of Spanish are checked to gain a better insight into areal variation. The authors also investigate the status of the diminutive as a grammatical and/or lexical category, they attempt to establish whether diminutive formation instantiates derivation or composition, and they examine its relationship to reduplication and to the absolute superlative.

12.1 Introduction

This paper looks at diminutives in two major Romance languages, viz. Spanish and Italian. It is the first *comparative* description of synthetic diminutive formation within the NSM framework (cf. however Travis 2004). Drawing up the inventory of Spanish and Italian diminutive suffixes and describing their present-day usage proved to be a major challenge, which we do not claim to have met in full. However, we consider that our contribution constitutes at least a first step towards a better understanding of what is certain to be a culturally essential and linguistically significant phenomenon for speakers of both languages (albeit to a different degree).

Our corpus of Spanish diminutives was gathered from a wide range of sources, including but not limited to oral examples from speakers of Colombian, Peruvian and Peninsular Spanish, the CREA corpus of synchronic usage available on the website of the *Real Academia Española* (<http://www.rae.es>), the Chilean newspaper *La cuarta*, two novels by Colombian author Fernando Vallejo (viz. *La virgen de los sicarios* and *La rambla paralela*, Madrid, Alfaguara, 1994 and 2002 respectively), a novel by Peruvian author Jaime Bayly (*La noche es virgen*, Barcelona, Anagrama, 1997), and a Uruguayan film (*En la puta vida*, 2001). The Spanish corpus consists of 1154 occurrences.¹

The Italian corpus is much more restricted, consisting of only 223 examples. They were drawn from two novels (Margaret Mazzantini's *Non ti muovere*, Milano, Mondadori, 2001 and Melania G. Mazzucco's *Vita*, Milano, Rizzoli, 2003) and two children's books (*Fiabe toscane a cura di Lella Gandini*, Trieste, Einaudi, 1998 and Fabrizia Polluzzi's *Parola di gatto*, Piacenza, Mondadori, 2001) as well as from various other sources, among them an electronic corpus of chat-room Italian.²

Section 12.2 addresses the formal aspects of Spanish and Italian diminutive formation. Section 12.3 identifies the functions that were detected for the various diminutive suffixes. NSM explications for each of these functions are provided in Section 12.4. We then address some theoretical issues in Section 12.5, before briefly formulating our conclusions in Section 12.6.³

12.2 Formal aspects of Spanish and Italian diminutive formation

12.2.1 Formal aspects of Spanish diminutive formation

In Spanish, diminutive (and, as we will argue below, related) meanings can be expressed by the following suffixes listed in any concise grammar of the language (e.g. Butt & Benjamin 2004:550): *-ito* (as well as the morphological variants *-cito*, *-ecito*, *-ececito*), *-illo* (var. *-cillo*, *-ecillo*, *-ececillo*), *-ico* (var. *-cico*, *-ecico*, *-ececico*), *-uelo* (var. *-zuelo*, *-ezuelo*, *-ezezuelo*), *-ete* (*-cete*, *-ecete*), *-ín*, *-iño*.⁴ There are some differences as to regional and/or semantic distribution. For example, *-ín* is typical of the Asturias, *-illo* is typical of Seville but is also often used in Central Spain (Butt & Benjamin 2004:553) while it is much less common in Latin American Spanish (where it is nonetheless frequently heard in certain regions, such as the Mexican state of Chiapas; cf. Lipski 1994:284). In Spain, besides *-ín*, *-iño* and *-ico* also "have a northern flavour" (Butt & Benjamin 2004:550), while Latin American Spanish *-iño* is typical of regions adjacent or influenced by Brazil and *-ico* is the preferred diminutive suffix after /t, d/ in Costa Rica (hence the tagging of Costa Ricans as *Ticos*), Colombia, Cuba, and occasionally other Latin American regions (Lipski 1994:214, 224–225, 233).⁵ *-uele* is mostly pejorative while *-ete* "may add a humorous tone" (Butt & Benjamin 2004:553–554).

In addition, there are a number of regionally used diminutive suffixes which can be found only in descriptions of particular dialects. For instance, the diminutive suffixes *-ingo*, *-inga* have been reported from the popular speech of the Bolivian Llanos, and among bilingual Bolivians the effect of the Spanish diminutive suffix *-ito* may be further increased by the suffixation of the affectionate/possessive Quechua suffix *-y* (e.g. *coraconcitoy* 'dear heart'; cf. Lipski 1994:190–191). The expansion of the use of the diminutive suffix *-urro* / *-urri* in Chilean Spanish, orig-

inally most probably used only with *chiquito* 'small', as in *chiquituro* 'very small', is reported by Larkovirta-Cabello (2002). In the present study, we cannot aim to cover every single one of the numerous Spanish dialects, but must limit ourselves to some representative examples.

Nouns and adjectives are the prototypical bases to which Spanish diminutive affixes are attached, as in examples (1)–(4):

- (1) Ay, pobrecita, ¿tienes gripita? (Oral Colombian, END)
'Oh, dear, are you taken by the flu-DIM?'
- (2) (...) y le habían puesto encima el cuerpecito del niño porque simplemente no tenían mesa vacía en donde acomodarlo.
(*La virgen de los sicarios*, p. 118, DIM)
'And they had put the little body-DIM of the child on top of him because they simply did not have another free table for it.'
- (3) Uno puede ver una persona morenita y creer que eh ihleño y resulta que eh costeño.⁶ (Oral Colombian, EUPH)
'You may see a colored-DIM person and believe she's an Islander and then it turns out she's from the [mainland] Coast.'
- (4) (...) uno de esos muchachitos linditos, riquitos, hijos de papá que me fascinan (también). (*La virgen de los sicarios*, p. 19, INS)
'one of those pretty-DIM, rich-DIM, spoiled-DIM boys who (also) fascinate me.'

Although the resulting combinations are not as frequent, Spanish diminutive affixes may be attached to a number of other bases as well, e.g. past participles (which with diminutive suffixes function just as any other adjective):

- (5) Espero que ya estés aliviadita de la gripa. (Oral Colombian, END)
'I hope you've overcome-DIM the flu.'
- (6) Y tú tratando de meterte en las doh piecitas que te quedaron allá, allá todo arrinconaito, digo ¡Dios mío! (Oral Colombian, INT)
'And you're trying to squeeze into the two small rooms you've got left, everything crammed-DIM into a corner, I say: Oh my God!'

but also adverbs:

- (7) (...) me ponían a caminar derecho, derechito, siguiendo la línea.
(*La virgen de los sicarios*, p. 110, INT)
'They made me walk straight, straight-DIM ahead, following the line.'
- (8) Ya voy, voy ahorita. (Oral Colombian, INT)
'I'm going right-DIM away.'

- (9) Vivo por ahí mihmito. (Oral Colombian, INT)
 'I live right-DIM there.'

- (10) Ahícito no más. (Ecuador; Toscano Mateus 1953:423)
 'Right here-DIM.'

pronouns (personal, demonstrative, interrogative):⁷

- (11) Ellita no ha venido aún. (Northwest Argentina; de Granda 2001:116)
 'She-DIM hasn't come yet.'

- (12) Estito no me gusta. (Northwest Argentina; de Granda 2001:116)
 'I don't like this-DIM one at all.'

- (13) ¿Quiere estito? (Ecuador; Lipski 1994:250)
 'Do you want this-DIM one?'

- (14) ¿Cuántito es? (Ecuador; Lipski 1994:250)
 'How much-DIM is it?'

numerals:

- (15) Cuatrito no más tengo. (Ecuador; Toscano Mateus 1953:423)
 'I have but four-DIM (left).'

interjections / greetings:

- (16) Chaíto. (La cuarta, END)
 'Bye-bye-DIM.'

- (17) Chaolín. (La cuarta, IRON)
 'Bye-bye-DIM.'

phrases:

- (18) El grupo Enclave, liderado por la bien hechita cubana Lourdes Jiménez (...) (La cuarta, INT)
 'The band Enclave, lead by the curvy-DIM Cuban singer Lourdes Jiménez'

- (19) Aquí no masito. (Ecuador; Lipski 1994:250; cf. *Aquí no más*)
 'Right-DIM here.'

gerunds:

- (20) Hasta que, llegandito a su casa, antes de entrar, le dijo de sopetón agarrándola desprevenida (...) (CREA-Mexico, INT)
 'Until, when they were just arriving-DIM at his house and were about to enter, he suddenly said, catching her off guard'

- (21) (...) pero es que ya otras noches había oído que entraban callandito.
(CREA-Spain, INT)
'It's just that s/he had heard them entering very silently-*DIM* already on other nights.'
- (22) ¡Corriendito!
(Oral Colombian, INT)
'I'm coming-*DIM*!!!'

imperative constructions:

- (23) ¡Bájemelito!
(Nariño, Colombia [region marked by Quechua-Spanish bilingualism]; Pazos 1984 quoted by Lipski 1994: 214)
'Get it down-*DIM* for me!'

proper nouns, most commonly anthroponyms, although we also found a toponym in our data:

- (24) Le seguieron al bellaco Samperito y Pastranita, otros dos.
(*La rambla paralela*, p. 71, INS; reference is being made to the Colombian presidents Ernesto Samper and Carlos Pastrana)
'The villain was followed by Samper-*DIM* and Pastrana-*DIM*, two others of the same kind.'
- (25) Una vez más, el inefable Felipillo ha cometido graves errores... ¡Una más Toledo!, ¡Nunca aprenderás?
(Written Peruvian [<http://www.infotext.org/polemica/>], PEJ; reference is being made to the Peruvian president Felipe Toledo)
'Once again, the ineffable Felipe-*DIM* has committed serious errors. One more, Toledo! Will you never learn?'
- (26) Vivo por ahí mihmito, por la Lomita, por ahí cerca.
(Oral Colombian, END; the Sanandresan district The Hill where the original recording was made translates as *La Loma* in local Spanish)
'I live right there, on the Hill-*DIM* itself, quite nearby.'

The adverb *poco* 'little, few' takes a diminutive suffix so frequently that we felt it should be assigned its own category (see below). Note that *poco* usually takes *-ito*, sometimes *-illo*, and only in cases where *-ito* is to be intensified also *-ico*, resulting in *poquitico*:

- (27) Talvez porque se siente como un poquito aihla'a. (Oral Colombian, POC)
'Maybe because she feels a little-*DIM* isolated.'
- (28) Este año ha sido un poquillo durillo. (Peninsular Spanish, POC)
'This year's been a bit-*DIM* toughish.'

- (29) No, no, lo hablo un poquititico así, unas cosita_, lo más sencillo.
 (Oral Colombian, POC; the postnuclear *-s* in the word *cositas* has been dropped)
 ‘No, no, I speak it just a little bit-*DIM*, a couple of words, the most basic things.’

From the preceding example we can also see that Spanish diminutive formation is recursive (*poc + ito + ito + ico*). On the other hand, there is no upper limit to the number of diminutives a sentence may contain:

- (30) – Bajito, flaquito, feíto, de gafitas redonditas de carey.
 (*La rambla paralela*, p. 125, PEJ)
 ‘Smallish-*DIM*, meager-*DIM*, ugly-*DIM*, with little round tortoise-shell-framed-*DIM* glasses-*DIM*.’

- (31) Al mes de haberse casado se murió la Niña Chita, no aguantó el empujón de ese hombre perseguidor, el virgo invicto en treinta y cinco años fue roto en la cama de lona, un gran grito salió a media noche de la escuela de Las Virtudes, no se levantó más de la cama la Niña Chita, perdió el pelo amarillo, perdió los dientes blancos, se le cayeron las uñas de las manos y de los pies, se encogió como un guiñapito, como una muchachita viejita, a la Niña Chita la enteraron recogida en un pañuelo los huesitos y la pielita arrugadita las patitas encogidas los bracitos deshilachados, la barriguita fruncidita el culito rotico la enterraron amontonadita en un pañuelito porque no es necesario hacer una urnita para angelito porque la Niña Chita es todo un montoncito de huesos, las niñas de la escuela lloraron con sol y todo, los muchachitos de Las Virtudes siguieron calladitos, las mujeres de Don Pedro María Lucena hicieron fila para rezar, se les salió una lagrimita a los jugadores de bolo, carajo dijo el Teniente Vizcaya, nos quedamos de nuevo sin escuela murmuró Don Pedro María Lucena, muy bueno que se haya muerto dijo desde encima del caballo Juan Montilla, yo me voy de aquí reventó el Teniente Vizcaya y al otro día lo encontró Elzeario Roque comido de los gusanos en el monte bien podrido se pudrió el Teniente Vizcaya, Francisco se alegró del gusanero y lloró seguido todo el día y toda la noche por la muerte de la tía Chita, la pobrecita Niña Chita que se murió en Las Virtudes picada de Vizcaya, maldita sea.
 (CREA-Venezuela / Guillermo Morón, *El gallo de las espuelas de oro* [1986], IRON)

‘Just a month after getting married, Niña Chita died, she couldn’t take the shove of this harassing man, her virginity which hadn’t been conquered in thirty-five years was broken in on the canvas bed, a tremendous scream burst out of the school of The Virtues at midnight and Niña Chita no longer rose from her bed. She lost her yellow hair and white teeth, the nails fell off her hands and feet, she shrivelled up like a rag-*DIM*, like an old-*DIM* maid-*DIM*, they buried Niña Chita with her bones-*DIM* folded up-*DIM* in

a handkerchief, her skin-*DIM* wrinkled up-*DIM*, her feet-*DIM* shrunken, her arms-*DIM* frayed, her stomach-*DIM* contracted, her ass-*DIM* broken-*DIM*, they buried her heaped up-*DIM* in a handkerchief-*DIM* because it isn't necessary to fashion an angel's-*DIM* urn-*DIM* because Niña Chita is a single heap-*DIM* of bones. The girls of the school cried in G and all tones, the boys-*DIM* from The Virtues remained silent-*DIM*, Don Pedro María Lucena's women lined up to pray, the ninepin players wasted a tear-*DIM*, damn it, said Lieutenant Vizcaya, we'll be left without a school again, muttered Don Pedro María Lucena, fair enough that she should have died, said Juan Montilla from the back of his horse, I'm out of here, shouted Lieutenant Vizcaya, and the other day Elzearia Roque found him eaten up by the worms in the wilds, totally putrified, Lieutenant Vizcaya rotted away, Francisco rejoiced in this breeding ground for maggots and cried all day and all night because of aunt Chita's death, poor-*DIM* Niña Chita died in The Virtues, screwed by Vizcaya, damned be her soul.'

Although the process is marginal, there is no rule prohibiting the formation of diminutives from compound nouns or adjectives, as in Italian (see below).⁸

- (32) Celebró su cumpleaños el domingo pasado. (Oral Colombian, END)
'S/he celebrated her birthday-*DIM* on last Sunday.'

12.2.2 Formal aspects of Italian diminutive formation

The suffixes used to form diminutives in Italian are *-ino*, *-etto*, *-uccio* and *-ello*. Of these, *-ino* is the most endearing (Italian *vezzeggiativo*). With bases ending in *-on(e)*, it has the allomorph *-cino*. *-uccio* may convey pejorative nuances in addition to the endearing ones. Presumably, *-etto* is not very productive and *-ello* even less so (Maiden & Robustelli 2000: 439). In certain cases, adding the diminutive suffix to the base changes the form of the latter. In example (33), *omino* < *uomo* 'man':

- (33) L'etichetta raffigura l'omino vagabondo con le sue inconfondibili scarpe troppo lunghe e il bastone. (Vita, p. 359, *DIM*)
'The label shows a little vagrant man-*DIM* with his unmistakable attributes, too large shoes and a stick.'

Diminutive formation is much more restricted in Italian than in Spanish. Typically, Italian diminutives are formed from nouns:

- (34) un salutino prima di andare a nanna (Chat-room Italian, END)
'a goodnight-*DIM* before going to bye-byes'

- (35) Rass continua a leccarsi circondato da un gruppetto di gatte impigrite (...)
 (Parola di gatto, p. 32, DIM)
 'Rass continues to lick himself, surrounded by a small group-DIM of lazy cats'

or adjectives:

- (36) però bellina / eh // la c'ha una faccina (Oral Italian, END)
 'but pretty-DIM, eh-em, she has a pretty face'
 (37) Gallina secchina, ti voglio mangiare! (Fiabe toscane, p. 55, INT)
 'You meagre-DIM chicken, I want to eat you!'

and also from certain adverbs (more precisely, so-called lexical adverbs such as *bene* 'well' and *male* 'badly'; cf. Maiden & Robustelli 2000: 440):

- (38) Se non stai zittino, non andrai con noi. (Oral Italian, INT)
 'If you don't keep real quiet-DIM, you won't go with us.'
 (39) Il re, a cui Giovanna piaceva già un pochino, disse (...)
 (Fiabe toscane, p. 49, POC)
 'The king, who had already become a bit-DIM fond of Giovanna, said'

In some instances, diminutive suffixes may be added to numerals as well. *Un seucio* (Maiden & Robustelli 2000: 440; < *sei* 'six') is 'a bare six-DIM' (the minimum pass mark in schools).⁹

Diminutive formation with proper names, especially first names, is very common in the spoken language (subject to an appropriate pragmatic context):

- (40) Oggi ha cucinato Vitarella. (Vita, p. 28, END)
 'Today it is dear Vita-DIM who has prepared the meal.'
 (41) Morganinaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa!!!!!!... Morganuzzzzzaaaa!!!!
 (Chat-room Italian, END)
 'Dear Morgana-DIM!!!!!!... Little Morgana-DIM!!!'

As in Spanish, Italian diminutive formation is a recursive process:

- (42) Ti chiedo di comprarmi qualche mel-ett-(in-)ina.
 (Dressler & Merlini 1994: 259)
 'I ask you to buy me some tiny, tiny-DIM little-DIM apples.'

Diminutive affixes may not be added to compound nouns or adjectives (Maiden & Robustelli 2000: 440).

12.3 Analysis

12.3.1 Diminutive functions

We have chosen to approach the diminutives from the point of view of their function and not their scope. There is therefore no room in the following analysis for the “sentence diminutives” (referred to in Spanish as *diminutivos de frase*) identified in previous classifications of diminutive formation. Example (43) is taken from Alonso (1951:205) (cf. also e.g. Dressler & Merlini 1994). The difference with example (44) should be obvious.

- (43) Ya tendremos que aguardar unos añitos.
 ‘We’ll have to put up with waiting for a couple of years-DIM.’
- (44) Tienen estas avecitas la propiedad de transmutar la carroña humana en el espíritu del vuelo. (*La virgen de los sicarios*, pp. 46–47, EUPH)
 ‘These little birdies-DIM possess the quality of turning the human carrion into the spirit of flying.’

Although there were some cases in which it seemed rather difficult to decide which function to attribute to a particular diminutive form, ten different functions were identified after an initial analysis of the data:¹⁰ DIM(inutive) for “pure” diminutives without any noticeable affective connotation; END(earment) for a positive affective value conveyed by the diminutive; INS(ignificance) for a mostly somewhat negative connotation, the main aim of which seems to be to downplay the importance of the concept denoted by the basic form; INT(ensification), typical of base forms in itself denoting something small or an action taking place right away;¹¹ EUPH(emism), where the diminutive is used to soften the contents of the message; HUM(or) where the diminutive conveys a jocular connotation to the concept being denoted; IRON(y), related to the previous but with a clearly negative connotation; PEJ(orative), where a pejorative meaning without any humorous or ironical connotation is to be conveyed; POC(o) for the large group of occurrences with the adverb *poco* (this function could have been included under INT, but that would have obscured just how often *poco* is used with one or even two diminutive suffixes; cf. above); and COM(ida) for diminutives formed from names and ingredients of dishes.¹² There is some overlap between our own list of diminutive functions and that arrived at by Travis (2004). The most obvious correspondences are INSIG ~ hedge, DIM ~ small size, END ~ affection, and (to a lesser extent) PEJ ~ contempt (labels used by Travis are mentioned last).

Each of the ten functions will now be illustrated separately. However, it must be noted that some functions form clusters and clearly outweigh the others. For instance, in the case of the suffix *-ito*, the END, INT and DIM functions are prevalent. More examples of such clustering will be provided later (see our analysis of

the figures in Tables 1 and 2 below). On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that the different nuances are not captured solely by the suffixes as such, but also by the contexts in which they are used.

12.3.2 The COM function

- (45) Vamos a hacer una pastica. (Oral Colombian, COM)
'We'll make some nice pasta-DIM.'
- (46) ¿Quieres pancito? ¿Sanduichito? (Oral Colombian, COM)
'Would you like some bread-DIM? Maybe a sandwich-DIM?'
- (47) Sabe muy rico con un poquito de limoncito. (Oral Colombian, COM)
'It tastes very good when prepared with a dash of lemon-DIM.'
- (48) Comemos maduritos todos los días en el almuerzo. (Oral Colombian, COM)
'We eat ripe-DIM plantains every day at lunch.'
- (49) ¿Tienes sed? ¿Quieres aguita? (Oral Colombian, COM)
'Are you thirsty? Would you like some water-DIM?'
- (50) Le provoca un tintico, maestro? (*La rambla paralela*, 40, COM)
'Would you care for a cup of nice black coffee-DIM, master?'
- (51) una tappa alla gastronomia Burgio per comprare pomodorini secchi sott'olio
(Written Italian, COM)
'a stop at Burgio's Delicatessen to buy some nice dried tomatoes-DIM in oil'

12.3.3 The DIM function

- (52) En un papelito había anotado el día y la hora en que debía hablar, pero no encontraba el papelito. (*La rambla paralela*, p. 65, DIM)
'He had taken down on a slip of paper-DIM the day and the hour when he should give his talk but he was unable to find the paper-DIM.'
- (53) Pero ningún pesebre más hermoso que el de la casita que digo yo: ocupaba dos cuartos, el primero y el fondo, llenos de maravillas: lagos con patos, rebaños, pastores, vaquitas, casitas, carreteritas, un tigre...
(*La virgen de los sicarios*, p. 13, DIM)
'But there was no other crib as beautiful as the one of the little house-DIM I am talking about: it occupied two rooms, the one at the front and the one at the back, which were full of wonders: lakes with ducks, herds, shepherds, tiny cows-DIM, small houses-DIM, little roads-DIM, a tiger...'
- (54) Espérate un ratico antes de llamar. (Oral Colombian, DIM)
'Wait for just a moment-DIM before you call.'

- (55) Per creare l'orco Shrek sono stati realizzati 50 modellini plastici.
(Written Italian, DIM)
'In order to create the ogre Shrek, 50 little plastic models-*DIM* were fashioned...'
- (56) (...) decisi di fare una passeggiatina fino in via Capo di Luca (...)
(*Parola di gatto*, p. 64, DIM)
'I decided to go for a little walk-*DIM* as far as Capo di Luca street...'
- (57) L'officina era chiusa, un foglietto ingiallito tenuto da un nastro adesivo diceva che avrebbe riaperto di lì a un paio d'ore. (Non ti muovere, p. 27, DIM)
'The office was closed and a little yellowed paper-*DIM* fixed with adhesive tape said it would open in a couple of hours.'

12.3.4 The END function

- (58) Jennifer está celebrando el cumpleaños de sus tres añitos el sábado próximo.
(Oral Colombian, END)
'Jennifer is celebrating her third birthday-*DIM* on next Saturday.'
- (59) ¿Estás enfermita?
(Oral Colombian, END)
'Are you sick-*DIM*, dear?'
- (60) M. está muy ingreidín.
(Oral Peruvian, END)
'M. is such a spoiled child-*DIM*.'
- (61) ¡Ay Manrique, barriecito viejo, barriecito amado!
(*La virgen de los sicarios*, p. 110, END)
'Oh Manrique, dear old quarter-*DIM*, beloved quarter-*DIM*!'
- (62) ciao Angela :) [03] ~ciao angiolettaaaaaaa :) [07] (Chat-room Italian, END)
'Hi, Angela, :) [03] ~hi, dear Angela-*DIM*! :) [07]'
- (63) roberta ma come fai a rispondere a Saturn??? SEI TROPPO MODESTA, ROBERTINA
(Chat-room Italian, END)
'Roberta, how does it occur to you to answer Saturn? You are too modest, dear Roberta-*DIM*'
- (64) Ma io il coraggio non ce l'ho, e tu invece sí, via, su, Geppone, Gepponcino...
(*Fiabe toscane*, p. 19, END)
'But I don't have the courage and you, on the contrary, have it, up and away, Geppone, my dear Geppone-*DIM*...'
- (65) È il tuo fidanzatino quello?
(Non ti muovere, p. 291, END)
'Is he your fiancé-*DIM*?'

12.3.5 The EUPH function

- (66) No le compres tantos dulces a Esme, ¿no ves que está gordita?
(Oral Colombian, EUPH)
'Don't buy so many sweets for Esme, can't you see she's rather fat-DIM?'
- (67) ¿Tú piensas que Viviana va a fijarse en alguien tan antiquadito como tú?
(Oral Colombian, EUPH)
'Do you think that Viviana will settle for someone as old-fashioned-DIM as you are?'
- (68) (...) Uribe que le impuso un 'peajito' a los habitantes de los Municipios del Nororiente de Antioquia (...)
(Written Colombian, EUPH)
'Uribe who imposed this "toll"-DIM on the inhabitants of the municipalities of northeastern Antioquia'
- (69) (...) una vecchietta che dalla finestra del terzo piano continuava a gettare cibo (...)
(*Parola di gatto*, p. 17, EUPH)
'an old lady-DIM who continued to throw food down from the window of the third floor'

12.3.6 The HUM function

- (70) (...) y en el ojito / del culito / tengo un rollito / con veinte duritos.
(CREA-Cuba / Guillermo Cabrera Infante, *La Habana para un infante difunto* [1986], HUM)
'and in the eye-DIM of my ass-DIM I have a roll-DIM with twenty dimes-DIM'
- (71) (...) y quiero que se case / porque ya tiene dos pechitos / como dos naranjitas / y un culito / como un quesito / y una urraquita que le canta y le grita.
(CREA-Cuba / Guillermo Cabrera Infante, *La Habana para un infante difunto* [1986], HUM)
'... and I want her to get married / because she already has two little breasts-DIM / like oranges-DIM / and an ass-DIM / like a piece of cheese-DIM / and a magpie-DIM which sings and shouts at her.'
- (72) ma siluro... hai tutti i faretti che ti puntano addosso???? :)
(Chat-room Italian, HUM)
'But Torpedo... do you have all the headlights-DIM on which point at you?'

12.3.7 The INS function

- (73) Si es un simple viajecito de cuatro horas en avión. . .
(*La rambla paralela*, p. 124, INS)
'If it's just a little trip-*DIM* of four hours by plane. . .'
- (74) Un perro caliente y una gaseosa por el comodo precio de 3000 pesitos.
(Oral Colombian, INS)
'A hotdog and a soda for the convenient price of just 3000 pesos-*DIM*.'
- (75) ¿Tienes afán? Me faltan unas cositas, si todavía estás dispuesta, voy a preguntar unas cositas más.
(Oral Colombian, INS)
'Are you in a hurry? I still need a couple of things-*DIM*, if you're still willing, I'd ask you a couple more things-*DIM*.'
- (76) Si usted tiene un charquito de agua o un arbolito a la entrá'e la puerta si usted ve que la está molestando: "¡quítelo!" y yo le digo: "usted me está hablando de arbolito y del charquito, pero yo le estoy hablando que mi casa está destruida y que me la tumbó el ventarrón ese, el árbol."
(Oral Colombian, INS)
'If you have a little puddle-*DIM* of water or some kind of a little tree-*DIM* at the entrance of your house and you consider it's bothering you: "Do away with it!" And I am telling you: "You are talking to me about some little tree-*DIM* and some little puddle-*DIM*, but I am telling you my house is in ruins and that it was that blast which brought it down, the tree.'
- (77) Gli americani non hanno certo bisogno del loro foglietto di otto pagine appena. . .
(*Vita*, p. 61, INS)
'The Americans definitely don't need their little paper-*DIM* with only eight pages. . .'
- (78) luna scappo un secondo... vado a prendermi una pasticchetta innoqua e torno ;o)
(Chat-room Italian, INS)
'Moon, I will run away for a second. . . I'll go and take an innocuous lozenge-*DIM* and I'll be back ;o)'

12.3.8 The INT function

- (79) Ella está muy pequeñita también para ponerla yo acá a hacer muchas cosas.
(Oral Colombian, INT)
'She is very, very small-*DIM* for me to make her do a lot of things here.'
- (80) Yo te puedo hablar a tí tan rapidito que tú no me entiendes.
(Oral Colombian, INT)
'I can talk to you so fast-*DIM* you won't understand me.'
- (81) Aquí arribita yo voy a escribir. . .
(Oral Colombian, INT)
'Right here on top-*DIM* I'll write. . .'

- (82) ¡Corriendito! (Oral Colombian, INT)
‘Im coming-*DIM*!!!’
- (83) Gigi... eh máh cortito, máh sensual. (Oral Uruguayan, INT)
‘Gigi is far shorter-*DIM*, more sensual.’
- (84) Trenzas, peinados a lo rasta, pero lo que no se le da nada mal es cortar el pelito de los bebés. Suave suavito. Con maquinilla.
(CREA-Spain, *Prensa* [2001], reduplication + INT)
‘Plaits, rasta hairstyles, but what she is really good at is cutting the hair of babies. Softly, very softly-*DIM*. With the shaver.’
- (85) (...) poi l’aprí pianino pianino (...) (Fiabe toscane, p. 23, reduplication + INT)
‘then she opened it very, very slowly-*DIM*’
- (86) C’era una gallina secca secchina. (Fiabe toscane, p. 55, reduplication + INT)
‘Once upon a time, there was an extremely skinny-*DIM* hen.’

12.3.9 The IRON function

- (87) Una pepita para la mamá en su corazón de madre, y dos para sus angelitos en sus corazoncitos tiernos. (La virgen de los sicarios, p. 101, IRON)
‘A little pip-*DIM* for the mother into her mother’s heart, and two for her little angels-*DIM* into their tender little hearts-*DIM*.’
- (88) (...) Diosito bueno desde arriba mirando y callando, callando y mirando (...) (La rambla paralela, p. 67, IRON)
‘Good God-*DIM* looking down from above and keeping quiet, keeping quiet and looking down...’
- (89) tesorino di manuel fo[r]se no hai capito una cosa tesorucci[o] (Chat-room Italian, IRON)
‘Manuel, my darling-*DIM*, maybe you haven’t understood one thing, my precious darling’
- (90) Guarda, guarda, il principino, vuole provare la mensa dei poveri oggi? (Parola di gatto, p. 17, IRON)
‘Look, look, does the noble prince-*DIM* want to have a taste of the offerings of the table of the poor today?’

12.3.10 The PEJ function

- (91) Al gamincito también... a esta gonorreíta tierna también... (La virgen de los sicarios, p. 55, PEJ)
‘For the little street urchin as well... for this nasty little tender gonorrhoea-*DIM* as well.’

- (92) La mariquita de Gaviria borró de un plumazo la palabra “honorabilidad” del diccionario de Colombia. (*La rambla paralela*, p. 71, PEJ)
 ‘Gaviria the queer-DIM erased with one penstroke the word “honorability” from the Colombian dictionary.’
- (93) [El presidente] les lee el discurso que le escribieron en inglés con esa vocecita chillona, montañera, maricona, suya, y con el candor y acento de un niño de escuela que está aprendiendo. (*La virgen de los sicarios*, p. 34, PEJ)
 ‘[The president] is reading the speech they wrote for him in English with his shrill, highland, queer voice-DIM and with the candour and accent of a schoolchild who is [still] learning.’
- (94) dimmi, dimmi arlek che commentini vi facevate la? (Chat-room Italian, PEJ)
 ‘Tell me, tell me, Arlek, what nasty little comments-DIM are you making to each other?’
- (95) No, lavati in fretta, puttarella, infilati sotto la tua tenda muffita, a colpi di spugna levati di dosso la merda e i fantasmi di questo balordo. (*Non ti muovere*, pp. 89–90, PEJ)
 ‘No, hurry up and wash yourself, you miserable whore-DIM, crawl under your mouldy tent, and with the strokes of the sponge, wash the shit and the spectre of this foolishness off your back.’

12.3.11 The POC function

- (96) C’è ancora un pochino di tempo. (Oral Italian, POC)
 ‘We’ve still got a little bit-DIM of time left.’
- (97) buonasera a tutti ~ siamo pochini eh? ~ jenny non è la quantità... (Chat-room Italian, POC)
 ‘Good night everyone, we are just a few-DIM, right? Jenny, it isn’t the quantity...’

12.3.12 Discussion

As we extracted our data from existing corpora and considered only examples with diminutive formation, we feel that presenting statistics on the frequency of the use of the diminutive suffix, e.g. on nouns or in different text genres, cannot be justified. The statistical clustering of the occurrences of diminutive formation according to function and morphological form is presented in Tables 1 and 2.

From Table 1, we can see that *-ito* (87% of all occurrences) clearly outweighs any other diminutive suffix in our Spanish sample, the END (25%), the INT (28%), and the DIM (17%) functions being the most frequent. In spite of a relatively large amount of Colombian data and a small amount of Peninsular data, *-ico* has to cede second place to *-illo*, which denotes mostly END (44%), and to

Table 1. Spanish

	END	INT	DIM	INS	PEJ	IRON	POC	EUPH	COM	HUM	Total
-ito	249	275	172	117	52	49	28	28	18	12	1000
-illo	34	6	16	10	5	1	2	1	1	1	77
-ico	2	6	15	7	2	2	3	—	5	1	43
-ín	11	1	3	2	—	—	—	—	2	—	19
-ete	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	6
-urri	—	3	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4
-uelo	—	1	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	3
-ino	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
-iño	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Total	297	293	212	136	60	52	33	31	26	14	1154

Table 2. Italian

	DIM	END	INS	INT	IRON	COM	PEJ	POC	EUPH	HUM	Total
-ino	94	37	2	6	4	5	2	4			154
-etto	26	10	6		1		1		1	1	46
-ello	7	10					1				18
-otto	2	1									3
-uccio		1			1						2
Total	129	59	8	6	6	5	4	4	1	1	223

a lesser extent DIM (21%) and INS (13%). As Wierzbicka (2003:50) mentions, among others, in Mediterranean cultures expressions of warmth, affection, intimacy (all of which we group together as ENDeartment) are reflected in rich sets of expressive derivation, and in particular in highly developed systems of diminutives. In our corpus, the most widely applied function found for the diminutive suffixes in Spanish is indeed the END function, represented by 297 occurrences (26%),¹³ closely followed by the INT function with 293 occurrences (25%) and then by the DIM and INS functions (212 ~ 18%, and 136 ~ 12%, respectively). PEJ and IRON are fairly well represented with 60 (5%) and 52 (4.5%) occurrences. The other functions were marginal or at least not frequent in our corpus.

From Table 2, we can see that, in Italian, it is *-ino* which clearly outweighs the other diminutive suffixes with 154 occurrences (69%). It is mainly used in the DIM function (61%), but also in the END function (24%). In our corpus, *-etto* occurs 46 and *-ello* 18 times (21% and 8%, respectively), *-etto* being mostly used in the DIM (57%), but also in the END (22%) and in the INS (13%) functions, and *-ello* mostly in the DIM (40%) and END (55%) functions. Surprisingly, *-uccio* appears only twice. *-otto*, a suffix usually not listed as an Italian diminutive suffix, may well be a euphonic variant of *-etto*. Wierzbicka’s hypothesis of the extent of expressive derivation in Mediterranean cultures is not borne out by our Italian data, where

the DIM function clearly outweighs any other functions (129 occurrences out of 223, or 58%). Among the remaining functions, only the END function is worth mentioning (59 ~ 26%) while the others are marginal. This fits in with the observation that diminutive suffixes are characterized above all as endearing in Italian grammars (cf. Note 8).

In both tables, the occurrences cluster in the upper left corner as is to be expected considering that the tables are organized according to the decreasing frequencies of suffixes and functions from top to bottom and from left to right, respectively. The fact that the Spanish DIM function can be rendered by a wide range of suffixes probably derives from the fact that it is the unmarked function. The few occurrences of the Spanish INT function towards the bottom of the table are most likely random cases.

12.4 An NSM account of the functions of Spanish and Italian diminutives

12.4.1 Preliminary remarks: Directionality

Before presenting our explications of the diverse functions of diminutive suffixes in Spanish and Italian, we would like to argue that, for some functions, the directionality of the diminutive in a conversational situation is an important factor. This was already acknowledged by Alonso (1951:227), who presents a classification of the functions of the Spanish diminutive according to “the intentional direction of the psychological contents”. Compare the following examples:

- (98) Que te lo cuente Alan, amiguito. (La noche es virgen, p. 15, END)
 ‘Let’s ask Alan about it, my friend-DIM.’
- (99) Pero es buena gente el gordito. (La noche es virgen, p. 15, END)
 ‘But the chubby-DIM one is a good guy.’

In (98), *amiguito* is used in a face-to-face interaction, the END function being directed at a friend of the speaker’s. In (99), *el gordito* depicts someone not present, someone outside (but still closely known to the speaker), and the END function can be seen, in addition to an expression of affection on the part of the speaker, as an affective reaction caused by *el gordito*.

Santibáñez Sáenz (1999:184) points out that a morphopragmatic account (one which focuses solely on the pragmatic feature [non-serious] often attributed to diminutives in the literature) of *-ito* and *-illo* would obscure the completely different connotations achieved by these two distinct diminutive suffixes, especially in contexts where the only difference is variation between *-ito* and *-illo* complementing the same lexeme. These diminutives function differently as far as the effects of

the speech act on either the speaker or the interpreter are concerned. Consider for instance the following examples (adapted from Santibáñez Sáenz 1999: 184):

- (100) ¿Me podrías hacer un favorcito?
 ‘Can you do me a nice little favor-*DIM*?’
- (101) ¿Me podrías hacer un favorcillo?
 ‘Can you do me just a little favor-*DIM*?’

In the first utterance, the suffix *-ito* reflects a desire to convince the interpreter to do something of importance to the speaker but not too costly to take care of. In addition, it is made clear that the speaker would (very much) appreciate the favor. In the second utterance, *-illo* seems to depict a favor with an *INS* flavor, one that is not that costly to undertake and at the same time not that important either.

Mendoza (2005: 166–167) discusses the use of diminutives as metalinguistic hedges, i.e. elements that contain a comment on the sentence being communicated. In much the same way, the above-mentioned examples might also be regarded as commenting on the content, modifying the speech act as such. This hedging function goes for many of the tokens presented in our study. In Mendoza’s study (ibid.: 169), it is also concluded that the Spanish diminutive has undergone a meaning change involving pragmatic strengthening. It is thus no more just a matter of small or insignificant, but the diminutive encodes aspects of social interaction and relations. Commands, for instance, constitute an excellent example of the politeness function borne by the diminutive (ibid.: 170); similarly, in interactions between two complete strangers, using the diminutive softens the illocutionary force of utterances and downgrades impositions.

12.4.2 NSM explications¹⁴

In our corpus and classification, the bare or “pure” diminutive generally expresses diminution in its most essential form, that is, smallness. This smallness does not imply any intimacy, affection or other emotional reaction. It is just a morphological rather than a lexical means of adding the connotation that something is small in size.

DIM

I want to say something about something small
 I think like this: it is very small
 because of this, I say it like this

(Spanish version)

quiero decir algo de algo pequeño

pienso así: es muy pequeño
a causa de eso, digo así

(Italian version)

voglio dire qualcosa di qualcosa di piccolo
penso così: è molto piccolo
a causa di questo, dico così

The END function works in several ways. As shown in the examples *amiguito* and *gordito* discussed in Section 12.4.1, the affectionate feeling can be bilateral in the sense that, in addition to expressing something felt by the speaker, it may reflect an emotion activated in the speaker by the addressee. Hence the need to posit two explications:

END₁ (a feeling of endearment when addressing someone)

when I say this to you, I feel something good
I don't want anything bad to happen to you
I think like this: I want something good to happen to you
because of this, when I say something to you
it is good if you can know that I feel something good

(Spanish version)

cuando te digo eso, siento algo bueno
no quiero que te pase algo malo
pienso así: quiero que te pase algo bueno
a causa de eso, cuando te digo algo
es bueno que puedas saber que siento algo bueno

(Italian version)

quando ti dico questo, sento qualcosa di bene
non voglio che ti succeda qualcosa di male
penso così: voglio che ti succeda qualcosa di bene
a causa di questo, quando ti dico qualcosa
è bene che tu possa sapere che sento qualcosa di bene

END₂ (a feeling of endearment when referring to someone)

when I say this about someone, I feel something good
I don't want anything bad to happen to this person
I think like this: I want something good to happen to this person
because of this, when I say something to this person
it is good if this person can know that I feel something good

(Spanish version)

cuando digo eso de alguien, siento algo bueno
no quiero que algo malo pase a esta persona
pienso así: quiero que algo bueno pase a esta persona
a causa de eso, cuando digo algo a esta persona
es bueno que esta persona pueda saber que siento algo bueno

(Italian version)

quando dico questo di qualcuno, sento qualcosa di bene
non voglio che qualcosa di male succeda a questa persona
penso così: voglio che qualcosa di bene succeda a questa persona
a causa di questo, quando dico qualcosa a questa persona
è bene che questa persona possa sapere che sento qualcosa di bene

The term *euphemism* depicts something the sender wants to express without hurting the addressee's feelings. By mitigating the assertion by means of a diminutive suffix, the sender is willing to soften the information being transmitted without undermining the truth value of the utterance.

EUPH

I know something bad about X
I think like this: when I say it to X, X will feel something bad
because of this, I want to say something else
I say it like this

(Spanish version)

sé algo malo de X
pienso así: cuando le digo eso a X, X sentirá algo malo
a causa de eso, quiero decir otra cosa
digo así

(Italian version)

so qualcosa di male di X
penso così: quando dico questo a X, X sentirà qualcosa di male
a causa di questo, voglio dire qualcos'altro
dico così

The HUM function or jocular usage of the diminutive reflects one of the multiple ways of conveying new dimensions to an utterance. The speaker seeks to manipulate everyday lexemes which usually have no affective connotation with the goal of inducing a humorous reaction in the person being addressed.

HUM

I want to say something

I think like this:

if I say it to X, maybe X will think like this:

this person wants me to know this

this person wants me to feel something good for some time

when I say it, maybe I will feel something good

because of this, I say it like this

(Spanish version)

quiero decir algo

pienso así:

si le digo eso a X, tal vez X pensará así:

esta persona quiere que yo sepa eso

esta persona quiere que yo sienta algo bueno por un tiempo

cuando digo eso, tal vez sentiré algo bueno

a causa de eso, digo así

(Italian version)

voglio dire qualcosa

penso così:

se dico questo a X, forse penserà così:

questa persona vuole che io sappia questo

questa persona vuole che io senta qualcosa di bene per un po' di

tempo

quando dico questo, forse sentirò qualcosa di bene

a causa di questo, dico così

In the INS function, in addition to the size-diminishing effect of the diminutive suffix, the value of the modified item is being belittled without rendering its meaning outright pejorative. In the case of the INS function, it is quite usual for the item being modified not to be present or within earshot of the speaker. The INS function labels both requests (in which the favor being asked is presented as being achievable) and minimizing expressions (which depict something as being of low importance).

INS₁ (requests)

I want to say something like this to someone:

I want you to do something good for me

it is good if this person can know that I think about it like this:

it is something small
it is good if this person can know that when I say this I feel something good

(Spanish version)

quiero decir algo así a alguien:

quiero que tu hagas algo bueno para mí
es bueno que esta persona pueda saber que pienso en eso así:
es algo pequeño
es bueno si esta persona puede saber que cuando digo eso siento algo bueno

(Italian version)

voglio dire qualcosa così a qualcuno:

voglio che tu faccia qualcosa di bene per me
è bene se questa persona possa sapere che penso di questo così:
è qualcosa di piccolo
è bene se questa persona possa sapere che quando dico questo sento qualcosa di bene

INS₂ (minimizing expressions)

I think like this:

this is not big
this is not good
because of this, when I say something,
I say it like this

(Spanish version)

pienso así:

eso no es grande
eso no es bueno
a causa de eso, cuando digo algo,
digo así

(Italian version)

penso così:

questo non è grande
questo non è bene”
a causa di questo, quando dico qualcosa,
dico così

I want to say something about X
I want to say X is very X
because of this, I say it like this

quiero decir algo de X
quiero decir que X es muy X
a causa de eso, digo así

voglio dire qualcosa di X
voglio dire che X è molto X
a causa di questo, dico così

I know something bad about you
I think like this:

if I say it to you, maybe you will think like this:
this person wants me to feel something bad
when I think about it like this, I feel something good
when I say something, I say it like this

(Spanish version)

sé algo malo de ti

pienso así:

si te lo digo, tal vez pensarás así:

esta persona quiere que yo sienta algo malo

cuando pienso así, siento algo bueno

cuando digo algo, digo así

(Italian version)

so qualcosa di male di te

penso così:

se te lo dico, forse penserai così:

questa persona vuole che io senta qualcosa di male

quando penso così, sento qualcosa di bene

quando dico qualcosa, dico così

IRON₂ (used in speaking about people/something)

I know something bad

I think like this:

if I say it to you, maybe you will think like this:

this person wants me to know something bad

this person wants me to feel something good

when I think about it like this, I feel something good

when I say something, I say it like this

(Spanish version)

sé algo malo

pienso así:

si te lo digo, tal vez pensarás así:

esta persona quiere que yo sepa algo malo

esta persona quiere que yo sienta algo bueno

cuando pienso así, siento algo bueno

cuando digo algo, digo así

(Italian version)

so qualcosa di male

penso così:

se te lo dico, forse penserai così:

questa persona vuole che io sappia qualcosa di male

questa persona vuole che io senta qualcosa di bene

quando penso così, sento qualcosa di bene
 quando dico qualcosa, dico così

At times, the diminutive suffix is used to really undermine someone's achievements, looks, intelligence, etc. This negative, even offending function is assigned the PEJ label, and works in a fairly similar way to the INT function: the conversational situation and the lexeme to which the suffix is added determine the degree of pejorativity created; however, they do so in an entirely unprototypical manner when compared to the bare diminutive function.

PEJ

when I say this about X, I want to say something bad
 I think about it like this: X is something very bad
 because of this, I say it like this

(Spanish version)

cuando digo eso de X, quiero decir algo malo
 pienso así: X es muy malo
 a causa de eso, digo así

(Italian version)

quando dico questo di X, voglio dire male
 penso così: X è molto male / cattivo
 a causa di questo, dico così

12.5 Theoretical issues

12.5.1 Diminutives: Lexicalization, grammaticalization or conventionalization?

In spite of the fairly low number of tokens in our Italian corpus, it seems clear that the pragmatic implications of an utterance containing a diminutive are *conventionalized* more readily in Italian than in Spanish (cf. also Santibáñez Sáenz 1999:183). In Spanish, there is no or much less trade-off in the pragmatic implications and the majority of the diminutive formations require a context-based interpretation.

Instead of *conventionalization*, the term frequently used for Italian diminutives is *lexicalization*. In a similar vein, without using this term, Maiden & Robustelli (2000: 440–441) caution that, in some cases, suffixation by means of *-ino* is blocked because “an identical word in *-ino* already exists” and “has an independent dictionary entry”. However, if *grammaticalization* is conceived above all as a semantic process which can be described as context-induced reinterpretation (cf. Heine & Kuteva 2002:2–3), it could perhaps be argued that Italian diminutives are also

in the process of being grammaticalized. This would conform with Santibáñez Sáenz's (1999: 188) observation that "diminutive suffixes seem to bridge the gap between grammatical and lexical categories", a view essentially based on the similarity of the overall cognitive patterns of such processes as [Spanish] diminutive formation, usually considered a derivational strategy, and unlexicalized compositional expressions of the English language (Santibáñez Sáenz 1999: 186–188). For the sake of comparison, it is of interest to note that the diminutive prefix *ti-*, derived from the French lexical item *petit* 'small', has been one of the relatively few derivative affixes to be recruited into French Caribbean Creole, for example into Haitian Creole and into Guadeloupean Creole.

In present-day Creole, *ti* also coexists as a morphophonologically reduced form of *piti* 'small' < French *petit*. The grammaticalization of *ti-* can be gleaned for instance from the following example from Guadeloupean Creole:

- (102) é tout piti timoun entérésé a-y. Pa ni pon timoun i pa entérésé a a a.¹⁵
 (Ludwig, Telchid & Bruneau-Ludwig 2001: 86, 112)
 'All small children-DIM are interested in television. There isn't a single one who isn't interested.'

Another example from Haitian Creole:

- (103) Pwofesè-a mande tigason-an (...)
 'The teacher asked the small boy-DIM...'
 (Savain 1995: 96)

12.5.2 Diminutive formation, reduplication and absolute superlatives

Some cases which combine diminutive formation and reduplication were cited above but were not further commented upon. Examples (84)–(86) are repeated here for the sake of convenience:

- (104) Trenzas, peinados a lo rasta, pero lo que no se le da nada mal es cortar el pelito de los bebés. Suave suavito. Con maquinilla.
 (CREA-Spain, *Prensa* [2001], reduplication + INT)
 'Plaits, rasta hairstyles, but what she is really good at is cutting the hair of babies. Softly, very softly-DIM. With the shaver.'
- (105) (...) poi l'apri pianino pianino (...)
 (*Fiabe toscane*, p. 23, reduplication + INT)
 'then she opened it very, very slowly-DIM'
- (106) C'era una gallina secca secchina. (*Fiabe toscane*, p. 55, reduplication + INT)
 'Once upon a time, there was an extremely skinny-DIM hen.'

Note that the typical Italian expression corresponding to example (105) is *pian piano*. In the examples cited, diminutive formation intensifies the meaning of the

adverbial expression or adjective. As a rule, combinations of reduplication and diminutive formation do indeed express the INT function.

Intensification is a feature also present in Italian syntactic reduplication as discussed by Wierzbicka (2003), but the focus is essentially on the validity or accuracy of the utterance. Wierzbicka's (2003:267–268) explication of the Italian strategy of emotional overstatement through syntactic reduplication (a significant improvement on the earlier explication in Wierzbicka 1986) is as follows:¹⁶

- I say: X
 I know: you can think:
 I say 'X', I think: 'something like X'
 I want you to know:
 I think 'X', not 'something like X'
 I say this like this because of this
 I feel something because of this

Although not as frequent as in Italian, syntactic reduplication exists in Spanish as well:

- (107) Quiero es café café. (Oral Colombian)
 'I want some REAL coffee.'
 (108) Es un pasaporte pasaporte. (En la puta vida)
 'It's a real passport [and not a falsified one].'
 (109) No, no, sino el [vestido] rojo rojo. (Peninsular Spanish)
 'No, no, I meant the strikingly red one.'

The INT function of the diminutive thus constitutes, in a certain way, a bridge between diminutive formation and syntactic reduplication, although it has to be acknowledged that the intensification is different in nature.

It is also the INT function of the diminutive which links diminutive formation and the absolute superlative. The following two examples from Spanish are equivalent in meaning and probably even in connotation:

- (110) Todo está riquito. (Oral Peruvian)
 'It [the food] is excellent-DIM.'
 (111) Todo está riquísimo. (Oral Colombian, Oral Peruvian)
 'It [the food] is excellent-DIM.'

Cf. also Wierzbicka's (2003:272) explication of the Italian absolute superlative (once again an improvement on the earlier explication in Wierzbicka 1986, but not entirely satisfactory, mainly because of the use of a slash in the second component):

I say: it is very X
no one / nothing could be more X
I feel something thinking about it

12.6 Concluding remarks

One of the main conclusions of this paper is that the wide variety of functions embodied by the synthetic diminutives of Spanish and Italian makes it impossible to propose just one NSM explication. In fact, we had to provide almost as many explications as we had established functional categories, and the fact that the number of explications was inferior to the number of functions is only due to the fact that, in the case of POC, we were dealing with a subfunction of INT, and that COM did not constitute a function but merely referred to a relatively homogenous semantic field.

Although there were important differences in frequency, we also found that the various functional categories were relevant to both languages. More research is needed to establish whether the majority of them are indeed as marginal in present-day Italian as our corpus seems to suggest. What we do know is that diminutive formation is much less productive and much more conventionalized in Italian than in Spanish, a language and speech community where diminutives (and other affective derivations; cf. above) appear to be linguistically and culturally much more fundamental, so much so that a Colombian informant cited as the reason for the use of diminutive affixes that “nosotros, los colombianos, somos dulzones” (‘we Colombians are softies’). We did *not* differentiate between the many varieties of Spanish as far as frequencies are concerned. However, it is widely known and it would be quite easy to prove that diminutive formation is (even) more frequent in Latin American Spanish than it is in the Peninsular variety of Spain.

The smallness or unimportance of an item may lead one to consider it as something one is able to control and therefore likely to value positively or neutrally. On the other hand, smallness may turn an item into something that easily penetrates the wall which surrounds the self and keeps one’s personal semiosphere or *Umwelt* clear, resulting in the item being considered unpleasant or dangerous (cf. Tarasti 2004: 19, 25; also Santibáñez Sáenz 1999). All this goes to show that, from the standpoint of a cognitive semantics, the wide range of diverse functions we have identified for the diminutive is entirely justifiable.

Notes

1. The bulk of the oral Colombian examples were recorded by Angela Bartens during field-work in Colombia (1999–2002); most of the remaining oral data were recorded or overheard in Helsinki. Instances taken from CREA are tagged as in the original corpus, i.e. with indication of origin and medium. The data from *La cuarta* were either supplied by Mari Larkovirta-Cabello or taken from her 2002 M.A. thesis.
2. While there is a clear preference for oral data in most serious present-day linguistic research, the inclusion of novels in both corpora was prompted by Dressler & Merlini's (1994:393) observation that "the pragmatics of diminutives in literary style is basically the same as in the general use of diminutives".
3. The following abbreviations have been used for the various diminutive functions: COM(ida), DIM(inutive), END(earing), EUPH(emism), HUM(our), INS(ignificant), INT(ensifying), IRON(ic), PEJ(orative), POC(o). For more information, see Section 3.
4. It is beyond the scope (and goals) of this paper to define the rules for the occurrence of the morphological variants cited.
5. There were no counterexamples to this phonotactic rule in our entire corpus. However, Alonso (1951:221) adds that *-ico* is used also after *-tr-*, as in *teatríco* 'little theater'.
6. Spoken data in which post-nuclear /s/ is realized as /h/ are transcribed accordingly.
7. These examples, as well as the following example involving numerals, are all from regions where speakers are Quechua-dominant bilinguals.
8. Note also the case of *regordete* 'chubby', cited as an example of diminutive formation with *-ete* from *gordo* 'fat' by Butt & Benjamin (2004:554).
9. As one of the anonymous referees pointed out, the numbers 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 are also found with diminutive suffixation.
10. It is difficult to agree with Dressler & Merlini's (1994:396) hypothesis that the feature [non-serious] provides the most appropriate description of diminutive formation in general. Their account cannot be extended to either Spanish or Italian, a view also shared (with reference to Spanish) by Santibáñez Sáenz (1999). The fact that Dressler & Merlini consider emotionality to be an independent factor appears to constitute a contradiction: is the judgment that something is 'non-serious' not rather frequently emotionally loaded?
11. Alonso (1951:198–200) considers that a similar analysis of some occurrences of the Spanish diminutive advanced by Beinhauer in 1930 is incorrect.
12. Toscano Mateus (1953:424), without providing explicit comment, lists numerous examples of diminutives drawn from this semantic field.
13. Back in 1935 already, Alonso (1951:197–198) observed that the affective functions of the Spanish diminutive outweigh its purely DIM usages.
14. For fairly obvious reasons, the COM function is not explained in this section as it would be impossible to define in terms of the NSM framework, the common denominator being the semantic field of food.
15. *Moun* 'person; someone; people' also exists in Guadeloupean Creole (Ludwig, Montbrand, Pouillet, & Telchid 1990:s.v.).

16. Two different explications are collapsed here. The emotional component in the last line is absent when X is a noun rather than an adjective or an adverb.

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Index of primes (by language)

	French	Spanish	Portuguese	Italian
I	JE	YO	EU	IO
YOU	TU	TÚ	TU / VOCÊ	TU
SOMEONE	QUELQU'UN	ALGUIEN	ALGUÉM	QUALCUNO
SOMETHING	QUELQUE CHOSE	ALGO	ALGO	QUALCOSA
PEOPLE	GENS	GENTE	GENTE	GENTE
BODY	CORPS	CUERPO	CORPO	CORPO
THIS	CE	ESTE	ESTE	QUESTO
SAME	MÊME	MISMO	MESMO	STESSO
OTHER	AUTRE	OTRO	OUTRO	ALTRO
ONE	UN	UN	UM	UN
TWO	DEUX	DOS	DOIS	DUE
SOME	IL Y A ... QUI	ALGUNOS	ALGUNS	C'È ... CHE
MUCH/MANY	BEAUCOUP	MUCHO	MUITO	MOLTO
ALL	TOUT	TODO	TODO	TUTTO
GOOD	BIEN	BUENO	BOM	BENE
BAD	MAL	MALO	RUIM	MALE
BIG	GRAND	GRANDE	GRANDE	GRANDE
SMALL	PETIT	PEQUEÑO	PEQUENO	PICCOLO
KNOW	SAVOIR	SABER	SABER	SAPERE
THINK	PENSER	PENSAR	PENSAR	PENSARE
WANT	VOULOIR	QUERER	QUERER	VOLERE
FEEL	SENTIR	SENTIR	SENTIR	SENTIRE
HEAR	ENTENDRE	OÍR	OUVIR	SENTIRE
SEE	VOIR	VER	VER	VEDERE
SAY	DIRE	DECIR	DIZER	DIRE
WORDS	MOTS	PALABRAS	PALAVRAS	PAROLE
TRUE	VRAI	VERDAD	VERDADE	VERO
DO	FAIRE	HACER	FAZER	FARE
HAPPEN	ARRIVER	PASAR	ACONTECER	SUCCEDERE
MOVE	BOUGER	MOVERSE	MEXER-SE	MUOVERSI

	French	Spanish	Portuguese	Italian
THERE IS	IL Y A	HAY	TEM	C'È
HAVE	AVOIR	TENER	TER	AVERE
LIVE	VIVRE	VIVIR	VIVER	VIVERE
DIE	MOURIR	MORIR	MORRER	MORIRE
WHEN	QUAND	CUANDO	QUANDO	QUANDO
NOW	MAINTENANT	AHORA	AGORA	ADESSO
BEFORE	AVANT	ANTES	ANTES	PRIMA
AFTER	APRÈS	DESPUÉS	DEPOIS	DOPO
A LONG TIME	LONGTEMPS	MUCHO TIEMPO	MUITO TEMPO	MOLTO TEMPO
A SHORT TIME	PEU DE TEMPS	POCO TIEMPO	POUCO TEMPO	POCO TEMPO
FOR SOME TIME	POUR UN TEMPS	POR UN TIEMPO	POR ALGUM TEMPO	PER UN PO' DI TEMPO
IN ONE MOMENT	EN UN MOMENT	EN UN MOMENTO	EM UM MOMENTO	IN UN MOMENTO
WHERE	OÙ	DÓNDE	ONDE	DOVE
HERE	ICI	AQUÍ	AQUI	QUI
ABOVE	AU-DESSUS	ARRIBA	ACIMA	SOPRA
BELOW	AU-DESSOUS	DEBAJO	ABAIXO	SOTTO
FAR	LOIN	LEJOS	LONGE	LONTANO
NEAR	PRÈS	CERCA	PERTO	VICINO
SIDE	CÔTÉ	LADO	LADO	PARTE
INSIDE	DANS	DENTRO	DENTRO	DENTRO
TOUCH	TOUCHER	TOCAR	TOCAR	TOCCARE
NOT	NE ... PAS	NO	NÃO	NON
CAN	POUVOIR	PODER	PODER	POTERE
MAYBE	PEUT-ÊTRE	TAL VEZ	TALVEZ	FORSE
BECAUSE OF	À CAUSE DE	A CAUSA DE	POR CAUSA DE	A CAUSA DI
IF	SI	SI	SE	SE
VERY	TRÈS	MUY	MUITO	MOLTO
MORE	PLUS	MÁS	MAIS	PIÙ
KIND OF	TYPE DE	TIPO DE	TIPO DE	TIPO DI
PART	PARTIE	PARTE	PARTE	PARTE
LIKE	COMME	COMO	COMO	COME

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